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I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it.
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AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CHARGES AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE CAPETIAN MONARCHY BEHIND INSTITUTING THE FALL OF THE ORDER OF THE TEMPLE

Chetan Singhal

The Templars were a religious military Order, founded in the Holy Land in 1119. During the 12th and 13th centuries they acquired extensive property both in the crusader states in Palestine and Syria and in the West, especially in France, and they were granted far-reaching ecclesiastical and jurisdictional privileges both by the Popes to whom they were immediately responsible, and by the secular Monarchs in whose lands their members resided. They also functioned as bankers on the large scale, a position facilitated by the international nature of their organization. But most of all they bore a large share of the responsibility for the military defence of the crusader state in the East, to which they owed their origin, and on account of which they had become so famous and powerful. However, the start of the 14th century marked the downfall of the Order of the Temple. Even a quarter of the century hadn't come to pass, and the organization of the Knights Templar had been completely annihilated from the face of earth. From the untouchable holy crusaders, they had been reduced into ashes in history.

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On September 14, 1307, King Philip IV of France issued a letter to his seneschals, ordering them to arrest the members of the Order of the Temple. The letter listed the "crimes" supposedly committed by the Templars.

> Brothers of the Order of the knights of the Temple…in the habit of a religious order vilely insulting our religious faith…When they enter the Order and make their profession, they are confronted with His image, and…deny Him three times and spit in his face three times. Afterwards, they remove the clothes they wore in the secular world, and naked in the presence of the Visitor or his deputy, who receives their profession, they are kissed by him first on the lower part of the dorsal spine, secondly on the navel and finally on the mouth, in accordance with the profane right of their Order…By the vow of their profession they are unequivocably bound to accept the request of another to perform the vice of that horrible, dreadful intercourse… This unclean tribe has abandoned the sources of living water, has exchanged its glory for the likeness of the Calf and made offerings to idols.[1]

By June 1308, some 127 charges had been drawn against the Templars, the major ones accused them of denying Christ three times, and spitting in His face three times during induction ceremonies. Further, they were accused of stripping naked during their reception ceremonies in the presence of the Visitor of the Temple or his deputy, and being kissed by him on the lower part of the spine, on the navel and on the mouth. They were also accused of practicing institutionalised homosexuality, making offerings to idols and adoring a cat.

The actual arrests took place in the early hours of the morning of Friday, 13 October 1307,[2] when all the Templars in France, much to their great surprise, were arrested. The Order of the Arrests also instructed the officials to hold the Templars, "captive to appear before an ecclesiastical court"[3] and "determine the truth carefully…and put their depositions in writing to be witnessed."[4]

This was a turning point in history. James of Vitry, Bishop of Acre between 1216 and 1228, in his "History of Jerusalem" described the Templars as:

> Lions in war, mild as lambs at home; in the field fierce knights, in church like hermits or monks; unyielding and savage to the enemies of Christ, benevolent and mild to Christians.[5]

Less than a century later, Philip IV had these men labeled heretics and brought to trial to try to prove their innocence as good Christians. Their rapid fall was an enigma to behold for those who lived during those times and even to this date, nearly seven centuries later, for modern historians, as they investigate the reasons behind the demise of one of Europe's most powerful quasi- religious-military Orders. At first sight, the accusations against the Templars do seem incredible and impossible; yet, in the face of the huge number of detailed confessions extracted by the inquisitors in France, many have since felt obliged to harbour doubts.

The events of 13 October provoke a range of fundamental questions: most obviously, why were the Templars arrested, and what motivated the parties involved? Such questions inevitably lead to consideration of the state of the Order and its situation in 1307: were the Templars actually guilty of all or some of the heresies and transgressions of which they were accused or, even if the accusations were wide of the mark, was the Order nevertheless in a decadent state? These questions perplexed contemporaries as much as ourselves, but as we are looking at the trial through a longer perspective, we have raised further questions, perhaps less evident to those who lived through it. Most importantly, how far was the trial the consequence of the wider context of the early 14th century? For us, this seems to have been a world in which embryonic ideas about witchcraft can be seen to be developing; it was a world in which R.I. Moore has seen the creation of a 'persecuting society.'[6] Moreover, only 16 years before the arrests, the Holy Land, in which the Templars had originated and had flourished, had been lost, and despite much debate, little had been done to recover it, thus raising the question as to whether 1291 and 1307 were connected. The aim of this essay is to trace the course of these events, to examine the motivation of the chief participants and to assess the extent to which the charges brought against the Order were justified.

Philip in his letter of 14 September had written that the accusations had come "to our not inconsiderable astonishment and vehement horror, vouched for by many people worthy to be believed."[7] Thus, before we examine the validity of the charges it is important that we investigate the nature of Philip's sources.

Some of the King's evidence came from individuals such as Esquin of Floryan.[8] He was a citizen of Beziers who had been condemned to death or perpetual imprisonment in one of the royal castles for his iniquities, was brought before Philip, and received a free pardon, and was well rewarded in return for an accusation on oath, charging the Templars with heresy, and with commission of the most horrible crimes.[9] Further, it is worth looking at the semi-literate letter sent by Esquin of Floryan to King James II of Aragon on 21 January 1308, where he writes:

> Let it be manifest to your royal majesty, that I am the man who has shown the deeds of the Templars to the lord King of France…My Lord remember what you promised me in your chamber at Lerida when I departed, that if the activities of the Templars were found to be proved you would give me 1,000 *livres* in rent and 3,000 *livres* in money from their good. And now that it is verified and when there is a place, think fit to remember.[10]

There is little evidence of Esquin of Floryan having a close relationship with the Templars. Therefore, it seems unlikely that he would be privy to any such traditions within the Order. Clearly, his testimony against the Order seems to be more from gratitude towards Philip for saving his life. Also, it is evident from his letter to James II that his primary motives were mercenary.

Further information was gathered from discontented elements within the Order. The first Templar to testify in public after the arrests of 13 October was a priest called John of Folligny, who, in his deposition of 19 October, claimed that he had told "the curia of the *prévôt* of Paris, the seat then being vacant, that the said order was not pleasing to him, and that he would freely leave it, if he dared or was able." Furthermore, his credibility as a witness against the Templars is questioned by the fact that he belonged to the group of very few Templars who were willing and could be trusted to repeat their confessions before the Pope at Poitiers in

the summer of 1308.[11] Another source was Nosso de Florentin, an apostate Templar, who had been condemned by the Grand Preceptor and chapter of France to perpetual imprisonment for impiety and crime, made in his dungeon a voluntary confession of the "sins and abominations" charges against the Order.[12] Thus, the uncertainty over the sudden arrests of the Order increases by examining the nature of Philip's sources. The men who testified against the Order either had grudges against it or were remotely linked to its organization, which greatly dilutes their reliability.

The irregularities in the procedure of arrest of the Templars did not end here. In the early 14th century no one would have disputed that cases of heresy were the business of the Church or that they fell under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authorities in one form or another.[13] However, the motivating force behind the arrests of the Templars evidently came from the French government, rather than through the Pope, Clement V. Philip IV tried to preserve legality in his actions by explaining that he was following the just request of William of Paris, Inquisitor in France, who held his authority as a deputy of the Pope.[14] However, the full extent of the inquisitor's power was rather vague. In 1290, Pope Nicholas IV had granted the Dominican prior in Paris power to inquire into heresy in France on his own behalf or on behalf of others, but it remains unclear how far this power had been transmitted to William of Paris.[15] Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to believe that Philip IV should have received ecclesiastical authorisation from Clement V himself before proceeding to arrest the Templars, because by the bull *Omne Datum Optimum* granted to the Order of Temple by Pope Innocent II on 29 March 1139, the Templars did not have to give "fealties, homages oaths or safeguards on sacred relics" to any secular person.[16] Thus, by ecclesiastical law, the Templars were not Philip's subjects, and he could not arbitrarily proceed against them.

Nevertheless, the King ordered the arrests, which took place in the early hours of the morning of Friday, 13 October 1307.[17] However, the irregularity of the process was not ignored. Pope Clement V in a letter to Philip IV, dated 27 October 1307, 14 days after the arrests, expressed his disapproval, writing:

> Dearest son…your ancestors…recognized that all things pertaining to the Christian faith lay in the jurisdiction of the Roman See for which they maintained their respect even to this day…Even the Roman princes at the time when the ship of Peter was buffeted by many dangers among the sects of various heresies…they nevertheless decided in many varied published pronouncements that in matters concerning religion and especially in those in which ecclesiastical and religious persons could be harmed, they would not reserve anything for their own courts of justice, but would leave everything to the ecclesiastical courts…But you, dearest son, we grieve to report, you have laid hands upon the persons and goods of the Templars, and not just anyhow but going as far as imprisoning them, as though we were privy to the events. To add to our grief, you have not yet released them.[18]

This letter by Clement V is a very important source of information to the historian, since it clearly indicates the papal position in light of the arrests of the Templars, thereby also highlighting the breach of accepted procedure by Philip IV in arbitrarily arresting the Templars. Historian Charles G. Addison had written that the new Pope, Clement V manifested himself "the obedient slave of the French monarch."[19] However, from the letter it is evident that Clement V disapproves of Philip's actions. The letter also undermines Philip's claim to have consulted the Pope before the arrests.[20]

The reluctance of the Pope to proceed against the Templars, is further evident from another letter by Clement V to Philip IV, dated 24 August 1307, where he writes:

> We do not believe that it has slipped your memory that at Lyon and Poitiers[21]…both you and yourself and your representatives spoke to us about the question of the Templars on several occasions…Although we could hardly able to bring our minds to believe what was being said at the time, since it seemed almost totally incredible and impossible, since then we have heard several strange and unheard-of-rumors about them, and so are obliged to harbour doubts…we propose to begin an enquiry of careful investigation of this matter in the next few days…informing your majesty what we have decided on this and how we intend to act on the aforesaid in the future, exhorting your Serene Highness in God to convey to us immediately and in full detail by means of letters…your opinion on the aforegoing and any information you have received on it.[22]

The above letter is a small indication that Clement feared precipitate action on the part of the French monarchy and was hoping to stifle such plans by means of an inquiry.[23] The idea of setting up an inquiry however argues strongly that Clement V was not at that time thinking of sanctioning a general arrest of the members of the Order.[24] A month later on 26 September, 13 days after the secret royal orders to arrest the Templars had been sent out, Clement was still asKing Philip for information, which suggests that he was ignorant of the French plans.[25]

Viewing the letters one can hardly say that the exchange between the Pope and Philip IV was cordial. Clement V clearly did not take too kindly, what can be said was an attempt to undermine his power by Philip. Thus by clarifying the papal involvement behind the arrests, which have been popularized by certain recent works of fiction, and by establishing the position of the ecclesiastical authorities, we can now investigate the charges of heresy, and explore the extent to which they had a ring of truth.

In the words of Dr. Karen Ralls, a leading scholar on the Knights Templar, "The aim of a medieval heresy trial was not to find out the truth, as we think of a trial today; instead emphasis was on proving the charges."[26]

The trial of the Templars was no exception. The official Order for the Arrest of the Templars issued on 14 September 1307 stated clearly that:

> The seneschals and *baillis*…will place the persons (arrested Templars) individually and under separate and secure guard, and will investigate them first before calling the commissioners of the enquiry, and will determine the truth carefully, with the aid of torture if necessary; and if these persons confess the truth, they will put their depositions in writing to be witnessed.[27]

This piece of information is crucial, since it tells the historian that royal instructions clearly indicated that the prisoners were to be terrorized by threats and tortured in advance of their official appearance before the papal inquisitors.[28] Although torture was only supposed to be applied when other methods of finding the truth had failed, it is evident that in these proceedings resort to

it sooner rather than later was always likely.[29] Pope Innocent III's definition of heresy as treason made it a unique betrayal of society against which exceptional methods could be justified.

There are 138 depositions surviving from the hearings, which took place in Paris in October and November 1307, including the confession of the Grand Master Jacques de Molay and the other leaders such as Hugh of Pairaud, Visitor of the Temple.[30] In examining some of these depositions the historian does come across certain very sweeping confessions. For instance, Grand Master Jacques de Molay's confession claims that:

> Brother Jacques de Molay, Grand Master of the Order of the Temple… said on oath that he had been received 42 years previously at Beaune in the diocese of Autun by the knight Brother Hubert of Pairaud… The said receiver caused a certain bronze cross…and told and ordered him to deny Christ whose image was there. Against his will he did this. Then the said receiver ordered him to spit on it but he spat on the ground…once and he remembered this clearly…Asked on his oath whether other brothers of the said Order were received in the same manner. He said that he believed there was no difference between his and others' reception.[31]

Summarising the contents of the 138 depositions in Paris, 105 knights admitted that the denial of Christ was enjoined upon them in some form. Twenty-three confessed that they had spat at, on, or near some form of crucifix, at the order of their receptors. One hundred three had admitted that they had been indecently kissed, usually on the base of the spine and the navel. Even those who denied everything else admitted kissing on the mouth. But it cannot be taken as indecent, for it was a standard part of a legitimate induction and—in the homage of 'mouth and hands'—was an essential element in lay feudal relationships in France.[32] In 102 cases there is an explicit or implicit statement that homosexuality among the brothers of the Order was encouraged. However only three knights admitted having homosexual relations with the other brothers.[38]

These depositions, along with the grandmaster's confession, seem to legitimize Philip's suspicions and actions. However, the authenticity of these confessions may be seriously challenged

because of the widespread use of torture, which was inflicted upon the knights. An insight into these torture practices can give an indication why the historian should not overestimate the worth of these depositions in legitimizing the guilt of the Templars.

The rack and strappado were the most common, but some Templars also had flames applied to the soles of their feet. The rack consisted of a triangular frame upon which the victim was tied. The cords, which bound him, were attached to a windlass, and when this was turned the joints of the ankles and the wrists were dislocated. The prisoner subjected to the strappado had his hands tied behind his back and attached to a rope thrown over a high beam. He was hauled up to the ceiling and allowed to fall with a violent jerk, stopping within a few inches of the ground. Sometimes weights were attached to the victim's feet or testicles to add to the shock of the fall. A 50-year old Templar knight, Gerard du Passage, later testified that he had been tortured by 'the hanging of weights on his genitals and other members.' Torture by burning involved securing the prisoner's feet in front of a fire, fat was rubbed on them and the flame applied. A board was placed between the fire and the victim's feet during periods when the interrogators wished to question the subject. Bernard of Vado, a priest from Albi, was tortured by this means, a process so vicious that a few days afterwards the bones of his feet dropped out.[34] Undoubtedly most of the Templars were subjected to intense questioning, probably prevented from sleeping, fed largely on bread and water, and physically humiliated.[35]

Thus, it is reasonable to agree with historian Malcolm Barber, one of the leading modern authorities on the Templars, that the confessions did not demonstrate anything more than the power of torture over the mental and physical resistance of all but the most extraordinary persons.[36] This is evident since of the 138 depositions in Paris, only four Templars pleaded innocence.[37] The surviving brother, Ponsard of Gizy, who appeared before the papal commission in November 1309, asserted that all the accusations were false, but if he were tortured again, he would say whatever anyone wanted.[38]

It would now be difficult to argue, as some 19th century historians did, that the Templars were guilty of the accusations made against them by the regime of Philip IV.[39] The torture inflicted upon the members renders their depositions unreliable. Moreover, the search of any material evidence for guilt is unproductive, since no idols have been found, nor any secret rule, despite the detailed inventories of the King's officers and the equally diligent investigations of 19th century antiquarians and historians.[60] The examination of the nature of Templar depositions in France takes us one step closer to, if not determining the answer, at least a reasoned stance towards the question whether the Templars actually were guilty of the heresies they were accused of? To further develop our understanding of this issue, it is worthwhile that we examine the nature of the charges themselves, to determine the degree to which they could be applied to the Templars.

In his letter of 14 September 1307, Philip IV moved against the Templars based on three main grounds: the denial of Christ and the spitting on the cross, obscene kissing and homosexuality, and idol worship.[40] These charges were then compiled into a fuller list of 127 articles.

Malcolm Barber highlights the need for the accusations against the Templars to be seen first of all within a short-term context; they were not a unique occurrence in a reign apparently beset by attempts to undermine it by anti-Christian forces embedded within the Church itself. However, while the political manipulation of accusations of heresy, witchcraft and sorcery was a particular skill of the French royal officials, they were able to draw on longer traditions from both the 13th century and earlier which were part of the common cultural heritage of the medieval world.[42]

For instance, the charge that they adored a cat had been made popular by various chroniclers of the medieval world. Walter Map, Archdeacon of Oxford writing c.1182, described a sect, which he called Publicans, who worshipped a huge cat. This cat they kissed on the feet or under the tail or on the private parts, an act that inflamed them with lust.[43] Alan of Lille, in his defense of

faith against the Cathars written in the 12th century, asserted that they kissed the hindquarters of a cat, in whose form, it was said, Lucifer appeared to them.[44] It is evident that these accusations had been part of the stock apparatus of propaganda used for centuries by both ecclesiastical and secular powers to discredit religious and political opponents.[45] Richard Leigh, another Templar historian points out that while it is true that from their earliest years, the Temple had maintained a warm rapport with the Cathars, and many wealthy Cathars had donated vast tracts of land to the order,[46] it is unreasonable to link them with such a charge only based on familiarity with the Cathars. As Henry Charles Lea points out, in contrast to the Cathars, who were wiped out in the Albigensian Crusade, not one Templar was prepared to be martyred for the heresies of which they were accused, yet many, including the Grand Master himself, died asserting the Order's innocence.[47]

Another serious charge against the Templars was that they worshipped a head. There are many medieval stories about the existence of a head. The first of these was made on 1 March 1311, by an Italian notary called Antonio Sicci of Vercelli, who was not a member of the Order, but who had worked for the Templars for about 40 years in Outremer. He had heard many times at Sidon that a lord of that town loved a noble lady of Armenia:

> A great lady of Maraclea was loved by a Templar, a Lord of Sidon; but she dies in her youth, and on the night of her burial, the wicked lover crept to the grave, dug up her body and violated it. Then a voice from the void bade him return in nine months for he would find a son. He obeyed the injunction and at the appointed time opened the grave again and found a head on the leg bones of the skeleton (skull and crossbones). The same voice bade him "guard it well, for it would be the giver of all good things.[48]

However, the above account is one of the many similar legends, about a head, which had existed in the medieval world for at least two centuries before the Templars were arrested. The essence of this tale stems from the ancient legend of Perseus and Medusa, and various versions of it were commonly known in antiquity in places as far apart as Italy and Persia. Ovid provides a detailed literary form, but this in turn is based on pre-existing oral versions.

It is to be expected that different regions and periods produced changed emphases, but the tale has a universal appeal and a hardy durability, which enabled oral versions to survive even among the peasants of 19th century Tuscany.[49] The retelling of the story among the depositions of the Templar trial is therefore only a minor incident in the overall history of this piece of folklore, and it cannot by any stretch of imagination be directly connected with the activities of the Order.[50] It was, however, a useful weapon in 14th century France, for it contained several elements that struck a response in the collective memory. Two features in particular are worthy of mention: the idea that the living and the dead can conceive and the belief in the possession of the evil eye.[51] Further, those who framed the charge that the Templars worshipped idols aimed to exploit popular belief that the Order had been corrupted by Islam.[52] As the historian N. Daniel points out in his work, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, in medieval times Muslims were often associated with idol worship. Obviously, the belief is entirely false since Muslim doctrine strictly prohibits idolatry.

The charge of homosexuality is probably the only with a ring of truth. But, it can be quite clearly seen as an obvious one to accuse an all-male celibate Order. It has often been argued that homosexual acts must have taken place within all monastic orders and that there is no reason to believe that the Templars were any different.[53] However, extending the connotations of this, to the whole Order, and claiming that Templars practiced institutionalised homosexuality seems too far-fetched.

The denial of Christ alone was an indictment sufficient to destroy an individual or group so convicted. Interestingly, this charge can be linked with the Cathars for, according to the mid-13th century Dominican inquisitor, Moneta of Cremona, the Cathars believed that the crucifixion was the work of the Satan, and thus the cross could never be an object of veneration. Also in the popular view, however, stories of Muslim armies dragging a crucifix through the streets were quite common in the West.[54] The charges concerning the crucifix might suggest penetration by either Catharism or Islam or both.

Thus, it is evident that the charges were based on certain popular beliefs, which had existed in the West for centuries. The implication that the errors came from contact with the Muslims is based on false premises about Islam in the first place, so it cannot be true that over-familiarity with the Saracens was the source of, idol worship. The Cathar connotations are not very convincing either.[55]

The striking success of the royal administration in extracting damning confessions would seem to indicate that the affair would be quickly settled, perhaps by Christmas 1307. The reulting alleviation of the royal financial problems was already being tackled; the King's officials had taken over the Templar estates and were busy making detailed inventories of what had been obtained. However, outside France much of the rest of Christendom was skeptical. To be the grandson of St. Louis was not in itself sufficient evidence of action against one of the most popular Orders in Christendom. On 30 October, Edward II replied to the letters concerning the arrests sent to him by Philip, by saying that he and his council found the accusations of 'detestable heresies' of this kind against the Order matters of astonishment 'more than it is possible to believe,'[56] while just over a fortnight later, on 17 November, James II of Aragon wrote that Philip's letters had caused 'not only astonishment but also disquiet' because the Order had hitherto rendered great services against the Saracens. Neither monarch was prepared to follow Philip's lead in their own lands.[57] It is thus worthwhile to investigate the reaction of Philip IV's contemporaries, since it is likely that if any heresies did exist in the Order, they would have been universal, due to the universal nature of the Order. Hence, doing this can give the historian a greater insight in not only searching for any truth behind the charges, but also in identifying the motives of the French King.

When the Templars in France were arrested on 13 October 1307, Edward II had been King of England for only four months. He was young and inexperienced, and all his life he had been overshadowed by the towering personality of his father. Despite his many successes Edward I had left his heir an inheritance full

of stresses and strains. Wars with Scotland, and France and a lavish program of castle building had put the crown under heavy debt, yet had failed to solve the problems which came with the wars. Discontent among the baronage, which had been growing during the later years of Edward's I reign, was now very near the surface. On the face of it, these problems are not very much unlike those experienced by Philip and hence it might be expected that when Edward II received news of the arrest of the Templars, he would have seized the opportunity to score an easy success. The Templars' lands in England were by no means as extensive as those in France, but they were still a considerable prize, and their seizure might have helped alleviate immediate financial problems without alienating any important sectional interest. The example of the experienced Philip IV, who, if he had failed to crown all his ventures with success, had for more than 20 years kept the authority of the monarchy intact by such expedients, lay before him. Moreover, opposition from the Templars was likely to be minimal, for although the Order in England was rich in possessions, it was comparatively small in numbers of personnel.

However, on 30 October he had told Philip IV that he could not give 'easy credence' to the accusations, but since the charges apparently originated in Guienne, he would write to William of Dène, his seneschal in Agen, summoning him to come to his presence to give his account. The outcome was that Edward remained unconvinced of the veracity of the charges and instead of arresting the Templars, on 4 December he sent out duplicate letters to the Kings of Portugal, Castile, Aragon and Naples, strenuously defending the Order.[58]

Since Hugh of Payns, the first grandmaster of the Order, had come to the British Isles in 1128, the Templars had held a respected, trusted and privileged position in the domains ruled by the Norman and Angevin Kings. Thus, Edward II clearly did not find it easy to effect a sudden reversal of this policy. However, the bull *Pastoralis praeeminentiae* issued by Clement V on 22 November 1307, ordering all Christian rulers to arrest the Templars in their domains and take control of their property in the name of the

papacy, made Edward institute a reversal in his policy. Thus, on 14 December 1307, when Edward received the bull, he authorized the arrest of the Templars.[59] The bull left little room for argument, and on 26 December Edward replied that the matters concerning the affair of the Templars would be expedited in 'the quickest and best way.' Royal instructions ordered that the Templars be arrested on 10 January.[60] In the event 'the quickest and best way' proved to be cumbersome. No concerted attempt to bring the Templars into custody was made which was in any way comparable with the arrests in France in October 1307, even though it must have been well within the administrative capacities of the English crown. Many of the Templars were allowed to remain in their preceptories, some of them until they were actually brought before the pontifical inquiries, which did not begin until the autumn of 1309.[61]

The trial in the British Isles contrasts markedly with the proceedings in France. Despite the demands of the papal inquisitors, it seems clear that torture was not applied until the summer of 1311, nearly two years after the inquisitorial proceedings had begun in England, evident by Clement's letter to Edward II on 23 December 1301 which suggests that torture was still not being systematically applied, and the subsequent renewal of proceedings in June 1311. Until this time extensive interrogation and in, some cases, threats and prolonged imprisonment, did not produce more than the admission that some brothers had failed to grasp the difference between a sacramental absolution by priests and absolution by the master for breaking the Orders' rules and regulations. Even after torture and intimidation had been used, the two leading figures among those tried in England, William of la More and Imbert Blanke, persisted in their denials. By the same token, however, it does seem that some brothers did believe that they were receiving a general absolution for their sins in chapter.[62] However, it should be noted that this had not even been originally included among the articles of accusation, and further it seems that many brothers simply misunderstood rather than willfully contravened ecclesiastical law.

This particular feature of the trial has been examined in an article by Henry Charles Lea. As he saw it, the problem really arose from the passage of time. In the Cistercian Rule (the influence of which was evident at the Council of Troyes) monks had to confess to the abbot or one of the older monks, and later this was developed into public confession in chapter. However, nothing was said about absolution, because these rules originated in the early 12th century, and it was not really until the advent of the refined scholasticism of the 13th century that its sacramental character was fully developed. Therefore, in the 12th century Rule the master in chapter gave brothers a penance to perform for their sins, and even though he was not a priest, nothing strange was seen in this. The real mistake of some of the Templars seems to have been their failure to adapt these early practices to the Church's sacramental theory, something that could have been done once they were granted their own priests in 1139. Nevertheless, the relative numbers of priests in England remained low—there were only eight among the 144 Templars examined—and in small preceptories it is unlikely that a priest was always available. The effect was that some Templars thought that their preceptor was giving them a general absolution for their sins, even if they had not confessed them, and some admitted this, apparently without being aware of the development of theological opinion on the whole subject.[63] However, historian Jonathan Riley-Smith in his *Were the Templars Guilty*? declares that he finds the argument that "Their (Templars) confusion…had been explained as an outdated reflection of penitential practice as it existed before the sacrament of penance was finally defined and the laws concerning it systematized," "utterly unconvincing."[64] However, he does not provide an alternate explanation for his reasoning.

Aragorn was ruled by King James II at the time of the arrests. Like Edward II, King James was rather unenthusiastic about the arrest in the beginning. Philip IV's letter of 16 October, where Philip had written to James II encouraging him to follow his example in case of the Templars, had rather surprised James II, and he stressed that the Order had always labored for his predecessors toward 'the exaltation of the faith and the laying low of the

enemies of the Cross.' As a result, his predecessors, believing that the Order was without error and that it had been instituted for the service of God, had conceded to it many strong castles, towns and other places, together with the other gifts. James II would only proceed if commanded to do so by the Church and if there were clear and vehement suspicion. On 19 November, two days after replying to the French King, James wrote to tell the Pope of the news that he had received from Philip IV, assuring him that he did not wish to act until he knew the truth from the Pope himself, and asking that if Clement knew of any error in the Temple, he should send the information to him.[65]

Suddenly, however, towards the end of November, James abruptly changed his policy. On 1 December, contrary to his protestations that he was awaiting papal instruction, he ordered his procurator in Valencia to seize the Templars and appropriate their goods there. The Royal Forces took over the important Templar coastal fort of Peñíscola with little resistance, together with most of the Order's other Valencian strongholds. Some Templars fled, but others were captured including Jimeno of Lenda, Master of Aragon. Interestingly, the speed of the operation easily outpaced the papal bull, *Pastoralis Praeeminentiae*, which, although it had been issued on 22 November, did not reach Aragon until 18 January.[66]

There is a range of possible reasons for the King's change of attitude. In Aragon two circumstances coincided which did not coincide in France or England. Firstly, the Aragonese Templars had warning of the possible course of events, and secondly, being in an area of active service, they had considerable numbers of fighting men. Also James II had declared that he did not believe the charges to be true, but on the other hand he had to consider whether the French King, equipped as he was with excellent counsel, could have proceeded without grounds. This view is held by historian Alan Forey who has emphasized that James did not receive Philip IV's letter of 26 October, which detailed the confessions of the Templars in Paris, until late November; this information might have persuaded him it was not only in his interest to proceed against the Templars, but that it was also his duty.[67]

Thus began a period of widespread sieges, where James II besieged the castle at Miravet, which held about 200 defenders. This was essentially a battle of attrition, where the Templars, acutely short of food and drink, finally gave up all resistance in July 1309.[68]

Records of four inquiries survive: 33 Templars were interrogated between November 1309 and January 1310, at Zaragoza, another 32 in February 1310 at Lerída, three more at Cervera in May 1310, and a further two at Tarragona in September 1310. At Lerída, for example, the first Templar to appear, Salvador of Anglesola, a serving brother of some 16 years' service, described a completely orthodox induction, and said that he believed all others were received in the same way. He was clear on the controversial issues of confession: the leaders could not absolve the brothers from sin, but if a brother committed a fault such as failure to rise for matins or not saying his hours, then he asked for the mercy of the chapter and was then sent to a chaplain for absolution. Inductions were held only in the presence of other Templars, but he did not believe that people suspected evil of them because of this. When the papal letters were read to him in the vernacular, he believed what they said about the leaders but nevertheless insisted that they had confessed 'a great falsehood.'[69] Now, it is rather unclear as to what was Salvador of Anglesola's position in the Order. However, his confession provides a general framework of most other confessions obtained in Aragon, where despite the use of torture, authorized by the Pope who wrote from Avignon in March 1311 ordering that the archbishop of Tarragona and the bishop of Valencia arrange for some of the Templars to be tortured to obtain "the full truth." Torture seems to have been applied to eight Templars at Barcelona in August 1311, but failed entirely to produce any confessions along the lines of those produced in France.

Malcolm Barber thus believes the charges to be the fabrications of the French monarch and dismisses them as being "intrinsically unlikely."[70] Considering the evidence provided thus far regarding the conduct of the procedure of arrest, the torture practices, the nature of the charges and the subsequent

trials in England and Aragon, a historian would be hard pressed to authenticate the validity of the charges against the Templars. However, the issue of them being "intrinsically unlikely" is more complicated. It can be argued that Philip IV needed the support of the papacy, the neighbouring kingdoms, and Christendom in general for him to successfully eradicate the Templars. Further, as the Order was highly privileged and respected, Philip would have certainly expected some kind of opposition against his radical actions towards the Templars. Hence, it is likely that the charges would have been framed by careful consideration of the structure of the Order, and particular areas where it was vulnerable, thus making them actually seem plausible to the contemporaries of the day. However, this is purely a theoretical interpretation; in hindsight, considering the large-scale burnings of the Templars including that of the Grand Master Jacques de Molay, because of the "heresies" of the Order, the issue of the validity of the charges takes precedence over whether they were likely or not.

If the charges were largely fabrications of the French monarchy, it is imperative that we look at other factors that brought about the end of the Order. The final decade of the 13th century had brought with it certain radical changes, most notably the loss of Acre to the Mamluks in 1291.[71] The loss of Acre was a big setback for the Order. The Templars had faced sporadic accusations against the integrity of their military operations from as early as the 1160s, but this was a situation that had never occurred before, and arguably one of the most important events in the Order's history. More than any of the other military orders the Temple was associated with the defense of the crusader states and the holy places. According to Malcolm Barber, the decision to abandon first "Atlit and then, in August 1291, Tortosa as well, was a portentous step, the repercussions of which were certain to be profound both inside and outside the Order."[72] Indeed, after the loss of Acre, while the Hospitallers took Rhodes and the Teutonic Knights consolidated their hold in Prussia, the Templars tried to stick to their original mandate which, as both the Rule and the induction ceremony stressed, demanded that they strive to conquer and defend the Holy Land.[73]

This junction in the Templar history is very critical, and relates directly to whether the Templars were a declining force after the Fall of Acre. Contemporaries such as the Norman lawyer Pierre Dubois in his *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte* is of the opinion that the Order's demise arose from the neglect of the traditional functions of the Temple—in particular the protection of the Holy Land.[74] Dubois probably isn't the ideal source in judging the effect of the loss of Acre on the Temple, since he was a close associate of Philip IV and thus it can be argued that his work was tailored to fit the lines of the French monarchy, which obviously welcomed any opinion that portrayed the Order in a negative light.

Historian Charles G. Addison too, is of the opinion that, "With the loss of all the Christian territory in Palestine, had expired in Christendom every serious hope and the expectation of recovering and retaining the Holy City. The services of the Templars were consequently no longer required, and men began to envy and covet their vast wealth and immense possessions."[76] This argument is only half-right at its best, since the Templars had rebuilt before, most notably after Hattin and again after the defeats of the 1240s.[76] Further, throughout the 1290s Jacques de Molay actively sought to build on the Order's contribution to the recovery of the Holy Land, by travelling to the west and making a personal appeal to key rulers. The concrete result of this activity can be seen both immediately and over the following decade. In July 1295, Boniface VIII issued a bull confirming that the privileges of the Temple in Cyprus would be the same as those enjoyed in the Holy Land.[77] When Clement V became Pope in November 1305, he at once began to consider the recovery of the Holy Land. To this end, he wrote to de Molay, telling him that he was considering a new crusade, and in response de Molay began to organize a large-scale chapter meeting in Cyprus for August 1306.[78]

Thus, the opinion that the demise of the Order was due to internal decline and loss of purpose since the fall of Acre can be seen as an instance of deductive reasoning, which is only possible due to the power of hindsight, since only hindsight revealed that the Latins would never regain their position on the Palestin-

ian mainland; the Templars were not seen by contemporaries as obsolescent, and the Order continued to draw new recruits until the eve of the trial.[79]

This leads us onto the final section of this essay. If the accusations of heresy are unproven, and the evidence for internal decline is difficult to assess, then this inevitably concentrates attention upon the motivation of Philip the Fair in causing the arrest and trial of the Templars in the first place.

The Templars were a military organization responsible not to the King directly but to the papacy—evident from the bulls *Omne Datum Optimum* and *Militia Dei*—and they possessed considerable immunities within the French kingdom. Possibly a man of Philip's temper saw them as posing a threat to his concept of the Capetian kingdom. At first sight this argument looks thin, if the numbers, age, structure, and social status of the largely unarmed guardians of the scattered rural preceptories are taken into account. Despite the exposure of the weaknesses of the French army at Courtrai,[80] and despite the fact that relatively small numbers of determined men, if well armed and properly motivated, could achieve considerable military success in the 13th century, it stretches credibility indeed to portray the Templars in France as a direct military threat to the Crown. But, more plausibly, it could be suggested that the existence of any immunity of the kind represented by the Templars was objectionable to Philip IV's lawyers, and that what was at stake was a matter of principle rather than any military threat. If, as Joseph Strayer believed, Philip IV was striving to unite the two ideas of a sacred King ruling over a holy country as a basis for the concentration of the people's loyalty upon the French monarchy,[81] then the Templars, especially if portrayed as heretics and therefore as a dire threat to his holy unity, could justifiably be suppressed. In this context, the contemporary belief that Philip, as the heir to generations of crusading Kings, wanted to take over the Order directly would make sense. Contemporaries as diverse as the English cleric and canon lawyer, Adam of Murimouth, and the Genoese merchant Christian of Spinola, believed that this was so. Christian Spinola thought that Philip had resented the opposi-

tion of the Temple to proposals for a union of all major military Orders in Christendom, while Adam of Murimouth said that the King gained the condemnation of the Templars at the Council of Vienne in 1312, "for he hoped to make one of his sons King of Jerusalem, and that all the lands and possessions of the Templars would be conceded to his son."[82]

However, the evidence of Philip IV's interest in such a project before the Council of Vienne is rather thin, for it is largely based upon a passing reference letter of an Aragonese correspondent in 1308 and the report of a conversation between a French cardinal and some Aragonese envoys in 1309. The idea that the King would give up his French crown for that of Jerusalem does indeed stretch credibility. Despite his apparent capacity for self-delusion, it is difficult to believe that he really intended to put this into practice or that he was prepared to destroy the Temple to enable him to do so. There has been a tendency to exaggerate Philip IV's anxiety to go on crusade, for he never actually went, despite a long reign of 29 years.[83]

However, modern historians and contemporaries of Philip have recognized that the most immediate and obvious reason behind the arrests was financial. Philip IV began his reign with a huge burden of debt from his father's failed crusade against Aragon in 1284-1285 and from the 1290s, wars against England and Flanders added to the financial pressures, so that despite the monarchy's large resources there was always an urgent need to raise even larger sums of money. His frequent interference with the coinage associated his regime indelibly with the issue of 'false money.' By 1306 the money had depreciated to two thirds. In 1306, after years of debasement, the King had ordered the re-establishment of the coinage at the standards set by Louis IX in 1266, an action which was not achievable without a greatly increased supply of specie for recoining.[84]

The French monarch had one further expedient: rich groups were singled out who could be despoiled without public protest[85] One such group were the 'Lombards,' merchants and bankers from the Italian city-republics. Philip instituted a general

arrest of these wealthy bankers in 1291, and by 1311, all their goods and debts were appropriated.[86] Similarly, the Jews were forced to hand over all "usurious" profits and in July 1306, were arrested, their property seized, and they were expelled from the kingdom.[87]

Considering the aforementioned nature and financial problems of the French monarchy, it seems plausible that financial reasons were present behind the arrest of the Templars. The Templars were certainly involved in royal financial administration,[88] as bankers they possessed considerable liquid wealth and negotiable assets, and as landowners, fixed and movable properties in every region of France from Normandy to Provence. In addition, there was a strong motive for gaining access to the Order's cash and precious metals, following the return to good money in 1306.[89]

Philip's financial interests behind the arrests are indicated in the Order for the Arrests of the Templars (14 September 1307) where he instructs his officials that:

> Seize their movable and immovable goods and hold the seizures under strict supervision…without any diminution or damage of any sort…make inventories of all movable assets in each place.[90]

Further, in his letter to the masters of theology at the University of Paris (January-March 1308) Philip asks them:

> We enquire whether the goods which the said Templars possessed… be confiscated for the profit of the prince in whose jurisdiction they are situated, or should rather be used for that of the Church or the Holy Land?
>
> If…these goods were assigned to the business of the Holy Land, to whom should their distribution, regulation and administration belong? Is it to the Church, or the princes, particularly in the kingdom of France?[91]

The two primary sources used above are significant in establishing the view that financial reasons were surely present behind the arrest of the Order. The careful inventories of the properties after the arrests, the sequestration and renting out of the lands, the stripping of their assets, and the continued administration and use of the Templar treasury by Royal officials after October 1307 despite papal displeasure, provide reasonable evidence to argue

that the Templars were probably the wealthy innocent victims of Philip's economic problems.[92] The second letter is rather important since it indicates that in the case of Templar property being allotted to be used for the Holy Land, Philip wanted to keep hold of the "distribution, regulation and administration" of the property. The implications of this statement indicate Philip's intention of using the Templar property for his own ends.

