

MERCENARY LOGIC:
MUSLIM SOLDIERS IN THE SERVICE OF THE CROWN OF ARAGON, 1265-1309

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ABSTRACT

MERCENARY LOGIC: MUSLIM SOLDIERS IN THE SERVICE OF THE CROWN OF ARAGON, 1265-1309

Over the course of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries – at the heart of the Spanish Reconquest – thousands of Muslim cavalry soldiers, whom the Catalans called *jenets*, entered the service of the Christian Crown of Aragon. This study attempts to explain how and why these soldiers joined the army of a Christian king as well as what their alliance may mean to the broader and on-going project of theorizing the connection between violence, religion, and political authority in the Middle Ages.

The dissertation is divided into five main chapters, which together follow the journey of the *jenets* into and ultimately out of the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. Chapter Two examines the pre-history of the alliance of the *jenets* with the Crown of Aragon. In short, it asks who the *jenets* were. On the basis of treaties and records of negotiations, Chapters Three and Four map the contexts in which and the processes by which the Crown of Aragon recruited Muslim soldiers for service in its armies. Chapter Five examines in detail the relationship between the Catalan kings and their Muslim soldiers. More particularly, it explores the military, legal, and symbolic significance of the *jenets* to the political authority of the Crown of Aragon. Finally, Chapter Six examines the life of the *jenets* beyond the Christian sovereign and the limits of their service. It asks how Christian soldiers, administrators, and villagers reacted to the presence of the Muslim *jenets* as agents of the Crown of Aragon. Most significantly, it explores the relationship of the *jenets* to the Crown's Mudéjars and the potential for resistance and rebellion in their shared religious identity.

For my father

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This project began to take shape in seminars that I took as an undergraduate with María Rosa Menocal, Ian Baucom, and Ahmad Dallal and later, as a graduate student, with Molly Greene, Peter Brown, and Adnan Husain, all of whom provided inspiration and encouragement. David Nirenberg, Adam Kosto, Paul Freedman, Kathryn Miller, Bernard Haykel, Lawrence Mott, Gerard Wiegers, and Stephen Bensch took time to provide thoughtful comments and suggestions. Along the way, I benefited from conversations, recommendations, and kind words from Thomas Boeve, Adam Davis, Michelle Garceau, David Graizbord, Guy Geltner, Nancy Khalek, Christopher Lasch, Tamer El-Leithy, Yaseen Noorani, Jarbel Rodríguez, Miranda Speiler, Justin Stearns, Ryan Szpiech, Benjamin Yousey-Hindes, and Douglas Weiner.

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conclusion. I finished for my wife, Rebecca, whose brilliance consistently inspired and pen consistently corrected. She knows this is all for her.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACA = Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó
ACB = Arxiu Capitular de Barcelona
ACV = Arxiu Capitular de la Catedral de Valencia
AHM = Arxiu Històric de Mallorca
AHN = Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
BNP = Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris
BNM = Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid

*EI*² = *The Encyclopedia of Islam*
HEM = Levi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*
Mas Latrie = Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce*

CR = Cartes Reials
Perg. = Pergamins
R = Registre
RP = Reial Patrimoni
f. = Folio
Ar. = Arabic
Cat. = Catalan
Cast. = Castilian
Rom. = Romance
Lat. = Latin

NOTE ON DATES AND TRANSCRIPTION

Records from the Real Cancillería of the Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó are dated according the Incarnation calendar. These dates have been regularized to the Common Era calendar. In the case, however, when the year remains ambiguous, the less likely date is noted in brackets, e.g. 1283 [1284]. Similarly, dates according to the Islamic calendar are converted to and presented alongside dates according to the Common Era calendar whenever relevant, e.g. 681/1283.

For Latin, Catalan, Castilian, or Aragonese transcriptions, capitalization, spelling, and punctuation have been preserved. Ligatures, shorthands, and macrons have been silently expanded. The transliteration of Arabic words and names follows the standards of the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. The following notations are used: [...] = illegible; <text> = uncertain reading; [text] = interpolation; \text/ = superscript; /text\ = subscript; //text// = redacted.