The Templar's position was not, however, unique in France; the Hospitallers were an equally respected and privileged Order. Thus, the question arises why did the Hospitallers not meet a similar fate? A part of the answer lies in the fact that the Hospitallers like others whose wealth lay predominantly in landed property, had been adversely affected by rising prices while rents remained fixed; the liquid wealth of the Templars, deeply involved in banking as well as land, was both an affront and a temptation to the monarchy.[93] Many contemporaries, especially those observing events from Italy, where there was perhaps a more profound understanding of the power of money than anywhere else in the early 14th century west, were quite convinced that this was the prime reason for the attack.[94] For some, avarice ran in the blood of the whole Capetian house from Hugh Capet onwards; Philip IV was the new Pilate who "flaunts his plundering sails" into the Temple.[95]

However, motivation is seldom as straightforward as this. Investigations of the King's character in recent years suggest that, although he sought to profit from the seizures, this does not preclude the possibility that he convinced himself or had been persuaded by others of the Templars' guilt, and therefore of the imperative duty of taking action at whatever cost. Philip maintained an aloof and stern manner intended to enhance the dignity and obligations of kingship, which in turn accords with what is known of the man, driven by a censorious morality and rigid piety which cut him off from other people, itself the product of an isolated and loveless upbringing.[96] Philip IV had been bequeathed a strong tradition of religious zeal, which he took seriously and his fervency

in the faith, expressed both in his personal conduct and in his policies, seems to have been an abiding characteristic.[97]

Philip's religious zeal is evident when, following the death of his wife in April 1305, he arrested Guichard, Bishop of Troyes and a former member of the queen's entourage, on the suspicion that the man had been using witchcraft and sorcery, resulting in her death.[98] Philip condemned his daughters-in-law for adultery in 1314, a scandal which tainted his family name and brought no political advantage whatsoever, yet which he pursued relentlessly. Two of the women, Margaret and Blanche, wives of Louis and Charles, were imprisoned for their alleged affairs with two brothers, knights in the royal household, while the third, Joan, wife of Philip, was accused of complicity. The two knights were publicly tortured and executed.[99] In June 1310, a woman called Margaret Porete was burnt to death as a "free spirit," on the basis of her writings, which suggested she believed in the possibility of the union of the soul with God outside Paradise.[100]

Thus, if the idea had been implanted in Philip's mind that the Templars had succumbed to heretical and sexual depravity, it would have been logical to 'purify' the realm, just as he had cleansed it of the Jews. William Jordan has shown that, although the King profited enormously from the attack on the Jews in 1306, he also believed that the Jews had regularly desecrated the host.[101] The 'Most Christian King' displayed considerable powers of self-deception—even credulity—during his reign, while neither he nor his advisors could not have been so completely detached from their environment that they should not be seen absolutely as its manipulators. The 'threat' of the Templars need not be seen in literal terms in the sense of deploying military strength, but rather as arising from the Order's "alliance with diabolical forces" undermining the Christian community, which the King had sworn to protect. In this sense the confessions were absolutely necessary to the King, not so much because of any information contained in them, but because he wanted the admissions of guilt for their own sake in order both to show he had defeated the forces of evil and to validate his own power.[102] In 1321, the evident belief

of Philip V and his advisors in a non-existent plot by lepers to poison the wells and take over the kingdom, orchestrated by the Jews and financed by the Muslims of Granada, says much about the atmosphere at the court of the late Capetians.[103]

Given the King's cast of mind, some historians have speculated on the extent to which he was manipulated by the narrow group of ministers, with which he surrounded himself and which appears to have conducted policy, including the proceedings against the Templars. From the 1290s the dominant figure was Peter Flote, Keeper of the Seals and head of the Chancery until his death in 1302, and thereafter it was William of Nogaret, who became Keeper of the Seals in 1307. Nogaret retained his preeminence until his death in 1313, but from about 1310 increasingly the royal chamberlain, Enguerrand of Marigny, seems to have been the most influential minister.[104]

Contemporaries are not very helpful in revealing the man beyond these ministers. When they disapproved of the King's actions, most adhered to the conventional line, as, for instance, is reflected by the monk Ives of Saint-Denis, who blamed exceptional currency alterations and heavy taxation "more on the advice of his counselors than on the instigation of the King himself." Some were less restrained. An anonymous writer from the early years of the reign attacked the King because he had surrounded himself with villains, thieves and plunderers of all kinds, men who were by nature brutal, corrupt and malignant. Justice was not administered, for the King was almost entirely occupied in pursuing his favourite occupation of hunting.[105]

Modern historians remain divided. Princeton historian, Joseph Strayer, in his work, *The Reign of Philip the Fair*, cites Philip as the controlling power in the reign, the director of overall policy and at times, even the supervisor of much detail. His servants were chosen by him, and none dominated affairs throughout the reign.[106] On the other hand, Robert-Henri Bautier, in his *Diplomoatique et histoire politique: ce que la critique diplomatique nous apprend sur la personnalité de Philippe le Bel* argues that Philip's narrow piety, intensified after the death of his wife, Joan of Navarre,

in 1305, was open to exploitation by his close advisers, and that his interest in affairs was limited to quite specific subjects. For Bautier, Nogaret was a skilful manipulator of a credulous monarch.[107] More recently, in a comprehensive study of his character and personality, Elizabeth Brown has reasserted Strayer's view that Philip retained a strong grasp on affairs, but allowed that his advisors did indeed take advantage of their position to steer him in directions which suited their policy ends, playing on the King's rigid morality, itself derived from his desire to emulate his grandfather.[108]

Strayer's and Brown's view is strengthened by the fact that so many of Philip's initiatives are marked by his view of the world that it is hard to argue that he was a mere cipher. Philip did not hesitate to act in this way against the Pope on the one hand, when his minister, William of Nogaret, attempted to seize Boniface VIII at Anagni in 1303 in order to answer charges in France, or against his own family on the other, when he humiliated his sons and punished their wives for adultery in 1314. Nevertheless, although he was no puppet, he did present his advisers with exploitable material. While it is perhaps going too far to describe Nogaret as 'a true Rasputin,' the King was evidently susceptible to a certain type of allegation and his ministers must have been aware of this: a connecting strand which runs through the cases of the Templars, the Jews, and Guichard of Troyes is a belief that they were trying to undermine the true Christianity of the sacred realm of France, armed with secret and underhand means derived from their knowledge of sorcery. If the King saw the Templars as a danger to the state, it was not as a military organization, but as a diabolical force.[109]

The fall of the Templars can be explained in terms external to the Order, rather than through any of its internal failings: the financial needs of Philip IV, the loss of Acre and its impact upon the attitudes of western Christendom, and the chance that led Clement V to request Jacques de Molay's presence in France during one of the recurrent financial crises of Philip's government. However, while these practical circumstances were of immediate relevance, the social context of the events should not be ignored. Magic,

sorcery and witchcraft were part of both the popular heritage and of the contemporary intellectual structure, and as a consequence the charges outlined would strike a response at all levels of society. The idea that the Templars sought gain by whatever means came to hand can be linked with beliefs about witchcraft and sorcery, as well as the omission of the words of consecration during the mass.[110] The success of the Templars as bankers and landowners could be explained in this way, especially as Satan tempted Christ in the wilderness with all the kingdoms of the earth if he would give him his allegiance (Luke 4.1-14).[111]

The arguments used against the Templars both play upon and reflect these fears. At Poitiers, Plaisians warned the Pope that "the devil comes as a robber for the purpose of breaking into your house;" the anonymous jurist of 1310 justified his view that the Templars should be condemned by reference to Scripture, for he pointed out that a whole city had been brought down because many of, although not all, its habitants, had committed the sins of idolatry and sodomy, which had also been proved against the Templars; while at the council of Vienne, William le Maire had seen the course of action against the Order paraphrasing Matthew 5 and 18, "If your right eye or right limb offend you, cut them off and throw them away. For it is better that one of your limbs be sacrificed than your whole body."[112]

Seven centuries later, the brutal fates of the valiant knights of the Order of the Temple, the charges of depraved heresies and the shady character of the Capetian monarch and his officials, almost seem to be parts of a convoluted Shakespearean tragedy. Yet, the spark that ignited the stakes at which Jacques de Molay, along with thousands of his brethren, were burnt, refuses to die to this day. The fall of the Templars cannot therefore be viewed in the conventional sense of a test of guilt or innocence, but as a medieval tragedy in which society, by creating the circumstances which enabled the government of Philip IV to act as it did, crushed the life from an Order which it had once been so proud to raise up.[113]

The Templars were indeed tragic heroes, and their legacy is beautifully summarized in this account by the Templar of Tyre:

> And if Almighty God, who knows and understands hidden things, knows that he and others who were burned were innocent of those deeds of which they were accused, then they are martyrs of God; and if they received what they deserved, they have been punished—but I may truly say that, to all appearances, I knew them for good Christians and devout in their masses and in their lives."[114]

For authors, more than one publication by whom has been used, the name of the respective book is consistently mentioned in the endnotes.

[1] Malcolm Barber and A.K. Bate, "The Trial," in The Templars: Selected Sources (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002) p. 245

[2] Malcolm Barber, "The Arrests," in The Trial of the Templars 2nd ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 60

[3] Barber and Bate, p. 248

[4] Ibid., p. 248

[5] Malcolm Barber, "The End of Order," in The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 280

[6] R.I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250 2nd ed. (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2007)

[7] Barber and Bate, p. 244

[8] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 260

[9] Charles Greenstreet Addison, "Chapter X," in The History of the Knights Templar, The Temple Church, and the Temple (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1842) p. 200

[10] Barber and Bate, pp. 256-257

[11] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 66

[12] Addison, p. 200

[13] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 61

[14] Ibid., p. 61

[15] Ibid., p. 62

[16] Barber, The New Knighthood, p. 57

[17] Dr. Karen Ralls, "The Trial of the Templars, summary of," in Knight Templar Encyclopedia: The Essential Guide to the People, Places, Events, and Symbols of the Order of the Temple (Franklin Lakes, New Jersey: New Page Books, 2007) p. 210

[18] Barber and Bate, pp. 249-250

[19] Addison, p. 198

[20] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 63

[21] The meeting at Lyon probably took place on the occasion of the Pope's coronation there in November 1305.

The King and the Pope had met at Poitiers in early May 1307, and the Pope had received various royal representatives since that date.

[22] Barber and Bate, pp. 243-244

[23] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 63

[24] Ibid., p. 63

[25] Ibid., p. 63

[26] Ralls, p. 211

[27] Barber and Bate, pp. 243-244

[28] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 68

[29] Ibid., p. 71

[30] Ibid., p. 69

[31] Barber and Bate, pp. 252-253

[32] Marc Léopold Benjamin Bloch, "The Ties between Man and Man: Vassalage and Fief," in Feudal society 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) p. 146

[33] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 75-76

[34] Addison, p. 205

[35] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 71

[36] Ibid., p. 283

[37] Ibid., p. 69

[38] Ibid., p. 69

[39] Ibid., p. 283

[40] Henry Charles Lea, "Chapter V—Political Heresy Utilized by the State," in A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Volume 3 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Franking Square, 1888) pp. 264-276

[41] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 202 Barber and Bate, pp. 243-244

[42] Ibid., pp. 202-204

[43] Walter Map, M.R. James, Christopher Nugent Lawrence Brooke, and R.A.B. Mynors, "The First Distinction," in *De Nugis Curialium* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) p. 57

[44] Barber, "The Charges," p. 205

[45] Ibid., p. 205

[46] Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh, and Henry Lincoln, "The Warrior Monks," in Holy Blood, Holy Grail (New York: Dell, 1983) p. 73

[47] Lea, p. 265

[48] Baigent, Leigh, and Lincoln, pp. 83-84

[49] Edwin Sidney Hartland, "Chapter I," in The Legend of Perseus: a Study of Tradition in Story, Custom and Belief (London: Nutt, 1894) pp. 1-13

[50] Barber, The Trial of the Templars, p. 212
[51] Ibid., p. 212
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In 1302, the population of Bruges started a successful uprising against the French, who had annexed Flanders a couple of years earlier. On May 18, the French population in that city was massacred, an event that could not go unpunished. The famous ensuing Battle of Courtrai or the Battle of the Golden Spurs between the Flemish people, mostly commoners and farmers, and Philip the Fair's knights took place near Kortrijk on July 11, resulting in a victory for Flanders.

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THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS AND ANDREW JACKSON'S VIEW OF FEDERALISM

Edward R. Mahaffey

The balance between state and federal power became an important political issue during the Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833. The crisis began on November 24, 1832, when South Carolina's state legislature declared the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void within its borders. South Carolinians objected to the tariffs, which imposed high duties on imported manufactured goods. Because South Carolina lacked significant manufacturers and relied heavily on imports for many products, its residents believed that the tariffs placed an unfair and disproportionate burden of taxation on Southerners for the benefit of manufacturers in the North.[1] Andrew Jackson, President of the United States from 1829 to 1837, delivered several speeches articulating his views on the crisis, including his Second Inaugural Address on March 4, 1833. In that speech, he proclaimed his primary domestic policy goals to be "the preservation of the rights of several States and the integrity of the Union."[2] The Nullification Crisis was resolved just seven days after Jackson's speech, following the passage of the Force Bill, which authorized the use of the military to enforce the tariff, and enactment of a new tariff law, which reduced the size of the duties. Jackson had always believed in the broad ideas he

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invoked in response to the crisis, including majority rule and the importance of both the Union and states' rights, but the details of some of those ideas, especially those about the proper balance between state and federal power, were not fully formed until the Nullification Crisis. Furthermore, Jackson was pragmatic enough that he did not seek perfect consistency in his actions.

Jackson's anti-nullification sentiments had roots in his earlier speeches and actions. He had always claimed to care greatly about the Constitution. For example, in his First Inaugural Address, in March 1829, Jackson repeatedly said that as President he would be guided by the Constitution.[3] In the same speech, he spoke of the Constitution's meaning rather vaguely, but he portrayed it as essentially a matter of balance, mentioning "the limitations as well as the extent of the executive power."[4]

In fact, Jackson showed more commitment to the extent of executive power than to its limitations. He became the first President to give reasons other than constitutionality for vetoing a bill in July 1832, when he destroyed the Second Bank of the United States.[5] He also removed public officials from the previous administration, a radical idea at the time; he called this policy "rotation of office."[6] In fact, Jackson expanded executive power so much that his detractors called him "King Andrew the First."[7] In this respect, Jackson's forceful response to the Nullification Crisis was unsurprising.

Jackson's opposition to nullification also had roots in his belief in majority rule. In his first State of the Union Address, he referred to "the first principle of our system—that the majority is to govern."[8] In many circumstances, such as the Second Bank of the United States controversy, Jackson's support of the majority led him to a states' rights position.[9] However, during the Nullification Crisis, one state, South Carolina, attempted to thwart, by extraordinary means, a law passed by a Congressional majority, although several other Southern state governments considered nullification before rejecting it.[10] A minority was trying to stop majority rule, and the minority justified its action with a doctrine so broad that if Jackson acceded to it, other federal laws could

also be nullified. Responding to accusations that it had taken an excessively pro-centralized government stance, the Jackson administration explicitly mentioned the anti-majority rule implications of nullification.[11]

Moreover, Jackson had often been willing to use force. As a child, he often got into fights.[12] Once, when he was a judge, he threatened to shoot a defendant who had walked out of his courtroom.[13] He once killed a man in a duel.[14] His main source of fame before he became President was his military leadership, especially at the Battle of New Orleans and against the Spanish in Florida. The Force Bill was therefore a solution characteristic of Jackson.

On some previous occasions, Jackson had declined to assert federal authority as vigorously as he did during the Nullification Crisis. For example, in 1832, the Supreme Court struck down an anti-Cherokee Georgia law under which two missionaries had been arrested. The Georgia Superior Court, to which the case had been remanded, refused to release the missionaries, and because the Supreme Court was in recess, it could not deliver a final decision that could be enforced directly for 10 months.[15] Jackson remarked that "the decision of the Supreme Court has fell still born, and they find that it cannot convince Georgia to yield to its mandate," and did not act to enforce the decision.[16] However, his legal authority to do so was less certain than in the case of the Nullification Crisis, because the Supreme Court had not yet issued a final decision in the Cherokee case.[17] Furthermore, since the movement for nullification had already begun by this time, Jackson may not have wished to antagonize the South further, and given his support for Indian removal, he may have approved of the Georgia law in question.

Although Jackson had not always moved forcefully to assert federal law, his speeches made clear that he maintained a fairly consistent view of the respective roles of the state and federal governments. For example, there are remarkable parallels between the ideology of Jackson's First and Second Inaugural Addresses. "I hope to be animated by a proper respect for those sovereign members

of our Union [the States], taking care not to confound the powers they have reserved to themselves with those they have granted to the Confederacy," Jackson declared in 1829.[18] Similarly, in 1833, Jackson acknowledged that "the rights of the several States" were one of the "two objects which especially deserve the attention of the people and their representatives," the other being "the integrity of the Union."[19] Similarly, in the first speech Jackson promised to "keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent of the executive power trusting thereby to discharge the functions of my office without transcending its authority,"[20] while in the second he declared, "It will be my aim to inculcate by my official acts the necessity of exercising by the General Government those powers only that are clearly delegated."[21] Despite these similarities, the Second Inaugural Address placed somewhat more emphasis on the Union, probably more due to differing circumstances than a genuine ideological shift.

Jackson was a pragmatist who recognized that perfect consistency was unworkable in practice. For example, he vetoed some bills that spent federal money on internal improvements but signed others.[22] He was initially willing to settle for changes to the charter of the Bank of the United States, but decided that the Bank needed to be destroyed in response to a devious political tactic by the Bank's supporters.[23] It is therefore unsurprising the Henry Clay, one of his fiercest political enemies, somewhat hyperbolically accused Jackson of inconsistency due to the different tones of Jackson's State of the Union Address and a proclamation he made shortly afterwards, both during the Nullification Crisis.[24]

A debate in the Senate on January 18, 1830, between Robert Haynes and Daniel Webster may have also influenced Jackson's thinking. Haynes argued for greater state autonomy, while Webster emphasized the importance of the Union.[25] It was on this occasion that Webster uttered the words, "Liberty *and* Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!"[26] Jackson told an advisor that he felt that Webster, not Haynes, was correct.[27]

However, Jackson's ideas were not the same as those of present-day supporters of centralized government. He called the

states "sovereign members of our Union," a phrase few Americans today would use.[28] He believed that Congress could not establish a national bank.[29] In his bank veto message, he declared that the federal government's "true strength consists in leaving individuals and states as much as possible to themselves."[30] He supported a far stronger central government than the supporters of nullification did, but his views would seem very pro-states' rights today.

Jackson had acted on his support for the Union in the past. When he was in charge of the Tennessee militia, Jackson reported his suspicions that Aaron Burr was planning something treasonous, perhaps a plot to form a new country out of American territory in the Southwest.[31] However, Jackson once took an oath that might seem incompatible with genuine support for the United States: as a young man, he swore an oath of allegiance to the King of Spain, as he was legally required to in order to conduct business in Spanish territory.[32] Jackson later demonstrated that he was not truly loyal to Spain when he invaded Spanish Florida in 1818, during the First Seminole War.

It is tempting to attack Jackson as a hypocrite for some of his actions, such as taking and then breaking an oath to Spain, and thus conclude that he was a dishonest person in general and that his statements of his principles are therefore unreliable. If true, this conclusion would undermine any argument that used Jackson's words as evidence of his actual ideas. Jackson's actions in his first term were sometimes difficult to reconcile with his First Inaugural Address; he promised a "just and liberal" policy regarding Native Americans but supported draconian Indian removal policies, and promised to "keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent of the executive power" but expanded presidential authority.[33]

However, this view of Jackson would be unfair. His statement about executive branch power was quite vague, and while his Indian policies had terrible effects, many white people at the time regarded Indian removal as necessary for Native Americans' survival, so Jackson may have genuinely believed that he had treated them fairly.[34] Jackson fulfilled other promises he made

in the First Inaugural Address, such as his pledges to reform the system of appointments to government jobs and to promote "the diffusion of knowledge."[35] He fought for the former policy, which he called "rotation of office," despite the controversy it created, and the latter policy was very successful.[36]

The Nullification Crisis forced Jackson to apply his thinking about the relationship between the federal and state governments to actual events. Though the Nullification Crisis was the first time a state formally invoked the controversial legal doctrine of nullification, it was not a new idea. The nullifiers cited the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 in support of their ideas, although James Madison, one of the authors of these resolutions, argued against the doctrine that states could nullify a federal law.[37] The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had argued that the Alien and Sedition Acts, which restricted press freedom and the rights of noncitizens, were unconstitutional. John C. Calhoun, Jackson's Vice President, had anonymously written a document entitled the *South Carolina Exposition and Protest* in 1828.[38] It argued that the Tariff of 1828 was unconstitutional because the Constitution's power to tax allowed Congress to raise revenue but not to promote certain business interest over others, and that an individual state could refuse to allow unconstitutional acts of the "General Government" to be enforced within its borders.[39] This veto power, it continued, could be overridden only by a constitutional amendment declaring the law in question constitutional.[40] Other opponents of the tariff had even more radical ideas. In 1831, George McDuffie, a congressman from South Carolina, argued in favor of South Carolina's secession from the Union.[41]

Although the Tariff of 1832 reduced the duties, it did not placate many Southerners who opposed any tariff that was designed to protect American manufacturers rather than simply to raise revenue.[42] When the South Carolina government responded by attempting to nullify the law, tensions between supporters and opponents of nullification nearly erupted into violence.[43] On December 4 and 10, 1832, Jackson gave two speeches, the State of the Union Address and a proclamation, both against nullifica-

tion, but differing in tone.[44] On January 16, 1833, he proposed the Force Bill to Congress, which would give him the power to use the military to enforce federal law.[45] On March 2, the Force Bill became law, while the new Compromise Tariff further reduced the tariff to reflect Southern interests.[46]

Jackson's First Inaugural Address demonstrates one point of agreement between him and the nullifiers. He acknowledged that in tariff policy, "the great interests of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures should be equally favored," with the exception of "products…essential to our national independence."[47] South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification criticized the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 for their "bounties to classes and individuals engaged in particular employments, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of other classes and individuals."[48] In fact, the Tariff of 1832, which Jackson shaped and signed, was designed as a compromise that would address Southern criticisms of the Tariff of 1828.[49] Jackson was sympathetic to the opponents of the Tariff of 1828 to an extent, but their rejection of a compromise he had formulated himself must have displeased him.

Jackson's most important disagreement with the nullifiers, however, involved the issue of nullification itself. In his proclamation of December 10, 1832, he called nullification:

> INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNION, CONTRADICTED EXPRESSLY BY THE LETTER OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNAUTHORIZED BY ITS SPIRIT, INCONSISTENT WITH EVERY PRINCIPLE ON WHICH IT WAS FOUNDED, AND DESTRUCTIVE OF THE GREAT OBJECT FOR WHICH IT WAS FORMED.[50] [Capitalization Jackson's]

He had opposed nullification at least since 1830. In April of that year, Jackson attended a dinner at the Indian Queen Hotel at which he believed many speakers thought nullification an appropriate response to the Tariff of 1828. Jackson infuriated some of those people with a toast: "Our Union—it must be preserved."[51]

Jackson was a Southerner; he was born in either North or South Carolina.[52] He had held public office in Tennessee.[53] It might, therefore, seem surprising that he was willing to act so

forcefully against Southern interests. Furthermore, Jackson was a slaveholder, and many Southerners saw the tariff and similar forms of federal power as a threat to slavery.[54] However, Jackson's past experiences had led him to place his country above his region. He was born in 1767, and was therefore old enough to remember the American Revolution; his brother died in a British prison camp, and some historians have argued that Jackson's experiences during the Revolution greatly shaped his character.[55] He led American forces from different parts of the country against the British army and against the Native American leader Tecumseh during the War of 1812.[56] As a result of these experiences and despite his response to the Cherokee case, Jackson had always been committed to the Union, and therefore to the federal government's supremacy over state governments.

He viewed nullification as a threat not merely to federal power but to the Union itself, because he thought it a prelude to secession. He called nullification "INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNION" in the December 10 proclamation and linked "the absurd and wicked doctrines of nullification and secession" in a private letter.[57] Jackson's fears must have stemmed partly from the fact that the most extreme anti-tariff politicians, such as George McDuffie, advocated secession.[58] Jackson's concern was vindicated much later when extreme Southern states' rights thinking led to the formation of the Confederate States of America in 1861. He explained why he thought secession was so dangerous in his Second Inaugural Address: "The loss of liberty, of all good government, of peace, plenty, and happiness must inevitably follow the dissolution of the Union."[59]

While Jackson reacted firmly to the Nullification Crisis, his response was not actually quite as forceful as it appeared on the surface. He signed the Force Bill on the same day as the Compromise Tariff. Before his angry proclamation of December 10, he had taken a conciliatory tone in his State of the Union Address on December 4; John Quincy Adams called it "in substance a complete surrender to the nullifiers of South Carolina."[60] However, Adams unfairly exaggerated. Despite Jackson's calm tone and his criti-

cism of the tariff in the speech, he stood firm in his opposition to nullification and qualified his negative view of tariffs.

In that State of the Union Address, after discussing foreign policy and other subjects, Jackson declared that the "legislative protection" granted to certain interests should probably be "gradually diminished."[61] However, he noted that one of the negative effects caused by the tariff was "a spirit of discontent and jealousy dangerous to the stability of the Union" in some Americans.[62] In other words, the concerns of tariff opponents were partly legitimate, but their proposed solution of nullification was bad for the nation. Jackson then noted that criticism of the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 was "in a great degree exaggerated."[63] He even implicitly threatened to use military force against South Carolina when he declared that "the laws themselves are fully adequate to the suppression of such attempts [to obstruct federal power] as may be immediately made."[64]

Some of Jackson's past words, actions, and experiences involving state and federal power, the use of force, executive power, and majority rule anticipated his response to the Nullification Crisis. Some of Jackson's other words, actions, and experiences suggested that he might act differently during the crisis by taking a more forceful or less forceful approach. Jackson's basic principles did not change when he was confronted by South Carolina's decision to defy the tariff law, but he was pragmatic enough that he could apply those principles somewhat differently than he had in the past.

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[26] Ibid., p. 129
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[28] "Andrew Jackson's First Inaugural Address"
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[30] Ellis, p. 40
[31] Meacham, pp. 27-28
[32] Remini, The Jacksonian Era, p. 5
[33] "Andrew Jackson's First Inaugural Address"
[34] Remini, The Jacksonian Era, p. 49
[35] "Andrew Jackson's First Inaugural Address"
[36] Remini, The Jacksonian Era pp. 26-27, 85
[37] Meacham, p. 184
[38] Ibid., p. 58
[39] Calhoun
[40] Ibid.
[41] Meacham, p. 183
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[43] Meacham, pp. 223-224
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Bonaparte suggested an invasion of Egypt to cut Britain's lifeline to India. He had apparently been thinking about such an expedition for some time. From his earliest youth he was attracted by the mystery and lure of the East, and the year before, he had carried away all the books on the area from Milan's famed Ambrosian Library. Having played Caesar in Italy, he now dreamed of emulating Alexander and establishing an empire in the East. "This little Europe is too small a field," the general told an aide. "Great renown can only be won in the East."

Britain's industry and trade were closely bound to Asia, and India was the citadel of her power in the East, he observed. Without India, Britain could not carry on her lucrative commerce with China and the East Indies and would be unable to continue to finance the war. There were several favorable auguries for the expedition. The Royal Navy had been driven from the Mediterranean while the Ottoman sultan, who ostensibly ruled Egypt, was too weak to challenge any violation of his territory. Moreover, the self-perpetuating body of slave-soldiers, the Mamelukes, who actually controlled the country, could not withstand a French army. Impressed by Bonaparte's reasoning and aware of the danger of having a wolfishly ambitious hero on hand with nothing to do, the Directory acceded to his plan.

On April 12, 1798, Bonaparte was named commander in chief of the Army of the East and directed to take possession of Egypt for the French Republic. Only a man supremely confident of his own invincibility would have undertaken such risks. The expedition would have to travel the entire length of the Mediterranean to a hostile coast where the French had no base. By secrecy and evasive routing, he hoped to attain the surprise that was the key element of his plan. Napoleon's orders made no specific mention of Egypt or India, but he intended to occupy Egypt and then march through Syria and Persia to India and found a great new empire in the East. To further this object, he enlisted a corps of antiquarians, chemists, artists, engineers, geologists, and naturalists to explore the conquered territory and lay the foundations of the new imperial order.

FORTY YEARS AT NUMBER 123 SESAME STREET: HOW *SESAME STREET* MADE EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION WORK

Isabel Ruane

> This instrument can teach, it can illuminate: Yes, and it can even inspire. But it can only do so to the extent that humans are determined to use it to those ends. Otherwise, it is merely wires and lights in a box.
>
> —Edward R. Murrow.[1]

The 4,167th episode of *Sesame Street*, broadcasting 6 December 2008, opened with the same cheery strains with which it has opened for the past 40 years: "Sunny day/sweeping the clouds away/ on my way to where the air is clean!/Can you tell me how to get/how to get/to *Sesame Street?*" But under the familiar tune, the 21st century peeks out—the glimmering skyline of New York City, a bold and colorful Times Square, children in current fashions on a brand new playground. This opening montage showcases *Sesame Street*'s balance of tradition and innovation. Established 40 years ago to help parents prepare children for school, *Sesame Street*'s purpose has never changed, but through continuous adaptation, the show today targets the children of 2008: there are celebrity appearances—football player, Jason Taylor, in this particular episode—as well as computers, cell phones, and raps.[2]

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Sesame Street has remained vital because of its adaptability and consistent focus on improvement. The *Sesame Street* team restructures each season to meet the changing needs of America's children; they evaluate each episode, segment and idea, implementing positive change wherever possible. The team succeeds because it comprises both television producers and professional researchers. In 1968, *Sesame Street* pioneered the idea of a combined research and production team, a collaboration that brings direction and focus to the show. Forty years later, hundreds of millions of children still benefit from their work.

In 1996, Joan Ganz Cooney, a producer with a background in education, organized a proposal for an educational television show.[3] In the greater television world, children's television was definitely the minor leagues, with little money or interested talent, and little incentive to provide quality programming. However, at a time when only 75 percent of five-year-olds attended kindergarten, and only 40 percent of three- and four-year-olds attended preschool,[4] Cooney saw television was a new front for education. Though a relatively new technology, by 1968, television already reached 97 percent of American households,[5] so most of those young children not attending preschool would have had access to a television. Moreover, parents' worries about the effects of immoral, violent shows on their children meant that a program with educational and age-appropriate content might be welcomed.

Cooney could not affiliate her show with a major network nor engage commercial backers because such connections would have compromised the show's objectivity. Instead, she hoped to receive private funding and produce the show for public television. At the same time, Cooney would not work at the substandard level of previous children's shows: for true success, the show would need high quality writing, sets, production, and actors.

On 15 March 1967, Cooney presented her idea to private and government agencies. Together, the group was offered $8 million to produce 130 hour-long shows and authorized an 18-month planning period, an exceptionally long time in the television world.[6] This long planning period allowed Cooney ample time

to hire a production team and write a curriculum for the show, a necessary foundation for such an ambitious project.

Without such a dedicated creator and later, a dedicated team, *Sesame Street* could not have succeeded. But the facility with which Cooney raised the funds to actually produce the show depended largely on its timeliness in history.[7] America stood on unsteady ground in *Sesame Street*'s nascent years: the Vietnam War, high profile assassinations, and an increasingly violent Civil Rights movement shook America's confidence and polarized the country. But a rallying cause for many was the War on Poverty. Lyndon B. Johnson, President from 1963 to 1969, took up this crusade with his plan for a Great Society, with which he hoped to improve the lives of all Americans. Accordingly, in six years, he signed more than 20 pieces of legislation related to social issues including education.[8] One of LBJ's major education programs, Head Start, sought to prepare preschool children for Kindergarten, so *Sesame Street* fit directly into the government's plans for education reform. Also, his major education bill, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, had a provision for education-related funding under which *Sesame Street* received a hefty government grant in 1967. This government grant gave the project credibility, opening the doors for private organizations to fill in the $8 million budget. *Sesame Street* continues to receive funding authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, restructured as No Child Left Behind in 2001. Part of No Child Left Behind, the Ready-to-Learn Television program, commands a yearly budget of $23 million, around a third of which goes to *Sesame Street*.[9]

In the 18 months following the grants, Joan Cooney assembled a dedicated group of writers, producers, actors, puppeteers, and researchers to create the show. The emerging team called itself the Children's Television Workshop or CTW. From day one, CTW broached new territory; there was no precedent for an educational television show on such a large scale.[10] Thus, the *Sesame Street* team had to live up to its name as a *workshop*, creating, testing, and revising every step of the way.

Of their original budget of $8 million, CTW allotted 10 to 15 percent to research.[11] CTW has never reneged on this commitment: the 2007 Annual Report shows that 10 percent of $99 million in program expenses was spent on research.[12] The fact that the research budget has never waned confirms the value of research for the show, but in analyzing the research process, one can see why research has been so effective.

There are two main branches of research on *Sesame Street*. One team of researchers works with the producers to create new material. These researchers show preliminary versions of *Sesame Street* to test groups of children whose responses they evaluate before and after watching the show. The researchers look at how well the children attend to the show and how much they learn from it; then the researchers report these results to the producers. Because this process helps with the formation of new material, CTW calls it "formative research."[13] Notably, the term formative research was first used in 1967, just as *Sesame Street* adopted the concept, which underscores the novelty of the technique.[14]

The second branch of research evaluates *Sesame Street*'s overall success, which is important to know with so much grant funding. The show's backers need to be sure the CTW uses their money effectively. To avoid bias in evaluating their own work, CTW hired an outside research group, the Educational Testing Service, to perform annual analyses of the show's progress. Because this research summarizes a year's worth of material at a time, CTW calls it summative research.

With so much focus on research within a television project, one must examine the relationship between these researchers and the producers. Researchers and producers do not typically subscribe to the same work techniques or ideals, so to work together on *Sesame Street*, both groups needed to compromise.[15] The researchers had to forsake their usual lengthy, detailed process to fit the pace of television, while the producers had to relinquish some sacred "creative license" to submit to the researchers' findings. Without compromise, *Sesame Street* could not have succeeded. As Joan Cooney dryly put it, collaboration between researchers and

producers was "a marriage worth keeping intact—for the sake of the children."[16]

Because formative research bears on the creation of new material, the formative researchers began work immediately in 1968. The team still commands a fundamental role in *Sesame Street*'s production: in the show's credits, researchers fill a whole slide. Essentially, formative research is a way of involving children in the production of a show that is ultimately created for them.[17] While adults might guess at the best way to teach children, without asking the children, it is impossible to tell what works. Accordingly, *Sesame Street* bases its formative research almost exclusively on what *Sesame Street*'s head researcher, Edward Palmer, called "child-watching." The concept is hardly more complicated than it sounds. Researchers observe children who are watching television. First, the researchers note time intervals during which each child maintains eye contact with the screen. Synthesized, this data displays the most engaging and least engaging parts of the show. Next, researchers talk to the children to discover what the children liked and what lessons they learned. The producers use the results to modify, scrap or accept a segment as a success.[18]

The formative researchers consider physical or verbal responses paramount indicators of learning. Researchers look specifically for these "modeling behaviors" to assess a segment; if children stare zombie-like at the screen, researchers are not satisfied, but if the show engages children to move and talk, then researchers know the segment has worked. For example, in a 1971 study, Natalie Sproull reports a show's overwhelming success, noting that children responded an average of 53 times during a 55-minute show. Their responses included shaking the head "no," repeating phrases: "Delicious!" and counting along with the characters. She noted enthusiastically that every child smiled at least once every two minutes.[19] But along with predictable responses, researchers take caution from other, unintended results. As an addendum to her response section, Sproull adds two children's surprising reactions: one boy saw a Muppet eat a ping-pong ball and copied the motion with glee; another boy, upon seeing Kermit the Frog

kiss another Muppet, leaned over and kissed the little girl next to him, much to her surprise.[20] These anecdotes may be charming, but they also caution *Sesame Street*'s producers: children may not distinguish between what is serious and what is comedic and might copy something they see.

Over the years, formative research has molded the show, dictating what CTW keeps, modifies, or throws out. It has also provided background information—studies of what children know outside of *Sesame Street*—to give the show focus. In 1999, for example, the producers decided to focus an entire season on science. They wanted to include a segment about space but were unsure if pre-schoolers would understand the concept. So the research team tested a segment called "Slimey to the Moon" in two day-care centers, determining children's understanding of space before and after the segment. Of course, they also tested whether children enjoyed the show. The researchers found that those children who knew little about space learned the basics—what an astronaut is, how one travels through space, on which planet we live—while the more space-savvy children learned new information about space suits and gear. As importantly, the children enjoyed the space segment, laughing, smiling, and commenting frequently. Following such positive results, the producers finished the segment and aired it frequently that season and in subsequent years.[21]

Not all good ideas succeed. In 1992, CTW decided to tackle divorce because of the growing divorce rate in America. The producers hoped to make divorce less scary by discussing it on the show, so they decided to have Snuggleufpagus's parents divorce. Testing showed that the segment confused rather than reassured: children thought that the dad had run away, that Snuffleufpagus would never see his dad again, and that the divorced parents no longer loved their son. Consequently, CTW pulled the segment from production and decided divorce was too complicated to be addressed properly on *Sesame Street*.[22]

In 1990, *Sesame Street* decided to focus multiple seasons on race and diversity, after a number of race-related incidents around

the country, but the producers were unsure of pre-schoolers' perspective on race. Before producing any material, CTW sent its research team to examine race-conceptions of white, African American, Puerto Rican, Chinese American, and Crow Indian children. Children were asked if they would be friends with a child of a different race. Overall, the children responded affirmatively, with percentages from 50 to 87 percent. However, when asked if they thought their mothers would approve of interracial friendships, most responded negatively with percentages as low as 23 percent approving. These results surprised producers, yet confirmed suspicions that children of the 90s still needed help with integration and tolerance. The third activity provided more worrisome results. Researchers asked children to construct multiracial play neighborhoods (in the vein of block set-up). African American, Chinese American, Crow Indian, and Puerto Rican children integrated all races, but white children overwhelmingly—80 to 90 percent—segregated white children and African American children in homes, playgrounds, schools, churches, and stores. When asked why the families were separated, the white children cited differences in looks, amounts of money, current living conditions, and current conflicts. But the children also added that separation would make both White and Black children sad.[23] In response, the producers committed themselves to reversing conceptions of irreparable differences between the races. Every show emphasized integrated neighborhoods and play dates between children of different races, especially highlighting approving mothers. The CTW suggested that parents talk about race before and after the broadcasts.

In each of these three examples—"Slimey to the Moon," the divorce segment, and the 1990 special focus on race—the formative research team provided the essential link between the producers' ideas and their defined needs of America's children.

Though formative research directly influences *Sesame Street*'s success in creating useful material, summative research is equally important to *Sesame Street*'s success because it maintains funding. CTW needs to prove the show "works" to keep backers interested.[24] After *Sesame Street*'s first season, begun November 10,

1968, positive reviews and reports of large audiences provided empirical evidence of the show's success. But the financial backers wanted numbers. Accordingly, the summative researchers began their first evaluation with two questions in mind: First, how well did *Sesame Street* achieve its educational goals? Second, how broad was the show's appeal nationally, i.e., did enough children watch to justify this non-commercial expense?[25]

The second question was easier to answer: data showed that by the end of the 1969 season, 4 million pre-schoolers were watching *Sesame Street*. Before the premier, CTW had determined that according to public television's availability nationwide, the show had an absolute maximum audience of 8 million children. An audience of half the maximum audience was an exceptional share, especially for the show's first season.[26] For comparison, the Neilson Ratings Company repots that the most popular show for the week of 1 December 2008 yielded 11.6 percent of the possible national audience.[27] Granted there are many more options on television today, especially in general programming as opposed to children's programming, but nevertheless, this low percentage for a well-watched show highlights *Sesame Street*'s incredible popularity when it premiered.

Despite *Sesame Street*'s initial success, CTW worried that interest might wane after a few years. Their worries were unfounded; by 1972, the show's audience bloomed to almost 9 million children between the ages of two and five.[28] The growth of public television had increased the available audience and word-of-mouth attracted even more viewers. As an example of the show's pervasiveness, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of New York City, 91 percent of children watched *Sesame Street* in 1972.[29]

Besides tabulating how many children watched *Sesame Street*, the summative researchers determined how much those children learned. The Educational Testing Service published results of a broad study of *Sesame Street*'s first season in late 1969. They concluded that children who watched *Sesame Street* made statistically irrefutable learning gains as compared to children who did not watch *Sesame Street*.[30] The *Sesame Street* viewers improved

in recognizing letters, numbers, and body parts. Moreover, the researchers calculated that the more a child watched the show, the more he or she improved. In some areas, children who watched every day improved by 40 percent on the tests. The results that children who watched *Sesame Street* learned more held across all socioeconomic, racial, geographic, age, and sex divisions, and it held internationally, as well; a 1973 Australian study showed that *Sesame Street* produced significant learning gains in Australian children. As further evidence, the summative researchers interviewed kindergarten teachers and found that *Sesame Street* "graduates" performed better in school than other children.[31]

Because of these positive results, CTW was able to renew its grants and continue producing the show; in fact, consistently positive results over 40 years have kept *Sesame Street* on the air as one of the longest running shows in television history. However, from early on, CTW had its eyes beyond America's borders, and foreign educators had their eyes on *Sesame Street*. In the 1970-1971 season, CTW tested *Sesame Street*'s appeal outside of America; a version broadcast on the Caribbean Island of Curaçao reached 80 percent of children in homes with televisions.[32] In the next few years, television producers in Mexico, Brazil, and Germany all approached CTW about creating their own versions of the show. CTW agreed to co-produce the new versions, offering ideas and expertise to local producers, who would produce the show in their own countries. Each new show had its own specialized characters, was filmed in the local language, and took place in a setting specific to the country, but all followed the CTW model of research and production.[33] By 1974, just five years after *Sesame Street*'s American debut, *Plaza Sésamo* in Mexico, *Vila Sésamo* in Brazil, and *Sesamstrasse* in Germany all held captive audiences, and the English language version was on-air in 50 different countries from Antigua to Poland to Zambia.[34]

By 2001, *Sesame Street* and its international co-production reached 120 million children in more than 130 countries,[35] and the numbers have only gown since. Today, there are 18 international co-productions, all of which address special interests in

their home countries. For example, the South African *Takalani Sesame* includes black and white characters with a myriad of different accents to highlight diversity in post-Apartheid South Africa. More controversially, the show includes an HIV-positive Muppet who teaches children to seek help if they are sick and looks to reduce the stigma that HIV/AIDS carries in many areas. Also, the South African team produces nine versions of every *Takalani Sesame* episode, each in a different language (South Africa has 11 official languages); then they rotate the languages among the daily broadcasts. In war-torn and divided Israel, *Rechov Sumsum* tries more than anything to embrace diversity and encourage acceptance of all people. The storyline focuses on conflict resolution, the set is carefully designed to include Arabic and Hebrew signage, and the show features both Muslim and Jewish characters. Co-productions in Kosovo and Northern Ireland also focus on diversity and acceptance, as both countries have suffered from intolerance and cultural division.[36]

Sesame Street's international growth and the adaptations in each of its new co-productions highlight the ways in which the show has matured and evolved over the years. Within America, the original *Sesame Street* has adapted to changing times. Today, the show addresses more than its bare-bones educational objectives of 1969; though children still learn their ABCs and their numbers up to 20, the show focuses on social skills like cooperation, understanding, listening, and sharing. The producers choose special topics for each season such as the 1990 focus on race, or a series on love, marriage, pregnancy, and family that coincided with the character, Maria's, actual marriage and pregnancy. These special topics keep the material fresh and relevant in a changing world.

In 1999, professor Gerald Lesser, of the original CTW team, wrote about *Sesame Street* at its 30th anniversary. He noted that *Sesame Street* has always been and still remains an experiment worthy of its creators' name: Workshop.[37] Ten years later, his diagnosis is as true as ever. The show could not be more current, yet it has not diverged from its roots. The nature of the show as a continuous experiment allows this paradox of tradition and innovation

to exist. And the show that began as a fledgling experiment has matured into one of the strongest cultural institutions in America. Most importantly, children still love *Sesame Street*, and they are still learning from it. As Gordon Brown, one of *Sesame Street*'s recurring characters, said as the opening line of *Sesame Street*'s first episode back in 1969, "Sally, you've never seen a street like Sesame Street before. Everything happens here. You're gonna love it!"[38]

[1] Gerald S. Lesser, Children and Television: Lessons from *Sesame Street* (New York: Random House, 1974) p. 257

[2] "Annual Triangle Toss," *Sesame Street* Episode #4167, produced by Carol Lynn Parente, PBS, December 6, 2008

[3] Lesser, p. 3

[4] Ibid., p. 12

[5] Edward L. Palmer and Shalom M. Fisch, "The Beginnings of *Sesame Street* Research," in G is for Growing ed. Shalom M. Fisch and Rosemarie T. Truglio (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2001) p. 5

[6] Lesser, p. 35

[7] Palmer, p. 4

[8] Mary Beth Norton, et al., A People and A Nation: A History of the United States (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005) p. 839

[9] U.S. Congress, No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 Public Law 107-110, 107th Congress, January 8, 2002, www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/107-110.pdf, p. 259

[10] Rosemarie T. Truglio, et al., "The Varied Role of Formative Research: Case Studies from 30 Years," in Fisch and Truglio, p. 4

[11] Lesser, p. 132

[12] Sesame Workshop, http://www.sesameworkshop.org/home

[13] Jim Warren, "Children's Television Workshop," Educational Researcher 5 (1976) p. 7, JSTOR, www.jstor.org

[14] Palmer, p. 14

[15] Lesser, p. 133

[16] Palmer, p. 21

[17] Truglio, p. 6

[18] Lesser, p. 152

[19] Natalie Sproull, "Visual Attention, Modeling Behavior and Other Verbal and Nonverbal Meta-Communication of Prekindergarten Children Viewing Sesame Street," American Educational Research Journal 10 (1973) pp. 107-108, JSTOR, www.jstor.org

[20] Sproull, p. 112

[21] Truglio, p 64

[22] Ibid., p. 76

[23] Truglio, pp. 64-73

[24] Palmer, p. 7

[25] Lesser, p. 140

[26] Ibid., p. 203

[27] Nielsen Media Research, "Top TV Ratings," http://www.nielsenmedia.com/nc/portal/site/Public/menuitem.43.afce2fac27e890311ba0a347a062a0/?vgnextoid=9e4d9669fa14010VgnVCM100000880a260aRCRD

[28] Lesser, p. 205

[29] Ibid., p. 204

[30] Warren, p. 8

[31] Lesser, pp. 208-224

[32] Ibid., p. 206

[33] Charlotte Cote, et al., "The World of Sesame Street Research," in Fisch and Truglio, pp. 147-148

[34] Lesser, p. 260

[35] Cole, p. 147

[36] Sesame Workshop

[37] Gerald S. Lesser and Joel Schneider, "Creation and Evolution of the Sesame Street Curriculum," in Fisch and Truglio, p. 25

[38] Internet Movie Database, "Memorable Quotes from Sesame Street," http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0063951/quotes

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1453: The Holy War for Constantinople and the Clash of Islam and the West
Roger Crowley, New York: Hyperion, 2005, pp. 242-243

...It would be another two hundred years before the advance of the Ottomons into Europe was definitely halted, before the gates of Vienna (1683); in the interval Christianity and Islam would wage a long-running war, both hot and cold, that would linger long in the racial memory and that formed a long link in the chain of events between the two faiths. The fall of Constantinople had awakened in Islam and Europe deep memories of the Crusades. The Ottoman peril was seen as the continuation of the perceived assault of Islam on the Christian world; the word Turk replaced the word Saracen as the generic term for a Muslim—and with it came all the connotations of a cruel and implacable opponent. Both sides saw themselves engaged in a struggle for survival against a foe intent on destroying the world. It was the prototype of global ideological conflict. The Ottomans kept the spirit of jihad alive, now linked to their sense of imperial mission. Within the Muslim heartlands the belief in the superiority of Islam was rejuvenated. The legend of the Red Apple had enormous currency; after Rome it attached successively to Budapest, then Vienna. Beyond these literal destinations, it was the symbol of messianic belief in the final victory of the Faith. Within Europe, the image of the Turk became synonymous with all that was faithless and cruel. By 1536 the word was in use in English to mean, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, "anyone behaving as a barbarian or savage." And what added fuel to these attitudes was a discovery that typified the very spirit of Renaissance enlightenment—the invention of printing.

The fall of Constantinople happened on the cusp of a revolution—the moment that the runaway train of scientific discovery started to gather speed in the West at the expense of religion. Some of these forces were at play in the siege itself: the impact of gunpowder, the superiority of sailing ships, the end of medieval siege warfare; the next seventy years would bring Europe, among other things, gold fillings in teeth, the pocket watch and the astrolabe, navigation manuals, syphilis (from the New World), the New Testament in translation, Copernicus and Leonardo da Vinci, Columbus and Luther—and movable type.

Gutenberg's invention revolutionized mass communications and spread new ideas about the holy war with Islam. A huge corpus of crusader and anti-Islamic literature poured off the presses of Europe in the next 150 years...

THE SINKING OF THE *LUSITANIA*

Rujul Zaparde

On May 1, 1915, the *Lusitania* left New York for England. On the ship was Elizabeth Horton, who had come from England to meet her newly born granddaughter. She boarded the *Lusitania*, intending to return to England, carrying photos of her granddaughter to show her husband.[1] With Britain and Germany at war, the ship was sailing in a time of heightened tension. The Imperial German Embassy displayed ads in the *New York Times* warning against a possible German attack on the liner. Six days later, at 1:40 pm on May 7, the *U-20*, a German submarine, torpedoed the British ship. In 20 minutes, the *Lusitania* was underwater. Of the almost 2,000 people on board, 1,198 perished, including Elizabeth Horton.[2] The photos of her granddaughter never reached England. Who would cause such a calamity? Could the loss of life possibly be justified?

Although the captain of the *Lusitania* may have been responsible, both Germany and Britain played important roles in the ship's sinking, albeit with different motives. The tragedy did not precipitate U.S. entry into the war, but bolstered the country's anti-German sentiment. Of course, Germany was directly responsible for the sinking; it launched the torpedo and later

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claimed responsibility for the attack.[3] Other than maintaining its aggressive stance in the waters surrounding Great Britain, which it labeled as a war zone, Germany had various motives to sink the *Lusitania*.[4] If the United States were coaxed into the war, the supply of resources to the Allies would slow while the U.S. built up its forces, and Germany would be able to attack with impunity American ships carrying non-contraband goods. As the United States was currently neutral, this was not possible.[5] Yet in defense of Germany's actions, the *Lusitania* was possibly transporting munitions, including highly explosive ammunition.[6] The German government had warned passengers not to board, and had declared the English Channel an open war zone.[7] The British, too, shared responsibility—although more for what they didn't do rather than for what they did. No armed escort was provided—of course, an armed escort for every ship was not always possible. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, was interested in involving the Americans in the Great War—U.S. assistance could help the Allies win what had become a war of attrition.[8] Even Captain Turner of the *Lusitania* himself might be to blame. He followed neither protocol on that day nor the directions provided by the Admiralty.[9] The responsibility for the *Lusitania*'s sinking can be split among several parties—their motives, however, were quite different.

The sinking caused immediate outrage in the United States and thoroughly weakened its relations with Germany, but failed to drive American popular sentiment to support the war. Several ships has been sunk before the *Lusitania* with a similar American reaction—there was no reason to believe this would be any different.[10] Most did not want to be entangled in a conflict with Germany—an apology and indemnities would be enough.[11] Yet Germany's actions did do irreparable damage to its image, painting it as a ruthless, immoral enemy, and caused the United States to side more closely with the Allies. Germany would later pay a heavy price for this action.

Many Americans believed that Germany torpedoed the *Lusitania* because it wanted to involve the United States in the war, which would limit its supply to the Allies. According to the *Wall*

Street Journal, Germany wanted to bring the United States into the Great War to decrease the supply of munitions being exported to the Allies, since they would then be required for the U.S. military.[12] The United States was already helping Britain as much as it could with weapons and munitions.[13] By drawing the Unites States into the war, Germany could limit U.S. supply to Britain. It could also attack American ships carrying non-contraband supplies if the United States were a declared combatant. As long as the U.S. was neutral, its ships carrying non-contraband goods were off-limits.[14] In fact, Robert Lansing, United States Secretary of State declared that "on balance, Germany would be helped by American belligerency, while Britain would be harmed," and that "Germany…wanted to force President Wilson into the Allied camp so that if she lost, he would use his influence to bring about a 'soft' peace."[15] Clearly at the time, U.S. entry into the war appealed to the Germans: it would grant Germany the opportunity to consolidate its position in the Great War (of course, in retrospect, U.S. entry actually precipitated Germany's defeat). By firing the torpedo, and acknowledging that it did, Germany took the immediate blame for sinking the ship.

Although Germany declared the English Channel an open war zone and warned passengers against travel through it, it still did not follow naval codes of conduct, and therefore had no justification for sinking the *Lusitania*. Three months earlier, on February 4, 1915, the German government had declared that "all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are…a war zone."[16] The declaration went on to warn that "from February 18 onwards every enemy merchant vessel found within this war zone would be destroyed without it always being possible to avoid danger to the crews and passengers."[17] The German embassy had issued ads in the *New York Times* before the ship sailed, warning "travelers intending to embark…do so at [their] own risk."[18] Still Germany torpedoed the *Lusitania* without specific warning which could have allowed the orderly deployment of lifeboats, and made no attempt to rescue its passengers. As Wilson described it later, "no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed" can justify the

act.[19] Despite issuing a printed warning, Germany claimed lives which could have been saved.

The German *U-20*, however, had good reason to believe the *Lusitania* was armed, and felt compelled to strike without warning. It was standard protocol to search an unarmed ship carrying passengers, remove the passengers, and then sink it if contraband were found.[20] The *Lusitania* was originally meant to be used as an armed merchant cruiser, and could therefore be armed—whether it was armed or not on that fateful day is not known.[21] Churchill had promised that by March 31, 1915, the British would have 70 armed merchant ships with two guns each.[22] So if German U-boats were to surface in order to warn an armed merchant ship, they would be vulnerable to gunfire. For this reason, U-boats saw themselves compelled to sink even potentially armed ships without warning.[23] Because it would be hard to tell whether the *Lusitania* were armed or not from a distance (guns were often masked), and the Germans were becoming more and more wary about the increasing number of armed merchant ships, the *U-20* might have fired on the assumption that the *Lusitania* was armed. The captain of the *U-20* found himself in a moral dilemma: place his crew's lives at stake or those of the British and Americans. He chose the latter.

The Germans had yet another reason to sink the liner: the *Lusitania* had munitions (and possibly, explosives) on board. Although the *Lusitania* was a passenger liner, it carried a cargo of ammunition: 4,200 cases of Remington rifle cartridges—totaling more than 4 million cartridges.[24] This was a staggering number, and could have killed thousands of Germans if used in combat.[25] Surprisingly, however, carrying these munitions was legal. In fact the day after the sinking, the *New York Times* published the manifest of the *Lusitania*, which clearly listed that the ship had on board 4,200 cases of rifle cartridges.[26] It is also important to note that this manifest was filed the day the liner set sail, and could have easily been accessed by the Germans; it was only published in major newspapers after the ship had been sunk.[27] Yet the *Lusitania* might have been carrying illegal munitions as well. According to eyewitnesses,

the torpedo struck about 50 yards from the cargo hold where the ammunition mentioned in the manifest was stored. There was a second explosion at the rear of the ship that caused it to sink in under 20 minutes. This second explosion, which was much larger, implies that additional, highly explosive munitions were stored elsewhere on the ship.[28] It might seem that the Germans had good reason to torpedo the ship: this action would potentially save thousands of German lives, as the munitions would be destroyed. However, according to internationally-recognized naval codes of conduct, no unarmed ship carrying passengers—regardless of whether its cargo contains illegal/legal munitions—can be sunk without warning.[29] The lives of its passengers must be preserved.[30] Nonetheless, the German *U-20* ignored these rules and fired a torpedo without warning.[31] By no means was it justified in sinking the ship at the expense of the lives of its civilian passengers.

Britain, too, stood to benefit from the sinking of the *Lusitania*: the United States might join the war effort, and by blaming the incident on the Germans, the British would give credence to its propaganda. In a letter to Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, Churchill acknowledged his "hope [to] embroil the U.S. with Germany."[32] Clearly Churchill saw the sinking of the *Lusitania* as an opportunity to sway popular opinion in the United States and involve it in the war to aid the Allies. Churchill himself began the campaign to arm merchant ships, a decision that led German U-boats to attack without surfacing and exposing themselves to fire.[33] It is possible that Churchill, knowing the U-boats would be forced to strike without warning, hoped to recruit neutral powers (mainly the U.S.) by exposing more of their vessels to attack without warning.[34] Of course, this claim cannot be validated, and Churchill may have armed merchant ships simply to protect their cargo. The sinking of the *Lusitania* gave the British another benefit: Churchill could blame the "barbaric Germans" for the incident, and spread British propaganda.[35]

Yet Britain also had many grounds not to implicitly help sink the *Lusitania*. The flow of goods (both contraband and non-contraband) from the United States to Britain was already at its

peak, and Britain's main goal at the time was simply to maintain this supply.[36] If Britain were to involve the U.S. in the war, German U-boats would be able to sink any and all American ships and British supply would plummet. The United States would also have to redirect supplies from exports to prepare its own military.[37] Even if Britain did hope to involve the U.S. in the war, the U.S. would only go to war if public opinion were swayed enough: a far-fetched hope that even the sinking of passenger ships seemed incapable of bringing about. Before the *Lusitania*'s sinking, two U.S. ships—the *Cushing* and the *Gulfight*—had been sunk and the British ship *Falaba* had gone down, taking American lives, without so much as a note of protest from the U.S.[38] Clearly, the United States had high tolerance for German naval tactics. There might have been some isolated protest in the United States, but popular opinion was little moved. Although many Americans died when the *Lusitania* was sunk, ultimately it was a British ship, and Britain and Germany were at war. Until the Germans started to attack U.S. ships without warning, there was no cause for U.S. entry into the war.[39] Considering the muted American response to German naval attacks, Britain and Churchill had little reason to believe that the sinking of a British liner would draw the United States into the Great War. Walter Hines Page, the U.S. ambassador in London, clarified that Britain did not seek "military help"—it wanted "moral condemnation of Germany."[40] Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in the United States, stated that the United States was a "base of supplies" for Britain, and it was in Britain's "main interest" to preserve this status quo.[41] Churchill would have to have been utterly desperate for U.S. military aid if he hoped to involve the United States with such a scheme.[42] After all, it was May 1915, and the Great War had begun only 10 months earlier —the British were not as hard-pressed as they would later become. Russia was still fighting in the war (it had not surrendered yet), and Italy was on the brink of entering the war on the Allies side.[43] The British fleet was also faring well against the Germans. In addition, if American President Wilson were to be involved in the war, his known disapproval of Britain's imperial goal of acquiring German colonies would have to be overcome.[44] Britain's motives

regarding U.S. involvement were split: there were benefits, but also great costs.

Yet somehow the British took steps, both intentionally and unintentionally, to make a sinking more likely. The Admiralty reduced the maximum speed of the *Lusitania* from 25 to 21 knots.[45] Slowing down the liner meant it was now considerably more exposed to attack. The Admiralty also did not explicitly prohibit the *Lusitania* from carrying arms. The ship was exposed because it lacked an armed escort, which was necessary in this time of war. Churchill later explained that "the resources at our disposal do not enable us to supply destroyer escort for merchant or passenger ships."[46] Armed escorts were desirable but not always available, and assigned to vessels of the highest priority. The *Lusitania* was not such a vessel. Thus the British took measures that opened the *Lusitania*—both intentionally and unintentionally—to attack.

William T. Turner, the captain of the *Lusitania*, shares the blame for the sinking, as he did not follow protocol, and so endangered the lives of his passengers. The *Lusitania* progressed at only 18 knots.[47] He was directed to follow a zigzag route, as it would deter a submarine from a direct attack, but did not. In trial, after the sinking, when asked why he did not follow a zigzag path, Turner replied that he "did not think it was necessary until [he] saw a submarine."[48] If a submarine is within sight of a ship, it is already too late—and Turner, an experienced captain, should have known that. Whether he answered truthfully, or why he answered the way he did, is not known. Turner also did not follow a mid-channel course or avoid headlands.[49] In fact, he proceeded in a straight course directly to the *U-20*.[50] Captain Richard Webb, the Director of the Trade Division, stated that Captain Turner "displayed an almost inconceivable negligence."[51] Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, called Captain Turner a "knave" and "scoundrel" for being "bribed," as "no seaman in his senses could have acted as he did."[52] Captain Turner disregarded his orders to such a degree that he was in direct suspicion of being "got at by the Germans."[53] We can deduce that Captain Turner blatantly ignored the Admiralty's directions; whether he was motivated by a bribe

or simply placed too much trust on his own navigational abilities is unknown. Little did Turner know that his actions would drive two nations apart: the United States and Germany.

Although the *Lusitania*'s sinking outraged Americans, it did not drive them to declare war. The majority of Americans were shocked by Germany's immoral actions especially along the East Coast, and the shock was shared by much of the international community.[54] In Liverpool, the *Lusitania*'s final destination, a British mob destroyed a German cutlery shop, and similar riots took place elsewhere.[55] Some deemed the sinking as the "most monumental moral crisis since the crucifixion of Christ."[56] The *New York Nation* described the sinking as "a deed for which a Hun would blush, a Turk be ashamed, and a Barbary pirate apologize."[57] For such strong words, ironically, there was no accompanying action. Though outrage was rife, few were willing to spill blood over the sinking. One thousand editorial reactions were published within three days of the incident, mostly indicating disapproval and shock at the sinking. Fewer than six of these expressed a desire to engage in combat.[58] Only two senators and one representative openly advocated war.[59] Most Americans felt war was too large a step to take; it would allow for a German blockade against its ships, and the Allies would in turn receive fewer supplies.[60] Five hundred thousand Germans and Austrians also resided within the United States. Many feared that involvement in a European conflict might spark a civil war at home.[61] Essentially, although many American lives had been lost, the *Lusitania* was a British ship. Not until the Germans made a habit of sinking American ships did the United States declare war.[62]

Germany, by refusing to accept culpability for the *Lusitania*'s sinking, reinforced anti-German sentiment in the United States. On May 10, 1915, three days after the incident, Germany gave its "deepest sympathy" to "the loss of American lives," but stated that "the responsibility rests…with the British government," which had forced it "to resort to retaliatory measures" by "starving the civilian population of Germany."[63] To Americans, the German "apology" was merely an accusation, and only deepened the rift

between the United States and Germany. One newspaper described the German apology: "Sorry, but I'll do it again."[64] The German ambassador, Johann von Bernstorff, acknowledged that German "propaganda…has collapsed completely under the impact of the *Lusitania* incident."[65] Doctor Bernhard Dernburg, another German propagandist, agreed that Germany was justified in sinking the *Lusitania* on account of its explosive cargo.[66] Although it had killed innocent Americans, Germany still refused to accept blame for its actions. After the sinking, Wilson sent three notes of protest to Germany, which replied relatively quickly to the first two, but took an astonishing six months to respond to the last one.[67] Perhaps Germany wanted to remove itself and the *Lusitania* from the limelight, but Americans considered this delay negligent. Germany finally agreed to pay indemnities in its reply to Wilson's third note, but did not pay until a full decade after the tragedy![68] To most Americans, Germany's attitude towards the loss of life was unacceptable.

Yet many Americans blamed the British instead because Britain should not have permitted passengers to board the *Lusitania* when the ship was carrying ammunition.[69] Rear Admiral F.E. Chadwick said with outrage, "You can't cover 10,000 tons of ammunition with a petticoat."[70] Secretary of State William Bryan argued that Germany was justified in "prevent[ing] contraband going to the Allies, and a ship carrying contraband should not rely on passengers to protect her from attack—it would be like putting women and children in front of an army."[71] Anti-British sentiment was prevalent: many believed the Germans were not the only ones at fault.

Others even blamed the American passengers themselves who set sail on the *Lusitania*. Vice President Thomas Marshall explained that when one boards a British ship, one is associated with the British, and must be prepared for the repercussions.[72] Because many saw a degree of justification in Germany's actions, a U.S. war with Germany seemed even less plausible. If Germany was not entirely in the wrong, as many Americans agreed, why should it have to fight a war against the United States?

In fact, many Americans considered the *Lusitania*'s sinking a cause for peace, not war. In his first note to Germany, President Wilson cited "the practical impossibility" of using submarines without "disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative."[73] If submarines can't function in line with international codes of conduct, then they should not be used. He also demanded what many Americans had hoped for: Germany must assume full responsibility for the sinking, pay indemnities, and ensure such a tragedy does not occur again.[74] Wilson sent two more notes to Germany within the next 12 months. By the third note, he had conceded to submarine warfare, but on the condition that passengers must be warned and evacuated before a ship was destroyed.[75] Germany, in response, apologized, agreed to pay indemnities, and affirmed that it would "gladly cooperate" with the United States.[76] The *Lusitania*'s sinking was no reason for U.S. entry into the war—only peaceful, diplomatic actions ensued. In fact, Congress was so opposed to the idea of war that when a resolution to alert Americans against boarding armed ships was proposed, the Speaker of the House predicted it would pass with a two to one ratio.[77] If Americans did not sail on armed ships, there was less chance for another tragedy (and conflict). The sinking resulted in strong anti-German sentiment in the United States, but it prompted measures to preserve peace and limit bloodshed. America maintained its position of isolationism.

Despite having different motives, Germany, Britain, and Captain Turner each played a role in the sinking o f the *Lusitania*. Although the sinking itself did not precipitate a U.S. entry into World War I, it did create strong anti-German sentiment in the United States. It seems everyone except for the passengers was waiting for the torpedo. Germany had a strong motive to sink the *Lusitania*: blockading the United States. Although Britain would ultimately benefit by U.S. involvement, it was currently receiving as much aid as it could.[78] Captain Turner, by completely disregarding his instructions, placed the *Lusitania* directly in the German *U-20*'s course.[79] When the *Lusitania* sank on May 7, 1915, at 2 pm, Americans were outraged. Yet none was willing to spill blood over

the lives lost. But after German U-boats sank the *Ancona* and the *Arabic*, Wilson called for a stronger U.S. army.[80] When five more American freighters were torpedoed, Wilson called for war.[81] Within months, U.S. soldiers were in direct combat in Europe. As the *Lusitania* drifted down to the bottom of the sea, overwhelmed by the waves, it marked the beginning of a change in the tide of World War I: American sentiment against Germany was soaring, and in three years, Germany itself would fall.

[1] The *Lusitania* Resource, Mrs. Elizabeth Horton, Second Cabin Passenger, under "List of Recovered Victims, Numerical," http://www.rmslusitania.info/pages/second_cabin/horton_elizabeth.html (accessed December 17, 2010)

[2] "Commentary on the *Lusitania*," in American Journey Online: World War I and the Jazz Age (Farmington Hills: Primary Source Microfilm, 2000) http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/HistRC (accessed May 23, 2010)

[3] Ibid.

[4] "The Lusitania," The American Journal of International Law 12, no. 4 (October 1918) p. 895

[5] Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, The *Lusitania* Disaster (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975) p. 186

[6] Ibid., p. 100

[7] "Commentary on the *Lusitania*"

[8] Bailey and Ryan, pp. 184-186

[9] Ibid., p. 184

[10] Ibid., p. 188

[11] Ibid., p. 235

[12] Ibid., p. 187

[13] Ibid., p. 186

[14] Ibid., p. 186

[15] Ibid., p. 187

[16] "The Lusitania," The American Journal of International Law 12, no. 4 (October 1918) p. 865

[17] Ibid., p. 187

[18] Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "Sinking of the *Lusitania*," in Dictionary of American History 3rd ed., Stanley I. Kutler, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003) p. 175

[19] Bailey and Ryan, p. 77

[20] Ibid., p. 97

[21] Ibid., p. 6

[22] Ibid., p. 10

[23] Ibid., p. 11

[24] The *Lusitania* Resource, *Lusitania* Cargo Manifest, under "*Lusitania* Cargo Manifest," http://www.rmslusitania.info/pages/cargo.html (accessed May 30, 2010)

[25] Bailey and Ryan, p. 96

[26] *Lusitania* Cargo Manifest

[27] WWI Document Archive, Armament and Cargo, under "The Munitions Cargo," http://www.gwpda.org/naval/lusika03.htm (accessed May 31, 2010)

[28] Bailey and Ryan, p. 100

[29] Ibid., p. 97
[30] Ibid., p. 97
[31] Schmitt, p. 174
[32] Bailey and Ryan, p. 189
[33] Ibid., p. 10
[34] Ibid., p. 12
[35] Ibid., p. 191
[36] Ibid., p. 186
[37] Ibid., p. 186
[38] Ibid., p. 188
[39] Ibid., p. 188
[40] Ibid., p. 187
[41] Ibid., p. 187
[42] Ibid., pp. 190-191
[43] Ibid., p. 186
[44] Ibid., p. 187
[45] "The *Lusitania*," p. 880
[46] "Mr. Churchill and the *Lusitania*" The Times (May 11, 1915) http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/627/991/115327630w16/purl=rc1_TTDA_0_CS201524395&dyn=3!xrn_2_0_CS201524395&hst_1?sw_aep=lawr21149 (accessed May 24, 2010) p. 12
[47] "The *Lusitania*," p. 880
[48] Bailey and Ryan, p. 213
[49] Ibid., p. 179
[50] Ibid., p. 2
[51] Ibid., p. 179
[52] Ibid., p. 180
[53] Ibid., p. 179
[54] Ibid., pp. 234-235
[55] Ibid., p. 226
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[58] Ibid., pp. 235-235
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[60] Ibid., p. 235
[61] Ibid., p. 235
[62] Ibid., p. 235
[63] Chartley Grattan, Why We Fought (United States: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969) p. 300
[64] Bailey and Ryan, p. 239
[65] Ibid., p. 237
[66] Ibid., p. 237

[67] Ibid., p. 266
[68] Ibid., p. 271
[69] Ibid., p. 237
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[71] Ibid., p. 236
[72] Ibid., pp. 235-236
[73] "Sinking of the *Lusitania*," in The New York Times Current History The European War (New York: The New York Times Company, 1917) p. 998
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[75] Ibid., p. 265
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For want of a nail the shoe was lost.

For want of the shoe the horse was lost.

For want of the horse the rider was lost.

For want of the rider the message was lost.

For want of the message the battle was lost.

For want of the battle the kingdom was lost.

And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

[little things can mean a lot down the road...]

NEAR V. MINNESOTA: MINNEAPOLIS CONFLICT EXPANDS PRESS FREEDOMS THROUGHOUT THE NATION

Alexander Q. Anderson

The Roaring Twenties was the age of Prohibition and organized crime. Speakeasies and bootlegging became big business as gangsters bribed government officials to look the other way. Gangsters controlled illegal gambling dens and the police accepted bribes to ignore them. Labor unions often employed gangsters and thugs to force people to comply with their wishes.[1] In Minneapolis, for example, the Twin Cities Cleaners and Dyers Association hired gangster Mose Barnett to threaten Sam Shapiro, an independent drycleaner. When Shapiro ignored this threat, Barnett's men robbed and assaulted him and vandalized his shop.[2] According to historian John Hartmann, Minneapolis was one of the most corrupt cities in the nation in the 1920s.[3] Against this historical backdrop, Minneapolis became the battleground for a conflict between a small weekly newspaper and local politicians, resulting in expanded freedom of the press and extended Constitutional protections for all persons in every state.

While the major newspapers certainly knew of the corruption in the Cities, they refrained from reporting it, leaving the task

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to the smaller publishers.[4] Two such publishers, Howard A. Guilford and Jay M. Near created *The Saturday Press* on September 24, 1927. Its mission was to expose crime and corruption, especially within the government.[5] Fearing exposure, Barnett threatened them and later had Guilford shot, hospitalizing him.[6] These gangsters hoped to stop *The Saturday Press* before it could further expose them and their connections, but neither Near nor Guilford was intimidated. In the newspaper's third issue on October 8, 1927, Near reported on Sam Shapiro's assault, pointing the finger at Barnett. Although it was common knowledge that Barnett threatened Shapiro, the police department did not arrest him. Near believed it obvious that the police were protecting Mose Barnett.[7]

In "Our Czar? Our Censor!" Near focused specifically on exposing Police Chief Frank Brunskill.[8] Near accused him of ignoring mob activity and protecting gangsters in return for bribes from the gambling dens he should have been raiding and shutting down. The gangsters, according to Near, bluntly called Brunskill their "weak sister."[9] It became evident that Brunskill was protecting gangsters, for Near had published the gambling den's address, and yet the police continued to ignore it. Near continued to attack Brunskill throughout the newspaper run.

Because Brunskill could only suppress the sale of individual issues through a city obscenity ordinance, Hennepin County Attorney Floyd Olson, who had himself been the target of a few of the publishers' attacks, decided to invoke the Public Nuisance Law against *The Saturday Press*. He claimed that it had defamed many government officials and the entire Jewish race.[10] Near had purportedly defamed the Jews by publishing "Facts Not Theories," accusing Jewish gangsters and other Jews of being responsible for the city's problems. Though anti-Semitic in tone, Near wrote, "I am launching no attack against the Jewish people as a race."[11] He felt he was doing his part to rid the city of crime. In spite of Near's own words that he was exposing crime, Olson charged that *The Saturday Press* was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory.

The Public Nuisance Law prohibited the publication of a "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or

other periodical" and made it a crime to possess, sell or give the publication away. The only way a publisher could regain permission to publish was to prove his good motives and the material's truth.[12] Authored by two politicians angry about being exposed, the so-called gag law's original purpose was to suppress *The Duluth Rip-saw*, a newspaper published by John L. Morrison.[13] Because Morrison died of a brain clot before he could be charged.[14] Olson's exercise of the Public Nuisance Law on November 21, 1927 became the first attempt to use this law to suppress a newspaper.[15]

Judge Mathias Baldwin immediately issued a temporary restraining order as requested by Olson.[16] Near's attorney, Thomas Latimer, argued the gag law was unconstitutional. He observe that the only other countries with similar gag laws were fascist Italy and communist Russia.[17] Italy's government funded the "free papers, and restrained them from publishing anything controversial or displeasing."[18] It is clearly impossible to have a free press if the government can restrain or otherwise control it. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed the gag law's constitutionality and remanded the case to the district court.[19] Tiring of the legal process, and anxious to move on with his life, Guilford left *The Saturday Press* on October 2, 1928. Eight days later, Judge Baldwin declared *The Saturday Press* permanently abated and enjoined.[20]

Robert McCormick, publisher of *The Chicago Tribune,* learned of Near's situation and pledged his newspaper's financial and legal support, declaring the gag law the "most drastic and destructive measure to control the press" in the history of this country.[21] Weymouth Kirkland, *The Tribune*'s chief legal counsel, filed an appeal in the Minnesota Supreme Court, but much to Near's dismay, he purposely lost the state case[22] in order to open the door to an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. McCormick and Kirkland were eager to fight the gag law that McCormick believed to be "tyrannical, despotic, un-American, and oppressive."[23] McCormick understood the greater issues of the gag law and worried that unless Near won his case at the federal level, other states would enact similar laws, reducing America's freedom of the press to the "freedom of a straight jacket."[24]

Fortunately for Near, the composition of the Court had recently changed. On March 8, 1930, Chief Justice William Taft and Associate Justice Edward Sanford both died,[25] allowing the appointment of two new Justices. President Hoover appointed Charles Evans Hughes in place of Taft, and Owen Roberts in place of Sanford.[26] This was a dramatic change because Taft had been a conservative and virtually controlled the votes of Justices Sutherland, McReynolds, VanDevanter, Butler, and Sanford.[27] Now this group of conservatives held only four of the nine votes on the Court. Without these changes to the Court, Near most likely would have lost his case, crippling freedom of the press.

Near's brief declared that his goal was innocent and honorable: to clean up gang rule and corruption in Minneapolis. The brief also explained that if gag laws were deemed constitutional, all newspapers would be at the mercy of corrupt government officials.[28] This could prevent many newspapers from revealing crime, corruption, or even expressing an opinion on politics or any action of the government. Freedom of the press is essential to a free and open society; as the American Newspaper Publishers Association observed, "freedom of speech, whether written or oral, is the bedrock foundation of government."[29] Our Founding Fathers ratified the First Amendment specifically to prevent the government from having the power to decide what is published.

Weymouth Kirkland argued Near's case before the Supreme Court on January 30, 1931.[20] He explained that the Public Nuisance Law violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[31] and that Near was not tried by a jury, violating the Sixth Amendment.[32] He asserted the importance of exposing government corruption so citizens can respond accordingly. He acknowledged " so long as men do evil," newspapers should 'defame' them by exposing the act.[33] Butler, the conservative from Minnesota, observed that the gag law prevents publishers from blackmailing people, but Kirkland answered that victims could simply sue the publisher for libel and blackmail.[34] Prior restraint is unlawful because it punishes a crime not yet committed.

Arguing for Minnesota in favor of the gag law was Deputy Attorney General James Markham. He claimed the law had the effect of purifying the press.[35] Markham may have been hoping that Justice Brandeis, being Jewish, would take offense at the anti-Jewish rhetoric of *The Saturday Press*, but he was disappointed when Brandeis interrupted to point out that a newspaper "cannot disclose evil without naming the doers of evil…if that is not one of the things for which the press chiefly exists, then for what does it exist?"[36] Brandeis went on to say that in a free society, newspapers must be able to publish whatever they want, whether true or false, and then must be held accountable afterwards.[37] He said "it is difficult to see how one is to have a fee press and the protection it affords a democratic community without the privilege this act seems to limit."[38]

The Court announced its decision on June 1, 1931.[39] Hughes wrote and presented the majority opinion,[40] declaring the Public Nuisance Law an "infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Because it imposed "an unconstitutional restraint upon publication," the judgment was reversed.[41] According to Hughes, there is a need "of a vigilant and courageous press, expecially [sic] in great cities," where "crime has grown to serious proportions."[42] The gag law could have destroyed newspapers that aspired to this task, attacking them for being false, malicious, and defamatory. Of course, any article that criticizes a public official will seem offensive to that official, but the people's need to be informed outweighs an official's embarrassment. The United States owes its very existence to a press that was critical of the ruling government.

Hughes declared that prior restraint "is the essence of censorship."[43] Freedom of the press does not depend on the truth of the press. Freedom of the press is not an absolute right—abuse can be punished by the state—but suppression is not acceptable. Hughes said specifically that if a publisher recklessly attacks a public official who does his job well, that publisher deserves the severest of consequences.[44] However, the ability to gag the paper allows an official to destroy any paper that criticizes him, justly or

not. He declared that liberty "extends to the false as well as the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false."[45]

Butler, representing the conservative justices, wrote the dissent. He argued that Hughes interpreted the word 'liberty' in the due process clause differently than anyone before, putting a federal restriction on states.[46] Butler's dissent objected that "our Constitution was never intended to protect malice, scandal or defamation."[47] He challenged the veracity of the publisher and the purity of his motives, and claimed the Public Nuisance Law was not an example of prior restraint.

Freedom of speech and of the press are protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Prior to this case, the Bill of Rights was generally thought to be applicable only to the federal government because of the phrase in the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law."[48] However, the Fourteenth Amendment states "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."[49] In this case, Hughes declared "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."[50] This case established the incorporation theory, the legal doctrine that applies fundamental freedoms from the Bill of Rights to the states.

This decision was a great victory for every newspaper in America, and is still considered a significant milestone in press freedom.[51] Even public officials who originally supported the law celebrated the decision. Minnesota Senator Thomas Schall believed that "the evils and abuses of the press are far less to be feared than the evils of suppression."[52] Minnesota Senator Henrik Shipstead agreed with Schall, saying that "the gag law…was a disgrace to Minnesota."[53] Even Floyd Olson, by now governor of Minnesota, praised the decision.[54] This change of heart may have been motivated more by political expedience than personal belief. Illinois Representative Fred Bitten stated that "it would be difficult to overestimate the magnitude of this great victory."[55]

Indeed, *Near v. Minnesota* has been cited at least 116 times in the Supreme Court since then, and has been cited numerous times in lower courts as well.[56]

The response was not all positive, however. The *Minneapolis Journal* considered the decision unfortunate, observing that "Minnesota must now grope for some other remedy."[57] The *Minneapolis Tribune* feared that "the scandal sheets would quickly revive in Minnesota."[58] And only 13 days after prior restraint was declared unconstitutional, Minneapolis police restrained Arthur Kasherman's *The Public Press*.[59] This emphasizes the need to continually protect the press from infringements, even after a great victory.

While the decision was a clear victory for the press, freedom of the press usually represents a compromise. The rights of the press must be balanced with the rights of individuals and the needs of national security. This case ruled that the press generally cannot be restrained, but can be sued for libel; additionally, the press may be restrained in times of war. However, even these 'compromises' or limits on the press where chipped away in future cases.

Among the many cases citing *Near v. Minnesota* was *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* (1964). This case made it difficult for public officials and figures to invoke libel laws against the media. Instead of a publisher having to prove his good motives and justifiable intentions, this case shifted the burden of proof to the accuser.[60] This resulted in greater liberty of the press and weakened the control the government has on the press. Publishers must no longer worry about defending themselves against bogus libel charges.

Another legacy of the conflict was the Pentagon Papers case.[61] In *Near v. Minnesota*, Hughes made allowance for prior restraint in situations of national security issues and protecting troops in time of war.[62] In 1971, *The New York Times* obtained an embarrassing and classified study from the Pentagon on the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.[63] The government attempted to prevent publication, claiming the study was classified and endangered national security. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court upheld the newspaper's right to publish. Every single Justice

wrote his own assent or dissent, each relying on *Near v. Minnesota.*[64] If the government were given the ability to suppress anything that was "classified," they could classify anything a newspaper threatened to expose. The liberty of the press prevents secrecy in the government.

Because of the resolution of Jay Near's conflict with Minneapolis politicians, all Americans now enjoy expanded freedom of the press. The case established the role of the press as the people's watchdog over government. It ruled prior restraint unconstitutional and applied the First Amendment to the states. No longer could the states take way freedoms granted by the Constitution. A free press encourages discussion of controversial topics, such as illegal immigration and universal health care. Such discussions benefit society by hastening cultural change. *Near v. Minnesota* represents an ongoing conflict between all newspaper publishers and government officials. As Thomas Jefferson said, "were it left for me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter."[65]

[1] Paul Maccabee, John Dillinger Slept Here: A Crook's Tour of Crime and Corruption in St. Paul, 1920-1936 (St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995)

[2] Jay M. Near, "A Few of the 'Unsolved' Minneapolis Mysteries," Sunday Press [Minneapolis] 8 October 1927, p. 1

[3] John E. Hartmann, "The Minnesota Gag Law and the Fourteenth Amendment," Minnesota History 37 (1960) p. 165

[4] Marda Liggett Woodbury, Stopping the Presses: The Murder of Walter W. Liggett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p. 39

[5] Hartmann, p. 165

[6] Fred W. Friendly, Minnesota Rag: The Dramatic Story of the Landmark Supreme Court Case That Gave New Meaning to Freedom of the Press (New York: Random House, 1981) pp. 37-39

[7] Near, "A Few of the 'Unsolved,'" p. 1, 8

[8] Jay M. Near, "Our Czar? Our Censor!" Saturday Press [Minneapolis] 8 October 1927, p. 2

[9] Jay M. Near, "A Direct Challenge to Police Chief Brunskill," Saturday Press [Minneapolis] 15 October 1927, p. 7

[10] Case File No. 272132 "State of Minnesota ex. Rel. Floyd B. Olson vs. Guilford and Near," (Minnesota Fourth District Court, 1927) Minnesota Historical Society

[11] Jay M. Near, "Facts not Theories," Saturday Press [Minneapolis] 19 November 1927, p. 4

[12] William H. Mason, ed., Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927 (St. Paul: Citer-Digest Company, 1927) 10123-1 to 10123-3

[13] Reed L. Carpenter, "John L. Morrison and the Origins of the Minnesota Gag Law," Journalism History 9.1 (1982) p. 16

[14] Friendly, p. 26

[15] Case File No. 272132

[16] Ibid.

[17] Friendly, pp. 51-52

[18] "Freedom for Italy's Press," Minneapolis Journal 24 November 1927, p. 18

[19] Friendly, pp. 61-62

[20] Case File No. 272132

[21] "Free Press in Minnesota," Chicago Daily Tribune 12 October 1928, p. 12

[22] Friendly, p. 88

[23] Hartmann, p. 168

[24] Ibid., p. 17

[25] Friendly, pp. 92-93

[26] Ibid., pp. 102-103, 117

[27] Ibid., pp. 94-95

[28] "Press Gag Law is Attacked in Supreme Court," Chicago Daily Tribune 13 December 1930, p. 6, Proquest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1986), Proquest Information and Learning, University of Minnesota Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 24 November 2007 <http://www.lib.umn.edu/get/chicagotribune>

[29] Arthur Sears Henning, "Decision Ends Gag on Press," Chicago Daily Tribune 2 Jun. 1931, p. 6, Proquest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1986), Proquest Information and Learning, University of Minnesota Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 24 November 2007 <http://www.lib.umn.edu/get/chicagotribune>

[30] Paul L. Murphy, "The Case of the Miscreant Purveyor of Scandal," Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution ed. John A. Garraty (New York: Harper and Row, 1987) p. 222

[31] "Brandeis Hints Minnesota's Gag Law is Invalid," Chicago Daily Tribune 31 Jan. 1931, p. 7, Proquest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1986), Proquest Information and Learning, University of Minnesota Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 24 November 2007 <http://www.lib.umn.edu/get/chicagotribune>

[32] Friendly, p. 127

[33] "Brandeis Hints," p. 7

[34] Friendly, p. 128

[35] Ibid., p. 129

[36] "Brandeis Hints," p. 7

[37] Friendly, p. 129

[38] "Brandeis Hints," p. 7

[39] Henning, p. 1

[40] Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Co. Atty. 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931) Westlaw Dakota County Law Library, Apple Valley, Minnesota, 16 August 2007, p. 701

[41] "Near v. State of Minnesota," p. 723

[42] Ibid., pp. 719-720

[43] Ibid., p. 713

[44] Ibid., p. 719

[45] Ibid., p. 714

[46] Ibid., p. 723

[47] Ibid., pp. 728-729

[48] "Bill of Rights," The National Archives 14 December 2007 <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html>

[49] "Constitution of the United States: Amendments 11-27," The National Archives 14 December 2007 <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html>

[50] "Near v. Minnesota," p. 707

[51] Brian Leehan, Personal Interview, April 11, 2008

[52] "Press Gag Decision Praised by Washington Officialdom," Chicago Daily Tribune 3 June 1931, p. 4, Proquest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1986), Proquest Information and Learning, University of Minnesota Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 24 November 2007 <http://www.lib.umn.edu/get/chicagotribune>

[53] Ibid., p. 4

[54] "Supreme Court of U.S. Rules State Gag Law Invalid," Minneapolis Journal 2 June 1931, p. 17

[55] "Press Gag Decision," p. 4

[56] "FindLaw: Cases and Codes: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions," FindLaw Thomson Corporation, 22 December 2007, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/casesearch.pl?court=us&CiRestriction=460+u.s.+575&>

[57] "The Gag Law Knocked Out," Minneapolis Journal 2 June 1931, p. 18

[58] "Press Suppression Law Invalid," Minneapolis Journal 2 June 1931, p. 10

[59] "Police Suppress Second Paper in Gag Law Fight," Chicago Daily Tribune 15 June 1931, p. 7, Proquest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1986), Proquest Information and Learning, University of Minnesota Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 24 November 2007 <http://www.lib.umn.edu/get/chicagotribune>

[60] Kenneth Jost, ed., "Press, Freedom of," The Supreme Court A to Z (Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1998) pp. 342-343

[61] Melvin Urofsky, ed., "Freedom of the Press," Rights of the People: Individual Freedom and the Bill of Rights International Information Programs, 22 November 2007 <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/rightsof/press.htm>

[62] "Near v. Minnesota," p. 716

[63] "Press, Freedom of," p. 342

[64] Friendly, pp. 175-177

[65] Urofsky

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Documents

Chicago Tribune

I viewed articles from nine days of the Chicago Tribune ranging from October 1928 to June 1931. As Near's main support in the case, McCormick devoted much space to the cause. He explained his decision to aid a small Minnesota newspaper and stressed the principles of the case. He praised the Supreme Court decision and the American judicial system, predicting the importance of the case for the future.

Duluth Rip-saw, Oct. 25, 1924

This issue of the Duluth Rip-saw prompted the creation of the gag law by George Lommen and Mike Boylan. Seeing articles such as "Angry State Senator Says He Will Kill Head-sawyer," and "Bert Jamison's Unfitness Due to Physical Reasons," I recognized both why they would be angry, but also the importance of exposing crime and corruption.

Mason, William H., ed., Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927 St. Paul: Citer-Digest Company, 1927, 10123-1 to 10123-3

This statute, often referred to as the "gag law," was the statute that was fought over and declared unconstitutional in *Near v. Minnesota*. This gave me the actual text of the law.

Minneapolis Journal

The November 24, 1927 editorial, "Freedom for Italy's Press," described the censorship in Italy and Russia, specifically focusing on the fact that Italy's "free press" was not free. I also looked at the Journal's response to the decision of Near's case on June 2, 1931. Their response was surprisingly negative for a case that broadened their own rights as a newspaper.

Minneapolis Tribune

On September 27, 1927, the Tribune published an article on Guilford's shooting. Their reaction showed their reluctance to expose gangsters and politicians, and seemed to suggest that Guilford asked for his shooting. I also examined their response to the Supreme Court decision of June 2, 1931. They feared that scandal sheets would revive in Minnesota.

Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Co. Atty. 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931), Westlaw Dakota County Law Library, Apple Valley, Minnesota, 16 August 2007

This includes the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes and the dissenting opinion by Justice Butler. Reading the Supreme Court opinion helped me to move beyond the specifics of the story to the constitutional issues of the case.

"Press Gag Barred by Supreme Court; Minnesota Law Hit," New York Times 2 Jun. 1931, pp. 1-2, Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2004) Proquest Information and Learning, Dakota County Library, Eagan, Minnesota, 16 September 2007 <http://www.proquest.com/>

From the New York Times, this article reports on the outcome of *Near v. Minnesota*. The amount of space given to the outcome of the case by a major New York newspaper impressed upon me the national importance of the case.

St. Paul Pioneer Press

The article on *Near v. Minnesota* on June 2, 1931, the day after the decision was handed down, was mainly objective, though the newspaper seemed pleased with the decision. I compared its reaction to the Supreme Court opinion to those in other newspapers.