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*Mostrays con nuevo honor acreditado
Del ginete feroz la gallardia,
Por enfrenar la barbaraosadia
Con fuerte adarga y lança en campo armado.*

A Sonnet from Alonso de Caravajal to Bernardo de Vargas Machuca

1. INTRODUCTION

i. FIVE BOUNDARY-CROSSERS

Around April of 1285, five Muslim soldiers crossed from the kingdom of Granada into the Christian Crown of Aragon.¹ In other circumstances, the arrival of Muslim raiders – whom the Catalans called *jenets* – into these borderlands, would have raised an alarm; this frontier was overrun by Muslim cavalry from Granada and North Africa in times of war and peace. These incursions were violent and swift: horsemen would arrive suddenly, driving panicked villagers into town walls, ransacking their homes, taking captives for ransom, and then burning fields.² Capital, not conquest, was the engine of these raids. On this occasion, however, these soldiers did not inspire terror. The five *jenets* – famous for their prowess on horses – rode lumbering and braying mules that they had borrowed from a Jew in Granada. Along the public roads at the border of Valencia, they unfolded letters of safe conduct (Lat. *guidaticum*, -a), Latin documents coupled with Arabic translations, and presented them to local officials, who then stripped these Muslims of their swords, making them the least likely of marauders, toothless lions.³ The

¹ This date is approximate, extrapolated from documents that show these soldiers at the king's court in May of 1285.

² The templar knight, Berenguer de Cardona, gives a stunning report of one such raid conducted by Muslim soldiers and Templar knights into Castilian territory in 1304. See ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 137, *Templarios*, no. 101. A complete edition of this document appears in Chapter 6. [All archival documents were consulted directly. If a published edition was employed, it is noted.] Cf. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar [Taʾrīkh al-ʿAllāma]*, 7 vols. (Dar al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1959), VII:397, the description of the raid of the Marīnid prince Abū Yaʿqūb in the Spanish frontier in 674/1275.

³ On the *jenets* using Arabic translations of royal documents, see ACA, R 52:68v (4 November 1284, my emphasis): “Berengario de Conques, baiulo Valencie. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, solvatis Petro Bertrandi habitatori Valencie sexcentos XXX solidos regalium Valencie, quos Mahomat Abulhaye et Mançor Abnemudaffar et Abraham Abehalmema, Sarraceni janeti [qui] in nostro servicio venerant, sibi debebant cum duobus publicis instrumentis, quorum unum est moriscum et aliud cristianice scriptum, que nos recuperavimus ab eodem. Et mandamus per presentes fidei nostro Raimundo de Rivo Sicco, quod de precio baiulie Valencie a vobis ipsos denarios in compotum recipiat. Datum Ces[arau]g[uste], II nonas

soldiers moved on in any case, vulnerable but heading toward the town of Albarracín near Teruel, where they hoped to enlist in the Catalan king's army.

ii. BOUNDARY-CROSSING, BOUNDARY-MAKING

Like these five *jenets*, over the course of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries – at the heart of the Spanish Reconquest – thousands of Muslim cavalry soldiers from al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) and North Africa entered the service of the Christian Crown of Aragon. This study attempts to explain how and why these soldiers joined the army of a Christian king as well as what their alliance may mean to the broader and on-going project of theorizing the connection between violence, religion, and political authority in the Middle Ages.

The case of the *jenets* highlights a conceptual problem, a seeming paradox, in the historiography of interfaith relations in the medieval Mediterranean. Put most boldly, on the one hand, scholars have seen a world of violent boundaries – drawn by crusade and *jihād* – where Muslim and Christian are unproblematic categories. On the other hand, scholars have seen a world of utopian and democratic frontiers – driven by capital and commerce – where individuals moved regardless of seemingly solid boundaries. If one perspective privileges religious and political discourses and ideologies, then the other devalues them. In practice, however, neither view can account for the complexity of interconfessional interaction in the medieval Mediterranean.

In an effort to clear some space and to shift the terms of discussion, this dissertation attempts to unravel the mercenary logic that tied Muslims soldiers to the

Novembris.” See also Robert I. Burns, “The *Guidaticum* Safe-Conduct in Medieval Arago-Catalonia: A Mini-Institution for Muslims, Christians, and Jews,” *Medieval Encounters* 1:1 (1995), 51-109.

Catalan kings. Grounded in Arabic, Latin, and Romance archival, historical, and religious sources, it argues that the use of Muslim soldiers by the Crown of Aragon did not signal the collapse of religious boundaries, the triumph of self-interest over ideology or greed over grievance.⁴ By means of a detailed and comparative study, this project attempts to lay bare the various private, political, economic, and religious motivations that shaped the alliance between the nascent Catalan state and foreign Muslim soldiers. Nevertheless, perhaps surprisingly, it argues that these diverse and overlapping motivations both reflected and reinforced religious boundaries. Put differently, this dissertation aims to demonstrate how acts of boundary-crossing were also crucial acts of boundary-making in the conservative thirteenth century.

iii. CRUSADE AND CONVIVENCIA

Modern events have not only underscored the importance of understanding religious interactions but also polarized and politicized their study. And in the desire to make sense of the present, the Middle Ages have become another space of contestation and manipulation, invoked on all sides for often contradictory aims. They have provided, for instance, evidence of ancient, continuous, and therefore, inevitable conflict between Muslims, Christians, and Jews; and simultaneously, they have provided evidence of

⁴ These opposing ways of reading interaction and violence have a significant pedigree. The former, greed, can be traced from Thucydides and Hobbes (or a particular interpretation of him) to contemporary studies of ethnic violence, the “new wars,” driven by greed and loot. The latter, which holds that violence is the result of impersonal actors, states and ideologies, stems from the thinking of Rousseau and finds its contemporary articulation in the work of Carl Schmitt. See Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen, Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1963) (*The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (University of Chicago, 1996)).

religious tolerance and cultural accommodation, thus presenting alternatives to a contemporary sense of crisis.⁵

In part, this polarization also reflects deep and unresolved divisions among historians regarding the place of religion in the Middle Ages.⁶ Within the historiography of the Mediterranean, for instance, this division is epitomized by the works of Henri Pirenne and Fernand Braudel.⁷ Pirenne famously placed religion at the center of the medieval world. He argued that the seventh-century Muslim conquests in the Mediterranean represented a violent rupture. Before this period, East and West constituted a single world, united by commerce and cultural interchange. Islam shattered that unity by introducing an incompatible and intolerant civilization. Although “the Pirenne thesis” has been convincingly challenged, Pirenne’s privileging of religious identity as the determining factor in Mediterranean interaction has continued to influence scholars.⁸ In contrast to Pirenne, Braudel argued that religious divisions were secondary to the environmental unity of the Mediterranean world. For Braudel, all the sea’s inhabitants, from the Phoenicians to the Turks, were actors reading the same script, playing on the same stage. Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell’s recent *The Corrupting Sea*, a revision of Braudel’s thesis, testifies to the enduring value of an

⁵ See for examples of the former, Norman Cohn, *Europe’s Inner Demons* (London, 1975); R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society* (Oxford, 1987); and Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and the Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford, 2002); or for an example of the latter, María Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Little, Brown, 2002).

⁶ In part, it is also a reflection of the introduction of new methodologies, in particular social anthropology.

⁷ Henri Pirenne, *Mohamet et Charlemagne* (Paris, 1937) and Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II* (Paris, 1966).

⁸ For critiques, see Alfred Havighurst, ed. *The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism, and Revision* (Heath, 1976). The concept of rupture strongly influences the works, for example, of Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 1978) and Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (Oxford, 1993).

environmental approach.⁹ Also responding to Pirenne, Shelomo Goitein emphasized the economic unity of the sea. Using Judeo-Arabic (Arabic in Hebrew script) documents discovered in Egypt, he portrayed a polyglot and cosmopolitan Jewish community that traded with ease across the medieval Mediterranean, traversing political, religious, and linguistic boundaries, linking Muslim and Christian lands.¹⁰ Goitein's Jewish merchants seemed to shrug off shibboleths, exchange identities as if they were clothes. This Mediterranean world was an internationalized, democratized, and marketized frontier, an outlook that has had the most palpable influence on recent scholarship.¹¹

Perhaps nowhere has this debate over the Middle Ages been more virulent than in Spanish historiography.¹² The argument, which rattles on in current discussions of immigration and international policy in Spain, was first articulated by Américo Castro and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz.¹³ While Castro argued that the key to Spanish history and identity was the period of *convivencia*, tolerance and interaction between Muslims, Christians, and Jews, Sánchez Albornoz stressed the fundamental continuity of Spanish character, in conflict with hostile and alien influences. And, again, despite the fact that

⁹ Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, 2000).