Saturday Press [Minneapolis]

Published by Jay M. Near and Howard A. Guilford, this weekly newspaper exposed crime and corruption and became the target of the gag law. I reviewed the run of papers from their first edition on September 24, 1927 to the last issue before the enjoinment on November 19, 1927. Looking at these articles, I formulated my own opinion of Near's writings. Articles of particular interest were "A Few of the 'Unsolved' Minneapolis Mysteries" and "Our Czar? Our Censor!" on October 8, "A Direct Challenge to Police Chief Brunskill" on October 15, and "Facts not Theories" on November 19.

"State of Minnesota ex. rel. Floyd B. Olson vs. Guilford and Near," Case File No. 272132 (Minnesota Fourth District Court, 1927) Minnesota Historical Society

The case file for *Near v. Minnesota* contains the court documents from the complaint to the judgment. As I paged

through the original documents, this case moved from an intellectual abstraction to a genuine drama with real people and real personalities. This file became key to my understanding of the legal process that ensnared Near.

Secondary Documents

Altman, Linda Jacobs, The Decade That Roared: America During Prohibition New York: Twenty-First Century Books, 1997

This book illustrates life in the 1920s, from Prohibition and organized crime to jazz. It provided a context to Near's crusade and helped me to understand just how much crime and corruption existed both within and apart from the government.

Carpenter, Reed L., "John L. Morrison and the Origins of the Minnesota Gag Law," Journalism History 9.1 (1982) pp. 16-71, 25-28

Establishing the origins of the gag law and the history of the Duluth Rip-saw, this article gave me the background to the Public Nuisance Law. As I read it, I learned the details of Morrison's situation and realized the corruption of the era that needed to be exposed by the press.

Eastland, Terry, ed., Freedom of Expression in the Supreme Court Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000

This is a collection of 60 First Amendment Supreme Court cases along with responses from the media. It gave me the opportunity to view the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times response to the decision.

"FindLaw: Cases and Codes: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions," FindLaw Thomson Corporation, 22 Dec. 2007 <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/casesearch.pl?court=us&CiRestriciton=460+u.s.+575&>

A website sponsored by Thomson Corporation, a leading legal publisher, FindLaw is a comprehensive set of legal resources. Through this, I discovered *Near v. Minnesota* has been cited at least 116 times at the Supreme Court level and numerous other times at lower levels, exhibiting its importance and impact.

Friendly, Fred W., "Censorship and Journalists' Privilege: The Case of Near versus Minnesota—a Half Century Later," Minnesota History 46.4 (1978) pp. 147-151

Friendly, a journalism professor at Columbia University, summarizes his speech given at the Minnesota Historical Society on *Near v. Minnesot*a and freedom of the press. This article enriched my understanding of this case and the freedoms it established.

Friendly, Fred W., Minnesota Rag: The Dramatic Story of the Landmark Supreme Court Case That Gave New Meaning to Freedom of the Press New York: Random House, 1981

Friendly's research provided me with detailed information on the case, from the Public Nuisance Law's formation to the conclusion of the case. This book led me to primary sources that helped me to formulate my own opinion and further my research.

Greenberg, Steve, "Landmark Decision," Editor & Publisher 129.26 (1996) p. 6, Academic Search Premier EBSCO*host*, Dakota County Library, Eagan, Minnesota, 14 August 2007 <http://search.epnet.com>

This editorial declares the Pentagon papers a landmark decision. It gave me a basic knowledge of the Pentagon Papers case which build upon the decision of *Near v. Minnesota*.

Hartmann, John E., "The Minnesota Gag Law and the Fourteenth Amendment," Minnesota History 37 (1960) pp. 161-173

An American constitutional history scholar, Hartmann describes the events surrounding *Near v. Minnesota*. It provided me additional insight as well as McCormick's quote that the statute was "tyrannical, despotic, un-American, and oppressive."

Leehan, Brian, Personal Interview, April 11, 2008

Mr. Leehan is a reporter and writer/editor for the *Star Tribune*. He underscored Near's relevance to today's media and shared his views about the work on shield laws that needs to be done to further protect the press. This interview allowed me to confirm the change over time in the *Tribune*'s position on the case.

Maccabee, Paul, John Dillinger Slept Here: A Crook's Tour of Crime and Corruption in St. Paul, 1920-1936 St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995

Paul Maccabee researched and recorded his findings on prohibition, gangsters, and government corruption in the Twin Cities between 1920 and 1936. It introduced me to the O'Connor system and detailed how gangsters virtually controlled the Twin Cities.

Murphy, Paul L., "The Case of the Miscreant Purveyor of Scandal," Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution ed. John A. Garraty, New York: Harper and Row, 1987

This is an essay from an anthology of great Supreme Court decisions that have altered the Constitution. It summarized Near's case and included background on how the historical context led to the conflict.

"Press, Freedom of," The Supreme Court A to Z ed. Kenneth Jost, Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly, 1998

An excellent overview of freedom of the press, this article explores prior restraints and subsequent punishment. It enabled me to understand these concepts more fully.

"Prior Restraint," West's Encyclopedia of American Law Eagan, Minnesota: West Group, 1998

This encyclopedia article explains freedom from prior restraint as a fundamental right derived from the English common law. Here I was able to follow the path of challenges to prior restraint from *Near v. Minnesota* to the Pentagon Papers.

Steffens, Bradley, ed., Censorship San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press, 2001

From the Opposing Viewpoints Digest, this compilation of essays showed me that there are two sides to every issue. Not everyone believes a free press is so important.

Tanick, Marshall H., "Minnesota and the Bill of Rights," Minnesota History 52.8 (1991) pp. 323- 326

Celebrating the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights. Tanick praises Minnesota's role in shaping the Constitution, especially in the case of *Near v. Minnesota*. I was drawn to the impact of the incorporation theory, in addition to the banning of prior restraint.

Urofsky, Melvin, ed., "Freedom of the Press," Rights of the People: Individual Freedom and the Bill of Rights International Information Programs, 22 November 2007 <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/rightsof/press.htm>

This chapter from the U.S. Department of State website reviews freedom of the press from the forming of America to the present. From this work, I built an understanding of the evolution of our free press and found a quote by Thomas Jefferson on the necessity of a free press.

Woodbury, Marda Liggett, Stopping the Presses: The Murder of Walter W. Liggett Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998

The author shares her research on the murder of her father, a Minneapolis journalist. In Chapter 4, "Meanwhile, in Minnesota," she discusses Floyd B. Olson and his open-door policy toward criminals. She confirms that, indeed, the major newspapers in the area were not reporting on scandals.

Tyranny set in stone
Roger Kimball
The New Criterion
November 2009

...In 1948, The Soviets blockaded Berlin, a preliminary, they hoped, to annexing it entirely. The Berlin airlift, orchestrated by the American army general, Lucius Clay, provisioned the city with some 4,500 tons of food, fuel, and other necessities every day for nearly a year—at its peak, 1,500 flights a day were crowding in and out of Tempelhof airport. Finally, in May 1949, the Soviets gave up and lifted the blockade.

The airlift was an extraordinary act of political defiance as well as an unprecedented logistical feat. But it did not overcome the contradiction that was Berlin. Increasingly, East Germans voted with their feet. By 1960, a thousand people a day were fleeing East Germany via Berlin. Walter Ulbricht, the GDR's Communist dictator, pleaded with Nikita Kruschev to do something to staunch the flow of human capital. The following summer, Kruschev, having taken the measure of JFK and his lieutenants, decided to close the border. At a dinner on August 12, he gleefully announced to his companions: "We're going to close Berlin. We'll just put up serpentine barbed wire and the West will stand there, like dumb sheep."

Work began at midnight. The Russian soldiers had been told to withdraw if challenged. But no challenge came from JFK's ovine entourage. In the succeeding months, the barbed wire was replaced by masonry and metal. The wall gradually encircled the whole of West Berlin. Some three-hundred guard towers punctuated the wall. A second, inner wall sprang up. The "death strip" between was mined and booby-trapped. Guard dogs accompanied the soldiers on their rounds. Erich Honecker, who replaced Ulbricht in 1971, issued a shoot-on-sight order. Somewhere between a hundred and two hundred people were killed trying to scale, or tunnel under, the wall, another 1,000 trying to flee elsewhere from East Germany. For Honecker, it was a small price to pay. Between 1949 and 1962, some two and a half million people had fled East Germany to the West. From 1962 to 1989, his draconian measures reduced the flood to a trickle of 5,000.

THE CHARGE OF THE LIGHT BRIGADE: GIVING MEANING TO A MEANINGLESS WAR

Erynn Kim

The Crimean War was once described as "the world's most curious and unnecessary struggle."[1] The most significant part of the war was its huge death toll, amazingly high due to a large number of military blunders. By far the most outstanding military mistake during the Crimean War was the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Battle of Balaclava in 1854. Many are to blame for this infamous blunder that cost the lives of so many. Lord Raglan, Lord Lucan, Lord Cardigan, and Lewis Edward Nolan all played key roles in this tragedy, and each shares some responsibility for the disaster that resulted from the Charge of the Light Brigade, one of the best known military failures of all time. The Charge, however, did make some important contributions to the development of the British army as well as becoming a symbol for the bravery of soldiers. Because of the development of this recognition of military bravery that resulted from the Charge, the Charge became immortalized, most significantly through poetry. Although the Charge of the Light Brigade may have sacrificed many lives needlessly as a single action within one battle, the Charge made a relatively meaningless war meaningful for the British as it eventually improved military conditions and, more importantly, boosted

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national pride due to the bravery of the soldiers.

The commander of the British troops at Balaclava, Lord Raglan, was known for his indifference to danger, which could be interpreted as either bravery or foolishness. Raglan was then 66 years old and, as a habit from his service as a staff officer at Waterloo, often called the enemy, any enemy, the "French," who, ironically, were now his allies in the Crimea.[2] Due to his old-fashioned attitudes toward war, Raglan was unfit for leading a modern army. Furthermore, Ragland did not have close relations with his troops, as he hardly visited them in their camps or trenches and made little or no effort to ease their suffering. Some believed that either he did not care or he could not find a way to help them.[3] Out of touch and rather out of date, Raglan was hardly the best man to lead the British into war.

Under Raglan's command was Major General Lord Lucan, a man with a fearsome temper and little intelligence. Three days before the battle of Balaclava, Lucan earned himself the nickname "Lord Look-on" for his failure to advance at the perfect opportunity against a disordered enemy merely because Raglan had not given him the written command to charge.[4] Lucan clearly lacked the initiative and the leadership skills to command his men without being led by the hand of one of his superiors. Lord Lucan's brother-in-law, Lord Cardigan, was the commander in charge of the Light Brigade and under Lucan's command. A cavalry officer once described the two brothers-in-law by saying, "As to Lord Cardigan, he has as much brains as my boot, and is only equalled in want of his intellect by his relation Lord 'Look-on.'"[5] Evidently, Cardigan deserved a position of authority just as much as his brother-in-law did; neither of them was truly fit to be in a position of such responsibility for the lives of so many men. In addition, the terrible relationship between the two brothers-in-law was well known, but Ragland chose to ignore this fact instead of tackling the problem.[6] The combination of Cardigan and Lucan, considering their relationship, was a disaster waiting to happen, a fact that their superiors should have foreseen but failed to act upon. In addition, the laziness and incompetence of both Cardi-

gan and Lucan caused many of their men to despise them.

One such man was Captain Louis Edward Nolan, a great swordsman and horseman. Nolan hated not only Cardigan and Lucan but Lord Raglan as well, remarking that Raglan's shortcomings were disgraceful and infamous.[7] Nolan's arrogant personality allowed him to voice his thoughts about his superiors as he saw them. His hatred for incompetence was a key factor that led to the fatal Charge of the Light Brigade.

On October 25, 1854, in Balaclava, Crimea, Raglan saw the Russians about to carry away some captured British guns and sent an urgent order to Lucan reading, "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate."[8] Instead of ordering one of his aides to send the message, Raglan sent Nolan to deliver the order to Lucan, the first of many mistakes to be made that day. While he was one of the best riders in Europe, Nolan also openly hated Lord Lucan and should not have been entrusted with such a message, especially one that was so vague.

Once Lucan received the message, he immediately questioned Raglan's orders, for the only guns Lucan could see from his position were not the ones Raglan was referring to but rather the Russian artillery pieces, stretched across the valley about a mile and a half away. Lucan completely misinterpreted Raglan's orders and, knowing that attempting to take the Russians' guns would be pointless as well as suicidal, expressed his confusion over Raglan's seemingly absurd orders to Nolan. Nolan despised Lucan and could not tolerate what he saw as Lucan's contradiction of Raglan's plans. He shouted at Lucan that Raglan's orders were for the cavalry to immediately begin the attack.[9] This only led Lucan to respond to Nolan by asking what he was supposed to attack[10] This question, though a legitimate one, aroused Nolan's loathing for Lucan's incompetence in general. Ignoring Lucan's higher rank, Nolan angrily responded by saying, "There my Lord is the enemy, there are the guns," while flippantly waving down at the valley.[11] Nolan's gesture was completely imprecise and pointed in

the general direction of the battery guarding the Russian cavalry standing further up the valley. Lucan, by now completely enraged by Raglan's unreasonable order, became even more livid at Nolan's insolence and conceit.

Despite his deep anger for the combination of Raglan's apparently bizarre command and Nolan's disrespectful audacity, Lucan decided to obey the order without further word to Nolan and went to Cardigan to order him to advance with the Light Brigade. Even Cardigan, dense as he was, realized that Raglan's order did not seem quite right. However, Cardigan was not one to contradict the commands of higher ranking officers and merely confirmed somewhat disbelievingly that the orders were for the Light Brigade to advance "against a battery with guns and riflemen on [thei]r flanks."[12] Lucan merely answered by stating that it was an order that could not be contradicted. Thus, Cardigan uttered the fateful words: "the Brigade will advance."[13]

When the Light Brigade rode into battle, Nolan, who had gained unofficial permission from a friend to ride with the brigade, suddenly charged ahead of the group shouting unintelligible words while gesturing madly with his sword in an action interpreted as either an attempt to change the charge's direction or to hurry up the attack.[14] At any rate, Nolan was the first to meet his untimely demise when shrapnel hit his chest. Despite the heavy gunfire, a large number of cavalrymen reached the Russian batteries and managed to kill the Russian gunners. The brigade was torn apart by gunfire and intercepted by the Russian cavalry, which the British cavalry turned to face. The valley in which the battle took place proved to be a dead end, and the British had to double back and go through the same open heavy gunfire to get back to their base. Cardigan led what was left of the British troops back to the camp. As a result of the charge, 113 out of 673 men died that day, along with 247 casualties.[15] About 397 horses were also killed during the attack.[16]

After the Charge of the Light Brigade, people struggled

to understand what the destruction of so many lives in such an apparently meaningless action meant. Naturally, they looked to find a cause for the soldiers' deaths and automatically turned to Raglan, Cardigan, Lucan, and Nolan, the leaders of the Charge. In a letter written to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a prominent British diplomat, to accompany a copy of Raglan's order, the anonymous writer related that either Cardigan misunderstood the order to charge or Nolan delivered the order incorrectly.[17] This implies that either Cardigan or Nolan was most at fault for the fatal charge—the former for misinterpreting the order, and the latter for failing to convey the message correctly. Nolan has often been blamed because of his disrespectful attitude that sparked the anger of his superiors leading to the Charge, though this may largely be due to his death during the Charge. Had he lived, Nolan might have been able to defend his actions. Cardigan, on the other hand, has probably been blamed the least by historians, as he merely followed the orders of his superiors as he was supposed to. It is known, however, that Raglan initially singled Lucan out as the most at fault, especially after Raglan realized that Cardigan was only obeying Lucan, his superior. Raglan directly told Lucan that had "lost the Light Brigade."[18]

Raglan was not the only one to believe that Lucan was to blame for the incident; Lucan became vastly unpopular, and the Duke of Newcastle, taking the side against Lucan, wrote to Lucan informing him that "it is Her Majesty's pleasure that he should resign the command of the Cavalry division and return forthwith to England."[19] Lucan never succeeded in regaining his former position of respect during his lifetime. Later in Raglan's life, however, Raglan probably would be the first to say that he himself was the most to blame, not Lucan. Raglan has remained largely blameless for the failure of the Charge, as his intentions behind his order were completely different from what the outcome of his order came to be. But after seeing so many in the British army die during the winter of 1854, Raglan's guilt overpowered him, and he died officially of Crimean fever but actually of a broken heart, as, in the words of Florence Nightingale, Raglan was very

depressed.[20] In the end, all four of these men received their share of the blame for the tragedy that was the attack on Balaclava.

On the other hand, some historians argue that perhaps none of the generals was truly to blame: there might have been some immediate purpose to the Charge that would justify the deaths of many members of the Light Brigade. Hugh Small, one such historian, argued that the British cavalry generals only charged "out of respect for the wishes of their men."[21] Small believed that the British cavalrymen wanted to fight to show Britain how brave they were and how they did not fear the enemy Russians.[22] Small's argument would free the generals from having to take the blame for the fate of the Charge. However, Small's claims have been effectively refuted by the other historians' accounts of the Charge, most notably in Colin Robbins' published direct rebuttal to Small's article. Robbins pointed out that Small ignored the details of the Charge and did not justify his argument with facts.[23] Whatever the case, if Small had effectively argued his case, the blame for the deaths of the soldiers would only be cast on the deceased soldiers themselves. This would justify their deaths by admitting that the soldiers could blame no one but themselves for the outcome of the Charge. This, however, would still fail to give anyone any real relief for such a careless destruction of so many lives.

Generally, most historians, Small and Robbins included, only view the Charge of the Light Brigade as a battle from a military standpoint; they all agree that the Charge was one of the biggest military blunders in history and should never have happened. In fact, militarily, the Charge of the Light Brigade was arguably the least valuable (it lost the use of the Light Brigade for Raglan) and least important (it did nothing to win the war for the British) attacks of the entire war. However, these historians often fail to acknowledge that humans learn best from their mistakes. Though the Charge was undoubtedly a complete military failure, the effects it had on the British soldiers, government, and public must be considered in order to judge the usefulness of the Charge.

In a letter Lieutenant Colonel Dallas wrote that, with respect to the British soldiers' reaction to the Charge of the Light Brigade, there was simply "one universal feeling of disgust throughout the whole Army at this murder, for it can be called nothing else."[24] Obviously, the British soldiers were horrified and angry at the deaths of so many of their friends, their fellow soldiers, whose lives were seemingly wasted in a battle that did nothing to improve Britain's standing in the war. But according to Dallas, instead of rebelling, the British soldiers became even more motivated to fight the Russians in order to avenge the poor Cavalry.[25] Ironically, the Charge that killed so many British soldiers, though most likely negatively affecting their relationship with their superiors, made the overall attitude of the British soldiers better, as they had more incentive to fight; in a way, the Charge inspired the British soldiers to fight as hard as they could, directing their anger, pain, and feelings of injustice at the enemy Russian troops and thus positively affecting the British troops in general for the rest of the war. This attitude may have been a key point in allowing the British to win the Crimean War.

In addition, because of the high mortality rate caused by poor planning as well as attacks such as the Charge of the Light Brigade, the British government reacted by initiating reforms and improving the conditions of the Army, allowing the British army to be well supplied with clothing, food, medical and hospital service, and other necessities.[26] This caused the mortality rate, which was 60 percent in the early stages of the Crimean War, a rate higher than that brought on by the great plagues in England, to decrease significantly in the second half of the War.[27] Furthermore, because of failures in the Crimean War like the Charge of the Light Brigade, the out-of-date system of fighting was transformed into a more modern system of battle involving the importance of marksmanship to be successful.[28] The Charge of the Light Brigade was indeed necessary to wake up the British and get them to understand that changes were needed in the army to make Britain a more successful military power. Consequently, in the greater scheme of things, the Charge of the Light Brigade actually improved Britain militarily.

This idea, however, that the Charge of the Light Brigade may have changed Britain for the better from a military standpoint still does not account for the views of the public on the killing of so many young men who played a huge role in British society. That this single Charge ended the lives of so many was not really the issue for the British public, rather the belief that the Crimean War bore no real meaning for Britain and only stood as an utter waste of time, money, and lives caused outrage among the public. Ironically, this Charge, which cost the lives of so many soldiers, proved to give the entire war some sort of meaning for the public.

In the public's eye even today, the Charge of the Light Brigade was the thing that redeemed the Crimean War, due to the heroic bravery of the soldiers who charged against all odds with the knowledge that this order would more than likely lead to their deaths. The belief that war was a romantic, gallant effort was intensified as a result of the Victorian era that began during the mid-19th century. Because of these views, events like the Charge of the Light Brigade in this case were often romanticized. William Howard Russel, the war correspondent for the *London Times* at the time of the Crimean War in the 19th century, played an important part in the romanticizing of the Charge.[29] Russel used intense words, vivid imagery, and repetition to dramatize the Charge in his article, as well as switching tenses and using weak language, such as the passive voice and linking verbs, to add contrast to further sensationalize and romanticize the exciting moments of the event.[30] All of these tactics gave the Charge a tragically heroic and brilliant flair in the *London Times*, causing the Charge to become such a heroic event in the eyes of the press, and consequently, in the eyes of the British people. Lord Lucan himself, though initially extremely against the order to charge, commented on the Light Brigade's attack by saying that the Light Cavalry's attack was daring and brilliant.[31] Even the man who began the day outraged at such a suicidal order marveled at the bravery of the Light Brigade. In addition, one enemy Russian cavalry officer commented on the British troops' incredible fearlessness by saying, "With such desperate courage these valiant lunatics set off again, and not one of the living—even the wounded—surrendered."[32] How much

more would the British public, ignorant to all the specific details of the attack and thoroughly on the side of their British soldiers, be impressed, especially with the efforts of the process to embellish the actual event?

Indeed, the idea that the British soldiers rode out with such courage to fight for their country gave the Charge of the Light Brigade purpose and caused the British people to lionize those who fought in the Charge. In fact, when Lord Cardigan came back from the war and landed in Dover, he found himself a hero rather than someone to be blamed for the deaths of many men. The crowd that met Cardigan upon his arrival actually gave "three cheers for Balaclava."[33] Everywhere Cardigan went in England, the British seemed to honor him. A wool jacket that Cardigan had often worn in Crimea was copied and named Cardigan, a name it has maintained to this very day.[34] Songs such as Slade Murray's "Oh! 'Tis a Famous Story of Balaclava" were sung in his honor, as well as for the honor of the generals.[35] However, the glory of the generals did not last, as the public eventually became aware of the fact that the generals were responsible for the failure of the Charge of the Light Brigade and did not really take a large part in the bravery exemplified by the ordinary soldiers. As one officer, Viscount Wolseley wrote, "In all the history of modern war, I do not know of another instance of such culpable neglect on the part of divisional commanders."[36] The public came to understand that the generals only represented the negative side of the Charge and should not be glorified for their part in the attack at Balaclava. Ultimately, the realization that the British military leaders of the Charge were at fault only emphasized the bravery of the soldiers, who loyally and courageously followed these flawed leaders into an attack that was bound to fail.

This romantic concept of bravery in the face of death filled the British public with national pride. As a result, the Charge of the Light Brigade has stood in the minds of all people as the iconic example of British valor, best immortalized through Lord Alfred Tennyson's poem, "The Charge of the Light Brigade," in his most famous lines: "Theirs not to reason why,/Theirs but to do

and die."[37] "The Charge" was chosen out of Tennyson's Crimean War poems (including "Maude," which Tennyson himself preferred) to be widely publicized because of its beautifully strong voice and its musical sound in recitiation.[38] Though aspects of the poem show Tennyson's uncertainty in how he felt he should react to the Crimean War, the poem as a whole evokes such an emotional response as its spurring language immortalizes the idea of courage in the soldiers participating in the doomed Charge.[39] Because of its poignant eloquence, "the Charge" became widely popular. A British military hospital in the Crimea even wrote to Tennyson requesting that copies of the poem be sent to the hospital to be read to the soliders.[40] Tennyson ironically remarked, "No writing of mine can add to the glory they have acquired in the Crimea."[41] Though the Charge was arguably glorious in itself, Tennyson was largely responsible in showing the British people the positive side of the Charge through his poem, which helped to shape the people's opinion into admiring the bravery of the Charge. Without Tennyson's poetic description of the Charge, the Charge would not have become as famous as it did, and the soldiers in the Charge would probably not be remembered in such a gallant light. With the help of Tennyson's poem, the Charge of the Light Brigade has now come to represent all the times in history when soldiers have valiantly charged straight into the valley of death to fight for their country. For this reason, the Charge of the Light Brigade is the most remembered event of the Crimean War, as the one incident of importance that, as a result of its own significance, gave meaning to the entire Crimean War.

[1] Robert B. Edgerton, Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) p. 10

[2] Ibid., p. 52

[3] Michael Hargreave Mawson, ed., Eyewitness in the Crimea: The Crimean War Letters (1854-1856) of Lt. Col. George Frederick Dallas (London: Greenhill Books, 2001) p. 49

[4] Richard Barker, "Britain's Last Cavalier," Military History 21, no. 4 (October 2004) p. 43 (accessed November 28, 2010)

[5] Edgerton, p. 94

[6] Barker, p. 42

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[8] Edgerton, p. 96

[9] John Selby, Balaclava: Gentlemen's Battle (New York: Atheneum, 1970) p. 148

[10] Philip Warner, The Crimean War: A Reappraisal (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1973) p. 69

[11] Warner, p. 69

[12] Ibid., p. 69

[13] Ibid., p. 70

[14] Trevor Royle, Crimea: The Great Crimean War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) p. 274

[15] Warner, p. 70

[16] Royle, p. 274

[17] Ibid., p. 277

[18] Ibid., p. 275

[19] Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954) p. 260

[20] Denis Judd, Someone Has Blundered: Calamities of the British Army in the Victorian Age (Gloucestershire: The Windrush Press, 1973) p. 52

[21] Hugh Small, "They Were the Reason Why" History Today 54, no. 11 (November 2004) p. 3 (accessed November 28, 2010)

[22] Ibid., p. 2

[23] Colin Robins, "The Reason Why Not," History Today 55, no. 2 (February 2005) p. 62 (accessed November 28, 2010)

[24] Mawson, p. 40

[25] Ibid., p. 41

[26] Woodham-Smith, p. 271

[27] Warner, p. 213

[28] Ibid., p. 219

[29] Jack Hart, "Keeping Pace," Editor & Publisher: The

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[30] Ibid., pp. 5-6

[31] Warner, p. 75

[32] Royle, p. 274

[33] Woodham-Smith, p. 263

[34] Ibid., p. 263

[35] The Crimean War: Jackdaw No. 11 comp. John Langdon-Davies, ed., John Langdon-Davies (London: Jackdaw Publications LTD, 1964) p. 4

[36] Edgerton, p. 99

[37] Royle, p. 276

[38] Stefanie Markovits, "Giving Voice to the Crimean War: Tennyson's 'Charge' and Maud's Battle-song," Victorian Poetry 47, no. 3 (Fall 2009) p. 496, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45540974 (accessed January 7, 2011)

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POLITICAL HOAX OR GENUINE CHANGE? THE DOMESTIC POLICIES OF JOZEF PILSUDSKI AND HIS FOLLOWERS IN THE YEARS 1926-1939

Piotr Dormus

Abstract

The following question is researched in the present essay: during the years 1926-1939, to what extend did Jozef Pilsudski and his followers in the field of domestic policies accomplish *sanacja* (healing) of the Polish state, which was the motivation for the May Coup in 1926? The first section of the essay examines the aims put forward by Pilsudczycy (the group of political activists concentrated around Pilsudski), who seized power in 1926. This serves to prepare the ground for the analysis of the accomplishments of Pilsudczycy both in terms of the written law and less formal political practices geared at making the political system more authoritarian. The investigation of the relations between the government and the opposition follows. Both direct and indirect measures taken by the government towards the opposition are discussed. The economic policies of Pilsudczycy are then investigated both in the successful periods of 1926-1929 and 1936-1939 as well as during the crisis which encompassed the whole first half of the 1930s. The last section of the essay analyzes the policies concern-

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ing the army sector, mainly in relation to changes in the military structure of command and preparation of the future war plans. The conclusion is then reached that Pilsudczycy put into effect a significant part of their initial ideas. This, however, did not result in *sanacja* of the Polish state in all of the areas of domestic policy. Although Pilsudczycy enormously improved the effectiveness of government, it was done with the use of practices that stood in clear opposition to the principles of a moral revolution. Also, while the balance of their economic policies was significantly positive, the decisions made with regard to the military most likely reduced the defensive capabilities of Poland.

Introduction

In November 1918—after 123 years of captivity (when the Polish territory was under the rule of Russia, Prussia, and Austria)—Poland regained independence and appeared on the map as a democratic state: the Second Polish Republic. Yet this young democracy encountered many complications resulting from, *inter alia*, the need to integrate territories from three partitioning states (with different laws, economic and political systems etc.) into one state, and the lack of government experience for the majority of the politicians. In 1921 the so-called March Constitution was enacted, yet the functioning of democratic political institutions was still far from ideal. The political situation was unstable: between 1918 and 1926 the average lifespan of a government came to six months.[1] This state of affairs raised strong objections from Marshal Jozef Pilsudski—a man who enjoyed extraordinary respect among Poles, stemming from his contributions to the process of regaining independence and rebuilding the Polish state—and a number of former independence activists concentrated around him, who were commonly known as Pilsudczycy. Facing the situation that, as they reckoned, was weakening the condition of Poland, Pilsudczycy successfully conducted a *coup d'état* in May 1926 under the slogan of *sanacja* (from the Latin word "sanatio" for healing)[2] of the Polish state.

Although more than 80 years have passed since the *coup*, its interpretations—to cite the historian Marek Sioma—still "(…) propel discussion; contribute to posing questions; open the field of analysis of the facts widely known (…)."[3] There is ongoing debate among many Polish and a number of foreign historians concerning the origins, course, and effects of the *coup*. However, due to the scope of the topic the present essay deals only with the most controversial aspect of the *coup*: its consequences. More specifically, it deals with the rule of Pilsudski and his followers. The essay will therefore try to answer the following question: during the years 1926-1939, to what extend did Jozef Pilsudski and his followers in the field of domestic policies accomplish *sanacja* (healing) of the Polish state, which was the motivation for the May *coup* in 1926? In order to answer this question, the actions of Pilsudczycy will be analyzed in relation to key aspects of domestic policy, such as political system transformation, relations with the opposition, the economy and the military. It is important to note that after Pilsudski's death in 1935, his followers carried on his principles, without significant changes, until the outbreak of World War II. Therefore, in this essay the terms *Pilsudski* and *Pilsudczycy* are used almost interchangeably.

The Aims

In order to fully analyze the domestic policies of the so-called *Sanacja* regime, it is essential to first examine the aims of Pilsudczycy. Many of Pilsudski's statements indicated his negative attitude towards the March Constitution and democratic political system. In his opinion, personal and party disputes had pushed Poland to the verge of anarchy.[4]

Yet willingness to improve this situation did not necessarily translate into a specific reform plan. The major aims declared by Pilsudczycy were rather general: their chief idea was the concept of *sanacja* (or the need to heal the state of affairs in Poland),[5] which was supposed to be comprised of a moral revolution and reinforce-

ment of the state.[6] The idea of moral revolution was brought up by Pilsudczycy especially often, and was given significant emphasis: for instance, the government address to the nation from 16 May 1926 read that "(…) such a level of morality in public life has to be achieved, which would ensure an internal revival and elevation of the Republic."[7]

However, thorough examination of the historical record provides a few more concrete priorities of Pilsudczycy. Reinforcement and expansion of presidential powers,[8] expansion of government prerogatives and reduction of prerogatives of the Sejm and the Senate (lower and upper houses of parliament)[9] were all intended to bring about a significant increase in the effectiveness of government. Similarly, reinforcement of the army was supposed to be achieved by liberating the army from parliamentary influence.[10]

Though Pilsudczycy may be criticized for their lack of ideas for specific reforms, which led to the general nature of their aims, it makes more sense to say that "(…) the vagueness of the *sanacja* slogan had certain advantages. In theory, all citizens supported patriotism, selfless public service, and morality in political life."[11] This allowed Pilsudczycy to gain support from different parts of the political spectrum. Yet, obviously, concrete actions were needed in order to change the situation in Poland, not just the slogans.

Political System Transformation

The form of political system was one of the crucial matters for Pilsudczycy, as they believed that the causes of the unfavorable situation in Poland were a powerful parliament and a weak executive branch of government. However, after seizing power, Pilsudski decided not to dissolve parliament, arbitrarily alter the constitution, or take the presidential office (though he proposed the candidacy of Ignacy Moscicki, who was then elected president). This was probably aimed at maintaining a positive image abroad,[12] and a relatively peaceful situation at home.

Instead, on 2 August 1926, the Sejm passed the so-called August Amendments to the constitution, which gave the president the right to issue acts with equal power to that of laws passed by the parliament. Pilsudczycy presented the August Amendments as an essential tool to quickly create legal order within the state, while only slightly reducing the powers of parliament.[13] However, as Andrzej Garlicki rightly points out, the August Amendments in fact gave Pilsudczycy substantial legislative power, as any presidential act could be regarded as a step to create legal order.[14]

From the point of view of written law, after the August Amendments there were no fundamental modifications of the political system until the so-called April Constitution was adopted in 1935. However, the style of government changed drastically. As Garlicki observes, "(…) the essence of the May events was that from then on it was not the written law that formed the supreme standard, but the will of the victor."[15] During the first period of their rule (1926-1930), Pilsudczycy did not have a parliamentary majority, yet they coped in various ways with resulting difficulties. The executive branch of government was constantly taking advantage of powers acquired through the August Amendments. Moreover, Pilsudczycy used practices that severely bent the law, yet were not overtly illegal. For example, in the instances when parliament voted a no-confidence motion, the government indeed resigned, yet the same ministers formed the next government. Another typical practice was the enforcement of controversial laws through presidential acts, followed by the postponement of parliamentary sessions by the president, in order to avoid the abolition of those acts by the parliament.[16]

Characteristic of this style of ruling was the question of the judiciary. Even though many historians, such as Richard M. Watt or Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, claim that the courts of law retained complete independence,[17] Garlicki more fluently argues the opposite. He points at article 78 of the March Constitution, which provided the possibility of removing or transferring judges in case of changes in the organization of the judicial system. Although this regulation was introduced to unify the way in which the judiciary

had been organized in the territories formerly ruled by different partitioning states, the *Sanacja* regime used it to exert pressure on judges who were ill-disposed towards the government.[18] Moreover, on 6 February 1928 the president issued an act allowing the government to retire judges or transfer them to different courts without their consent.[19] This act also provided the government the right to award bonuses to retiring judges and thus could be used as another tool to put pressure on them.[20]

Though during the first four years of their rule Pilsudczycy retained some restraint in the way they governed the country—most likely because they did not have a parliamentary majority and wanted to avoid actions starkly contrasting with the written law—the situation changed after 1930. In the precipitated elections of 1930, Pilsudczycy gained 56.1 percent and 69.4 percent of the seats in the Sejm and the Senate respectively,[21] which allowed them to pass any law except a constitution. In addition to this, the government informally adopted the so-called legislative leeway rule, which allowed the construction of laws in a way that would give ministers the great decision-making freedom possible.[22] This increased the effectiveness of the government, especially since no institution had the right to examine the compliance of laws with the constitution.[23]

In this light, it could be stated that the institution of the new constitution in 1935—although it further strengthened the executive branch of government—was not very revolutionary. Even the process of passing this constitution was characteristic of the way *Sanacja* regime worked at the time. Pilsudczycy passed it when members of the opposition boycotted the debate in the Sejm. Although all MPs ought to have been notified about the vote on the new constitution 15 days in advance, Pilsudczycy claimed that the constitutional debate that had been going on for several months prior to the vote in itself constituted such notification.[24]

Clauses of the new constitution were also a testimony to the authoritarian tendencies of the *Sanacja* regime. The presidential power was brought to an extreme: the government, the Sejm, the Senate, the military, and the courts were all under his authority.

Furthermore, the president had the right to appoint the government and the highest military officials, dissolve the parliament, issue acts with the statute power as well as other official acts without the need to obtain a counter-signature, and he could veto any law passed by parliament. Finally, the president was not responsible to anyone except "(…) God and history."[25] At the same time, the constitution radically reduced the number of MPs and—more importantly—the powers of parliament, the essence of which was article 31, which simply stated that "The duties of governing the country do not belong to the Sejm."[26]

It has to be admitted that from the point of view of government effectiveness Pilsudczycy undoubtedly healed the state of affairs: the executive branch of the government was strengthened, while the parliament—which had been constanly deadlocked and thus ineffective—was forced to undergo a decline in real power. Moreover, while putting such changes in practice, Pilsudczycy did not cause serious unrest, nor did they damage the image of Poland abroad. Yet this process was not accompanied by a moral revolution, as it happened at the cost of democratic standards being drastically bent or even breached.

Relations Between the Government and the Opposition

Even more controversy is aroused by Pilsudczycy's direct (electoral abuses) and indirect (various forms of repression) treatment of the opposition. The repertoire of electoral irregularities—which were especially intensified during the parliamentary campaigns of 1928 and 1930—included secret campaign funding from the treasury of the pro-Pilsudczycy candidates,[27] openly ordering provincial governors to support Pilsudczycy,[28] adding electoral cards to ballot boxes,[29] cancelling electoral lists of the opposition parties,[30] and confiscating the opposition's publications.[31]

Most importantly, however, during the 1930 campaign members of the opposition were subjected to direct repression. During the final part of the campaign several important MPs from

the opposition parties were arrested—under the allegation of preparing a *coup d'état*—and transported to a stronghold located in the town of Brzesc. Immediately after their release from Brzesc, the prisoners revealed that they had been starved, systematically beaten up, and put in solitary confinement, with some of them having to face simulated executions. Yet during the Sejm discussion on 26 January 1931, the then prime minister Walery Slawek stated that "(…) there was neither sadism nor mistreatment,"[34] and Pilsudczycy easily rejected the opposition motion to appoint a committee to investigate the Brzesc issue.[35] Nowadays, however, it would be difficult to find a reputable historian who argues that the Brzesc prisoners were not severely mistreated. Even the usually pro-Pilsudczycy Pobog-Malinowski admits that Pilsudski went "(…) too far both in secretiveness regarding deeper motives as well as vividness of applied penalty."[36]

Yet the *Sanacja* regime did not abandon the practice of arresting political opponents after the 1930 elections. By virtue of a presidential order from 17 June 1934 an isolation camp was founded in the town of Bereza Kartuska,[37] where neither the people arrested for a crime nor those convicted by court were to be detained but those "(…) whose activity or behavior provide a basis to suspect that they constitute a threat to safety, peace, or public order."[38] Gradually, Pilsudczycy deported a number of activists of far right-wing parties.[39] According to witnesses, the methods used towards the prisoners were more brutal in Bereza than in Brzesc.[40] Although Pilsudczycy explained that Bereza had been essential for detaining foreign spies (who could not have been put on trial for diplomatic reasons),[41] the experience of Brzesc, as well as the political affiliations of many prisoners at Bereza, urge one to doubt such explanations, and view Bereza simply as a tool to combat opposition. Garlicki even compares Bereza to Nazi concentration camps, asserting that Bereza's sole goal was to break the spirit of Pilsudczycy's opponents.[42] However, such a statement seems far-fetched, as not many other historians criticize Bereza so radically. For instance, Norman Davies describes such comparisons as "(…) absurd (…),"[43] whereas Pobog-Malinowski writes that Polish historians "(…) go too far in their judgments

and evaluations."[44] Yet it is imperative to underscore that the arguments of both Garlicki and Pobog-Malinowski concerning the most controversial issues of the *Sanacja* period should be treated carefully. Even though both of them are reputable historians, their biographies may influence them to hold certain positions in the debate. Pobog-Malinowski for a part of the 1930s was the head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Department of History and Sciences. The career of Garlicki, on the other hand, has flourished in Communist Poland, where Pilsudski used to be widely condemned for his alleged hostility towards Soviet Russia.

In spite of this, it is safe to say that employing brutal methods against the opposition excludes the possibility of a moral revolution. Although, arguably, various forms of repression were used for the sake of increasing government effectiveness, such actions did not simply constitute bending the law to its maximum, as occurred in the case of parliamentary activities. Rather, those actions were simply illicit.

The Economy

The economic policies of Pilsudczycy constitute another very important part of their domestic policy. Undoubtedly, the economic situation in Poland improved significantly after the May *coup*, and such a state of affairs lasted until 1929 inclusive. For example, the value of one zloty increased in only two months (which was reflected in the drop of the zloty's ratio to the American dollar from 11:1 to 9.15:1),[45] and kept on growing until it achieved a stable value of about 8.9 for one dollar.[46] Earnings purchasing power in the same period noted an approximately 10-20 percent increase.[47] The state budget became balanced.[48] For the first time in the interwar history of Poland, state revenues outgrew expenses,[49] and the foreign trade balance was positive.[50] Unemployment gradually declined and in October 1926 was 50 percent smaller than before the *coup*.[51] In addition, various significant investments took place, such as the construction of the sea harbor in Gdynia

accompanied by numerous related investments in the region neighboring the Baltic Sea,[52] and construction of nitric plants in Moscice between 1927-1929.[53] All of this makes it possible to talk about the economy being very much healed between 1926 and 1929.

At the same time it is important to reflect on the actual contributions of Pilsudczycy to economic improvement, and to analyze other factors which may have caused this situation. Pobog-Malinowski classifies the economy-related events of 1926-1929 as successes of the government. He ascribes them to factors such as the foundation of three advisory committees to the prime minister (working on strictly economic matters, agriculture, and unemployment) which were comprised of experts from the whole political spectrum.[54] Another such factor could be the implementation of the loans and monetary reforms plan, commonly known as the stabilization plan. Its execution led to a fast increase of the value of gold and foreign currency reserves to the extent that allowed the zloty to achieve the status of one of the most stable currencies in the world.[55] Yet giving credit for the improvement of the economy solely to Pilsudczycy seems groundless in the face of strong arguments put forward by many historians (including Zbigniew Landau and Jerzy Tomaszewski,[56] Jacek Piotrowski,[57] Watt,[58] and Garlicki).[59] They claim that the situation in Poland was for the most part a logical consequence of global economic growth. Watt also convincingly argues that the successes stemming from the implementation of the stabilization plan should not be attributed to Pilsudczycy, since it was the pre-May governments that developed the guidelines of the plan, but due to the unfavorable economic situation they did not execute the plan.[60]

In addition to this, in the beginning of the 1930s the economy started to decline. There is a consensus among historians regarding the global economic crash as the reason for such a situation. However, the question of whether Pilsudczycy undertook appropriate steps towards combating the crisis during its five-year duration arises. The government's strategy came down mainly to reducing expenses in order to avoid creating a budget

deficit and maintaining a desired rate of change of the zloty.[61] It seems, however, that many of the actions included in this strategy only worsened the situation. For instance, a vast number of civil servants were dismissed, which only boosted unemployment. The customs duties were raised, which caused an increase in the prices of imported goods. Finally, in order to stop the outflow of gold, the export of Polish goods was stimulated. This created a need to sell those goods even at dumping prices, which in turn had to be balanced by setting higher prices for the local market.[62] All this led to a decline of national income from 28 billion zlotys in 1929 to 15 billion in 1933, which translated to a significant decrease in living standards.[63] Most likely, many of the actions that worsened the situation could have been avoided had a less orthodox strategy been chosen, such as expanding the budget deficit to stimulate demand.[64] On the other hand, one has to keep in mind that while analyzing these events now, one has the invaluable benefit of hindsight. As Watt admits, Keynesian concepts—which would most likely have brought better effects—were not at this time commonly accepted, even in larger countries.[65] Therefore, the economic policies of Pilsudczycy during the crisis should not be assessed too harshly.

Besides, government actions in the economic sphere between 1935 and 1939 appeared much better. Unemployment was in decline, while industrial production was increasing. This was caused primarily by several less orthodox policies, for instance in the form of various trade agreements, refinancing foreign debt, or emitting a huge internal loan for industrial development.[66] Even more important was the start of central planning—based mainly on national resources—in March 1936. The main achievements related to central planning were the development of the military industry and the foundation of the so-called Central Industrial Region. Other considerable investments (e.g. the hydro-electric power station in Roznow and the metallurgical plant in Stalowa Wola) were nearly finished, yet their completion was affected by the outbreak of World War II.[67] Still, government actions regarding industry greatly contributed to the highest industrial production levels in interwar Poland.[68] As Davies points out, Pilsudczycy em-

ployed central planning quite early compared to other countries, which definitely turned out to be a sound move.[69]

Thus, the period of 1936-1939 in the economy should be described as successful for Pilsudczycy. Also, when analyzing the whole of their rule from the economic standpoint, it can be stated that they accomplished *sanacja* to a substantial degree. Although in the first period of their rule the global economic situation hugely operated to their favor, they were able to take advantage of it. This positive picture is somewhat disturbed by a number of inaccurate decisions made during the crisis, yet in the last period of their rule they managed to rehabilitate themselves, and many of the investments conducted at that time have been serving Poland up to the present day.

The Military

Pilsudczycy also meant to accomplish *sanacja* by bringing the armed forces to an appropriate condition. Certainly important for Pilsudski himself, as well as for the whole military, was to streamline the structure of command.[70]

Changes in the structure of command came soon after the *coup*. In August 1926 the office of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces (GIAF) was instituted and taken over by Pilsudski himself. Thus, he obtained total military command, as he had already been serving as the Military Minsiter.[71] Yet one-man command of the army, as enforced by Pilsudczycy, is a subject of controversy. This structure definitely created the possibility for very effective military management. It seems, however, that Pilsudski—especially in the last period of his life—was not able to allocate a decent amount of time to military reorganization and modernization. But, without his consent, no significant decisions could have been made.[72]

However, a substantial critique of Pilsudski concerns the plan for a future war. Pilsudski demanded to be involved in the majority of decisions,[73] which led to the underutilization of the

human potential gathered in GIAF. The experts employed there could have probably worked much more effectively had they not been obliged to consult Pilsudski with regard to the majority of their decisions. Furthermore, individual Army Inspectorates—which were supposed to become units of command during the war—were not able to obtain specific information from the head office. Thus, their leaders were only able to prepare very hypothetical plans for future military conflict.[74] All of this led to the creation of very vague and not necessarily premeditated plans for possible wars with Germany or Soviet Russia.[75]

The major consequence of the above was that Poland entered World War II with a rather unsophisticated plan, and a considerable number of troops who nonetheless formed an antiquated army.[76] Although it is very likely that the defeat of Poland by the Hitler-Stalin alliance would have happened even if the Polish army had been in much better condition, it is still difficult to talk about *sanacja* with regard to the situation in the armed forces. It is true that Pilsudczycy put into effect their idea of removing the army from the influence of parliament. However, taking into account the magnitude of problems caused by a *de facto* one-man command over the army, it can be stated that the *Sanacja* regime did not change the situation of the military in a positive way.

Conclusion

The answer to the question about the extent to which Pilsudczycy accomplished the healing of the Polish state in the sphere of domestic policy is definitely complex. Unquestionably, Pilsudczycy put into effect the majority of their initial concrete ideas, whether by making the political system more authoritarian, by changing the structure of military command, or by improving economic conditions, at least during certain periods. However, these changes did not necessarily translate into true *sanacja* of the country. The extent of *sanacja* varied depending on the given aspect of domestic policy. Although Pilsudczycy achieved a significantly

more effective level of government, and contributed greatly to healing the economy, there was no *sanacja* in the military sector. One could even argue that Pilsudczycy reduced the defensive capabilities of Poland. Also, though the concept of moral revolution had at first been very heavily emphasized by Pilsudczycy, *sanacja* was certainly not achieved from a moral standpoint. The fashion in which Pilsudczycy treated the opposition is a strong testimony to that.

Apart from the answer to the research question, the investigation of the topic provides material for further reflection. For instance, one could analyze the impact of Pilsudczycy's domestic policies on the defeat of Poland by Germany and the USSR in September 1939. One could also ask to what extent the direction of political transformations mirrored the various authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies present in other European countries during the interwar period. Finally, the essay topic is an excellent case study for deliberations about the continuing problem of the struggle of young democracies. The topic could also be used as a starting point for a debate about the boundaries of actions that are acceptable for those in power. The analysis of the *sanacja* period by pondering the rightness of the Machiavellian "end justifies the means" cliché, lies, however, more in the philosophical than the historical sphere.

[1] Wielka Encyklopedia PWN, s.v. "*Polska—II Rzeczpospolita*"

[2] Due to the lack of an English term equivalent to the Polish term *sanacja*, different versions of this term are used in the historiography in English. By using the Polish word *sanacja*, this essay follows the standard set by Norman Davies, one of the most famous historians specializing in the history of Poland.

[3] Marek Sioma, "*Wstep*," in *Zamach stanu Józefa Piłsudskiego*, ed. Marek Sioma (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2007) p. 9

This and all the following quotations were translated from Polish by Piotr Dormus.

[4] Andrzej Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste* (Warsaw: Prószynski i S-ka, 2008) pp. 123-124; Richard M. Watt, *Gorzka chwała, Polska i jej los 1918-1939* trans. Piotr Amsterdamski (Warsaw: A.M.F. Plus Group, 2005) pp. 240-241

[5] Antoni Czubinski, *Przewrót majowy 1926 roku* (Warsaw: Młodziezowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1989) p. 45

[6] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 24

[7] Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe* vol. 9, ed. Kazimierz Switalski (Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego Poswiecony Badaniu Najnowszej Historii Polski, 1938) p. 32

[8] Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864-1945* vol. 2, 1919-1939, part 1 (London: Gryf Printers, 1956) pp. 487-488

[9] Piłsudski, p. 14

[10] Janusz Rakowski, "*Koncepcja panstwa w mysli politycznej Józefa Piłsudskiego*," *Niepodległosc* 18 (2009) pp. 183-184

[11] Watt, p. 249

[12] Andrzej Chojnowski, *Piłsudczycy u władzy, Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Współpracy z Rządem* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolinskich, 1986) p. 66; Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 33

[13] Andrzej Garlicki, *Przewrót majowy* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1987) p. 355

[14] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 7, 13

[15] Garlicki, *Przewrót majowy*, p. 369

[16] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 33

[17] Pobóg-Malinowski, p. 499; Watt, p. 414

[18] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 17

[19] *Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych z dnia 7 lutego 1928 r., Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* 1928, no. 12, p. 93 (7 February 1928)

[20] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p.17
[21] Wielka Encyklopedia PWN, s.v., "Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rzadem"
[22] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 27
[23] Ibid., p. 27
[24] Watt, pp. 303-304
[25] *Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 23 kwietnia 1935 r. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej* 1935, no. 30, p. 227 (23 April 1935)
[26] Ibid.
[27] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 24
[28] Watt, p. 250
[29] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 122
[30] Watt, p. 260
[31] Ibid., p. 250
[32] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, pp. 109, 156-157
[33] Ibid., p. 142; Watt, p. 260
[34] Andrzej Garlicki, *Od Brzescia do maja* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1986) pp. 90-91
[35] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 155
[36] Pobóg-Malinowski, pp. 529-530
[37] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 240
[38] *Rozporzadzenie w sprawie osób zagrazajacych bezpieczenstwu, spokojowi i porzadkowi publicznemu z dnia 17 czerwca 1934 r., Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* 1934, no. 50, pt. 473 (17 June 1934)
[39] Garlicki, *Piekne lata trzydzieste*, p. 241
[40] Ibid., p. 245
[41] Ibid., p. 252
[42] Ibid., p. 245
[43] Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland vol. 2, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) p. 316
[44] Pobóg-Malinowski, pp. 529-530
[45] Watt, p. 221
[46] Pobóg-Malinowski, pp. 502-503
[47] Ibid., pp. 502-503
[48] Ibid., pp. 502-503
[49] Ibid., pp. 502-503; Watt, p. 221
[50] Watt, p. 221
[51] Pobóg-Malinowski, pp. 502-503
[52] Ibid., pp. 502-503
[53] Watt, p. 264
[54] Pobóg-Malinowski, pp. 502-503

[55] Watt, pp. 222, 263

[56] Zbigniew Landau and Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Zarys historii gospodarczej Polski 1918-1939* (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1999) p. 148

[57] Tadeusz Radzik, et al., "Dyskusja," in *Zamach stanu Józefa Piłsudskiego* ed. Marek Sioma (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2007) p. 469

[58] Watt, p. 221

[59] Garlicki, p. 348

[60] Watt, p. 221

[61] Ibid., p. 265

[62] Ibid., p. 266

[63] Ibid., p. 268

[64] Ibid., p. 265

[65] Ibid., p. 265

[66] Ibid., p. 269

[67] Davies, p. 309

[68] Ibid., p. 309; Watt p. 330

[69] Davies, p. 308

[70] Karol Olejnik, "Konsekwencje przewrotu majowego w siłach zbrojnych II Rzeczypospolitej," in *Zamach stanu Józefa Piłsudskiego*, ed. Marek Sioma (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie- Skłodowskiej, 2007) p. 377; Watt, p. 216

[71] Olejnik, p. 377

[72] Watt, p. 373

[73] Olejnik, p. 378

[74] Ibid., p. 379

[75] Ibid., p. 378

[76] Watt, pp. 374-375

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Not institutions alone, but geographical position, climate, and many other conditions unite to form the educational influences that, acting through successive generations, shape the character of nations and communities.

It is easy to see the nature of the education, past and present, which wrought on the Canadians and made them what they were. An ignorant population, sprung from a brave and active race, but trained to subjection and dependence through centuries of feudal and monarchical despotism, was planted in the wilderness by the hand of authority, and told to grow and flourish. Artificial stimulants were applied, but freedom was withheld. Perpetual intervention of government,—regulations, restrictions, encouragements sometimes more mischievous than restrictions, a constant uncertainty what the authorities would do next, the fate of each man resting less with himself than with another, volition enfeebled, self-reliance paralyzed,—the condition, in short, of a child held always under the rule of a father, in the main well-meaning and kind, sometimes generous, sometimes neglectful, often capricious, and rarely very wise,—such were the influences under which Canada grew up. If she had prospered, it would have been sheer miracle. A man, to be a man, must feel that he holds his fate, in some good measure, in his own hands.

But this was not all. Against absolute authority there was a counter influence, rudely and wildly antagonistic. Canada was at the very portal of the great interior wilderness. The St. Lawrence and the Lakes were the highway to that domain of savage freedom; and thither the disfranchised, half-starved seigneur,and the discouraged habitant who could find no market for his produce naturally enough betook themselves. Their lesson of savagery was well learned, and for many a year a boundless license and a stiff-handed authority battled for the control of Canada. Nor, to the last, were Church and State fairly masters of the field. The French rule was drawing towards its close when the intendant complained that though twenty-eight companies of regular troops were quartered in the colony, there were not soldiers enough to keep the people in order. One cannot but remember that in a neighboring colony, far more populous, perfect order prevailed, with no other guardians than a few constables chosen by the people themselves.

PERESTROIKA IN THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN 1985 AND 1991: HOW DID GORBACHEV'S RELIANCE ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY CONTRIBUTE TO THE FAILURE OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS IN *PERESTROIKA* BETWEEN 1985 AND 1991?

Lo Man Chuen Adrian

Abstract

This research paper investigates the failures of the economic reforms in *perestroika* in the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991, asking the question—how did Gorbachev's reliance on the Communist Party contribute to the failure of the economic reforms in *perestroika* between 1985 and 1991? Through examining the worker-class protests and nationalist uprisings caused by the unsuccessful economic reforms, the paper shows how significant resistance in the Party led to their ultimate failure. This paper argues that without full support at every level of the Party, *perestroika* was never going to succeed, and such conditions were not present despite the political reforms under *glasnost* taking place.

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Introduction

The decline in the rate of economic growth in the early-mid 1980s had led to the Soviet political elites coming to a consensus that decisive steps had to be taken to repair the faltering economy from the Brezhnev era.[1] *Perestroika* can thus be seen as Mikhail Gorbachev's answer to these calls, after his rise to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985.

Perestroika, best translated as reconstruction or restructuring,[2] was an all-embracing economic reform[3] first mentioned by Gorbachev in December 1984 with the need to establish a commodity-money relationship.[4] These aims were channeled through reforms for opening up the market, such as the Law of the State Enterprise in 1988. These reforms, however, did not successfully revitalise the economy as desired, but to a certain extent led to local uprisings and ultimately the fall of the regime. This essay will examine the failure of the economic reforms of *perestroika*—how the policy of bold reforms had not achieved its intended results of increasing the pace of socio-economic development[5] and improving workers' living standards. Inflation rates rose from about 7 percent in 1987 to 53.6 percent in 1990 and to 650-700 percent by 1991 before the fall,[6] and more people lived under the official poverty line in 1991 than in 1985.[7]

Gorbachev commented that *perestroika* as a reform was initiated and led by the Party,[8] supported from both the top and the bottom.[9] However some historians argued that it was a "revolution from above,"[10] and other historians noted that the opposition within the Party had in fact paralysed Gorbachev's reforms.[11] This academic contention deals with the role of the Communist Party in the implementation of *perestroika*, and to what extent did it contribute to the failure of the reforms. Therefore, this essay aims to discuss the following question: How did Gorbachev's reliance on the Communist Party contribute to the failure of the economic reforms in *perestroika* between 1985 and 1991?

To understand Gorbachev's reliance on the Party in implementing these reforms, the essay will first examine the contextual

and structural reasons that inclined Gorbachev to enforce the reforms through the Party. It will then analyse the weaknesses in the Party system that hindered the effects of the reforms: its lack of understanding of the market, its lack of public support and its opposition to *perestroika*. The essay will lastly turn to examine the consequences of the reliance, on how these weaknesses played a significant and indispensable role in the failure of a thorough reform.

Several Reasons for Gorbachev's Failure:

Power Structure Within the Soviet Society and Party

The Soviet society had always been highly controlled by the Party in all sectors of living. The regime, state, society, polity and economy were essentially monopolised by the CPSU under the Soviet partocratic and mono-organisational regime, as well as every centrally and locally based ministry, industrial or agricultural enterprises, trade unions and the armed forces.[12] This arrangement of power and authority established the Communist Party as the supreme order and helped maintain a form of metastability, which ensured the level of control by the Party on all fronts. Civil society was almost non-existent before Gorbachev's implementation of *glasnost*,[13] as the presence of the Party in all different sectors along with the KGB forbade any form of dissent against or autonomy from the regime.

Peter Boettke contended that the system in the Soviet society that had arisen from the attempt to realise the Marxist dream was a "caste society of political power and economic special privileges,"[14] where all the political leadership and the *nomenklatura* (or ruling elites) of the Party acted similarly as "feudal lords" over the classes below and benefitted directly from the economic successes and failures.[15] While this analysis controversially implied that the economy in the Soviet Union was a market economy controlled by various power groups rather than a command economy as we came to understand it, the analysis reflected the presence of a hierarchi-

cal structure which accurately pointed out that members within it benefitted from any successes of the economy, often through both legal and illegal means such as bribery and nepotism.[16]

However, as Jerry Hough argued, Gorbachev and his advisors accepted from as early as 1985 that the bureaucracy of the Party had been granted "unchallengeable power"[17] from the Brezhnev-era, which allowed "some ministries…to interpret the decisions of the Central Committee…that in practice nothing at all remained of these principles."[18] Gorbachev's description questioned the capacity of the bureaucracy for any successful reform to be implemented and to reach the people.

The common ground in these analyses lie with the fact that the bureaucracy was in control of significant aspects in the economy, and under this context it was understandable that any reforms to the economy had to be initiated and implemented by the Party-state to achieve the goal of improving the system, as the only organ with complete penetration and domination of Soviet society.[19] It should be noted though, that some of these conditions had changed under the implementations of *glasnost*, which empowered the Communist parties in the republics.[20] However, these reforms required the Party to surrender its fundamental privileges and status to take on new tasks, which was the underlying cause of much of the opposition.[21] Moreover, as Boettke rightly expressed, there was significant conceptual difficulty in "mobilising a people that had been culturally conditioned to submit to authority to challenge the main beneficiaries of the system"[22] through these reforms. The conservatism of the people became an impediment to reforms relying on public support, such as private farming.

Gorbachev's Goal of Reliance on the CPSU

Gorbachev's reformist character was evident prior to his appointment as General Secretary in his speech at the Politburo in December 1984.[23] In that speech, where the ideas of *perestroika* and *glasnost* first came to light, he emphasised "changes for accel-

erating scientific and technological processes"[24] and for enhancing productivity[25] under the slogan of *uskorenie* (acceleration), which persisted for the first year and a half of his rule. The reforms hinted towards an intention to tighten the economy rather than invoking fundamental transformation,[26] which were revised by Gorbachev's implementation of the 1986-1990 Five Year Plan, which raised growth targets with increased investments into heavy industries. Historians such as Robert Strayer and Victor Winston argued that Gorbachev had yet to relate the economic problems with the inherent properties of the system,[27, 28] a point that was alluded to in Gorbachev's memoirs that the contradictions of the systems were thought to be solvable "without going outside its original framework."[29]

The serious political and economic reforms of *perestroika* and *glasnost* as we know them today, brought up during the Communist Party Central Committee Plenum in 1987,[30] were constructed upon the disappointing results of *uskorenie*. It should also be noted that Gorbachev had a vision that the Communist Party could remain in power had successful reforms be put in place. As Jack Matlock pointed out, Gorbachev had the illusion that the CPSU could be turned into "an instrument of fundamental change,"[31] which explained the rationale for operating within the Party to diminish the authority of the Party for a more open governance, which to him, would complement the economic reforms of *perestroika* to restore the Soviet economy.[32] These were the circumstances under which Gorbachev committed to reform the Soviet economy and Party bureaucracy through relying on the Party itself.

Weaknesses of the Communist Party

As the reforms unfolded, it was evident that the Communist Party and some of the structural problems hindered the progress of *perestroika*. What were the weaknesses in the Party that obstructed the implementation of *perestroika*?

Lack of Understanding of the Market

Aside from the few *institutchiki* (civilian academicians), such as Abel Aganbegyan and Aleksandr Yakovlev, whom Gorbachev drafted into the highest decision-making levels,[33] most of the Party officials, both central and local, had little experience with or knowledge of the market system proposed in Gorbachev's reforms, being raised and schooled under Communist rule. The impact was illustrated in their handling of public reactions to market events, where the lack of consideration for market responses turned minor incidents into significant crises. The withdrawal of agricultural subsidies led to short-run depletion in banks and a failure in the distribution mechanism[34] which was beyond the imagination of the officials. These setbacks impeded efforts of marketisation and provided opportunities to individual opportunists for exploitation,[35] particularly when decentralisation placed greater decision-making in the hands of equally ignorant managers and not merely the ministries.

It can even be argued that many local Party secretaries were unclear about the difference between carrying out "political leadership" of the economy as specified in the reforms and the old-style of administrative pressure. According to a survey of local Party secretaries in the Orenburg region in 1987, while 80 percent agreed direct Party interference in management was the fault of economic bureaucracy, 79 percent imprecisely understood the distinction between their old and new roles under the reform.[36]

Party and Reforms Lacked Public Support

Andrei Sakharov critically remarked in his final years that the Soviet society was overcome by an apathy towards politics, where "having been deceived so often by pretty words, the people no longer believed in [the Party]."[37] These comments precisely pointed to a prevalent attitude of the Soviet people towards politics. The economic stagnation under the Brezhnev era in the years

preceding *perestroika* had narrowed public confidence in reforms, due to fears of insecurity it might pose to their livelihoods. Timothy Colton suggested that many Soviet blue-collar workers were among the "passive and conservative-minded"[38] who saw deep reforms adding greatly to the insecurity of working class life. According to a large survey carried out in 1991, 46 percent of the Soviets felt at risk of losing their jobs in the transition to a market economy.[39]

Gorbachev's reforms to the economy called for the marketisation of the command economy in place. In his efforts to introduce cooperatives and greater autonomy to producers, such as the Law of Cooperatives and Law on State Enterprises in 1988, the manufacturers responded negatively to the market incentives proposed, which could be attributed to a lack of knowledge about the market, poor management of the local Party and a lack of confidence. While the Law on State Enterprise aimed at reducing *goszakazy* (state orders) to around 70 percent of the factory output, coupled with the market incentive of higher profit from private sales in the market, many manufacturers insisted on ministries taking up a larger share of their production,[40] thus reducing their workload to source and channel excess production.

At the time of the reforms, the public and the enterprises had little knowledge about the market. Most of its citizens in the longest-serving Communist regime were second-generation, and had not experienced family-farming or private ownership as their counterparts had in China.[41] As a result, the social acceptance of cooperatives and competitive prices was low in many sectors of society, resulting in discouraging responses to the proposed reforms of the Party. The Soviet people, most of whom deeply held collectivist values resulted from decades of Communist rule, were suspicious and resentful towards individual wealth and property,[42] which was evident in their disdain for the cooperative members, associating their new-found wealth with criminal activity and foul-play.[43] The law legalising cooperative business enacted in May 1987 was thus only supported by the establishment of merely several thousand cooperatives in its first year,[44] which prevented the trend of marketisation from gaining wider credibility in society. While

that had been the predominant thought, the local parties did not attempt to advocate market values, arguably because they, too, were not well exposed to the market ideas.

Plant managers under the system of greater authority and autonomy to determine wages and product assortment had to face the "alien concepts of financial risk and profitability"[45] that were obscure to them under the central command system. Moreover, under the market system, managers had to find their own sources for supplies and manage costs, which demanded a shift of entrepreneurial mentality from satisfying targets to maximising profits, one that had been suppressed since the rise of Lenin. Neither did the market have the infrastructural support for the enterprises to increase control, where supplies, wholesalers and middlemen were rare,[46] and in fact, an open market to sell the goods was nonexistent, which forced many to reduce production capacity.[47] These obstacles for managers to accept the market incentive and adopt the reforms explained their preference for central planning.

Internal Opposition to *Perestroika*

Perestroika was a term so broadly defined during the time by the leadership that it essentially encompassed everything. As a result, anyone could have supported the aims of *perestroika* while disagreeing over the means used to achieve them.[48] Many officials since the beginning of the reforms had been providing lip service for the reforms without truly backing them with actions.[49] Gorbachev attributed the initial lack of success of *perestroika* to the resistance by the bureaucracy, where he recognised the leading structures of ministries, such as the Gosplan, the State Supply Committee, the Ministry of Finance and the apparatus of the government as chief oppositions to the plan.[50] He explained the situation to be a consequence of "no-one want[ing] to let go of power [where] whoever determined targets and allotted resources was seen as tsar…[and] otherwise the monopoly…and bribes, grafts and so forth…would simply collapse."[51] Likewise, Matlock recalled that

after the legislation of the Law of State Enterprises, outside Moscow "nothing much had changed."[52] He noted that aside from the terminology "state orders" replacing "planned output," Party officials essentially maintained their grip over local production.[53] Without their support at a local level, reform ideas of marketisation remained conceptual at the leadership and were thus not executed as planned.

The real structure of bureaucratic power, as argued by Tatiana Zaskavskaia, was part of the obstacle to reforms. She argued that power had been concentrated at the officials in the middle (employees of branch ministries and their territorial administrations) whilst the highest levels of government and the employees of the enterprises shared less. This power structure, as she noted, would be shifted by the economic reforms, which strengthened the prestige and influence of the top and bottom while weakened the bureaucrats in the middle.[54] The local officials were described as having an inertia against reforms and were accustomed to being "in the presence of authority," and would thus unconsciously oppose any diminution in these roles.[55] Moreover, reforms in place were criticised within the Party for both being too radical and too reactionary. The conservative ministers of the Politburo, led by Nikolai Ryzhkov, said that reforms such as the Law on Cooperatives should only be implemented gradually;[56] while the liberals, led by Boris Yeltsin, protested that these reforms were too timid and the Union should rapidly open to a market economy to attain significant effects.[57] This disputation within the Party had created significant hindrances in policy making by the second half of the *perestroika*, and thus restricted measures to control the downturn. This was arguably the most significant stumbling block towards success with *perestroika* from within the Party.

Consequences of the Weaknesses of the Communist Party

Perestroika led the Soviet Union into a graver economic situation than it had started with. Gertrude Schroeder argued that in addition to inflation and decreased growth rates, the economy was left facing three major crises: a disintegrated consumer market, a disrupted investment process and a massive budget deficit.[58] These crises, coupled with inflation and poverty, contributed to the rise of the worker-class protests and democratic and nationalist oppositions in the final years of the Union, a clear indicator of public discontent against the Party. How did the weaknesses of the Communist Party contribute to these conditions?

Worker-class Protests

The causes of the large-scale protests and strikes that erupted from the working class between 1989 and 1991 were predominantly related to the dissatisfaction with the economic situation at that time. These expressions were made possible through the processes of *glasnost* that allowed different groups to express their opinions and the legalisation of strikes beginning October 1989.[59] Between 1989 and 1991, a rising number of workers took their concerns to the streets, from an average of 15,000 per day in the first half of 1989 to 130,000 per day in less than a year.[60] These protests, originated from the coalfields of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, were stimulated by the inadequacy of food and basic necessities (soap, in particular) available to the people among many other reasons.[61] As prices rocketed while wages failed to follow the increase, households experienced a decrease in disposable income and a rise in expenditure. The Director of the Centre for Price and Market Research Policy noted that, as of June 1991, people in Moscow with average income were spending as much as 70 percent of their income on food, and the poor were spending perhaps 85 percent of their income just to eat.[62] Fear of poverty began to rise in 1991 when the state first admitted to the situation,

and in a mass survey conducted in November 1991 by Moscow Interfax, up to 64 percent of the interviewees feared their income would fall below the poverty line of 75 rubles per month.[63] The fear of inflation, decreasing wages, economic instability and most directly, deficiency in supplies, precipitated these labour protests against the state founded in the name of the working class.[64]

The supplies of food and other necessities were greatly reduced and affected by the unsuccessful agricultural reforms and in promoting the production of consumer goods. Historians such as Schroeder suggested that had Gorbachev undertaken major agricultural reforms, rapid boosts to the production of food would have been possible.[65] Contrary to their claims, the reality was that these reforms had been heavily obstructed both within and outside the Party despite persistent promotion.[66] Gorbachev had spoken about agricultural reforms at the 27th Party congress in 1986 and at Central Committee meetings in 1988, yet owing to the vested interests of local officials and collective and state-farm chairmen, who sought to protect the power and authority that they had in allocating resources, they resisted these reforms. Farm chairmen opposed these reforms on the grounds that 25 percent of the state and collective farms were unprofitable and thus smaller-scale familial farming would be unable to self-sustain, a claim which was refuted even by anti-reformist Ligachev.[67] Despite having the legal approval for families to lease land for private farming from collective and state farms, the *apparatchiki*'s fear of being deemed redundant led to strong opposition to local initiatives and less than 2 percent of agricultural land registered under private farms by the fall of the Soviet Union.[68] Together with the Law on Cooperatives enacted in 1988, these reforms failed to find sufficient support within the Party as it challenged the status of Party apparatuses and officials.

The inadequacy in necessities provided was met through extra imports, adding significantly to the Soviet Union's foreign trade long-term debt,[69] which created a greater obstacle for economic revitalisation. The bureaucratic culture of achieving targets had been so rooted in the Soviet mind that natural resources had

been wastefully used in the production, only to be compensated for with imports of similar goods. This led to a long-lasting budget deficits which hampered the economy's growth by the late 1980s.

As the political reforms implemented alongside *perestroika* advanced, deep inherent inequalities that remained untouched by the reforms were exposed and thus aroused public criticism. The economic reforms that aimed to create a fairer environment for the market had left the privileges of the *nomenklatura* unchallenged, a compromise made by Gorbachev in his attempt to hold the Party together for his reforms.[70] The lifestyles led by the *nomenklatura* as part of their class privilege provided a model for the workers to draw comparisons with, contrasting their scanty wages and inadequate supplies with an access to excellent housing, medical care and chauffeured cars. This fueled the workers' resentment towards the ruling class and Party, as expressed through the protests, in its contradictions with the egalitarian principles of Communism. Maintaining these privileges for the ruling elites also posed a sizable economic cost on the Party. The annual cost of maintaining the official cars for functionaries' personal use alone in 1990 was six times the total amount spent on the space program that year.[71]

Democratic and Nationalist Uprising

Although some of the causes of the nationalist uprising and surges were more politically grounded, on the existing national sentiments and democratisation efforts, the faltering economy did contribute to these national awakenings.[72] The incompetence of the central planning in meeting the needs and understanding the local situations and the collapsing economic system had precipitated these independence movements.

Under the repeated restructuring of the central planning ministries, the authority and relevance of their legislations to the different republics decreased as they eventually grew to lack public understanding and cause confusion, which was part of what inspired republics to take the economy into their own hands.[73] As

the rise of the ruble outpaced production, wide-spread shortages of necessities arose. The shortages in the market had tested the relationship of the republics and the central planning agencies, where decisions to protect the outflow of goods and sales to non-residents created trends of regional protectionism. *Obkom* first secretaries in the regions whose vested interests were the economy of their regions now made accountable to the people through election under *glasnost*, placed greater concern on regional stability over national interest.[74] As the economy deteriorated and supplies became deficient, Party officials in the Baltic republics began establishing rules banning sales of high-priority products such as meat to non-residents,[75] and invoking national protective measures. These acts hindered the flow of goods across the Union, and thus created the situation of unequal distribution of necessities by the wealth of the regions, leading to significant shortages in parts of Russia and Ukraine.[76] These acts not only crumbled the supply chains planned across the Union, but also led to increasing autonomy which persuaded republics to act increasingly independently.[77]

Conclusion

This investigation concludes by demonstrating the part reliance on the Communist Party and its weaknesses played in leading to the failure of these economic reforms, as examined through the economic reasons behind the two major outcomes: the worker-class protests and the nationalist uprisings. Evidence explored demonstrated significant resistance in the Party, both fundamental and intentional, that hampered the progress of the largely top-led reforms.

The Communist Party consisted of a traditional bureaucracy and ruling class that had little understanding of the market. Deeply rooted in the customs and practices of the previous eras, most officials in the Party were reluctant to change, having established themselves in positions of power and fortune through exercis-

ing their authorities. The market reforms, which only reduced their status in exchange for greater freedom and equality for the people and greater control of the leadership, did not appeal to most officials. As a result, local officials stood against the reforms by discouraging the people from participating in them.

Perestroika, though supported by the Party at its genesis, was heavily opposed by the different factions within the Party. This essay tried to show that without full support at every level of the Party structure, *perestroika* was never going to succeed in its radical aims of reforming and transforming the economy and the system. Even under *glasnost*, the Party was still too conservative in its own roots and benefits and would thus not have carried out the reforms successfully. The opposition within the Party had thus discouraged public support for the reforms, which led to the failure of the reforms in raising the standard of living. Though other factors such as leadership and foreign influences were not examined in this paper, the analysis still demonstrated the significant role the over-reliance on the Party had on the reforms.

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[3] Vadim Medvedev as quoted in Brown, p. 123

[4] Mikhail Gorbachev as quoted in Hahn, p. 42

[5] Communist Party Plenum of January 1987 retrieved on 10 September 2010, Available Online at <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111peres.html>

[6] William Moskoff, Hard Times: Impoverished and Protest in the Perestroika Years (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993) p. 89

[7] Robert Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union Collapse? (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) p. 137

[8] Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) p. 55

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[11] Michel Tatu as quoted in Ed Hewett with Thane Gustafson and Victor Winston, The 19th Party Conference in Ed Hewett and Victor Winston (eds.), Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroyka (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1991) p. 119

[12] Hahn, p. 18

[13] Ibid., p. 19

[14] Peter Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed—The Politics and Economics of Socialist Transformation (London: Routledge, 1993) p. 70

[15] Ibid., p. 69

[16] Karl Ryavec, Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003) p. 70

[17] Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR 1985-1991 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997) p. 375

[18] Gorbachev as quoted in Ibid., p. 375

[19] Hahn, p. 42

[20] See XXVIII CPSU Congress where CPSU was challenged by regional Communist Party leaders in Hahn, pp. 183-196

[21] Strayer, p. 106

[22] Boettke, p. 70

[23] Marshall Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) p. 82

[24] Ibid., p. 87

[25] Victor Winston, The Early Years of the Gorbachev Era in Hewett and Winston, p. 3

[26] Strayer, p. 95

[27] Winston in Hewett and Winston, p. 3

[28] Strayer, p. 98

[29] Michael Gorbachev, Memoirs, (New York: Doubleday, 1995) p. 250

[30] Brown, p. 123

[31] Jack Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire (New York: Random House, 1995) p. 660

[32] Ibid., p. 660

[33] Hahn, p. 45

[34] Goldman, pp. 144-145

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[37] Andrei Sakharov, The Inevitability of Perestroika (1988) p. 4, retrieved on 1 October 2010, Available Online at <http://www.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/sakharovconference/SuggestedReading/The%20Inevitability%20of%20Perestroika.pdf>

[38] Colton in Hewett and Winston, p. 86

[39] Moskoff, p. 162

[40] Goldman, pp. 140-141

[41] Ibid., p. 115

[42] Strayer, p. 115

[43] Ibid., p. 117

[44] Goldman, p. 114

[45] Nicholas Fone and Shelley Deutch, Defense Conversations in the Former U.S.S.R.: The Challenge Facing Plant Managers in Richard Kaufman and John Hardt (ed.) for the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, The Former Soviet Union in Transition (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993) p. 730

[46] Goldman, p. 141

[47] Matlock, p. 254

[48] Ed Hewlett with Thane Gustafson and Victor Winston, The 19th Party Conference in Hewlett and Winston, p. 121

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[50] Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 227

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[52] Matlock, p. 253
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[60] Goldman, p. 151
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[67] Goldman, pp. 191-192
[68] Strayer, p. 119
[69] Goldman, p. 150
[70] Doug Lorimer, The Collapse of Communism in the USSR: Its Causes and Significance 2nd (revised) ed., (Chippendale: Resistance Books, 1997) p. 28
[71] Ibid., p. 28
[72] Strayer, p. 151
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The [Royal] Navy, as always, was considered the first line of defense in any conflict with France, and the strategy in 1793 was no different. Hood and the other admirals had put to sea to impose the usual blockade on French ports and naval bases, and to prevent any union of the various French fleets. But the Union Jack, flying on frigates at the edge of Toulon or Brest harbor or on ships at sea, represented something else to millions of unhappy Frenchmen: a sane alternative to revolutionary upheaval and terror. By that summer, many, indeed the majority, had turned their backs against the government in Paris. Spontaneous uprisings spread across the country. One seized control of Marseilles, France's principal southern port, and another Toulon, the home of the French navy's Mediterranean fleet. Toulon, with its sweeping harbor framed by an amphitheater of mountains and bluffs, would now be the stage for the first confrontation between the forces of French revolution and British sea power, and launch the careers of the three men who came to personify them.

The Revolution had shattered the old French navy. The majority of sea officers, the aristocrats of the old Grand Corps, had quit or fled France. A century-old tradition of naval skill and excellence vanished. Ideological correctness took its place. The Revolution abolished the "undemocratic" rank of master gunner—fatally weakening the French navy's firepower right down to Trafalgar—and offered captaincies to anyone who had been a captain in the merchant marine or even a ship's master. The old officers who stayed were always suspect: Trogoff de Kerlessy, commander of the Toulon fleet, had to watch his subordinates go constantly in and out of arrest for their supposed royalist sympathies. Not surprisingly, discipline collapsed on French ships and insubordination became common. When one admiral ordered his ship to engage Hood's squadron as they first came into the Bay of Biscay, his crew simply shot him and returned to port.

ONE MAN LEFT ALIVE: THE FIRST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR

Eric Keen

> This has been going on for ages. Alexander the Great was there. Then, the English came twice. They all tried to conquer Afghanistan. It did not work out.[1]
>
> —General Valentin Varennikov, former Soviet Commander in Afghanistan

Former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev called it a "bleeding wound." The decade-long Soviet attempt to occupy and control Afghanistan sapped Soviet morale and was a contributing factor in the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the Soviet Union was not the first superpower to meet stunning defeat in Afghanistan. About 145 years earlier, the mighty British Empire also invaded Afghanistan. Not only would the British fail in their mission to subdue Afghanistan, they would suffer, at the hands of rural tribesmen, one of the most disastrous defeats in British history. What would the British Empire, the superpower of the 19th century, have wanted with a poor, rugged country in Central Asia?

To understand, one must go back to 1815. After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, Great Britain and Russia emerged as Europe's two main world powers. With its primary colonial rival, France, out of the picture, Great Britain was busily working on

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expanding its network of colonies throughout the world. Although colonies in the Caribbean and Africa no doubt enriched Great Britain, there was one colony that towered above all the others: India. According to one estimate, between 1808 and 1815, annual net financial transfers from India to Britain valued £447,000,[2] or nearly $50 million in today's money.[3] Clearly, the British would do whatever it took to ensure India's safety. While the British Empire was extending its long arm across the oceans, Russia was happy to have a seat at the world table after being treated as "backwards" for hundreds of years. Seeing the prosperity that Britain was gaining from its colonies, Russia, despite its already massive size, was determined to enlarge its borders. Russia couldn't easily expand westwards without provoking Prussia and Austria. North and east only led to frigid oceans. Therefore, Russia, to expand as it wished, needed to move south into Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 1825, Russia claimed the Kazakh steppe, in modern-day Kazakhstan. Three years later, the Russians took over Armenia. Watching Russia's continued expansion in Central Asia, the British were becoming more and more concerned.

In 1814, even before Napoleon had been defeated, Britain had signed a mutual-defense pact with Persia. The agreement clearly stated that if a European power attacked Persia, Britain would lend either money or military aid. Article 6 of the treaty read, "Should any European power be engaged in war with Persia when at peace with England, his Britannic Majesty engages to use his best endeavors to bring Persia and such European power to a friendly understanding. If, however, his Majesty's cordial interference should fail of success, England shall…send a force from India, or, in lieu thereof, pay an annual subsidy."[4] In 1828, Persia fought Russia's annexation of Armenia. When Persia asked the British for aid as spelled out in the treaty, Britain, claiming that the treaty's language was ambiguous, refused. Believing that the British had betrayed him, Persia's ruler, ironically, began to explore ties to Britain's main competitor, Russia. Having now alienated Persia, the British decided that they urgently needed to explore other possible alliances in the region. They targeted Afghanistan.

In 1836, Britain decided to send 31-year-old diplomat Captain Alexander Burnes to meet with Afghanistan's ruler, Dost (the honorific title "friend") Mohammed Khan. Burnes was familiar with Central Asia, having undertaken an expedition to Central Asia a few years earlier, during which he met with Dost Mohammed. On this return, Burnes found Dost Mohammed amenable to an alliance against the Russians, but the Dost, more than anything, wanted back the strategic city of Peshawar, which had been taken by the independent Sikh state under Ranjit Singh. There was a complication, however. Ranjit Singh already had his own alliance with the British. Because the Afghans and the Sikhs had historically loathed each other, which was only made worse by the Sikhs' seizure of Afghan territory in 1834, the British could not ally themselves with both the Afghans and the Sikhs.

Captain Burnes recommended that Lord Auckland, governor-general of India, explore an alliance with Dost Mohammed, but Lord Auckland refused to risk a mutually profitable, fairly assured alliance with the Sikhs for only a potential alliance with Afghanistan. Burnes pointed out that Ranjit Singh was old and frail, and that if the Sikhs' respected leader died, there could be no assurance that the new ruler would be friendly towards the British. Burnes also noted that Dost Mohammed was, at heart, pro-British and could make a strong ally. Lord Auckland, though, ignored Burnes's analysis.

Two events in late 1837 would have a significant role in shaping the British policy towards Afghanistan. In November 1837, a Persian army laid siege to the city of Herat, in western Afghanistan, sometimes described as "the gateway to India." Persian attempts to capture Herat weren't all that unusual, as it had a large population of Persian Shiites. This time, however, in addition to the Persian army, the attack was reinforced by Russian troops and led by an official from Czar Nicholas I's court. To the British, this was confirmation for their suspicion that the Russians were interested in Afghanistan, with a possible eye towards India. Luckily for Herat's defense, though, Eldred Pottinger, a young officer for the British East India Company who had been doing

reconnaissance in Herat, offered his help in defending the city.[5] With Pottinger's aid and skill, the Afghans managed to hold back the combined Persian/Russian army.

The second event that propelled the British down the path to war was when Colonel Ivan Vitkevich, a political agent from St. Petersburg, arrived in Kabul in December 1837 with letters of introduction from Czar Nicholas to Dost Mohammed. When Dost Mohammed met with Colonel Vitkevich, Lord Auckland's worst fears about a Russian-Afghan alliance were realized. However, despite the fact that he had met with the Russian agent, Dost Mohammed was still willing to ally himself with the British and was still reaching out to Lord Auckland with the hopes of an alliance. By this point, however, Lord Auckland was already convinced that Dost Mohammed must be removed from Afghanistan. Auckland intended to establish a new, pro-British king on the throne of Afghanistan, a former ruler named Shah Shuja. Shah Shuja had lost the Afghan throne to Dost Mohammed in 1834, but the British had retrieved him and supported him with a pension in India. Now, Shah Shuja was ready to reclaim his throne courtesy of British arms.

In early 1838, Lord Auckland began responding to Dost Mohammed's hopeful overtures with a series of demands. In March, Auckland sent Dost Mohammed a virtual ultimatum: "You must desist from all correspondence with Persia and Russia; you must never receive agents from [them] or have aught to do with [them] without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vitkevich with courtesy; you must surrender all claims to Peshawar… In return for this, I promise to recommend to the Government that it use its good offices with its ancient ally, Maharaja Runjeet [Ranjit] Singh…."[6] Understandably, Dost Mohammed felt this was a one-sided arrangement. In hopes of forcing the British to offer him a better deal, the Afghan ruler began to meet with Colonel Vitkevich in more earnestness. To Lord Auckland, this was final proof of Dost Mohammed's infidelity.

In October 1838, Lord Auckland issued his Simla Manifesto, which falsely claimed that Dost Mohammed had made an

unprovoked attack on Ranjit Singh.[7] Lord Auckland sent one of his most trusted advisers, William Macnaghten, to meet with Ranjit Singh, to begin making plans for the restoration of Shah Shuja. From the first, though, it was clear that Ranjit Singh didn't have in mind what the British had in mind. The British first proposed that Ranjit Singh would furnish the manpower needed to restore Shah Shuja to his throne. In return Shah Shuja would abandon all claims to Afghan territory that had been taken by the Sikhs. However, Ranjit Singh declined this offer. Instead, he insisted that in addition to the terms proposed by Macnaghten, British soldiers would accompany the Sikh army and that once Shah Shuja regained power, he would pay a generous annual subsidy to the Sikhs. Macnaghten readily agreed to this proposal. However, when Shah Shuja heard about the arrangement, which Macnaghten told him that he was expected to agree to, he was furious. Shah Shuja detested paying a tribute to the Sikhs, the Afghans' historical enemies, and even worse, he balked at entering his own country with the help of the Sikhs.