¹⁰ S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, 5 vols. (Berkeley, 1967-88) as well as S.D. Goitein, ed. and trans. *Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders* (Princeton, 1973).

¹¹ Janet Abu Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350* (Oxford, 1989); Amitav Ghosh, *In an Antique Land* (Granta, 1992); Mercedes García-Arenal, *Entre el Islam y occidente: vida de Samuel Pallache, judío de Fez* (Madrid, 1999); Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, 2002); David Abulafia, ed. *The Mediterranean in History* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2003), which argues for a more local approach to Mediterranean studies; or further afield, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra* (Verso, 2002).

¹² The following discussion of Spanish historiography has been laid out many times before. See, most notably, Robert I. Burns, *Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia* (Cambridge, 1984), esp. 2-9 and 17-24; David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1998), esp. 8-9; and Brian Catlos, "Contexto y conveniencia en la Corona de Aragón: propuesta de un modelo de interacción entre grupos etno-religiosos minoritarios y mayoritarios," *Revista d'Història Medieval* 12 (2001-2), 259-68, esp. 259-60. I would also like to thank Ryan Szpiech of the University of Michigan for sharing his thoughts on the issue with me.

¹³ Américo Castro, *España en su Historia. Cristianos, moros, y judíos* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1948) and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, *España: un enigma histórico*, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1956).

both positions have been challenged, revised, or moderated, Spanish historiography continues to be divided between those who privilege religious boundaries and those who see them as convenient fictions that mask either deeper structures or local and contingent actions.¹⁴

iv. DISCIPLINE

In another way, this polarization also reflects a disciplinary divide in the study of the medieval Mediterranean. For instance, while several important and foundational works have dealt with Christian-Islamic relations in the Western Mediterranean – between Spain and North Africa – their authors with rare exception have been either Medievalists, who use Latin and Romance sources and focus on European history, or Arabists, who use Arabic sources and focus on Islamic history.¹⁵ Through this methodological isolation, these scholars have also reinforced the false, geographical and

¹⁴ One might take Charles Julian Bishko, *Studies in the Medieval Spanish Frontier* (London: Variorum, 1980) as exemplary of the first position, religious boundaries, and the considerable body of work by Robert Ignatius Burns as exemplary of the second, deeper structures. Catlos, “Contexto y conveniencia,” 260, which defines itself against both, advocates the third, local and contingent. See also Abulafia, *The Mediterranean in History*, for another example of the emphasis on local and contingent history. For a subtle approach that continues to focus on religious difference, see Olivia Remi Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900-1500* (Cambridge, 1994).

¹⁵ The Europeanists include Louis de Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix et documents divers concernant les relations de chrétiens avec les arabes de l’Afrique septentrionale au moyen âge* (Paris, 1866); Àngels Masià i de Ros, *La Coronà de Aragon y los estados del Norte de África: Política de Jaume II y Alfonso IV en Egipto, Ifríquia y Tremecén* (Barcelona, 1951); Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles: de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l’avènement du sultan mérinide Abou-l-Hazzan (1331)* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966); and Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera amb l’Islam en el segle XIV: Christians i sarraïns al País Valencià* (Barcelona: CISC, 1988). The Arabists include J. F. P. Hopkins, *Medieval Muslim Government in Barbary until the End of the Sixth Century of the Hijra* (London: 1958) and Robert Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides des origines à la fin du XV^e siècle* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1940). The notable exception in the study of Spain and North Africa is Olivia Remi Constable, *Trade and Traders*. Other comparative works on Muslim-Christian interaction using both Arabic and Latin sources, which provided a model for this study, include Thomas Burman, *Reading the Qur’an in Latin Christendom, 1140-1560* (University of Pennsylvania, 2007); Brian Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*; Adnan Husain and K. E. Fleming, ed. *A Faithful Sea: The Religious Cultures of the Mediterranean, 1200-1700* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007); and Kathryn Miller, *Guardians of Islam: Muslim Communities in Medieval Aragon* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1998).