Having determined that the Sikhs were not going to be of much value, the British were making final preparations for their invasion of Afghanistan. They decided on a force of 20,000 soldiers,[8] dubbed "The Army of the Indus." Tagging along were some 38,000 camp followers.[9] The British extravagance on campaign was amazing. One senior officer needed 80 camels to carry his personal belongings alone.[10] In December 1838, the invasion force set out from India under the command of General Sir John Keane. Sir William Macnaghten, Lord Auckland's longtime political agent, was given the position of British envoy to Shah Shuja's court. The First Anglo-Afghan War had begun.

At the start, some prescient individuals doubted that the restoration of Shah Shuja would be ultimately successful. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who led the first British expedition to Afghanistan in 1809, predicted, "I have no doubt you will take Candahar and Cabul; but for maintaining him [Shah Shuja] in a poor, strong and remote country among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless."[11]

From the beginning, the British had troubles in Afghanistan. As soldiers and camp followers entered Afghanistan through the Bolan Pass, hostile tribesmen stole provisions. Temperatures soared well past 100 degrees Fahrenheit. With so many mouths to feed, and with tribes refusing to sell food for anything other than exorbitant prices, the British soon ran out of supplies and drinkable water. When Alexander Burnes, who was sent ahead to procure food, managed to return with 10,000 sheep, the British breathed a sigh of relief.

In early May 1839, the British arrived at the first major Afghan city on their route: Kandahar. The British were hoping that Shah Shuja would be joyously welcomed by the Afghans, but this proved not to be the case. Only about 100 Afghans turned out to witness Shah Shuja's triumphant parade into Kandahar. As Captain George Lawrence commented, "Shah Shooja was formally installed here as king of Affghanistan [sic], without, however, any symptom of the interest or enthusiasm which we were led to expect on the part of his subjects."[12]

The next major challenge that the British faced was the mighty fortress of Ghazni, defending the route between Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan's capital. Ghazni, renowned throughout Central Asia, crowned a tall hill and had walls 60 feet thick. The British, underestimating the size and strength of the fortress, had left their siege artillery back in Kandahar, and now had only one field gun, too small to have any impact. To make matters worse for the British, the fortress at Ghazni was defended by a garrison of about 3,500 men commanded by one of Dost Mohammed's sons. Another son commanded some 5,000 cavalry in the vicinity of Ghazni. However, the British were the beneficiaries of a piece of extraordinary luck. One of the fort's defenders defected to the British and told them the weakest link in Ghazni's formidable defenses: the Kabul Gate.

On the morning of July 23, 1839, a company of engineers, led by Lieutenant Henry Durand of the Bengal Engineers, piled 300 pounds of gunpowder against the Kabul Gate. Behind them was a storming party led by Brigadier Robert Sale and Colonel

William Dennie. As the gunpowder went off, the storming party charged into the gaping breach. After some initial confusion, which included Brigadier Sale being wounded, the British took control of the mighty fort. The victory was tremendous. The British had lost a total of 17 men killed and 165 wounded while the Afghans had suffered more than 500 dead.[13] More importantly, though, Afghan morale was ruined. Dost Mohammed, stunned that the British had taken Ghazni so quickly at such a small loss of life, found his support melting away. Dost Mohammed fled Kabul and retreated into the mountainous passes of the Hindu Kush. As an article in the *London Gazette* read, "It appears that the news of the quick and determined manner in which we took possession of Ghuznee, completely paralyzed the population of Cabool and Dost Mahomed's army; and that, on the evening of the 2d ultimo, all his hopes were terminated by a division in his camp, and the greater part of his army abandoning him; and finding that our army was fast advancing upon him, and that all opposition with the slender force which remained with him would be but useless, Dost Mahomed fled…"[14]

Two weeks later, Shah Shuja and the British entered Kabul unopposed. However, as in Kandahar, a lack of enthusiasm toward Shah Shuja was clearly apparent among Kabul's residents. Despite their earlier plans to crown Shah Shuja and then leave Afghanistan, it became clear to the British that unless a permanent presence was maintained in Afghanistan, Shah Shuja would shortly be toppled from power. However, with Lord Auckland back in India demanding to cut costs, General Keane led most of the British soldiers back to India, leaving just two brigades to guard Kabul, a division to garrison Kandahar, and smaller forces in Ghazni, Quetta and Jalalabad to maintain lines of communication.[15]

Since the British had decided to establish a semi-permanent garrison in Kabul, they needed some sort of shelter for their troops and camp followers. The obvious choice was the Bala Hissar, a massive palace/fortress that was the dominant landmark in Kabul. However, Shah Shuja objected to the British sharing the Bala Hissar, as having British soldiers guarding his own palace

would further weaken Shah Shuja's prestige among his subjects. Macnaghten overruled his officers to appease Shah Shuja, and the British began construction on their own fort, or cantonment.

The location and construction of the cantonment was atrocious. Lieutenant Vincent Eyre wrote, "Our cantonment at Cabul, whether we look to its situation or its construction, must ever be spoken of as a disgrace to our military skill and judgment."[16] The cantonment was constructed in a low, swampy plain that was commanded by hills on all sides. By means of fortifications, the British had only a mud wall that was waist high in some places.[17] Even worse, the British decided to build a separate fort to house all of their supplies, including food and medicine. If this second fort could be captured or cut off from the main cantonment, the British would face serious supply problems.

Still, at the time, the British had little to worry about. Afghanistan, thanks to generous subsidies paid by the British to tribal chiefs, was in a state of peace. More importantly for the British, their invasion of Afghanistan to keep it out of Russian hands seemed vindicated when they learned that a Russian expedition of 5,000 men had set out for Khiva, in modern day Uzbekistan. However, the British soon learned that the Russian attack on Khiva was a complete disaster. The Russians began their campaign in November, and, unfortunately for them, encountered the worst winter in years. A few months later, the Russians staggered home without firing a single shot, having lost 1,000 men.

Throughout 1840 and early 1841, Afghanistan continued to remain relatively quiet, at least on the surface. Minor uprisings did occur, but these were put down quickly. However, two significant events occurred. First of all, in November 1840, Dost Mohammed surrendered to Sir Macnaghten, which was completely unexpected. Macnaghten wrote in a letter back to India that appeared in the *London Gazette*, "I was returning from my evening ride and, within a few yards of my own residence in the citadel, when a single horseman gallopped [sic] up to me, and having satisfied himself that I was the Envoy and Minister, told me that Dost Mahomed Khan was arrived and sought my protection. Dost

Mahomed Khan rode up to me and alighted from his horse."[18] Dost Mohammed was eventually exiled to India, where, in a twist of irony, he occupied Shah Shuja's former house!

The second event destined to play an important role in upcoming events was the arrival of a new commander in April 1841: Major-General William Elphinstone.[19] Why Elphinstone was chosen for the job is still a mystery to most historians. The general was almost 60, suffering from severe gout and dysentery and had not held a field command since Waterloo more than 25 years earlier.

Despite the calm, some thought that the British could not hope to hold Afghanistan. An article that appeared in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* was strangely prophetic. The article read, "Still, though Affghanistan [sic] may be for the moment tranquil, our prospects there are far from cheering….we are hated as both strangers and infidels, and as the interested supporters of an unpopular dynasty; and any disaster which befell our arms, any material reduction of the army of occupation, would be followed by an instant and universal revolt of all the tribles."[20]

Even General Sir William Nott, the commander of the British garrison in Kandahar, predicted a British disaster in Afghanistan. He wrote in a letter, "In the meantime, all goes wrong here. We are become hated by the people, and the English name and character, which two years ago stood so high and fair, has become a bye-word….Unless several regiments be quickly sent, not a man will be left to note the fall of his comrades."[21]

In the middle of 1841, the first signs of open rebellion started to show. In the summer of 1841, Sir Macnaghten, responding to calls to cut costs, halved the annual subsidy paid to the powerful Ghilzai tribe of eastern Afghanistan. Thus far, the Ghilzais had completely refrained from harassing the hundreds of convoys that passed through their territory to and from India. However, the Ghilzais felt betrayed by Macnaghten's action, and they began to attack supply convoys, making the area unsafe for travel. This occurred at a most inconvenient time for Macnaghten, who had just been named President of Bombay, the second-most

prestigious position in British India.[22] However, a plan was soon decided upon: Brigadier Sale's troops which were returning to India anyway, would clear the rebellious Ghilzais out of the way. Then, Sir Macnaghten and Brigadier Sale's wife, Florentia, would return to India. However, the second part of this plan would never be carried out. Afghanistan was about to erupt into uncontrollable violence.

On the night of November 1, 1841, a mob surrounded the house of Sir Alexander Burnes. Of the British, Burnes was particularly despised because he was unscrupulous about having affairs with Afghan women. At first, the mob just consisted of men whom he had personally offended. Over time, though, the mob's ranks swelled with people who just hated the British presence. Burnes stood on his balcony and tried to reason with the crowd, promising them gold from the adjacent treasury if they would disperse. Mohan Lal, Burnes's secretary, wrote, "Now about 200 people assembled on all sides, and Sir Alexander Burnes, from the window of his upper room, demanded the insurgents to pacify themselves, and promised a handsome reward to all."[23] However, Burnes's proposal was rejected, and the mob started screaming for Burnes's blood. Eventually, Burnes gave the order for his bodyguard to fire, but by then it was much too late. According to most accounts, Burnes was approached by a mysterious Afghan who offered to lead Burnes to safety if he would don Afghan clothes. Burnes, out of other alternatives, agreed, but as soon as they were outside, the mysterious Afghan denounced Burnes to the crowd. Burnes, along with his brother and the commander of Burnes' bodyguard, Captain William Broadfoot, were gruesomely killed by the mob. The enraged Afghans proceeded to burn down Burnes's house and loot £17,000 from the treasury.[24] Ironically, Burnes had been warned the day before that the pot was about to boil over. As Lady Florentia Sale wrote in her diary, "It is further worthy of remark, that Taj Mahommed Khan went to Sir Alexander Burnes the very day before the insurrection broke out and told him what was going on. Burnes, incredulous, heaped abuse on this gentleman's head."[25]

Despite their momentary success, the Afghans were in great danger. The British, from their cantonment, could clearly hear and see the violence in Kabul. A strong show of force could have ended the revolt, but General Elphinstone could not decide whether or not to commit troops. The Afghans were afraid that the British would, indeed, come to nip the rebellion in the bud. In fact, the two leaders of the revolt had their horses saddled and their belongings packed in saddlebags, ready to flee at a moment's notice.[26] However, due to Elphinstone's indecision, the Afghans gained confidence and momentum. In the end, Shah Shuja was the only person who acted on that fateful night. Shah Shuja sent his best troops to drive away the mob, but, trapped in Kabul's narrow streets, the men suffered heavy casualties. The British had missed a golden opportunity to solidify their position, but now it was too late. As Lt. Vincent Eyre wrote, "Such an exhibition on our part taught the enemy their strength—confirmed against us those who, however disposed to join in the rebellion, had hitherto keep aloof from prudential motives, and ultimately encouraged the nation to unite as one man for our destruction."[27] Even worse, most of their Afghan allies deserted at this display of indecision. Eyre wrote, "The unwelcome truth was soon forced upon us, that in the whole Affghan [sic] nation we could not reckon on a single friend."[28]

Across the country, emboldened by British incompetence, tribesmen rose in revolt. What started out as a rather small demonstration in Kabul was now a national rebellion. Worst of all for the British, warriors from every corner of Afghanistan flocked to Kabul to besiege the foreigners and infidels.

At this point, the British realized the sheer measure of their folly in the design and construction of their cantonment, as well as their outdated weaponry. Afghan marksmen, among the best in the world, commanded the nearby heights and could easily pick off unwary soldiers or camp followers. These snipers used jezails, matchlock muskets that were slow-firing but accurate at 800 yards.[29] As Lady Sale, an astute observer of military affairs, wrote, "They [the Afghans] fire from rests; and then take

excellent aim; and are capital riflemen, hiding behind any stone sufficiently large to cover their head, and quietly watching their opportunities to snipe off our people."[30] The British, by contrast, were armed with Brown Bess muskets, which had been standard issue in the American Revolution and were only effective up to about 150 yards.

However, the British faced even worse problems than the crack Afghan sharpshooters. On November 3, 1841, just two days after the death of Sir Alexander Burnes, Afghan cavalry attacked the vulnerable fort that contained all of the British food, medicine, and clothing supplies. After a brief defense, the fort's commander told General Elphinstone that unless he was given a powerful force of reinforcements, the fort would have to be abandoned. Elphinstone, instead of sending one strong force, sent four small forces. Predictably, these forces were all stopped short of the fort, which was subsequently abandoned. The loss of the fort was both an immense blow to the British and a major rallying point for the Afghan rebellion. As Lt. Eyre wrote, "It is beyond a doubt that our feeble and ineffectual defence of this fort, and the valuable booty it yielded, was the first fatal blow to our supremacy at Cabul."[31]

For the next several weeks, the Afghans engaged the British in skirmishes, but no major fighting occurred. However, on November 23, the British launched a major attack on the strategic position of the Beymaroo Heights, from which Afghan sharpshooters were wreaking havoc on the cantonment. The attack was a complete disaster. The British, fearing Afghan cavalry, formed their infantry into squares. This was fine for resisting cavalry, but Afghan sharpshooters, stationed on the nearby hills, simply fired into the mass of troops. While the British were under fire, a force of *ghazis*, or fanatical religious warriors, hit the British flank. The British fled in disarray back to the cantonment, but their commander, Brigadier John Shelton, succeeded in rallying the men.[32] The British countercharged to regain the Beymaroo Heights, with the battle soon turning into a gunfight between the British and the Afghans. Not surprisingly, the Afghans, with their highly accurate jezails, soon gained the upper hand, and British casualties started

to mount. In a final, devastating blow, another force of ghazis attacked the British flank. This time, the British fled for good. As Captain George Lawrence wrote, "I could see from my post our flying troops hotly pursued and mixed up with the enemy, who were slaughtering them on all sides; the scene was so fearful that I can never forget it."[33] Lieutenant Vincent Eyre remembered "the slaughter of the soldier, the loss of officers, the evident panic in our ranks."[34] The British were only saved from total annihilation by the goodwill of one of the Afghan commanders, who could have easily overrun the cantonment but chose not to.

Unknown to the British, however, another powerful Afghan witnessed the battle. Twenty-five year old Akbar Khan, one of Dost Mohammed's sons, had arrived in Kabul the day before at the head of a strong party of cavalry.

The British knew as well as the Afghans that they were beaten. A few days after the battle, Afghan envoys met with Sir Macnaghten to discuss possible peace terms. However, from a British perspective, the Afghans were unreasonable from the start. The Afghans demanded an unconditional surrender and relinquishment of all British weapons.[35] Macnaghten still believed, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, that the Afghans were stupid and that he could convince them to make a favorable deal. Macnaghten's goal was to pit Afghan against Afghan, as Akbar Khan and others vied for supremacy in the political vacuum that was Kabul.

Negotiations continued for several weeks, with both sides unwilling to make concession. An agreement was finally reached on December 11 between Macnaghten and the Afghan chiefs. However, unbeknownst to the rest of the Afghan chiefs, Sir Macnaghten was doing some double dealing with Akbar Khan. On December 22, Akbar Khan proposed a new plan to Macnaghten. The plan stated that the hated Shah Shuja could remain as ruler, as long as Akbar Khan was given the position of vizier, or chief adviser. Additionally, instead of departing in the brutal Afghan winter, the British would be allowed to peacefully leave the country the following spring. This seemed too good to be true for

Macnaghten, and indeed it was. Some of Macnaghten's closest friends in the cantonment warned Macnaghten that this was just a treacherous plot. George Lawrence, Macnaghten's secretary, asked Macnaghten if there was not a risk of treachery. Macnaghten replied, "Treachery! Of course there is; but what can I do? The General [Elphinstone] has declared his inability to fight, we have no prospect of aid from any quarter, the enemy are only playing with us, not one article of the treaty have they fulfilled, and I have no confidence whatever in them."[36]

The next day, December 23, 1841, Sir William Macnaghten departed the cantonment. Along with Macnaghten were three officers, including Captain Lawrence. Protecting the group was a small cavalry patrol of only 10 men. As Macnaghten and the officers got near the hill on which Akbar Khan was waiting, the cavalry patrol returned to the cantonment. Macnaghten, who supposed the agreement to be a secret between himself and Akbar Khan, was surprised at the number of Afghans present. As Captain Lawrence wrote:

> I had on first arriving remarked to Sir William the unusually large number of armed Affghans [sic] congregated around us, and suggested his requesting Akbar Khan to send them to a distance, as the meeting was confidential. The Envoy, in consequence, mentioned the subject to Mohamed Akbar, who said, 'Oh, we are all in the same boat….' Scarcely were the words uttered, when my pistols were snatched from my waist, the sword drawn from the scabbard, and my arms pinioned…. I turned round and saw the Envoy, with his head down in the declivity, struggling to rise, and his wrists locked in the grasp of Mohammed Akbar, horror and consternation being apparent in his face.[37]

While Sir William Macnaghten was being dragged away by Akbar Khan, Lawrence and the other two officers were ordered by friendly chiefs to mount up behind them. It was very lucky for the men that they did, because the Afghan crowd closed in, demanding the infidels' blood. One officer, Captain Robert Trevor, either fell or was dragged from his horse, and was immediately hacked to death by the mob. Captain Lawrence and the other officer were whisked away to a jail, which almost surely saved their lives.

Meanwhile, Macnaghten was still struggling with Akbar Khan. A few moments later, pistol shots rang out. Exact details of the Envoy's death vary. Akbar Khan later told the British that he had not meant at all to kill Macnaghten, but only wanted to keep him as a hostage to ensure Dost Mohammed's safety. To the Afghan chiefs, though, he told a different story. Akbar claimed to have outsmarted Macnaghten and took personal credit for his death.[38] Whichever account is more accurate, Macnaghten's corpse, missing its arms, legs, and head, was later found hanging in Kabul's bazaar.

After Sir Macnaghten's murder, the top political officer was now a sick and wounded Eldred Pottinger, the "Hero of Herat." For some time, Pottinger had been tirelessly advocating an immediate march from the vulnerable cantonment to the well-guarded Bala Hissar. However, the inept Elphinstone kept finding reasons why this action should not be taken. Finally, the Afghans, realizing their vulnerability, destroyed the one bridge that would make such a move possible. Now, Pottinger had the thankless job of dealing with an untrustworthy adversary who held all the cards.

The British were desperate, and Akbar Khan knew it. In early January 1842, the British and Akbar Khan agreed on a peace treaty. All of the British cannons would be handed over, and all the other British garrisons in Afghanistan would also withdraw. In exchange, Akbar Khan would escort the British to the Indian frontier, and the British themselves would not be harmed. On January 6, the British army commenced its retreat with 4,500 soldiers and 12,000 assorted camp followers.

As soon as the British left the cantonment, the Afghans swarmed into it, looting and burning. More ominous, however, was the fact that the Afghans opened fire on the British rearguard as soon as they had left the cantonment.

The retreat from Kabul soon turned into a running battle. Hugh snowdrifts and subzero temperatures made sustained marching nearly impossible, and, paralyzed by the cold, many of the men got frostbite and could not use their weapons. Supplies, especially food and clothing, were running extremely low. Despite Akbar

Khan's assurances, the British were fired upon by hundreds or thousands of hostile tribesmen lining the passes. Afghan cavalry swept down and indiscriminately slaughtered unarmed camp followers as well as soldiers. As Lt. Eyre wrote, "Fresh numbers fell at every volley, and the gorge was soon choked with the dead and dying…The Affghans [sic] now rushed down upon their helpless and unresisting victims sword in hand, and a general massacre took place."[39] In the first five days of marching from the cantonment, some 12,000 of the 16,500 initial force had perished.[40]

The lucky ones were those handed over to Akbar Khan as hostages. Some of these included Captain Lawrence, Lieutenant Eyre, Lady Sale, and General Elphinstone. Despite his treacherous behavior to the rest of the British, Akbar Khan treated his captives well, presumably because his father, Dost Mohammed, was still in British custody in India.

Meanwhile, the rest of the troops and camp followers were trying to reach safety in India. However, it was not to be. As the troops and camp followers reached the Jugdulluk Pass, they found a terrible surprise. The Afghans had constructed, across the entire length of the pass, a barrier some six feet high consisting of prickly bushes and tree branches. As Lady Sale wrote, "Here two barriers had been thrown across the road, constructed of bushes and branches of trees…. The enemy, who had waited for them in great force at this spot, rushed upon the column, knife in hand."[41]

At this point, it became every man for himself. From the barrier at Jugdulluk Pass, two weary groups of men emerged alive. The larger group made a last stand at the village of Gandamak, where, despite their heroic defense, all were killed or captured.

On January 13, 1842, the remaining group stopped at the village of Futtehabad. When one soldier, Captain Bellew, approached the village asking for food, the villagers sounded an alarm, and scores of warriors poured out of concealment. As Dr. William Brydon, who was one of the unfortunate party, later wrote, "Captain Bellew said he would go and enquire into the state of the country… In about a quarter of an hour he returned again and said he was afraid he had ruined us, as from the village, which was

on a mound, he could see the cavalry coming up on all sides."[42] The villagers reassured Captain Bellew that they were friendly, but when Captain Bellew returned, he was immediately shot. Of the group's approximately dozen men, only five got away safely. Three of them soon rode ahead to a fate that remains unknown. Dr. Brydon's companion, who was wounded, decided to hide in a cave and hope for later rescue. The doctor continued by himself, desperately hoping to reach the British garrison at Jalalabad.

After riding by himself for a while, Dr. Brydon encountered a group of about 20 Afghans by the side of the road. Luckily for him, the Afghans were unarmed, and only pelted him with stones as he rode past. A little while later, Dr. Brydon encountered another Afghan, who was armed with a jezail. The Afghan shot at the doctor, but only succeeded in snapping his sword and wounding his pony. Before the Afghan could fire again, the doctor was out of range.

Before long, Dr. Brydon spotted a small party of cavalry in the distance. Believing them to be a British patrol from Jalalabad, Dr. Brydon eagerly rode toward them. However, as he got closer, Dr. Brydon realized that the men were Afghans. They immediately sent a horseman to deal with the unfortunate doctor. As Dr. Brydon later wrote, "He passed me, but turned and rode at me again. This time just as he was striking, I threw the handle of the sword at his head, in swerving to avoid which, he only cut me on the back of the left hand. Feeling it disabled, I stretched down the right to pick up the bridle. I suppose my foe thought it was a pistol, for he turned at once and made off as quick as he could."[43]

Despite his momentary success, Dr. Brydon's condition was dire. He was wounded in four places, his pony near death, and still an unknown distance away from Jalalabad. To Dr. Brydon's immense good fortune, he was closer to Jalalabad than he had thought, and a British cavalry patrol did discover him. The Doctor was brought into the city and fed and cared for. Beacon fires were lit on Jalalabad's walls and bugles were sounded to bring in survivors, but after a few days, it became clear that Dr. Brydon was the only one to get through.[44]

Meanwhile, back in India, a new governor-general had taken over. Lord Ellenborough was immediately concerned with winning back British prestige in Afghanistan and teaching the Afghans a lesson. To that end, the new governor-general sent Major-General George Pollock to reinforce Brigadier Sales' beleaguered troops under siege in Jalalabad, where Akbar Khan had taken personal command. Meanwhile, the forces of General Sir William Nott were clearing the Afghans from the Kandahar area. But the hawkish Ellenborough now got cold feet. Worried about mounting costs and the possibility of another massacre, and feeling that he had done enough to restore British prestige, Ellenborough ordered Generals Pollock and Nott to withdraw to India.[45]

Both men, determined to avenge their late comrades, were furious when they heard the news. They protested loudly, saying that at the time, they could not retreat to India via the most direct route. They could, however, retreat to India via Kabul! Ellenborough, faced with the news that Parliament did *not* view the recent successes as a balm to the earlier disasters, amended his orders, allowing Pollock and Nott to retreat through Kabul. The two armies became known jointly as "The Army of Retribution." The march soon became a race, with both generals vying to reach Kabul before the other. Along the way, Pollock, by going in the reverse direction, encountered the grim scene of the slaughter of Elphinstone's column. An army chaplain observed, "The narrow path by which they moved was strewn with the remains of Elphinstone's army. One upon another laid the dead; some of them reduced to the conditions of mere skeletons; other clothed, and with the features still so entire, that by many of their old acquaintances they were recognised."[46] Pollock, who had much less distance to cover than Nott, arrived in Kabul first, on September 15, 1842. He immediately blew up Kabul's grand bazaar and executed "perpetrators" of the rebellion.

At the same time, a company of cavalry was sent to rescue Akbar Khan's hostages, which included Lady Sale, Lieutenant Eyre and Captain Lawrence. Akbar Khan, knowing if taken alive he would face a fierce penalty from the British, fled into the moun-

tains. For the most part, the hostages were soon reunited with their loved ones. One who did not, though, was General Elphinstone. The sick and inept commander had died in April. Another key figure who died in April was Shah Shuja, who was assassinated by his own godson.[47]

After the British marched back through Afghanistan's treacherous passes to India, life in Afghanistan returned to a state of relative normality. Dost Mohammed was released from India, and, with British blessing, returned to his country to resume his rule. Remarkably, Dost Mohammed lived until 1863, maintaining cordial relations with the British almost the whole time.

Despite Dost Mohammed's forgiveness, others did not forget the debacle so quickly. The Sikhs were one of these. Just as Alexander Burnes had predicted, after Ranjit Singh's death, infighting tore apart the Sikh state. After witnessing Britain's disaster in Afghanistan, the British aura of invincibility in Asia was forever shattered. Not surprisingly, Ranjit Singh's ultimate successor was decidedly less friendly to the British, and after aggression on both sides, war broke out in 1845. The bloody war ended the next year, with the British annexing part of the Sikh territory. Another fierce war was fought two years later, and this time, the British took the rest of the Sikh lands and added it to the growing size of British India.

Another consequence of the First Anglo-Afghan War was that it contributed to the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The Sepoy Mutiny was a rebellion by the Indians against their British rulers. The sepoys, native soldiers recruited and trained by the British East India Company and who had borne the brunt of the casualties in Afghanistan, were unhappy with their cavalier treatment by the British. After withstanding years of abuse, the sepoys began to consider rebellion after experiencing first-hand the British weakness during the First Anglo-Afghan War. In fact, some of the first sepoy units to revolt were those who had served in Afghanistan![48] Although it ultimately failed, the Sepoy Mutiny came very close to driving the British out of India, which could have dramatically changed history.

Despite their stunning and remarkable defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War, the British fought two more wars with Afghanistan, one from 1878-1881, and another in 1919. The Second Anglo-Afghan War was almost as bad for the British as the first, as they lost large amounts of men and money. Both the Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars were mainly fought over control of Afghanistan's foreign policy. Britain still feared Russian attacks on India, and when Afghanistan's ruler resisted giving control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs to Britain, the British declared war.

The First Anglo-Afghan War will go down as one of history's most stunning military defeats. As former soldier and historian John William Kaye wrote in his 1851 account of the war, "No failure so total or overwhelming as this is recorded in the page of history. No lesson so grand and impressive is to be found in all the annals of the world."[49] However, this war should never have been fought at all. If Lord Auckland had compromised with Dost Mohammed, who sincerely wanted an alliance with the British, instead of stubbornly setting his mind on invasion, the British could have had a stronger ally than Shah Shuja at a much lower cost. Kaye commented, "If, instead of expelling Dost Mohammed [from his principality, we had advanced him a little money to raise, and lent him a few officers to drill, an army, the Persians would not now be lining the walls of Herat. But, instead of strengthening the Afghans, we have weakened them. Instead of making them our friends, we have made them our implacable foes."[50]

According to Afghan oral tradition, Dr. Brydon, the sole survivor of the retreat from Kabul, was deliberately allowed to escape "so that he might return to his own people and tell of the ferocity and bravery of the Afghan tribes. Battered Dr. Brydon was spared as a warning to the British: leave Afghanistan, and never come back."[51]

The British, of course, disregarded this warning. In addition to the Army of Retribution, the British returned to fight two more wars in Afghanistan before finally leaving the region in 1919. Russia, the other major contender for Afghanistan, also did not heed this warning. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan

seeking, as the British had before, to establish a friendly "buffer state" in the region. In both cases, the European armies easily conquered the main cities in Afghanistan and installed a puppet ruler. However, the Soviets, like the British, were unable to exert dominance over the rural areas of Afghanistan, which were hotbeds of resistance. In both instances, fiercely religious Afghan warriors declared a jihad against the infidels and used guerilla tactics that ran counter to the British and Soviet military strengths. After the foreigners pulled out of Afghanistan, both puppet rulers were soon assassinated, and civil war broke out.

Is the U.S. now also failing to heed the warning? Like the British Empire and the Soviet Union, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to overthrow an unfriendly government. Like the British and the Soviets, the U.S. quickly took control of Afghanistan's major cities but, more than nine years later, continues to struggle to maintain control of Afghanistan's rural areas and mountainous regions. Like the British and the Soviets, the U.S. cannot easily counter the guerilla tactics used by the Afghan resistance and has had, at best, mixed success in forging stable alliances with the tribal chiefs who control much of the countryside. Eventually, the U.S., too, will leave Afghanistan. On what terms and with what lasting results remain to be seen.

The First Anglo-Afghan War was neither the first nor the last attempt by a powerful foreign invader to bend Afghanistan to its will, but the Afghan people have proved uncompromising in their independence. Ahmad Shah Massoud, a leader of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance before his assassination in 2001, aptly noted, "We will not be a pawn in someone else's game, we will always be Afghanistan!"[52]

[1] Valentin Varennikov, interviewed on The True Story of Charlie Wilson The History Channel, December 28, 2007

[2] David Clingingsmith and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "India's De-Industrialization Under British Rule: New Ideas, New Evidence," Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 2039 (June 2004) p. 11, http://www.economic.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2004/HIER2039.pdf

[3] Lawrence H. Officer, "Purchasing Power of British Pounds from 1264 to 2007," MeasuringWorth.com, 2009, http://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/

[4] John William Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan: From the Unpublished Letters and Journals of Political and Military Officers Employed in Afghanistan Throughout the Entire Period of British Connexion with That Country (London: Richard Bentley, 1851) p. 645

[5] Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002) p. 135

[6] Quoted in Karl Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1999) p. 85

[7] John Waller, Beyond the Khyber Pass: The Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War (New York: Random House, 1990) p. 127

[8] Most of these were British East India Company sepoys or native Indian troops, not British regulars. Throughout the remainder, when referring to the "British" militarily, I am also including the sepoys.

[9] These included blacksmiths, cooks, laundrywomen, merchants, prostitutes, etc.

[10] Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002) p. 45

[11] Quoted in Waller, p. 128

[12] Sir George Lawrence, Reminiscences of Forty-Three Years in India (London: John Murray, 1874) p. 11

[13] Tanner, p. 142

[14] London Gazette 2045, no. 19784 (October 30, 1839) p. 6

[15] Ewans, p. 46

[16] Vincent Eyre, The Military Operations at Cabul, Which Ended in the Retreat and Destruction of the British Army, January 1842, With a Journal of Imprisonment in Affghanistan (London: John Murray, 1843) p. 34

[17] Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha International, 1990) p. 245

[18] William Macnaghten, Letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, published in the London Gazette January 9, 1841, p. 8

[19] Major-General William Elphinstone was a cousin of Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was previously quoted in footnote 10.

[20] "Results of Our Affghan [sic] Conquests," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 50, no. 309 (July 1841) p. 161, under http://books.google.cm/books?id=bKY-p1MMDzAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=blackwod%27s+Edinburgh&lr=&ei=s0GjR57VI4zQiQh2jJC3Cg#PRA4-PA161,M1

[21] J.H. Stocqueler, Memoirs and Correspondence of Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B., Commander of the Army at Candahar, and Envoy at the Court of the King of Oude (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1854) pp. 256-257

[22] Meyer and Brysac, p. 94

[23] Mohan Lal, Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul: With His Political Proceedings Towards the English, Russian, and Persian Governments, Including the Victories and Disasters of the British Army in Afghanistan (London: Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846) p. 404

[24] Tanner, p. 1616

[25] Florentia Sale, A Journal of the First Afghan War ed. Patrick Macrory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) p. 21

[26] Hopkirk, p. 242

[27] Eyre, p. 27

[28] Ibid., p. 29

[29] Meyer and Brysac, p. 98

[30] Sale, pp. 44-45

[31] Eyre, p. 44

[32] Tanner, pp. 170-171

[33] Lawrence, p. 93

[34] Eyre, p. 116

[35] Waller, p. 227

[36] Lawrence, p. 117

[37] Ibid., pp. 118-119

[38] Tanner, p. 125

[39] Eyre, p. 218

[40] Meyer and Brysac, p. 103

[41] Sale, p. 124

[42] William Brydon, "Dr. Brydon's Ride," Appendix I in A Journal of the First Afghan War ed. Patrick Macrory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) p. 166

[43] Brydon, p. 167

[44] Tanner, p. 187

[45] Hopkirk, p. 272

[46] G.R. Gleig, Sale's Brigade in Afghanistan, With an Account of the Seizure and Defence of Jellalabad (London: John Murray, 1846) p. 173

[47] Meyer and Brysac, p. 105

[48] Hopkirk, p. 292

[49] Kay, p. 669

[50] Ibid., p. 670

[51] Ben Macintyre, "Written Again in British Blood," Times Online July 7, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben_macintyre/article684268.ece

[52] "Quotes from Afghan Personalities of Yesterday and Today," Afghanistan Online, http://www.afghan-web.com/history/quotes/html. Ahmad Shah Massoud, a leader of Afghanistan's anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, was assassinated by al Qaeda operatives two days before September 11, 2001.

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The Crusade of Nicopolis

Much larger was the Crusade of Nicopolis. In 1395, King Sigismund of Hungary (1387-1437) sent a desperate plea for assistance to the French court. Charles responded enthusiastically with money and men, and he urged his subjects to contribute their time and money to the cause. Both Popes endorsed the proposed crusade and issued indulgences for whichever troops recognized them. Many Burgundian and German barons also joined the expedition. The troops rendezvoused in 1396 at Buda, where they were joined by Sigismund and his armies. It was an impressive force, one of the largest crusades ever assembled.

In a council of war, the King of Hungary argued for a cautious advance into Turkish territory, but the knights, eager to cover themselves with glory, would not hear of it. They wanted to follow the example of the First Crusade, fighting the infidel directly and winning conquests all the way to Jerusalem. The crusaders crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, where they took a few small towns. Next they laid siege to Nicopolis, a well-fortified town overlooking the Danube. Sultan Bayazid I (1389-1402) was prosecuting his own siege at Constantinople when he heard of Nicopolis's distress. At once, he marched his forces to meet the crusaders. The two sides had armies of equal size but unequal quality. Unlike the Christians, Bayazid's men were well disciplined and under a unified command. The sultan took up a position on a hill and waited. Sigismund again counseled caution, but the French and Burgundian knights insisted on an immediate attack. They also demanded the honor of leading the assault.

The thunder of the Frankish charge echoed in the valley outside Nicopolis as the brightly adorned knights galloped toward the Turkish lines. Quickly and decisively, they defeated the Turkish light cavalry. Beyond was a forest of wooden stakes driven into the soil to break up a charge. When the knights dismounted and began removing the stakes, archers approached and showered arrows down on them. The Franks fell ferociously on the archers, who ran up the hill to safety. On foot, the knights pursued them. As they crested the hill, they found an unexpected sight. Waiting for them was the sultan himself with his elite Turkish cavalry and Serbian army. The flower of chivalry turned tail and ran back down the hill, but it was too late. The Turks advanced in good order, crushing the crusading army. The defeat was total. Most of the crusaders were captured or killed; a few escaped into the woods. Those barons who could arrange ransoms were allowed to go free. The rest, about three thousand in all, were stripped naked, tied together with ropes, and led before Bayazid, where they were decapitated.

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CONFUCIAN INFLUENCE ON THE ANNEXATION OF JOSEON KOREA BY JAPAN

Hyoung Ook Wee

Introduction

The most prevalent sentiment in traditional Korean literature, music and culture is something called "han." Translating this sentiment into English, it would be something among the lines of sorrow, mourning, lament, or grief. Such sentiment originates from the gloomy history of Korea. As a relatively peaceable and small country, the peninsula has always attracted the attention of larger powers and aggressors such as China, Russia and Japan. In fact, throughout its history, Korea has seldom been a predator and always it was subject to invasion by other powers. A close analysis of the Joseon period in Korea (late 18th to early 20th century) reveals that it was the social and religious values of Korea that made Korea become the prey full of sorrow and grief.

The most important period in Korean history was the time just preceding the annexation of Joseon Korea[1] by Japan. With foreign influences bombarding the Joseon bulwark, there lay two different paths for the peninsula. The first path was opening Korean borders and accepting a new wave of influence, resulting in modernization of the peninsula. The second choice was closing

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the borders against all foreign influence and remaining a secluded society. Joseon Korea, at the time, chose the latter path.

Unfortunately, the consequence of choosing the latter path was extremely negative. Joseon Korea was annexed by Japan; for the next 35 years, the country then known as Korea would be obliterated from the world map and the people living inside the peninsula would endure severe oppression by the Japanese. By researching and examining this period, it is possible to understand the missteps that Korea took. In particular since neo-Confucianism lay at the very root of the Joseon Korean society, scholarship suggests that two specific neo-Confucian ideals directly led to Joseon Korea's annexation: first, the neo-Confucian concept of loyalty and second, the neo-Confucian concept of filial piety. By further examining the different attitudes of Joseon Korea and Japan toward Confucianism, we can see how Japan was able to emerge victorious at the end of the period—dodging the necessary obstacles—to successfully annex Korea.

Impact of Loyalty on Joseon Korea's annexation by Japan

Confucianism has earned Korea the name *eastern land of courtesy*. Core values of Confucianism such as filial piety, loyalty, humility, and trust have formed Korea into a country where youngsters revere their parents and grandparents and where the general public shows extreme hospitality towards foreigners. Yet, just like a double-edged sword, Confucianism also had a serious drawback which was its inability to form a harmonious relationship with the bombarding imperialist influences and major industrial development. To properly understand the impact of the Confucian ideal of "loyalty," in particular, on the downfall of Korea, it is important to grasp how "loyalty" was defined and applied within the Korean society.

Originally, the concept of "loyalty" was introduced by Confucius and was one of the main themes in his teachings. In fact, Confucius in his teachings defined the concept of "loyalty"

so that it could be applied to a broad social context. Still, at the crux of Confucian "loyalty" there lay two basic virtues, reverence and respect. The foundation of "loyalty," in the Confucian context, is formed within the family. Only when a man is able to maintain his loyalty within the family is he ready for his loyalty towards his superiors and rulers.[2] In his analects, Confucius says to his students,

> *A youth, when at home, should be filial, and abroad, respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friendship of the good.*[3]

Through the quotation above, Confucius stresses that a man's first duty is to revere and respect his father and older brothers and then extend that reverence to other elder members within the family. Only when the respect toward his own family is paid would the man be ready to respect and care for his friends. In another analect between one of Confucius's disciples and Confucius, he states that loyalty that must be established between a ruler and his subordinate.

> *The duke Ting asked how a prince should employ his ministers, and how ministers should serve their prince. Confucius replied, 'A prince should employ his ministers according to the rules of propriety; ministers should serve their prince with faithfulness.'*[4]

This teaching of Confucius on the concept of loyalty, with the other teachings of Confucius centuries ago, was adopted when the Joseon dynasty was established in the year 1392. Although the basic principles and teachings of Confucius remained intact, specific details were transformed in order to suit the needs of the kingdom and were called by the name of *neo-Confucianism*.[5] It was this brand of Confucianism that would come to define larger political decisions and help determine Korea's position in the modern world.

In *neo-Confucianism*, "loyalty" was used to define three basic relationships between individuals in a society. The very first among these three basic relationships is the loyalty between family members. In fact, loyalty within the family sphere bears the most significance and has the most rigorous standards. Because the first type of society in which a human being is exposed to, right after

birth, is the family, loyalty is crucial. Without loyalty established between the family members, it is absolutely impossible for the individual to remain loyal to others outside of his or her family. In other words, domestic virtues are fundamental and are inclusive of public ones.[6] The son and daughter always remain loyal to their elder siblings, parents and their elder relatives. If this relationship of loyalty breaks down between family members, for instance if a son defies the orders of his parents and acts discourteously, he will be chastised severely by his parents. Ultimately, the loyalty defined among family members reflects that of traditional Confucian ideals originally defined by Confucius.

The second crucial form of loyalty is loyalty between spouses. In fact, loyalty between spouses can be said to exist on the same plane as loyalty between family members; spousal relationships also constitute a family, even though spouses are strangers coming from outside of the family. In the strictly patriarchal Joseon society, where females were considered as subordinates to males, the relationship of loyalty was mostly one-sided with the female expected to remain loyal to her spouse even after his death, whereas males were allowed to enjoy polygamy. In extreme cases, this one-sided spousal loyalty relationship ended in the mandatory suicide of the female after the death of her spouse. When this happened, the entire family was officially praised by the king as the epitome of spousal loyalty and the female was labeled as *yeol-nyo*.[7] (The term *yeol-nyo* indicates a female who has committed suicide, following the death of the male head of the family. Even though not many females throughout the Joseon dynasty were so radically attached to the Confucian ideal of loyalty as to commit suicide, there are a few who were recorded in history.[8]) The very existence of this extreme form of spousal loyalty well conveys how much importance the concept of spousal loyalty bore in the neo-Confucian Joseon era.

The third and last basic form of loyalty is loyalty between friends. Unlike the two other basic relationships in which loyalty was defined, loyalty between friends is closer to the spirit of mutuality.[9] Usually it is faith and commitment that sustains a loyal

relationship between friends and through loyalty, friends are able to mutually develop and flourish. In fact, the loyalty between friends is a popular topic in folk tales from the Joseon era.

Once these three basic loyalty-based relationships within a society are established, the loyalty relationship within the political sphere emerges. The relevance of examining this loyalty relationship lies in its actual political implementation. Since this loyalty relationship reflects the very Confucian ideal that had pressured Joseon Korea to subjugate itself to China, such examination enhances any understanding of the impact Confucianism had on the fate of Joseon Korea. Furthermore, the loyalty relationship also helps explain why Joseon Korea had looked down on Japan, which was another factor in Joseon Korea's ultimate annexation by Japan. The loyalty relationship, applied within the political sphere, also determines one's duty to the ruler.

Just like the loyalty between friends, the loyalty relationship between a ruler and a subject also has the spirit of mutuality.[10] In fact, a common misconception is that loyalty is only paid by a subject to the ruler; the truth is, as much as the subject remains loyal to the ruler, the ruler must also trust and serve his subject. This principle of mutuality is present even in the teachings of Mencius himself.

> *If a prince treats his ministers as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as a mere fellow countryman. If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy.*[11]

In other words, a subject's loyalty comes from the amount of trust the ruler gives. Based on this principle therefore, the relationship between a king and his ministers was defined and developed during the Joseon era.

In a society where the ideal of neo-Confucianism dominated the cultural life, political power force and the social status force,[12] there are four different types of loyalty relationships: loyalty between family members, loyalty between spouses, loyalty among friends and loyalty toward the ruler. Among the four, three constitute the foundation stone of all loyalty relationships, the loyalty

between family members, spouses and friends. From these three grows the fourth type of loyalty, the duty of a minister towards his ruler. Even though these four different loyalty relationships can be structured like a branch sprouting from one tree trunk, no one of them was the sole cause of Joseon Korea's reckless reverence toward China. In fact, an amalgamation of all four loyalty-based relationship types was the spiritual basis of Joseon Korea's reverence towards China. Finally, it was this reverence that ultimately led Joseon Korea to become annexed by Japan.