historical isolation of North Africa and the Middle East from Europe. This project therefore hopes to confront this disciplinary isolation not only by attempting to use Arabic, Latin, and Romance sources with equal rigor but also by viewing the development of Christian and Islamic religious and political identities in a shared and comparative context.

V. MERCENARY LOGIC

Returning, therefore, to the five *jenets* riding mules, how does one explain their act of boundary-crossing? In previous studies, one finds two distinct and salient ways of looking at these soldiers. Andrés Giménez Soler, the first scholar to mention the *jenets* in his 1905 foundational essay, argued that since these soldiers must have been acting contrary to their beliefs – in essence, contrary to the imperative of *jihād* – that therefore their actions were involuntary and exceptional; they were exiles, seeking refuge.¹⁶ From a contemporary, historiographical perspective, Giménez Soler's logic sounds rather dated, relying as it does on the assumption that religious identities were unitary and unchangeable. In this respect, Brian Catlos, writing almost a hundred years after Giménez Soler, has provided a welcome corrective. The journey of the *jenets* was not exceptional, he argues, but rather another example of the ways in which neither religion nor culture determined interaction in the Iberian peninsula.¹⁷ Instead, these

¹⁶ Andrés Giménez Soler, "Caballeros españoles en Africa y Africanos en España," *Revue Hispanique* 12 and 16 (1905), 299-372, esp. 348: "... es muy presumible que éstos no lo hicieron por propia voluntad."

¹⁷ Brian Catlos, "'Mahomet Abenadalill': A Muslim Mercenary in the Service of the Kings of Aragon (1290-1291)" in *Jews, Muslims, and Christians in and around the Crown of Aragon: Essays in Honour of Professor Elena Lourie*, ed. Harvey Hames (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 257-302, cit. 301-2: "In sum, Mahomet Abenadalill's brief but illustrious career as a vassal of the Aragonese king does not represent an exception, but rather the illustration of a maxim – ideology is the handmaiden of expedience.... Neither Abenadalill's culture nor his religion presented a serious impediment for a certain integration in the Aragonese court." See also Catlos, "Contexto y conveniencia," 263: "La identidad sectaria tendió a no convertirse en una cuestión importante en la interacción cotidiana."

interconfessional encounters better reflected local and contingent interests – social and economic opportunities – rather than inflexible ideologies or determining discourses.¹⁸ In short, for one scholar, religion explains everything, while for the other, it explains little or nothing.

In an effort to essay a new reading – to rethink the mercenary logic that brought Muslim soldiers to a Christian kingdom – this study charts a course between these two ways of explaining interconfessional interaction. On the one hand, it recognizes that envisioning religious identity as fixed and essential flattens actors by dissolving their actions into the machine-like working of an abstract ideology. On the other hand, it also recognizes that the recent scholarly emphasis on agency and contingency – while a laudable and ethical response to totalizing explanations – can risk running too far from one essentializing explanation only to achieve another.¹⁹ The tendency, for instance, to see in all forms of interaction or transgression evidence of individual or local resistance to authority not only reifies that authority but also limits the very agency and contingency it presumes to recover.²⁰ This focus on agency as resistance both overlooks the way in which authoritative discourses can be partial, contested, or self-contradictory and the manner in which local and strategic acts can employ and shape these broader discourses.²¹ Specifically, in the case of the *jenets*, the inner solidarity between these two

¹⁸ Catlos, “Contexto y conveniencia,” 268: “En las esferas legal, económica y social fueron los convenios negociados dictados por el mutuo interés – conveniencia – los que determinaron las relaciones entre grupos e individuos a través de las divisiones sectarias etno-religiosas.”