China was in a culturally and militarily superior position to Joseon Korea before Joseon Korea's annexation by Japan in 1910. By examining the relationship between Joseon Korea and China, it becomes possible to see the significance of loyalty. The cultural and military superiority of China naturally led to Joseon Korea's reverence, based upon Confucian ideals.

During the Joseon era, China was a ruler, friend and family all at once to Joseon Korea. From this peculiar relationship, Joseon Korea developed a fundamental sense of loyalty toward China. In fact, China was the center of Confucianism to Joseon Korea and at the same time, a power that Joseon Korea wished to emulate.[13] From this attitude emerged the term "Sadae Jui," which means "worship of the powerful." China was that powerful source of civilization to Joseon Korea because in the Confucian worldview, China was the most civilized country, ready to distribute its cultural and technological advances to surrounding neighbors like Joseon Korea.[14] Yet, the relationship between China and Joseon Korea was not entirely lopsided; Joseon Korea also paid China back in the form of tributary goods. Still, Joseon Korea continued to emulate China, adopting many of its cultural aspects and placing China in a position of cultural superiority.[15]

The first and most obvious indicator of Chinese cultural superiority over Joseon Korea was the direct adaptation of the Chinese *yeon ho*, or reign name. Even before the Joseon era, kingdoms like Koryo, Shinla, Goguryo, and Bakje had been using different reign names depending on the name of the ruler in power. A reign name was the unique symbol of a king that represented his

authority as king and provided justification for the ruler's power. In fact, throughout the entire Korean history before the Joseon era, only once—during the Yuan invasion and occupation of the Koryo Kingdom, which started from 1274 and lasted for a century which ended in 1374—was Korea forced to use a foreign reign name. Yet, starting from the Joseon, the tradition of strong cultural independence from China became subdued. By using the Chinese reign name voluntarily, Joseon Korea acknowledged the fact that it was in a culturally inferior position to China.

The second piece of evidence is the importation of the Chinese calendar. Starting from ancient times in Chinese history, the first responsibility of a new dynasty was to reform the calendar.[16] Making a calendar required great effort because, unlike in the present, there were no standards by which to calibrate time and divide it into different segments. Therefore, not only was the making of a calendar a complex job that required mathematics but also it required a thorough understanding of nature.[17] The standard for segmenting time differed depending on the ruler and his dynasty.[18] Therefore, along with the reign name, the calendar was a symbol of authority of the ruler during the specific era. In the case of calendars, however, it was not only during the Joseon era but throughout time that Korea as a whole had been employing the Chinese calendar system. Even though Korea would later attempt to come up with its own time system during the rule of King Sejong, still the effort was largely based on the Chinese calendar system. Importing something of such significance, like the calendar system from China, proved again that Joseon Korea was in a slightly lower standing, culturally, than China.

Along with the cultural superiority, China was also in a militarily superior position. The Chinese military was larger in size and stronger in might. Joseon Korea relied heavily on it in times of war; its superiority can be easily seen through two different incidents.

The first incident was Ming China's military aid during the Hideyoshi Invasions from 1592 to 1598. In April of 1592, some 200,000 Japanese forces, in nine different divisions, assaulted Pusan. Even though the Korean army fought to the very last man, the Japanese army, supplied with brand new artillery, outmatched the sword- and arrow-using Koreans. Within 18 days of landing in Pusan, the Japanese advanced all the way up to Seoul, forcing King Seonjo and the Crown Prince to flee northwards towards Uiju.[19] In January 1593, a Ming[20] force of some 500,000 men, led by Li Rusong, arrived to aid Joseon. For the next five years, the allied force of Joseon Korea and Ming China fought against the Japanese, reclaiming the land that the Japanese had infringed upon. In the process, a number of righteous armies called *uibyeong*, which had been separately operating guerilla tactics in various regions, added their strength to the alliance forces.[21] Finally, in November of 1593, after a prolonged effort of seven years, the Japanese were forced out entirely from the Korean peninsula. During the early phase of the invasion, if it had not been for the Ming's military aid, the history of the peninsula would have turned out much differently. Through this incident, the Ming displayed their military superiority over Korea.

Yet again in1636, Joseon Korea underwent an event that again displayed its military inferiority to the Chinese: the Manchu Invasions. In 1636, the land of China was occupied by a new empire under the name of Qing. Once they were in full control, Qing demanded the same respect Joseon Korea had been paying Ming. However, because the Qing was an empire established by the Manchurians and inner Mongolians, Joseon Korea refused to pay such respect, instead considering the Qing as an illegitimate regime, established by outsiders or *orangkai*.[22] Insulted by such attitudes, Emperor Taizong of Qing led an army of 100,000 in December 1636, launching a full-scale attack against Joseon. Joseon lacked the military power to stop such a massive invasion; after 45 days of siege in the Namhan Fortress, King Injo came out to surrender to the Emperor of Qing.[23] Through this incident, Joseon Korea again felt the superiority and might of the Chinese military.

Even so, Korea remained in a superior position to Japan until the Japanese Meiji Reforms took place between 1868 and 1912. In fact, Japan had received major cultural influence from Korea and China during its development. After the Meiji Reform, Japan outperformed both Korea and China. As history shows, Japan's growth was so significant that it led to annexation of the Korean peninsula.

During the early stages of Japan, the island was no more than a group of indigenous hunters and gatherers living without a structured polity. Yet, when the island started down the route of becoming a nation state, it was mostly influenced by the two neighboring countries, Korea and China. Given the amount of cultural influence that Japan took from Korea, it is possible to see why Japan would be considered culturally "inferior" to Korea early in Japanese history. The superiority that Korea had over Japan, along with Korea's devotion to Confucian loyalty, would also help explain why Korea historically tended to look down on Japan. But after the Meiji reforms, Japan successfully inverted the superiority relationship to the point where it was able to annex Joseon Korea.

Korea's influence on Japan was mainly cultural, even though the economic benefits Japan received as a byproduct of the cultural exchange cannot be neglected. The cultural influence of Korea on Japan had started from an early time and lasted even to the late Joseon period. During the transitional time between the Jomon and Yayoi periods (300 BCE), Korean influence grew stronger as wet-rice farming introduced from the peninsula sat at the heart of the new culture.[24] The introduction of rice farming bears extremely significant meaning in the developmental history of any country because evolving agricultural practices reflect the transition of people's lifestyles from nomadic to settled.[25] From this perspective, it can be said that the civil history of Japan was influenced, and even triggered, by Korea. Korean influence on Japanese culture grew ever stronger; Koreans brought irrigation technologies, writing systems, expertise for building temples and pottery kilns, accounting techniques, new administrative structures, new dyeing and weaving methods, scriptures and a statue of the Buddha.[26]

Therefore, when the Joseon era was launched by Yi Seonggye, Japan was still receiving cultural benefits from the peninsula. This relationship continued until the infamous Hideyoshi invasions that lasted for seven years. After that war, Joseon decided to sever all ties with Japan. Yet, the newly-installed Tokugawa Shogun Bakufu constantly requested the resumption of diplomatic missions between Joseon and Japan. In 1607, Joseon finally sent a delegation to Japan to sign a new treaty—a treaty that was quite unequal in the sense that Joseon was granted major rights while Japan was given minor privileges—and brought back some 7,000 prisoners of war.[27] From that time forward, a diplomatic delegation called *Tongsinsa* was dispatched from Joseon whenever the leadership of Japan changed, based on the wishes of Japan. These *Tongsinsa* were diplomatic delegations with correspondence from the Joseon King; the presents they brought were mainly cultural products such as ginseng, medicine and books of Confucian studies. In fact, each time the Joseon mission made a visit, a Joseon boom would ensue, altering the style and direction of Japanese cultural development.[28] Therefore, until the Meiji Reform, the Japanese were in an inferior position to Korea, which explained why Joseon Korea looked down on Japan instead of revering it by the principle of loyalty as with China. However, this hierarchical relationship between the three countries soon inverted as a result of Japan's elaborate reform movement.

Based on the cultural resources from Korea, Japan began to outperform Korea in terms of technological advancement and military strength. The very time that marked the inversion point was the Japanese Meiji Reforms. This period, which shines most brightly throughout all of Japanese history, propelled Japan to the front ranks of modern nations.[29] During the late 19th century, Japan constructed railroads and telegraph lines, created experimental factories, adopted the Western calendar, built an effective postal system and encouraged the growth of a press.[30] The Meiji reform was Japan's largest step toward modernization and there is no doubt that these developments did, in fact, contribute immensely to its technological advancement. Yet, Japan did not stop there: Japan went on to advertise its growth to westerners and sought to learn

from them in return. From 1871 to 1873, Japanese conducted the Iwakura Mission, in which 50 leaders, including five top officials, spent 18 months traveling throughout the West to observe foreign affairs and negotiate treaties.[31] The most remarkable aspect of this journey was the extent to which high ranking officials within the Japanese government considered western models so important that Japanese domestic interests could take second priority.[32] In fact, in the early 20th century, cities in Japan became both modern and massive with the populations in Tokyo reaching 2.5 million by 1910 and Osaka nearly 2 million.[33] These population booms were all a product of Japan's successful transformation into a modernized nation.

With the technological advancement that Japan was able to achieve, it began building modern weaponry such as warships, guns and bombs. Assembly lines in the factories allowed the Japanese to produce modern weaponry at a rapid pace, thereby successfully replacing Japanese traditional weapons such as Samuri swords and bows.[34] Two separate incidents in which Japan emerged victorious speak to this success: the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, both of which clearly displayed the successful results of Japanese military reform.[35]

Joseon Korea, on the other hand, was suffering from massive internal conflicts while Japan was shedding its old skin and transforming into a world power. Just as Japan was undergoing technological advancements, Joseon Korea was at its most hectic period in Korean history. In the year 1882, there was a military uprising from traditional military forces due to unfair treatment; included were the suffering poor who opposed government officials and their policies.[36] Additionally, from 1892 to 1894, there were constant uprisings from peasants who were suffering from famine due to the tyranny of regional government officials.[37] These constant internal uprisings diverted the nation's scant efforts to modernize, preventing Joseon Korea from achieving the technological advances Japan had made. Moreover, due to the Confucian ideal of loyalty, Joseon Korea even refused to admit that Japan had outgrown Korea through modernization.

The very cause of Joseon Korea's failure to modernize was its attachment to a myopic Sino-centric worldview. Joseon Korea maintained loyalty to China according to neo-Confucian ideals. On the flip side, Joseon Korea failed to acknowledge Japan's modernization, believing that it was still an island full of indigenous people who required cultural aid. As a result, Joseon Korea made itself vulnerable to annexation, erased from world history for 35 years. It was the neo-Confucian concept of loyalty that had blinded Joseon Korea and permitted a skewed, Sino-centric worldview, leading Korea to a gloomy history.

Impact of Filial Piety on Joseon Korea's annexation by Japan

The Confucian ideal of "filial piety" also led Korea to isolate itself from various imperial influences. In order to properly grasp the impact of "filial piety" within Korean society must be established. With an understanding of "filial piety," it is possible to examine how this concept led the rulers of Joseon Korea to isolate the country from foreign influence.

Filial piety, along with the concept of loyalty, was one of the main themes that constituted the teachings of Confucius. Filial piety means respect and reverence for one's parents, then extended to one's teachers and elders.[38] In fact, Confucius valued filial piety over all other virtues in his teachings, as displayed in his conversation with one of his disciples.

> *The Master said, 'What does the Shu-chig say of filial piety?—"You are filial, you discharge your brotherly duties. These qualities are displayed in government." This then also constitutes the exercise of government. Why must there be THAT—making one be in the government?*[39]

Confucius placed strong emphasis on filial piety because it was the most basic virtue that was formed within the family—the most basic form of society.[40] Considering that even within the loyalty construct, the most basic form was the loyalty to one's father, Confucius's emphasis on filial piety does not come as much of a surprise. This reverence and respect toward one's parent, which

was the foundation stone of all other Confucian virtues, was also adopted in a broader context by the *neo-Confucian* Joseon society.

Filial piety, in a *neo-Confucian* text, was used to define the obligations of an individual within the family. In fact, the definition of filial piety remained intact as the neo-Confucian filial piety also laid its emphasis on revering, respecting and being good to one's parents. Rebellion and disrespect were severely punished through lashing and scolding. In some teachings, filial piety often went to an extreme degree where the lives of sons and daughters were at stake.

> *If a mother or father has a fault, the son should quietly, with a gentle voice and a blank expression, point out the problem. If this has no effect, the son should increase his reverence and filial piety. Later, the son can repeat his point. If the parents are displeased, the son should strongly state his point, rather than let them do something wrong in the neighborhood or countryside. If they are even more angry and more displeased, and, even if the parents beat the son till the blood flows, the son should not dare be angry or resentful, but instead should increase his reverence and filial piety.*[41]

From this extreme reverence to one's parents, filial piety evolved into defining one's attitude toward the ancestors. In a sense, ancestors were also the objects to which an individual had to pay his respects because they were the parents of the parents. In the oriental world, where they strongly believed in the afterlife, serving the ancestors meant holding annual rituals on ceremonial days so that the ancestors would also be able to enjoy the felicitous spirit. Therefore, the act we label as ancestor worship was considered as an activity that was conducted in order to pay respect to the ancestors in the *neo-Confucian* Joseon society.

Even though filial piety was a concept mainly related to families, it was never limited to the family. Instead, the concept of filial piety was expanded further to influence the course of events within the political sphere. For instance, the conflict over the funerary rites after the death of King Hyojong's wife, Queen Inseon, also known as the *Yeasong Nonjaeng*,[42] shows filial piety influencing the political sphere. At the time there were two different factions arguing for different funerary rites according to the separate interpretations of filial piety. The *seoin* faction led by Song Siyeol

called for a nine-month mourning period for Hyojong's mother while the naming faction led by Heo Mok called for a one year mourning period.[43] These kinds of conflicts over ancestor worship and the proper way of doing it happened quite often during the Joseon dynasty because usually they were directly interrelated with the political benefits of the winning faction. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Confucian ideal of filial piety constituted a large part of the family and also the political sphere.

The Confucian ideal of filial piety was an important concept that had been prevalent throughout the Joseon dynasty but the realistic importance of filial piety depended on the individual's social status. In other words, the impact ideology had on the individual mind was largely dependent on the social class of the individual. In order to understand this impact, therefore, the class structure of the Joseon Korean society must be reviewed. The relevance of reviewing the impact of filial piety to people from different social classes lies in explaining the attitudes of the elites toward western influences, which was the ultimate cause of the isolation and seclusion of Joseon Korea from imperialist influences.

The class structure of Joseon Korea can be divided into two major groups: the ruling Yangban class and the ruled non-Yangban class. First, to examine the ruled non-Yangban class, they were the majority of commoners who were not granted the liberty to bask in the privileges of the elite. Even within the non-Yangban class, there were more specific class distributions: *chungin*, —middle class or literally "a middle person"—*sangmin*—commoners— and *ch'onmin*—low or base class and slaves.[45] Due to the extremely rigorous and stringent class structure of the Joseon dynasty, mobility between classes was impossible; in other words, they were hereditary in practice.[45] The three groups of people comprised 85 percent of the entire population of the Joseon dynasty by 1910, thereby forming the majority yet being the political minority.[46] In fact, most of this political minority was illiterate because its primary focus lay not in reading books but in harvesting crops and maintaining their living in an agricultural society. Therefore, the attachment of the non-Yangban class towards the Confucian ideals was not strong and fundamentalist like that of the Yangban class.

On the flip side, the ruling Yangban classes were the political elites who had monopolized their authority within the civil and military hierarchies, making their positions hereditary.[47] The Yangban class was a distinct trait of Korea—unlike those of China or Japan—that developed in the Confucian monarchy as a dynamic interaction between aristocracy and bureaucracy.[48] Yangbans possessed land, monopolized education, married only among themselves, lived in separate quarters of Seoul, were exempt from physical labor and military service, were appointed to official positions, and were strongly attached to the neo-Confucian ideals.[49] In sum, being a Yangban was equivalent to being an extremely fundamentalist Confucian scholar and at the same time a conservative ruling class elite strongly devoted to preserving their wealth and privileges.

The above traits of the Yangban and non-Yangban classes are extremely important since they come to directly affect the attitude of each group towards foreign imperialist influences.

The non-Yangban class was widely receptive to the influx of western culture. The spreading of Catholicism and Protestantism among the ordinary people—or non-Yangban people—was the very cause of this receptive attitude. Starting from the late 18th century, there were already Korean converts, such as Yi Sung-hun, who traveled to Peking in order to bring back books of catechism and to contribute to a wider spreading of Catholicism in Joseon Korea.[50] The reason for the rapid spread of Catholicism and Protestantism among the ordinary people in Joseon Korea was because the under-privileged non-Yangban people were seeking for a change from the neo-Confucian tradition.[51] One author describes this attitude of the people below.

> *It is clear that what attracted Koreans to Catholicism was above all its creed of equality, its tenet that the whole of humankind are alike the children of God. It must have been a moving experience for chungin and commoners to be able to number themselves among God's children and worship Him on a basis of equality with the Yangban…In short, belief in Catholicism was in itself a grave and growing indictment of Yangban society and of the values it cherished.*[52]

Once the non-Yangban people became acquainted with Catholicism, the importation of western medical technologies, clothing and industrial technologies were just auxiliary benefits from the Catholic priests and Protestant missionaries. Therefore, the non-Yangban class became extremely receptive to the influx of western culture in general.

Yet, to the Yangban class, which was strictly attached to the ideals of Confucianism, such attitudes of the non-Yangban class were unacceptable. First and most important of all, the ideas and practices of Catholicism and Protestantism were entirely against the ideals of neo-Confucianism in which the Yangban so strongly believed. In particular, the Catholic practice that banned ancestor worship was utterly unacceptable to the strong Confucian believers because according to the neo-Confucian ideal of filial piety, ancestor worship was one of the primary duties of a posterity to ancestors. An auxiliary factor that even worsened the anti-Catholic sentiment was that the acknowledgement of the ideals of Catholicism and Protestantism meant the destruction of the accumulated wealth and privileges of the ruling class. Therefore, the attitudes of the ruling Yangban class were intensely negative toward Catholicism and Protestantism.

The result of such hostility was the persecution of priests over a period of seven years. In the year 1801, the first major Catholic persecution took place under the order of Regent Daewon.[53] Despite the massacre, however, the influx of priests and missionaries continued and a second massacre took place in 1839, again, under the order of Regent Daewon.[54] In fact, there were countless minor killings of suspected Korean converts and priests as well as constant burning down of churches and books related to Catholicism not recorded in the history of Korea.

The hostility of the Yangban class towards Catholicism and Protestantism also came to seriously affect the technology and culture coming into Joseon Korea. Just as the non-Yangban class had considered these as auxiliary benefits coming from believing in God, to the Yangbans, religions such as Catholicism and Protestantism were the vanguard of the western imperial overtures to

Joseon Korea.[55] Therefore, Regent Daewon, after going through a prolonged discussion with the ruling Yangban class, came to make the decision to block all western influences including religions, technologies and even the surveillance activities of foreign ships on the shores of Joseon Korea.[56] Thus emerges the famous isolationist policy of Regent Daewon, with the backing of the entire ruling Confucian Yangban class. In fact, the following slogan Regent Daewon and the ruling Yangbans created well depicts the deep distrust they felt toward western influences.

> *To not fight when the Western barbarians invade is to sue for peace. To sue for peace is to sell the country.*[57]

Unfortunately, a series of incidents, involving France and Germany, had created an even deeper distrust and forced the ruling Yangban class to further enforce the isolationist policy. In July 1886, the American ship *General Sherman* sailed up the Daedong River, looting and killing some inhabitants of Pyeongyang along the way.[58] In September 1866, a flotilla of seven ships and some 1,000 soldiers under the command of Admiral Roze dispatched by the French government raided and occupied Ganghwa Island. During their seizure, the French looted jewelry such as gold and silver and burned invaluable documents of Joseon Korea.[59] The incident that eventually caused the Yangban class to entirely turn its back on and detest foreigners and their culture was the ransacking of the tomb of Regent Daewon's father Deoksan, by a German merchant named Oppert. In 1868, Oppert tried to rob a tomb in South Chungcheong Province.[60] Robbing a tomb was an act that was the literal opposite of filial piety. Respecting and revering one's parents and ancestors was the very definition of filial piety and the reason Regent Daewon had decided to enforce the isolationist policy because western culture had directly invaded this belief. Yet, these westerners even tried to rob the tomb of an ancestor. The shock and bewilderment that the Yangban class would have felt are simply unimaginable. To the eyes of the Yangban class, the westerners were simply barbarians, as in the slogan above. They were no more than a group of invaders who had absolutely no respect toward ancestors. Therefore, resistance and repulsion

towards such intrusion was inevitable, again as indicated in the slogan. In fact, this incident, labeled "the Oppert's Ransacking," served to further convince Regent Daewon and his fellow Yangban class of the barbaric nature of the westerners.[61]

In conclusion, the strong conviction of the Yangban class towards the very idea of filial piety had led them to not only distrust the western culture and its underlying spirit but eventually to detest it. This abhorrence toward western culture by the ruling class ultimately led to the forming of isolationist policies, thereby keeping Joseon Korea from growing into a modernized nation and instead stagnating the development of Korea. This stagnation was the reason that Joseon Korea fell into 35 years of Japanese rule.

Conclusion

The ideological basis behind Joseon Korea's annexation by Japan was the two most basic Confucian ideologies: first the concept of loyalty and second the idea of filial piety. Yet, still there remains a last question that must be addressed. How was Japan, a country located in North East Asia—which always comes up when Korea and China are discussed even to this day—greatly influenced both culturally and ideologically by Korea and China but still able to successfully achieve rapid modernization? In other words, how was Japan—a country that was also influenced by Confucianism—able to dodge the trap that Joseon Korea had so easily fallen into? By examining the different attitudes and backgrounds of Joseon Korea and Japan when adapting Confucianism, it is possible to provide a sufficient answer to this question.

When Confucianism was first introduced into Japan, it was done by the zen-buddhist monks. To these zen-buddhist scholars, Confucianism was another tool that would complete the already existing doctrines of zen-buddhism.[62] In other words, when they were embracing the ideas and concepts of Confucianism, the Japanese were transforming and shaping the teachings of Confucius so that they would be compatible with their existing culture and

beliefs. The incongruence that existed between the traditional ideas of Confucianism and Japanese cultural beliefs was boldly eliminated and only those which were compatible remained. As a result, one scholar characterizes the Japanese adaptation of Confucianism in the following way.

> *Denied the prestige enjoyed by Chinese Neo-Confucianism as the prominent mode of social consciousness and the orthodox system of belief, Japanese Neo-Confucianism remained a set of cultural teachings and doctrines for specific functions. It had never been the predominant social consciousness or the orthodox system of belief.*[63]

On the other hand, Korean Confucianism was the exact opposite of Japanese Confucianism, as shown. When the ideals of Confucianism were introduced into Joseon Korea, they were to function as a counterculture against Buddhism which was the sole ideological and religious basis of the Koryo dynasty.[64] The new social elites of Joseon Korea wanted Confucianism to be the new ideology on which the new kingdom could rely. Therefore, with the full support of the state, Confucianism in Joseon Korea became the predominant mode of social consciousness and belief.[65] In other words, the Joseon Korean neo-Confucianism can be characterized as being extremely fundamentalist and orthodox by comparison.

It was the entirely different attitudes of Japan and Joseon Korea towards Confucianism that created such a big gap in the process of modernization in both countries. With flexibility, Japanese Confucianism was able to embrace the western influences that led directly to the modernization of the Japanese culture and society, whereas the fundamentalist and strictly traditional neo-Confucianism of Joseon Korea had failed to generate the inner motivation and propulsion toward modernization, thereby leaving Joseon Korea behind Japan. One scholar characterizes the two different modernization processes of Japan and Joseon Korea as follows.

> *…Japanese Confucianism was able to transform itself and actively adapt. When the second wave of Japanese modern culture came to Korea, Korean Confucianism was proven even more bankrupt…*[66]

The one single reason why Joseon Korea suffered the 35 years of Japanese rule in the early 20th century was because Joseon Korea was not able to effectively achieve modernization as Japan had done. Yet, the two keys to understanding why such modernization of Joseon Korea was impossible lie in the teachings of Confucius. As a predominant social belief system of Joseon Korea, neo-Confucianism had acted as the bulwark against the wave of modernization that had flooded Joseon Korea. Specifically, even among the dozens of neo-Confucian virtues, it was the ideas of loyalty and filial piety—which had formed the very basics of the neo-Confucian ideology—that had so strongly balked against the chance at modernization. Even though there are absolutely no guarantees that Joseon Korea would not have been annexed by Japan if it had effectively modernized—just as Japan was able to do—still the path that the neo-Confucian ideal of loyalty and filial piety had paved for Joseon Korea sealed its fate.

[1] Regarding the name of Joseon society, there are a variety of names that indicate Joseon depending on the scholars; for example, Chosun, Josun, Joseon, etc. In this paper however, *Joseon* will be the notification that indicates this kingdom. The term *Joseon society* is used to define the Joseon dynasty period that lasted for 500 years starting from 1392 to 1910. Twenty-seven different kings have ruled throughout the 500 years period. The society of Joseon was, as is mentioned above, a strictly fundamentalist Confucian society and without Confucianism, it becomes impossible to characterize and identify the dynasty.

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[3] James Legge, trans., The Confucian Analects, The Great Learning & The Doctrine of the Man (New York: Cosimo Classics, 1893)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Han Young Woo, A Review of Korean History: Joseon Era vol. 2, trans. Hahm Chaibong (Kyongsaewon, 2010) p. 91

[6] 10. Haejoang Cho, "Male Dominance and Mother Power: The Two Sides of Confucian Patriarchy in Korea," in Confucianism and the Family ed. Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos (State University of New York, 1998) p. 192

[7] Young Woo, Korean History: Joseon Era, p. 120

[8] Yeol-nyo, 2011, Doopedia, http://www.doopedia.co.kr/doopedia/master/master.do?_method=view&MAS_IDX=101013000720794 (accessed December 15, 2010)

[9] 7, Wei-Ming Tu, "Probing the 'Three Bonds' and 'Five Relationships'," in Slote and DeVos, p. 129

[10] Wei, p. 126

[11] Ibid., p. 126

[12] Byung Tai Hwang, Confucianism in Modernization: Comparative Study of China, Japan and Korea PhD dissertation (University of California, 1979) p. 622

[13] J. Clarke Crane, The Neo-Confucian Foundation in Modern Korean Culture PhD dissertation (Graduate School Sejong University, 2008) p. 22

[14] Jahyun Kim Haboush, The Confucian Kingship in Korea Yonjo and the Politics of Sagacity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) p. 22

[15] The term *Cultural Superiority* might grab the attention of the readers. In fact, according to the theory of *Cultural Relativism* by Franz Boas, every culture has its unique tradition,

history and structure that allow each and every single one of them to be discreet and incomparable, simultaneously. Therefore, in this context, *Cultural Superiority* is used as a calibration that measures the specific cultural traditions of China that was adapted by Joseon Korea.

[16] Edward L. Shaughnessy and Michael Loewe (ed.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 19

[17] Alan K.L. Chan, Gregory K. Clancey, and Hui-Chieh Loy (ed.), Historical Perspectives on East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001) pp. 387-392

[18] Shaughnessy and Loewe, pp. 21-23

[19] Young Woo, p. 167

[20] Ming was the name of the Chinese dynasty that was in power during the time period.

[21] Young Woo, Korean History: Joseon Era, p. 171

[22] Ibid., p. 182

[23] Ibid., p. 184

[24] James L. Huffman, Japan in World History (New York: Oxford University Press 2010) p. 7

[25] Agricultural Society, 2011, Doopedia, http://www.doopedia.co.kr/doopedia/master/master.do?_method=view&MAS_IDX=101013000696174 (accessed November 17, 2010)

[26] Huffman, pp. 11-12, p. 14

[27] Young Woo, Korean History: Joseon Era, p. 174

[28] Ibid., p. 177

[29] Huffman, p. 72

[30] Ibid., p. 77

[31] Ibid., p. 78

[32] Ibid., p. 78

[33] Huffman, p. 86

[34] Ibid., p. 87

[35] Young Woo, Korean History: Joseon Era, p. 74, p. 82

[36] Han Young Woo, A Review of Korean History: Modern/Contemporary Era vol. 3. Trans. Hahm Chaibong (Kyongsaewon, 2010) p. 40

[37] Ibid., pp. 55-59

[38] Rainey, p. 24

[39] Legge

[40] Rainey, p. 24

[41] Ibid., p. 26
[42] Young Woo, p. 141
[43] Ibid., p. 190
[44] Yong S. Colen, Transformation of the Chosun Dynasty: Variables challenging the Tradition in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century PhD dissertation (Yonsei Foreign Relations University, 1997) p. 18
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[48] Ibid. pp. 24-26
[49] Colen, p. 16
[50] Ibid., p. 32
[51] Ibid., p. 33.
[52] Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewong'gun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea (Cambridge, Massachusetts: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University Press, 1972) p. 93
[53] Colen, p. 34
[54] Ibid., p. 34
[55] Yong Woo, p. 29
[56] Ibid., p. 30
[57] Ibid., p. 30
[58] Young Woo, p. 28
[59] Ibid., p. 29
[60] Ibid., p. 30
[61] Ibid., p. 30
[62] Hwang, p. 615
[63] Ibid., p. 616
[64] Ibid., p. 621
[65] Ibid., p. 621
[66] Ibid., p. 643

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...After Valens had terminated the Gothic war with some appearance of glory and success, he made a progress through his dominions of Asia, and at length fixed his residence in the capital of Syria. The five years which he spent at Antioch were employed to watch, from a secure distance, the hostile designs of the Persian monarch; to check the depredations of the Saracens and Isaurians; to enforce, by arguments more prevalent than those of reason and eloquence, the belief of the Arian theology; and to satisfy his anxious suspicions by the promiscuous execution of the innocent and guilty. But the attention of the emperor was most seriously engaged by the important intelligence which he received from the civil and military officers who were entrusted with the defence [sic] of the Danube. He was informed that the North was agitated by a furious tempest; that the irruption of the Huns, an unknown and monstrous race of savages, had subverted the power of the Goths; and that the suppliant multitudes of that warlike nation, whose pride was now humbled in the dust, covered a space of many miles along the banks of the river. With outstretched arms and pathetic lamentations they loudly deplored their past misfortunes and their present danger; acknowledged that their only hope of safety was in the clemency of the Roman government; and most solemnly protested that, if the gracious liberality of the emperor would permit them to cultivate the waste lands of Thrace, they should ever hold themselves bound, by the strongest obligations of debt and gratitude, to obey the laws and guard the limits of the republic. These assurances were confirmed by the ambassadors of the Goths, who impatiently expected from the mouth of Valens an answer that must finally determine the fate of their unhappy countrymen. The emperor of the East was no longer guided by the wisdom and authority of his elder brother, whose death happened towards the end of the preceding year; and as the distressful situation of the Goths required an instant and peremptory decision, he was deprived of the favorite resource of feeble and timid minds, who consider the use of dilatory and ambiguous measures as the most admirable efforts of consummate prudence. As long as the same passions and interests subsist among mankind, the questions of war and peace, of justice and policy, which were debated in the councils of antiquity, will frequently present themselves as the object of modern deliberation. But the most experienced statesman of Europe has never been summoned to consider the propriety or danger of admitting or rejecting an innumerable multitude of barbarians, who are driven by despair and hunger to solicit a settlement on the territories of a civilised [sic]nation...

REASSESSING THE NEEDHAM QUESTION: WHAT FORCES IMPEDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SCIENCE IN CHINA AFTER THE 15TH CENTURY?

Jonathan Lu

Abstract

Why did modern science not develop in China, despite the fact that up until the 15th century, ancient China led the West for over a millennium in scientific discovery and technological advancement? This is the so-called "Needham Question," named after Joseph Needham (1900-1995), a brilliant Cambridge Sinologist, biochemist and historian of science who first posed the question in the 1940s. This essay will analyze Needham's own answer to this question, as well as the main theories that offer historical, philosophical, political, economic, and cultural perspectives on the paradox. It will also assess the relevance of The Needham Question to the study of the history of science and technology, particularly in the context of China's astonishing re-emergence as a global economic and political power.

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Introduction

Writing in 1620, the English philosopher Francis Bacon proclaimed the three greatest interventions in world history to be printing, gunpowder and the compass. According to Bacon:

> These three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world; the first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes, in so much that no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.[1]

Not surprisingly for a man of his era, Bacon presumed that these inventions had originated in Europe. It was not until the end of World War II, however, that a relatively obscure English scientist from Cambridge University revealed that all three inventions identified by Bacon, and indeed, hundreds of other scientific, mathematical and technological discoveries had emanated from China. The scientist was Joseph Needham (1900-1995), a tall, brilliantly erudite and eccentric biochemist obsessed with the history, language, science, and civilization of China.

Needham's revelations were nothing short of stunning. At the time, many in the West looked down upon modern China as a backward, impoverished and illiterate nation. The Jesuits, who first entered China in the late 16th century, opened the West to many of the marvels of Chinese civilization. However, these were largely confined to the fine silk and ceramic products produced by Ming Dynasty artisans, and the rich texts of the Confucian canon.[2] Scientific prowess was not something Westerners commonly attributed to the Chinese people.

Not until the appearance of the British scholar did the world begin to comprehend the breadth and significance of China's contributions. In the remaining five decades of his life, Needham would co-author the largest, most definitive compendium of the history of Chinese science and technology ever produced.

Science and Civilization in China, first published in 1954, comprises 24 volumes and documents the origins of over a thousand agricultural, astronomical, chemical, engineering, mathematical, medical, metallurgical, and military discoveries and inventions. Described by fellow Cambridge scientist and Sinologist Laurence Picken as "perhaps the greatest single act of historical synthesis and intercultural communication ever attempted by one man," *Science and Civilization in China* is an astonishing encyclopedia of creativity and genius, and opened not only the Western world to ancient China's brilliant scientific history, but also Chinese eyes to the glory of over two millennia of invention.[3]

Over the course of his remarkable discoveries, Needham continued to be perplexed by one question: Why, given the magnificent inventions of its long and ancient past, did scientific development in China come to an abrupt halt around 1500? Why did the scientific revolution of the 16th century and the industrial revolution of the late 18th century occur in Europe and Britain, but not in China? China had for over a millennium been far more advanced in science, engineering, and medicine than the West; but sometime around 1500, this innovation suddenly stopped, seemingly without reason. Needham became so obsessed with this question and its many possible answers that he devoted much of the second half of his life to addressing it. It became known as "The Needham Question," and scientists and historians of science from around the world have put forth a variety of possible answers to help understand what happened in China, particularly in comparison with the western world.

Needham's Introduction to China

Following Great Britain's entry into World War II, China desperately sought the British government's support for its academic institutions, scholars, and scientist, all under siege by Japanese occupation forces. The Nationalist Chinese were particularly keen to salvage key documents and archives relating to strategic

scientific, medical and technological know-how. In response, the British Commonwealth and Foreign Office established the Sino-British Scientific Cooperation Office and cast a net to find a qualified director.[4] Needham, a Sinophile fluent in Chinese, immediately applied for the position and in late 1942, found himself fulfilling a lifetime dream. He arrived in early 1943 in Kunming, in southwestern Yunnan Province, and proceeded onwards to the wartime capital city of Chongqing, where he remained stationed until 1946.

Over this three-year period, Needham travelled across non-occupied China, conducting 11 expeditions and collecting a cornucopia of scientific data. Through observation, investigation and meticulous research, he uncovered proof of the origins of more than 1,000 inventions, devices, processes, and compounds, many of which had until then been attributed to western science. In 1945, Needham published his main findings, including the origins of the printing press, gunpowder and magnetic compass, in his book, *Chinese Science*.[5]

Science and Civilization in China (SCC)

Returning to Cambridge in 1948, Needham soon submitted a proposal to Cambridge University Press to publish a definitive account of his findings in China. The original proposal, dated 15 May 1948, envisaged a one-volume treatise entitled "Science and Civilization in China."[6] Needham noted two objectives in his proposal: first, to present a complete history of science and technology in China; and second, to explain China's contribution to the history of world science and civilization.[7] Cambridge University Press immediately approved funding for the project, and just as quickly, Needham realized that the scope of his book could not possibly be contained within a single volume. The first volume appeared in 1954, and by the time of his death in 1995, *Science and Civilization in China* had grown to 15 volumes.

Even Needham's most discerning critics were astounded by *Science and Civilization in China*. Eminent British scientist Professor Mansel Davies wrote:

> [SCC] is perhaps the greatest work of scholarship achieved by one individual since Aristotle….Needham himself wrote more than 12 volumes….The first 10 volumes alone have 4,808 text pages, 1,202 illustrations, 1,285 bibliographies, and 549 index pages (in Chinese and Roman script). Whilst the size of the work is itself remarkable, it is the thoroughness, the depth, and the enlightenment found in these volumes which make them an unsurpassed historiographic treasure of the 20th century. Carefully detailed, systematic accounts and interpretations of Chinese achievements over 25 centuries in mathematics and astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, zoology, botany, hydraulics, metallurgy, maritime science, textiles, hygiene, and medicine are presented.[8]

Needham passionately believed in the importance of framing his work in the context of world civilization. Dr. Gregory Blue, who was Needham's research assistant from 1977 to 1990, quotes Needham:

> One of the greatest needs of the world in our time is the growth and widespread dissemination of a true historical perspective, for without it whole peoples can make the gravest misjudgments about each other. Since science and its application dominate so much of our present world, since men of every race and culture take so great a pride in man's understanding and control over her, it matters vitally to know how much modern science came into being. Was it purely a product of the genius of Europe, or did all civilizations bring their contributions to the common pool? A right historical perspective here is one of the most urgent necessities of our time.[9]

SCC currently comprises 24 volumes, with three additional volumes under preparation. Remarkably, it is still an active project at the Needham Research Institute at Cambridge, over six decades since its inception.

Scientific Development in Ancient China (circa. 400-1500)

It is important to understand the magnitude of scientific innovation in ancient China and compare it to the state of science and technology in Europe during similar periods. The Chinese

have long appreciated the wonders of their storied past. The centerpiece of the magnificent opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics was the depiction of the *si da fa ming* (the "Four Great Inventions of Ancient China"), namely the magnetic compass, gunpowder, papermaking, and printing. Showcasing scientific achievement was a metaphor not lost on the Chinese people, who embrace China's new-found pride and respect in the 21st century with excitement and confidence.

The scope of pre-modern Chinese scientific invention is breathtaking. In the fields of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, medicine, metallurgy, and engineering (civil, mechanical, hydraulic, agricultural, and nautical), these discoveries ranged from transformational inventions such as the abacus, acupuncture, ball bearings, the blast furnace, calipers, cast iron, the mechanical clock, the horse collar harness, the iron plough, plant grafting, the propeller, to more prosaic—but no less ingenious—inventions such as matches, the toothbrush, folding umbrellas and perfumed toilet paper.[10] As Needham wrote, "the mere fact of seeing them listed brings home to one the astonishing inventiveness of the Chinese people."[11]

Needham's genius was to catalog, verify and document the origins of these achievements, large and small, in a manner that allowed Westerners and Chinese to recognize the brilliance of centuries of applied creativity. The table below shows a sample from *Science and Civilization of China*, reflecting a range of mechanical inventions and techniques that originated in China, with the approximate lag time (in centuries) in technology transfer to Europe. The results are startling:

Invention	China's Advancement over Europe (in centuries)
Rotary fan	14
Crossbow	13
Porcelain	11-13
Iron chain suspension bridge	10-13

Canal lock gates	12
Cast iron	10-12
Wagon mill	12
Magnetic compass	11
Paper	10
Wheelbarrow	9-10
Arched bridge	7
Gunpowder	5-6
Movable type printing	4

Source: *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. 1, p. 242

Needham was able to identify several hundred examples of inventions from China that predated their first appearance in Europe. As Blue remarks, it is interesting to note that in contrast, the West was only able to contribute two mechanical elements to Chinese civilization at the time of the Jesuit missions in the 17th century, namely the Archimedean screw and the crankshaft.[12] Needham's work clearly demonstrates that from the 400 to 1500, levels of science and technology in Chinese civilization far exceeded those of Europe.

Needham puts his findings into perspective:

> If…the Chinese were recording sunspot cycles a millennium and a half before Europeans noted the existence of such blemishes on the solar orb, if every component of the parhelic system received a technical name a thousand years before the Europeans began to study them, and if that key instrument of scientific revolution, the mechanical clock, began its career in early 8th century China rather than (as is usually supposed) in 14th century Europe, there must be something wrong with conventional ideas about the uniquely scientific genius of Western civilization.[13]

Needham's Response to the Question

As Needham began to uncover the ingenuity of ancient China's science and technology, the question which took on his name started to intrigue him. He addressed the question explicitly in his 1969 book, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West.*[14] He determined that there were two main reasons why Chinese science failed to modernize. The first had to do with the central influence of Confucianism and Taoism in Chinese culture, particularly informing attitudes toward nature and science amongst the educated elite. Confucianism, or more precisely the Neo-Confucian school which emerged dominant in the Song Dynasty (960-1279), was an ethical system emphasizing an inward-looking, mind-focused way of life. Social harmony, happiness and goodness arose from people developing a set of virtues that underlay everyday conduct. Such virtues included filial piety, veneration of ancestors, respect for elders, moderation and conformity of the individual to society.[15] Needham argued that this inward focus marginalized the importance of studying the natural world. In fact, it rendered science frivolous in the grander scheme of what mattered most in life.

Needham felt that Taoism also had a negative impact on the development of the scientific method in China. Taoism stresses love of and respect for nature. As a code of behavior, it teaches that man should leave nature alone—completely—and accept its way, whatever the consequences.[16] The external world is far too complex to be fathomed by analysis, observation or mathematical theories. Originating more than 2,000 years ago, Taoism received official status as a religion during the Tang Dynasty (618-907).[17] Needham believed that its *laissez-faire* attitude toward the natural world proved a cultural and intellectual inhibitor to scientific research and innovation:

> It was not that there was no order in nature for the Chinese, but rather that it was not an order ordained by a rational personal being, and hence there was no conviction that rational personal beings would be

> able to spell out in their lesser earthly languages the divine code of laws which had been decreed aforetime. The Taoists, indeed, would have scorned such an idea as being too naïve for the subtlety and complexity of the universe as they intuited it.[18]

Secondly, Needham argued that modern science failed to develop in China because China lacked the kind of merchant-capitalist system that had been developing in Europe from the late Middle Ages to the Age of Discovery. Needham observed that China had started to lag in scientific innovation during this period.[19] He concluded that without a broad-based system of economic incentives, applied scientific research and development would be haphazard at best. Writing in *Science and Civilization in China*, Needham declared that:

> Interest in Nature was not enough, controlled experimentation was not enough, empirical induction was not enough, eclipse-prediction and calendar calculation were not enough—all of these the Chinese had. Apparently, only a mercantile culture alone was able to do what agrarian bureaucratic civilization could not—bring fusion-point to the formerly separated disciplines of mathematics and nature-knowledge.[20]

Since Needham first raised his question, there have been a multitude of theories attempting to resolve the puzzle. It is somewhat ironic that this question, which absorbed and perplexed Needham's great mind for decades, elicited even more elaborate and sophisticated answers from lesser scientists and historians of science than from the originator himself.

Philosophical Influences on Needham

The 20th century Chinese philosopher Yu-Lan Fung (*Feng Yulan*) had a great influence on Needham's thinking about Confucianism and Taoism.[21] In his seminal 1922 essay "Why China Has No Science," Fung argued that science, in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term, had no place in China "because the Chinese concern themselves solely with the mind, whereas Europeans concern themselves with knowing and controlling matter."[22] He explained that since the Song Dynasty in the 10th century, the

Chinese mind has been shaped by the forces of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. This so-called "Neo-Confucianism" continues to form the essence of Chinese philosophy today. Its basic tenet is that all conduct should be focused inward on the mind, and that happiness and meaning come from within. Fung wrote that the Chinese had no need for science *per se*: "They had no need or interest in analyzing the external world because it was their minds that they wished to conquer and nothing else."[23] Fung noted that in contrast, Descartes and Bacon, the two great philosophers of western science, had distinct notions of the purposes of science: "Descartes said that it is for certainty; Bacon said that it is for power."[24]

According to Fung, the Taoist belief that there is only one certainty, which is that nature holds all goodness and virtue, negated any need for scientific certainty. Confucians, in turn, had no need for scientific certainty since they sought to know only themselves within the context of self-reflection and discovery. They had no need for scientific power because there was no external force they wished or needed to conquer.[25] Moreover, Confucians could see no use in science if "intellectual certainty and the power to conquer the external world are not included in the idea of good."[26] This overview reveals the key differences between the Chinese and European philosophies of science, and their bearing on The Needham Question. Fung maintained that Europeans were focused on the external world, the world of the atoms, the human body, structures, tools, and weapons. In contrast, the Neo-Confucians, heavily influenced by Taoist and Buddhist thinking (the latter even treats the "external world" as an illusion), believe that everything good is already within each person for eternity. So there is no use in searching externally for certainty, power, meaning, happiness, or logic.

In short, the Neo-Confucian beliefs that have dominated Chinese culture, politics and society for over 1,000 years hold that scientific methods and inventions designed to harness nature are fruitless exercises that detract from the pursuit of happiness and goodness. As literary critic Kenneth Rexroth noted in his review of *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. 4:

> Chinese science…is radically, fundamentally different, and demands a willed, sympathetic reorientation of perspective on the nature of nature….Chinese scientific thought has been far more organic than mechanical, permissive than authoritarian in its interpretation of Nature's ways.[27]

Needham himself wrote that Chinese science:

> …derives from a world in which Nature works by "doing nothing" instead of by passing laws, in which the universe moves as a great web of interrelatedness of which man and his imperatives are only a part. That is basically a true picture of the Chinese universe. It is a universe of strange and wonderful things. It is a universe Western man is going to have to understand if we are going to survive happily together on a planet where, whether we like it or not, as Confucius said, 'all men are brothers.'[28]

The main problem with the arguments of Fung and Needham is that they cannot explain the stunning advances in science and technology which the Chinese produced from the Song Dynasty to end of the 15th century. In fact the Song period was one of the richest in terms of scientific discovery and inventiveness. By the end of the 11th century, China had coal-burning blast furnaces and produced twice as much pig iron as England did at the height of the Industrial Revolution.[29] The output of coal reached 150,000 tons and per capita income was estimated to be more than five times that of Europe.[30] China produced the most sophisticated textiles in the world at that time. Shen Kuo (1031-1095) and Su Song (1020-1101), two of the greatest scientists and inventors in Chinese history, lived during the Song period.

In the 13th century, a water-powered spinning machine similar to those used in Europe around 1700 was already producing linen thread.[31] China's sophisticated agriculture, industry and commerce astonished Marco Polo, whose native Venice was considered one of the most prosperous cities in Europe at the time. Following the Song era, key inventions included smallpox inoculation, the spindle wheel, bronze type printing, gunpowder, the trebuchet and bombs (12th century); lacquer and pasteurization of wine (13th century); sand clocks, rockets and rocket launchers (14th century), wallpaper and toilet paper (16th century) and the ginning machine (17th century).[32]

In reality, Neo-Confucianism's influence on impeding the development of science and technology in China lay not so much in its philosophical teachers *per se*, but in its enormous influence on the imperial civil service examination system.

The Imperial Civil Service Examination System

A number of scholars, most notably the economic historian Justin Yifu Lin, have argued that the root of The Needham Question lies in the nature and influence of the imperial civil service examination. This formidable system determined bureaucratic appointment and advancement from the 7th century to the beginning of the 20th century.[33] The examinations emphasized mastery of the Confucian canon and its attendant virtues to the near exclusion of mathematical and scientific study. Positions in the imperial bureaucracy conferred much sought-after power, social status and wealth; as a result, the civil service examinations had an enormous impact on the education of the elite. Lin's argument is that preparation for these examinations entailed at least two decades of intense study and "crowded out" any possible inquiry into non-essential subjects. The consequences of this focused academic endeavor were neglect (and official disdain) of the sciences.

In 221 BC, Emperor Qin united China and the country remained an absolute hereditary monarchy until the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Notwithstanding the replacement of dynastic rule first by a quasi-democratic republic and then by a Communist system, China has remained a unified country administered by a centralized bureaucracy for over 2,000 years.

One of the greatest reforms of the Qin Emperor was to establish a bureaucratic system of governance, which has remained largely intact over two millennia. An elaborate pyramidical structure comprising central, provincial, prefectural, county and township bureaus was formed to govern the newly united country.[34] Most importantly, Qin abolished the former hereditary-nepotistic system

of appointing government officials and replaced it with a "recommendation system," in which government officials filled vacancies by referral.[35] The hope was that officials would recommend men they considered possessed of talent and virtue. The reality, however, was that the system became corrupted, with wealthy families often buying favor for their sons and relatives.

During the Sui Dynasty (580-618), the method of civil service appointment and promotion was again reformed. The recommendation system was replaced by a fair and impartial civil service examination.[36] Government officials began to be selected and promoted on the basis of merit, namely intellectual talent and virtue. By the time of the Song Dynasty (960-1279), all bureaucrats were selected by competitive examinatin.[37] This reform proved monumental in Chinese history, and made the imperial civil service unique for centuries in its emphasis on meritocratic selection and advancement. This system continued until it was abolished in 1904, in a vain attempt to reform the dying Qing regime.[38]

Initially, the civil service examination tested a wide range of subject areas, including mathematics, astronomy and the "laws of nature."[39] In 1313, however, mathematics and science-related subjects were eliminated, and by the time of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the examination tested only the Confucian classics, i.e. the humanities.[40]

One of the greatest books on the state of science and technology in pre-modern China was *A Volume on the Creations of Nature and Man: Chinese Technology in the 17th century (T'ien Kung K'ai Wu)*, written by the famous Ming scientist Song Yingxing. His lament on his own book is a sad and poignant commentary on the times: "An ambitious scholar will undoubtedly toss this book onto his desk and give it no further thought; it is a work that is in no way concerned with the art of advancement in officialdom."[41]

Matteo Ricci, the great Jesuit scholar-priest who lived and travelled across China between 1583-1610, made a similar observation:

> It is evident to everyone here that no one will labor to attain proficiency in mathematics or medicine who has any hope of becoming

> prominent in the field of philosophy. The result is that scarcely anyone devotes himself to these studies, unless he is deterred from the pursuit of what are considered to be higher studies, either by reason of family affairs or by mediocrity of talent. The study of mathematics and that of medicine are held in low esteem, because they are not fostered by honors as is the study of philosophy, to which students are attracted by the hope of the glory and the rewards attached to it.[42]

The core of the examination syllabus was the main Confucian canon, comprising *The Four Books* and *The Five Classics*.[43] These totaled over 430,000 characters and required six years of rigorous study.[44] To even quality to sit the final imperial examination, a scholar would have to pass an arduous progression of lower-level examinations. During the Ming and Qing era, these comprised preliminary, county, prefectural, academy, provincial and state examinations.[45] Competition was intense. The pass rate in the Ming era for the provincial examination was 4 percent; for the state level examination it was less than 10 percent.[46] The few who attained the vaunted status of *jinshi*, or top scholar, in the final imperial examination studied, on average, for over 25 years without pause. Only one in 3,000 examinees achieved this ranking.[47]

Historian Lin's response to The Needham Question is that for the ambitious educated classes, there was neither the time nor the incentive to study mathematics and science, or to perfect the techniques of scientific investigation, experimentation and hypothesis testing. By this reasoning, he argues that from the end of the first millennium to modern times, Chinese society never developed a scientific tradition.

It is worthwhile to consider more closely the examination's extreme emphasis on the Confucian classics. On the surface, this focus would be expected, given the dominance of Neo-Confucian thinking in society, and especially among the imperial elite. However, there was a less obvious and more ingenious rationale. According to Lin and China scholar C.K. Yang, the imperial bureaucracy for centuries remained small relative to the physical size of the country and its population because of the prevalent Confucian ethic. From the 16th century to the middle of the 17th century, the total number of Chinese government officials ranged from

10,000 to 14,000, while the population grew from 75 million to 100 million.[48] The ratio of bureaucrats to citizens in China was far lower than those in England (1:200) and France (1:280) at the time.[49] Even at the height of the Qing Dynasty in the mid 18th century, the total civil service did not exceed 40,000, within a total population of 200 million.[50]

China scholar Yang attributes the efficiency of pre-Qing government to the focus on Confucianism in the civil service examinations as well as the continuous assessment required for promotion. Imperial Chinese government placed great emphasis on the ethical virtues of its officials; magistrates and lower-level bureaucrats were expected to rule judiciously and create networks of similarly upright non-officials to provide leverage in local governance. Officials could be trusted to develop wide-ranging ties with merchants, village elders, artisan chiefs and other useful citizens to "get things done."[51] In contrast, the European civil services tended to emphasize specialization and technical skills. The Chinese civil service embodied the Confucian principles of honesty, moderation, piety, obedience, conformity, fairness and harmony. By selecting its officials on the basis of virtues rather than technical skills it was able to rule successfully with a relatively small corps of highly educated people. The continuous 2,000-year history of the Chinese bureaucracy serves as testimony to the power of this system.

Critiques of the Civil Service Examination Theory

One substantial criticism of the civil service examination theory comes from Nathan Sivin, a noted historian of Chinese science and medicine. He argues that China was not unique in creating a "scholar-bureaucrat class immersed in books, faced toward the past, and oriented toward human institutions rather toward nature."[52] He observes:

> In Europe at the onset of the Scientific Revolution, the intellectual world was filled with scholars and dons immersed in books, steeped

> in the classical Greco-Roman Judeo-Christian classics, and oriented towards the study of the humanities rather than on nature. This, however, did not prevent the great changes in scientific thinking and invention which would sweep across Europe.[53]

Sinologist and historian Derk Bodde concurred with this point, citing the state of academia in England during the early 17th century:

> Of course the Chinese situation was by no means unique in 1600. As a Western parallel, let us consider the early 17th century curriculum at Cambridge. The leading studies at the time were classics, rhetoric, and divinity; mathematics was slighted and the various sciences practically ignored. During William Harvey's years at Cambridge (1594-1602), the so-called medical course was principally devoted to logic and divinity, rather than "physick." And even as late as about 1630, the university statutes threatened Bachelors and Masters of Arts who failed to follow Aristotle faithfully with a fine of five shillings for every point of divergence from the *Organon*.[54]

However, Bodde noted that a remarkable sea change soon occurred at Cambridge in the mid-1600s, in which the study of mathematics, natural sciences and natural history began to be embraced, paving the way for the Newtonian revolution and ultimately, the Industrial Revolution.

Economic Factors

Needham strongly believed that the lack of economic incentives for merchants and the general failure of medieval era Chinese to establish a healthy capitalist system were key factors that impeded scientific and technological development in modern China.[55]

The economic history of China has largely been shaped by the continuous struggle to feed a large population, while maintaining social order. This goal was the main objective of virtually all its emperors, and remains a primary concern of today's Communist rulers. As more than 70 percent of the country's land mass is either mountainous or arid, China's agricultural policies have long focused on intensive farming of the arable land around the

Yellow and Yangzi Rivers, and the high precipitation regions in the south. [56] Social scientists Kang Chao and Anthony Tang argue that China's large population created a long-term labor surplus, resulting in relatively little need for labor-saving technological innovation given persistent low real wages and sufficient farming productivity.[57] Moreover, excess labor in low-paying agriculture meant that there was little in the way of economic savings to finance capital investment. Without this stimulus, there were few commercial incentives for technological or mechanical innovation.[58] Historian Mark Elvin describes this situation as a "high level equilibrium trap" and suggests that it can answer The Needham Question.[59]

Comprehensive historical evidence, however, demonstrates that the labor argument is flawed. During prolonged periods of labor surplus, such as the 5th to 15th centuries, scientific and technological innovation flourished across China. Moreover, between the 14th and 19th centuries, per capita output of grains more than doubled, while the population quadrupled from 72 million in 1368 to 300 million n 1800.[60] The greatest weakness of the equilibrium trap theory is that it presumes scientific innovation to be the domain of the masses. While peasants in ancient China did produce much notable agricultural innovation, it was the educated classes who should have driven scientific advancement. The equilibrium trap theory is silent on why modern science did not take hold in any demographic.

Needham highlighted the longstanding hostility of the imperial bureaucracy toward the merchant classes as an explanation for his question. From the Han (206BC-220AD) to the Tang (618-907) periods, the state took an almost adversarial view of the merchant class:

> The prime objective of state policy was a settled, stable and contented peasant population, carefully registered and controlled, which would provide regular and ample taxation in kind, and be readily available for labor service or military service when required. In such a society, the merchant was conceived of as a disturbing factor…. Not only was he the advocate of a materialistic attitude…repugnant to the ethical precepts of Confucianism…. He also provided the population with

> a model of a possible means of social advancement based purely on the acquisition of wealth…. Moreover, he was an unstable element in society.[61]

During this period, the government tightly restricted the activities of *shang'ren* (merchant businessmen). Commercial activity in large cities was confined to walled marketplaces, where trading hours, the types of goods exchangeable, dealings with foreign parties, transported, distribution and freedom of travel were tightly controlled by local authorities.[62] Most importantly, under the Tang Dynasty, merchants and artisans were excluded from participation in civil service examinations, sending the clear signal that they were not worthy of government service.[63] This ban was not lifted until the Ming period.

However, Needham's anti-merchant argument also has flaws. According to Lin:

> Discrimination against merchants and artisans in ancient China was probably not as serious as Needham makes out…Historical data reveals that successful merchants, money lenders and industrialists of the Han period (206BC to AD8) were treated almost as social equals by vassals, kings and marquises. By the medieval period, big business and financial organizations had already appeared and were flourishing in China, most of them owned by gentry families. Therefore, young men who were not interested in books and learning but who had an adventurous personality could find socially approved outlets in commerce. Furthermore, during the Ming period, the discriminatory laws forbidding merchants to take civil service examinations were formally removed. After 1451, the channel for purchasing offices and even academic degrees was opened. Thus money could be directly translated into position and become one of the determinants of social status.[64]

In Needham's defense, Lin's argument neglects to mention that pre-modern China was not an actively trading society. In external trade, the Ming and early Qing governments virtually closed their doors to foreigners. China's isolationist foreign and economic policies mirrored its Neo-Confucian values. In contrast, western civilization arose around the Mediterranean, which became a natural channel for foreign trade and cultural exchange. The Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Portuguese, Spanish and French empires were all naval powers whose foreign policies were driven by mercantilism

and colonization. Great Britain would follow suit from the 16th century onwards. These powers went to war to secure vital trades routes. Continuous war and economic competition served as vital catalysts to scientific and technological advancement across the European states. Such forces were a non-issue in China, and this fact profoundly impacted its technological evolution.

Politics and Bureaucracy in Pre-Modern China

China's long history differs most distinctly from that of Europe in that the former has, since 221BC, been one unified nation state under centralized bureaucratic rule with a common social philosophy and an essentially homogenous ethnic citizenry. The imperial bureaucracy was central to pre-modern Chinese politics. Some historians argue that this institution played a critical role in undermining the advancement of science and technology. Sinologist Karl Wittfogel, for example, wrote of "hydraulic despotism," hypothesizing that since the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770BC-221BC), most of the country's economic and planning resources were committed to elaborate hydrological programs. These programs aimed to control the annual flooding of the Yellow and Yangzi rivers.[65] This investment, and the massive bureaucracy built to manage it, effectively crowded out resources that could potentially have been deployed in developing alternative scientific and industrial inventions.[66] Despite having some merit, Wittfogel's theory is far too narrow to explain why modern science did not develop in China despite centuries of such innovation during ancient times.

Soon after consolidating power in 221BC, the Qin Emperor ordered the burning of all books relating to history and the "laws of nature."[67] His motive was to rewrite history and propagate his own political philosophy of "legalism," which was devised to unify the country under an orderly system of laws and regulations.[68] In the ensuing centuries, other rulers conducted similar intellectual purges, especially in the sciences. As Bodde noted, the earliest complete surviving Chinese law code of 653 forbids the private

possession of "all instruments representing celestial bodies."[69] Violators were punishable by two years imprisonment. Bodde argued that government control of astronomy, which continued through the Qing Dynasty, was probably an important reason why science failed to progress beyond a certain point. In 1600, Matteo Ricci, who had been highly regarded by the Chinese literati and high government officials, had to surrender his entire library of European mathematical and astronomical treatises to the Qing court prior to entering the Forbidden City in 1600.[70] He observed that by that time, most Chinese scholars had already lost interest in mathematics and astronomy because of age-old government restrictions.[71]

While the latter theory has some merit, it does not fully address The Needham Question. It is important to compare Europe's own process of scientific advancement at the time to best understand the Chinese situation. From medieval times through the Renaissance, there were also significant impediments in Europe to scientific inquiry and discourse. The Catholic Church over centuries tried directly and indirectly to control the flow of ideas; the most notorious effort in this regard was the Spanish Inquisition. The clash between faith-based dogma and reason came to a head during the Reformation. European men of science such as Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler faced daunting religious, social and political obstacles to free expression and interchange. Despite these barriers to intellectual exploration, the scientific revolution took place in Europe and set the stage for the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution to follow. Why the same did not occur in China is the key question and accounted for Needham's main intellectual struggle.

Cultural Impediments

Needham stressed Confucianism's role in impeding scientific progress. Confucianism teaches respect for elders and teachers, and admonishes criticism, especially from young to old. It stresses social conformity and does not encourage free thinking. Rote memorization and veneration of the classics are deeply ingrained in Chinese culture. Celebration of antiquity was traditionally preferred to the celebration of scientific advancement or discovery. Zheng He (1371-1433), the great Ming Dynasty admiral, led a fleet of over 200 ships on seven expeditions that reached India, the Arabian peninsula and eastern Africa.[72] His voyages of discovery, however, were hardly recorded in Ming annuls.[73] Zheng He is in fact noteworthy for the reason that he remains a relatively obscure figure in Chinese and world history, unlike Columbus, da Gama, Magellan, Drake and Raleigh. As Bodde observed:

> Reluctance to pursue massive exploration, settlement, trade and exploration abroad also contributed to the lack of scientific development. The voyages of Zheng He to the Indian Ocean and Africa were criticized as wasteful and useless. This contrasts dramatically with the inexorable drive of Europeans, especially from the late 15th century, to explore, colonize and ruthlessly exploit.[74]

Moreover, Confucian philosophy is distinctly anti-violence and anti-war. Never in their history have the Chinese glorified war as a noble undertaking.[75] Therefore, the Chinese people historically felt no need to develop advanced weaponry or major transportation technology—that is, until the foreign incursions of the mid 19th century, when the Qing found themselves hopelessly outclassed in weaponry, logistics and naval strength by the British. Bodde noted that "Confucians had a conviction that a military class does not properly belong to a truly well-ordered state."[76] John King Fairbank wrote more emphatically:

> War is not easy to glorify in the Chinese tradition because ideally it should never have occurred. The moral absolute is all on the side of peace. No economic interest sufficed to glorify warfare; no wealthy neighbors enticed Chinese freebooters across the border or over the sea…. Generals had few triumphs; and they lost their heads as

> often as anyone else. Chinese youth were given no youthful worship of heroism like that in the West…Likewise holy wars are not easy to find in the Chinese imperial records, just as an avenging God and the wrath of Jehovah are far to seek…The whole view of the world is less anthropomorphic and less bellicose than that of the Old Testament, or of Islam.[77]

These observations in particular support Needham's point: Confucian thought combined with anti-war and anti-mercantile philosophies discouraged serious interest in ambitious scientific and technological development. The Chinese government's restrictions on the merchant class during pre-modern times were in part a means of keeping businessmen's power in check; they were also a reflection of the Confucian ethic. Confucian Chinese society was hierarchical and comprised four major classes. In descending order, these where the *shi* (scholars), *nung* (farmers), *kung* (artisans), and *shang* (merchants).[78] In a society where the notion of face" and social status is paramount, the placing of the merchant class at the bottom strata of society is telling. The lowly status of the merchant in China also reinforced Needham's belief that disenfranchisement of this group was a major causal factor in China's failure to embrace scientific and technological innovation. Neither economic incentive nor social respect was accorded to entrepreneurship.

Another cultural response to The Needham Question suggests that imperial China, particularly in the Ming and Qing periods, was simply too arrogant to be curious about innovations and discoveries from the outside world. Lord Macartney, the British envoy who was sent in 1793 by King George III to visit the Qing emperor Qianlong in the hopes of opening up Sino-British trade, was summarily dismissed by the Qing court.[79] The Emperor's letter to the English monarch is revealing:

> As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures…It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display an even greater devotion and loyalty in the future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country thereafter.[80]

Since their first encounters with Spanish and Portuguese traders along the southern coast of China in the 15th and 16th centuries, the imperial Chinese looked down on all foreigners as "barbarians." This prejudice also applied to Western inventions and ideas. The Chinese conceived of themselves as the Middle Kingdom between Heaven and Earth; this hubris can explain why they were generally uninterested in embracing foreign science and innovation. However, this pride still cannot fully explain why indigenous modern science did not develop beyond the 15th century, given the preceding centuries of spectacular ingenuity.

Idiosyncrasies of the Chinese Language

Another answer to the Needham paradox suggests that the Chinese written language itself presented a major barrier to the development of modern science. Because Chinese is a pictographic language with no alphabet or universal building block system, it was very difficult to develop movable-type printing. Producing books, manuscripts, journals and any other form of mass printing was therefore time-consuming and expensive. This fact must have presented a great hurdle in the dissemination of scientific ideas, research and methodologies.

Movable-type was invented during the Northern Song Dynasty (1041-1048)[81] Characters were engraved on moistened clay blocks and placed under a categorization system within an iron frame. These clay typesets were later replaced with wood and then bronze. However, the complex nature of Chinese characters made large-scale printing cumbersome. In 1298, it took several months to print 100 copies of the 60,000-character book *Shengde Gazetteer*, entailing the production of 30,000 wooden block characters.[82] In 1319, it took half a year to print a few dozen copies of *The Extended Meaning of The Great Learning*, which utilized over 100,000 wooden block characters.[83] In 1773, the Qing government had 253,000 bronze moveable types made to print 64 sets of *The Collection of Rare Editions at the Hall of Military Eminence*.[84] In contrast, soon after

movable-type printing became available in Europe in the middle of the 15th century, information exchange grew at an astonishing rate as printing presses became more widely available.

But the movable-type theory begs more questions than it resolves. Most obviously, how can it explain the fact that the scientific and industrial revolutions took place in Western Europe and Britain, whereas they did not do so in the Arab, Persian, Greco-Roman and Ottoman worlds, cultures whose languages were also alphabet-based? Moreover, it fails to explain why the Chinese language did not seem to inhibit the development of pre-modern science and technology in China over such a long period of time. Needham himself dismissed the theory:

> There is a commonly received idea that the ideographic language was a powerful inhibitory factor to the development of modern science in China. We believe, however, that this factor is generally grossly overrated. It has proved possible in the course of our work to draw up large glossaries of definable technical terms used in ancient and medieval times for all kinds of things and ideas in science and its applications…We are strongly inclined to believe that if social and economic factors in Chinese society had permitted or facilitated the rise of modern science there as well as in Europe, then already 300 years ago the language would have been made suitable for scientific expression.[85]

The Chinese language is not just a medium for communication and expression. It is, more importantly, the principal carrier of Chinese culture Imbedded within almost every picture-based character is a legacy of history, customs, folklore and philosophical teachings; in essence each word is a story that conveys profound meaning. Much of this meaning is subtle and nuanced. In a way, the Chinese language can be considered an even more sophisticated means of knowledge transmission than any alphabetic or phonetically-based language. Indeed, the scientific wisdom of the ancients was spread around society through this very mechanism, and new characters were invented to convey new concepts, inventions and discoveries.

The Needham Question and the Industrial Revolution

An obvious corollary question to the Needham puzzle, and one which Needham himself pondered, is: Why did the Industrial Revolution originate in Britain, and not in China? This question would appear easier to address than The Needham Question itself. By the middle of the 18th century, the great universities of Britain and Europe had been heirs for over four centuries to the individual, free-thinking rationalism emanating from the Age of Reason, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Age of Discovery. Britain was in the throes of the Enlightenment. Science was blossoming at universities and academies, and free exchange between scholars and scientists in Britain and the continent was more the norm than the exception.

In addition, the British Patent System of 1624 laid the grounds for the Industrial Revolution in Britain in two ways, according to economic historian and Nobel laureate Douglass North.[86] Firstly, it gave clear incentives to inventors by protecting their intellectual property rights for a defined period of time. Secondly, by making public the key technical processes of each patent, the system provided a legitimate mechanism for technology and knowledge transfer—and its attendant benefits to other would-be inventors within society.

Ultimately, the furthering of economic, commercial and military interests pursuant to Britain's mercantilist and colonization policies of the 16th to 19th centuries were the fundamental drivers of British scientific and technological innovation. These factors were wholly absent in pre-modern China. The Chinese considered such policies repugnant and irrelevant. China simply had no force driving it to an industrial revolution.

Conclusion

Based on the weight of historical evidence, the most persuasive answers to The Needham Question are the influence of Neo-Confucianism and the lack of clear economic incentives for systematic innovation. Neo-Confucianism inhibited the advancement of science in two ways: firstly, in its philosophical teachings; and secondly, in its impact on the imperial civil service examination system. The examination system itself effectively crowded out scientific study and development. By the time China realized the need to develop strategic technologies, the Qing Empire was already crumbling under incursions from more advanced European nations. Gunboat diplomacy, the Opium Wars, their resulting "unequal treaties," humiliating defeats in the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Rebellion, and invasion by Japan on the eve of World War II were the consequences of failing to embrace modern science and technology over so many centuries. When finally forced into war and the world marketplace, China suffered for its years of self-sufficient isolation.

How significant was The Needham Question during Needham's lifetime, and how relevant is it today?

The Needham Question attracted keen intellectual interest from academia in the West. Writing at the age of 93, Needham summarized the intellectual importance that he attached to the question:

> If you wish to explain why Europeans were able to do what the Chinese and Indians were not, then you are driven back upon an inescapable dilemma. One of the horns is called pure chance, the other is racicalism however disguised. To attribute the origin of modern science entirely to chance is to declare the bankruptcy of history as a form of enlightenment of the human mind. Racialism, in the political sense, has nothing in common with science. Racialism is neither intellectually respectable nor internationally acceptable. Humankind requires a great revival of interest in the relations of science and society, as well as a study ever more intense of the social structures of all the civilizations, and the delineation of how they differed in glory from one another.[87]

In essence, Needham believed that science and civilization are inextricably linked. In his mind, Ming and Qing society did not consider the advancement of science necessary or important. He felt that value judgments which equated scientific prowess with cultural superiority were spurious to the Chinese. To many westerners, Needham seemed an apologist for China's failure to develop and adopt modern science and technology. Perhaps he was; however, his observations were informed by a deep nuanced appreciation of Chinese thinking and morality.

At the conclusion of his final volume of *SCC*, Needham highlighted the moral importance of his quest: "If a single word was to be sought to describe the guiding thread which has run through all the volumes, I would be inclined to use the word 'justice.' When I started writing, justice was not being done in the West to the other great civilizations."[88]

The Needham paradox also underpins "The Great Divergence" theory put forth by Samuel Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) and Kenneth Pomeranz in *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (2000). The Great Divergence theory analyzes the reasons why economic growth took off in Europe and the New World in the period following 1600, while by comparison the economies of Qing China, Mughal India and Tokugawa Japan stagnated. Pomeranz argues that the main cause, not surprisingly, was the Industrial Revolution and the fact that modern science and technology were neither encouraged nor embraced by Asian societies during this period. The fact that the Age of Reason, the Renaissance, the Age of Discovery, the Reformation and the Enlightenment took place in Europe also weighs in the calculus. The various theoretical answers to The Needham Question are important contributing factors in this discussion.

It is evident, however, that the conditions present when The Needham Question was first conceived no longer apply in today's China. The influence of Confucianism has been on the wane since 1949. As noted, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) discouraged adherence to Confucianism in an attempt to replace it with Com-

munist ideology, mainly to maintain their control over society. Perhaps more detrimental to Confucianism has been the post-Mao era focus on economic growth and consumerism. Deng Xiaoping proclaimed in 1992 that "to get rich is glorious," and pushed the country into economic overdrive. Consumerism, materialism and a form of extreme capitalism have replaced Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism as the ethos of many in China—especially the urban, upwardly mobile younger generation.

"Capitalism with a Chinese face" has taken sway over the country. Since the Deng market reforms of the late 1970s , GDP growth has been the key performance metric for the country's leadership. Entrepreneurship has been embraced, along with technological innovation. Successful businessmen, unlike the merchants of pre-modern China, are the new heroes of the aspiring middle classes. In 2002, the CCP took the unprecedented step of inviting leading capitalists into the party's membership.[89] In today's China, the Confucian social order has been turned upside down. In one of history's great ironies, *shang ren*, the merchant class, now sit close to the apex of society, right alongside the ruling Communist party elite.

Politically, the CCP and central government control society and most of the economy. The Chinese bureaucracy is still large; however, it is no longer defined by meritocratic civil service examinations. Party loyalty is now the main arbiter of appointment and advancement. Moreover, government is generally business friendly, given the emphasis on economic growth. The most important difference between modern and imperial Chinese government is that the civil service today is no longer the principal conduit to social status and wealth. Power still resides in the CCP, but more and more Chinese prefer to find success in the private sector.

As noted, post-Deng Chinese culture has changed radically from that of ancient and imperial China. In fact, it is changing more rapidly than any culture in the history of mankind. While Confucian values appear to remain strong within the family unit, an almost extreme materialism is consuming much of contemporary Chinese society. Needham's observation that there were no

economic incentives encouraging merchants to invest in scientific invention is now quite the opposite. Venture capital, stock markets and fierce domestic and global competition provide tangible incentives for scientific and technological innovation. Entrepreneurs and scientists are responding, and there are a growing number of technology-related success stories coming from China.

Most importantly, the leadership of the CCP and the state are now the domain of scientists and engineers. A remarkable 70 percent of Politburo and State Council members have advanced degrees, of which 62 percent are in natural sciences, applied sciences or engineering.[90] This statistic reflects decades of Soviet-style central planning. The enormous investment in physical infrastructure (highways, bridges, airports, railways, telecommunications and energy—including the massive Three Gorges Project is a testimony to an industrial engineering-based economic model. Government funding for scientific research and development has grown at a compound annual rate of 17 percent over the past decade, and in 2009 was RMB548 billion (or US$88 billion), representing 1.6 percent of GDP.[91] The government is targeting to spend 2.5 percent of GDP on scientific R&D by 2020, implying an annual spending of well over US$250 billion within a decade.[92] The number of students enrolled in higher education has grown from four million in 1999 to more than 19 million today.[93] The most popular university majors are engineering (61 percent) followed by business, finance and accounting (24 percent).[94] The Confucian legacy has indeed been turned upside down.

Given these circumstances, it would appear that China is ripe for scientific discovery and technological innovation. Needham biographer Simon Winchester echoes many contemporary observers of the Chinese economy in his bullish assessment. He argues that China's former scientific stagnation

> ...may be seen in due course as more of a hiatus, more of a hiccup in China's long history, than a permanent condition. Today's China.. has become so rich, energetic, freewheeling, awesome, and spectacular—that the situation which so engaged Joseph Needham and the small army of Sinologist who followed in his footsteps may itself well have come to a natural end.[95]

A closer examination of modern China, however, indicates that we should be cautious about making overly optimistic predictions concerning Chinese scientific innovation. Beneath the veneer of stunning growth and heavy research and development lie several impediments to sustainable technological discovery. Education in China is a politically sensitive area and is tightly controlled by the CCP. The Chinese pre-tertiary education system is still heavily examination and rote learning based. Free, creative and critical thinking are impossible in a culture that emphasizes recitation and regurgitation, often of irrelevant and largely useless information. Many secondary schools and universities have poorly equipped science laboratories, and textbooks are often outdated. Teaching quality is erratic, and observers comment that teaching is poorest in higher education. Confucian values of social conformity and refraining from criticizing teachers and elders remain firmly engrained. There is evidence of widespread plagiarism and academic dishonesty, in part reflecting the lack of intellectual property rights protection.[96] Since 2002, nearly one third of college students have not been able to find satisfactory employment upon graduation, a testimony to the perceived poor quality of higher education.[97] There are restrictions on freedom of speech and expression, which impact freedom of thought and creativity. Moreover, the obsession with money making, consumerism and material success has made Chinese, young and old, more short-term in their thinking. Many businesses act short-term, often preferring speculative gains and "copycatting" to actual long-term investment in human resources and genuine innovation.

These factors are very different from those Needham and other investigators identified with The Needham Question. Nevertheless, they represent similar impediments to scientific and technological advancement in modern China. It may thus be premature to dismiss the Needham paradox as irrelevant.

Of greater importance than the relevance of The Needham Question, however, is the significant of Joseph Needham's life and work itself. On a multitude of levels, his intellectual accomplishments were monumental. At six feet five inches in height, he was

literally a towering figure. His long life spanned all 10 decades of the tumultuous 20th century. He mastered eight languages, three of them ancient. Even his name was epic; he was christened Noel Joseph Terence Montgomery Needham. He is the only person to have concurrently been appointed Fellow of the Royal Society, Fellow of the British Academy and Companion of Honour, three of the greatest accolades bestowed by the British establishment. It is telling that the man who now occupies his former study in Caius College, Cambridge is the renowned physicist Stephen Hawking.

F.W. Sanderson, Needham's headmaster at Oundle School, inspired his students to "always think in a spacious way, think on a grand scale."[98] Needham did not fail his mentor. Professor Mansel Davies wrote in Needham's obituary:

> Intellectually a bridge builder between science, religion and Marxist socialism, and supremely so between East and West, he has been called the Erasmus of the 20th century. A sober assessment suggests that, with the passage of time, he will be recognized as a greater figure than the scholar from Rotterdam.[99]

Kenneth Rexroth, one of Needham's most eloquent critics, wrote of *Science and Civilization in China*:

> Needham's book has the same stunning relevance as Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.…In sheer interest and lucidity, it is the superior of any history of science and related subjects since Heath's great work on Greek mathematics.…There is no work on Chinese civilization in any language that will remotely compare with it, and there are few works which show our own culture at its best, or which raise those best qualities to new heights. Those new heights are reached by forcing us to discard all the baggage of our own conceit.[100]

Philosopher and literary critic George Steiner compared Needham with Proust, and hailed him not only as a remarkable scientist and historian, but also as a gifted artist:

> He is literally recreating, recomposing an ancient China, a China forgotten in some degree by Chinese scholars themselves and all but forgotten by the west. The alchemists and metal workers, the surveyors and court astronomers, the mystics and military engineers of a lost world come to life, through an intensity of recapture, of empathic insight which is the attribute of a great historian, but even more of a great artist.[101]

Needham's former research assistant, Dr. Gregory Blue, comments that "serious and widespread comparative study of the history of science would have been almost impracticable before the appearance of his [Needham's] work, but it is now inevitable."[102] Quoting Sivin, Blue brings attention to the more profound ethical impact of Needham's work: "In the course of broadening and deepening our integral understanding of traditional Chinese culture, practically every paragraph that Needham has written has been designed to be world history, and to urge upon readers a more humane perception of the future."[103]

Perhaps Needham's greatest contribution to humanity was his insistence on studying the history of science in the context of civilization. He saw the two as inextricably linked. He was trained as a scientist, but he lived, thought and wrote as a humanist. Indeed, the title of his magnum opus was purposefully constructed to link science with civilization. More importantly, Needham did not view subject areas as isolated silos, as areas for specialization *per se*. While he meticulously organized *Science and Civilization in China* using conventional taxonomy (mathematics, astronomy, medicine, metallurgy, alchemy, the main engineering disciplines), his genius was to frame these in the cultural context in which ideas, innovations and inventions evolved. His works make us realize that science cannot be fully understood or appreciated through mathematical logic, induction, hypothesis testing and other analytical methods. Needham insisted that science must be learned in the context of culture, language, history, religion, philosophy, and the economic environment—in short, the entire civilization of a people. In fact, he believed that science and technology form an integral part not just of a country's civilization, but also the entire human civilization.

If Needham were alive today, he would no doubt be delighted, and almost certainly not surprised, by China's astonishing economic resurgence. He would have considered the scientific stagnation of the last five centuries as a momentary pause in the timeline of history. However he would likely be dismayed by the relentless pace of modernization, and its toll on Confucian-

Taoist values and the physical environment. Like many traditional Chinese who are ambivalent about China's race into modernity, Needham would surely hope that the Chinese people, lead by an enlightened set of rulers, will somehow find their way back to the Neo-Confucian principles which guided ancient China for over a millennium. Given the perils of climate change, natural resource depletion, rampant pollution, and nuclear and biochemical weaponry, a firm re-rooting in Confucianism and Taoism would be welcomed not only in China, but by all humankind. Respect for nature, and focusing inward on the mind rather than on materialism, is an ethos that kept Chinese civilization stable, unified and harmonious for over 2,000 years. Needham, above all the humanist, offers modern China and the world precious lessons in the responsibilities of science to civilization.

Afterword

I became interested in The Needham Question after reading Simon Winchester's biography of Needham entitled, *The Man Who Loved China* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008). The man's life, times and astonishing intellect were every bit as fascinating as the grand question he posed.

Joseph Needham was born in 1900 in London, the son of an affluent doctor. He graduated from Cambridge with a degree in biochemistry in 1921 and received his Ph.D. in 1925. That year, he married Dorothy Moyle, herself a talented Cambridge scientist. He joined Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge as a biochemistry researcher, and became an authority in embryology and morphogenesis. In 1931, he published the three volume text *Chemical Embryology*, a seminal work documenting the history of embryology from ancient Egypt to the early 19th century.[104] He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society a decade later, an immense achievement for such a young scientist.

In 1937, he met and fell in love with Lu Gwei-djen, a research associate who had come to Cambridge from Nanjing, China. The

two would have a lifelong affair lasting until her death in 1991. Interestingly, Needham's romantic relationship with Lu was sanctioned by Dorothy Needham, and the three enjoyed an unusually open and cordial friendship. It was Lu who introduced Needham to Chinese culture, civilization and language. She tutored him in classical Chinese and within two years, Needham could read and write at a high level of proficiency. Thus began his lifelong love of China, ancient and modern, scientific and humanistic.

Needham's intellectual and personal life was remarkably colorful, and his energies almost boundless. Besides teaching, researching and writing, he was an avid Morris dancer, a devoted Anglican lay preacher and an avowed nudist. His mastery of Chinese language, history and culture was exceptional for a man who started studying them in his late 30s. He was as eccentric as he was brilliant, and Needham lore abounds. An encounter in Fujian at the height of the Second Sino-Japanese war sheds light on the man's fascinating persona:

> Needham and his party were travelling on horseback with guides through a remote, forested region. Suddenly, they came up against another horseback party on the trail, led by a notorious local bandit, their terrified guides whispered. Needham dismounted, stepping in front of the party, up to the bandit leader's horse, and with his customary vigor executed an English folk dance. The bandit watched with interest. When Needham had finished, the bandit dismounted, stepped forward, and performed one of his own ethnic dances. The ice thus broken, everyone laughed and shook hands, and the two parties proceeded on their respective ways.[105]

At the same time, this Morris-dancing nudist could leave most readers breathless with his titanic intellect and erudition. Below is a not atypical entry from *Science and Civilization in China*:

> The philosophy of history was brilliantly studied in the T'ang period with "The Generalities of History of Liu Chih-Chi" in AD710—the first treatise on historiographical method in any language, quite worthy of comparison with the work of the European pioneers Bodin and de la Popolinire, eight and half centuries later. At that later time, China was also to have her Giambattisto Vico in the person of Chang-Hsueh-Cheng. But it was Liu-Chih-Chi's son Liu Chih (fl. C732) and another T'ang scholar, Ta Yu, who invented a new form of encyclopaedic

> institutional history, the former with his "Governmental Institutes," the latter with the famous "Comprehensive Institutes—a Reservoir of Source Material on Political and Social History," issued in AD801. But the climax to this sort of work was not reached until the Yuan period, when in 1322, "The Comprehensive Study of the History of Civilization" by Ma Tuan-Lin saw the light. His lucid and outstanding treatise in 348 chapters was essentially a general history of institutions…it paralleled the sociological history initiated by Ma's near contemporary, the great Ibn Khaldun, and the history of institutions later to be achieved by Pasquier, Giannone and de Montesquieu.[106]

Also adding color to Needham's profile was his sympathy toward Communism. As early as the Bolshevik Revolution, when Needham was still a teenager, he exhibited an emotional (as opposed to intellectual) attachment to Marxist socialism.[107] At Cambridge, he was an active member of several socialist groups. He supported the Republicans against the Fascists during the Spanish Civil War, and later became enamored with the Communist party movement in wartime China.[108] He was welcomed by Mao Zedong and China's premier Zhou Enlai during the Chinese Civil War and in the decades thereafter.[109]

Equally fascinating was his involvement with UNESCO. Needham lobbied hard to have "science" added as a pillar division to what was originally going to be the United Nations Education and Cultural Organization.[110] In 1946, he was invited by long-time Cambridge friend Julian Huxley, the founding Director-General of UNESCO, to assume the directorship of its sciences division. Needham served happily in Paris for UNESCO until 1948. He had not planned to leave his comfortable and stimulating position in Paris so quickly. He was forced out by pressure from the CIA, who had discovered Needham's history as a longtime Communist sympathizer.

He returned to Cambridge in 1948, where he lived until his death in 1995. He served as Master of Caius College from 1966-1976, and spent the remainder of his working life supervising the colossal *Science and Civilization in China* series.

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Interviews

Dr. Gregory Blue, Professor of History, University of Victoria, Canada and personal assistant to Joseph Needham, 1977-1990

I interviewed Dr. Blue via email exchanges during November and December 2010.

Dr. Peter L. Lee, Honorary Secretary, East Asian History of Science Foundation, Hong Kong

Dr. Lee was a research fellow at Gonville and Caius College Cambridge, 1976-1977, and worked under Joseph Needham. I interviewed Dr. Lee in Hong Kong on 9 December 2010 (on the anniversary of Needham's 110th birthday).

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

Adrian Goldsworthy

CAESAR: Life of a Colossus

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As Cicero would later declare: "For what is the life of a man, if it is not interwoven with the life of former generations by a sense of history?"

Notes on Contributors

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