¹⁹ See Walter Johnson, “On Agency,” *Journal of Social History* 37:1 (2003), 114-24, esp. 115, who argues that “agency” has not been unpacked from its liberal humanist heritage, which self-consciously constructed the idea of “agency” to express the difference between humans, who possess free will, and slaves, who do not. He proposes abandoning the term “agency” altogether for this reason.

²⁰ For examples of this tendency, see Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*. In philosophy, see the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, 1987) (originally, *Mille plateaux* (Paris: Minuit, 1980)).

²¹ See, for instance, the theory of “authoritative discourse” in Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (University of Texas, 1981), esp. 163 and

approaches is nowhere more clear than in the fact that both assume that religion could not have motivated these mercenaries to enter the service of a Christian king. By contrast, this study imagines religion as neither fixed nor vague and utterly contingent but rather as a meaningful and improvisational practice that continually sought to reconcile complex traditions with historical realities.²² Most significantly, this middle approach opens the possibility that this dissertation places at its center, the possibility that the *jenets* saw their actions as consistent with their religious belief.

The second challenge that the dissertation then attempts to address is theorizing the significance of this alliance. Why did Christian sovereigns choose to employ Muslim mercenaries and what did their collaboration mean? Most simply, in moments of crisis, the Crown of Aragon turned to these soldiers to suppress internal and external threats to its power. As mercenaries, soldiers-for-hire, the *jenets* provided a reliable and professional force for these embattled rulers. In one sense, therefore, the *jenets* supported and expressed the Catalan kings' claim to sovereign authority in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon.²³ Indeed, the importance of the *jenets* to these political ambitions was

342 or "hegemony" in Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (International Publishers, 1971). Elaborating on Gramsci, see Dominic Strinati, *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture* (London: Routledge, 1995), esp. 166: "Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups;" and Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford, 1977), esp. 112: "A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or structure." For the manner in which historical agents interact with broader discourses, see P. Bordieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge, 1977); M. Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago, 1985); and for relevant historical examples, Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrennes* (Berkeley, 1989) or Debra G. Blumenthal, "Defending their Masters' Honour: Slaves as Violent Offenders in Fifteenth-Century Valencia," in *A Great Effusion of Blood?': Interpreting Medieval Violence*, ed. Meyerson et al. (Toronto, 2004), 34-56. See also Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence*, 6. From an entirely anthropological perspective, see Lewis Hyde, *Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth, and Art* (North Point, 1999).

²² An approach toward identity employed for instance by Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton, 2007), Fred Moten, *In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition* (Minnesota, 2003), or Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Harvard, 1993).

²³ Cf. the case made by Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* (Princeton, 1996).

reflected not only in the *jenets*' exceptional privilege but also in their presence in the king's personal guard – their role in his ceremonies of power.

In another sense, the Crown's decision to employ foreign soldiers was connected to these soldiers' status as outsiders. The Catalan kings only used and agreed to use their Muslim soldiers in confrontations against their Christian enemies. While the decision to do so may have been pragmatic – a way of insuring the *jenets*' loyalty – it not only reflected but also confirmed the logic of religious violence, crusade and *jihād*. One might therefore say, the inclusion of the *jenets* in the armies of the Crown of Aragon was predicated on their exclusion from its communities or, to put it differently, was predicated on their being Muslims. This paradoxical observation extends the claim of David Nirenberg's *Communities of Violence* that violence and coexistence displayed an interdependence in medieval religious interaction.²⁴ In other words, far from the product of disorder and irrationality, violence could serve the purpose of preserving boundaries and creating social order.²⁵

What, then, does the curious claim that Catalan sovereigns employed the violence of Muslims against Christians reveal about the construction of political authority in the medieval Crown of Aragon? What does it mean that the *jenets* were included by their exclusion? One might read in the Crown's mercenary logic an example of the privilege of sovereign exception. The paradox of sovereignty has been noted many times before: in the ability to posit and suspend the law, the sovereign resides simultaneously within

²⁴ Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence*, esp. 7-10. Cf. Jonathan Elukin, *Living Together, Living Apart: Rethinking Jewish-Christian Relations in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 2007), who proposes to separate the question of violence from coexistence.

²⁵ See also, René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Johns Hopkins, 1979) (originally, *La Violence et le sacré* (Bernard Grasset, 1972)), esp. 2-3.

and without the juridical order.²⁶ And as Giorgio Agamben has recently argued, the ability to suspend the law, to decide on what constitutes the state of exception, reveals the absolute potential of sovereign authority.²⁷ Agamben points to the sovereign's power to banish, to exclude any man from the community. The bandit – who Agamben relates to the *homo sacer*, the sacred man, a figure of Roman law – is stripped of his political life and reduced to an indefensible bare life. As an outlaw, an outsider to the law, he can be killed by anyone but not murdered (or sacrificed). Nevertheless, Agamben continues, through his exceptional status, the bandit remains paradoxically included in the juridical order.²⁸ In this way, through his inclusion by exclusion, the bandit becomes the perfect expression of the sovereign's violent potential.²⁹ For Agamben, therefore, the ban – the ability to decide on the exception – reveals both the origin and matchless potential of the sovereign power.³⁰ Perhaps then, one can see in the relationship of the Catalan kings to

²⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität* (Munich-Leipzig: 1922) (*Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (MIT Press, 1985)), 13: "The sovereign stands outside the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it, since it is up to him to decide if the constitution is to be suspended *in toto*." Cf. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, 1998) (originally, *Homo sacer: il potere sovrano e la nuda vita* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1995)), 83 as well as 91-103. The latter reference points to Agamben's critique of Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1997), which Agamben claims mistakes a Christian origin for the sovereign exception.

²⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, esp. 15-29.

²⁸ Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Abandoned Being," trans. Brian Holmes in *The Birth to Presence* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 36-47, esp. 44, from which Agamben derives his argument. Nancy, "Abandoned Being," 44: "The law of abandonment requires that the law be applied through its withdrawal.... [A]bandoned being finds itself deserted to the degree that it finds itself remitted, entrusted, or thrown to this law." Cf. Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 39-67 for a parallel discussion of sacrifice.

²⁹ Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 361: "Sovereignty only rules over what it is capable of interiorizing.

³⁰ See Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 29. See also Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), 259: "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism."

the *jenets* a parallel to that of the sovereign to the bandit, an application of the sovereign exception that constitutes absolute political authority.

This reading, however, of the relationship between the Christian Catalan kings and Muslim soldiers also suggests that Agamben goes too far: it suggests that there are limits to the power of the sovereign exception and that the role of exception had a broader, social function in this history. While like the bandit or the *homo sacer*, the *jenets* were outsiders to the law of the sovereign, they were not outsiders to all law, all community.³¹ To put this differently, the *jenets* were not lawless and faithless mercenaries but more properly, soldiers of another law and another faith. Indeed, as treaties and contracts reveal, in bringing the *jenets* into the Crown of Aragon, the Catalan kings had to negotiate with these soldiers and agree to limits that they placed on their own service, including their exclusive use against Christians. The *jenets*, in other words, marked their own exclusion from the community and law of the Crown of Aragon, which is to say, they chose to ban themselves. This mercenary alliance therefore reflected the collaboration of two competing senses of law and legitimacy. Thus, the construction of Catalan political authority in this period cannot be understood on the basis of the sovereign exception alone. Christian sovereignty displayed a dialogic and agonistic relationship with Muslim identity.³²

Within the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, moreover, the lives of the *jenets* were not limited to or dependent solely upon their relationship with the sovereign. These soldiers dealt with not only the Crown's Christians but also its subject Muslims – the

³¹ Cf. Ernesto Laclau, "Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy," in *Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty & Life*, eds. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 11-22, esp. 14-5, which makes a parallel criticism.

³² See Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence*, 15, who makes the same claim. Cf. Steven F. Kruger, *The Spectral Jew: Conversion and Embodiment in Medieval Europe* (Minnesota, 2006).

Mudéjars. Each of these communities, in turn, posited their own sense of law and legitimacy, their own boundaries and limits, a fact that complicates the sovereign's claim to the privilege of exception. In one sense, these local encounters proved more effective than the sovereign's in marking the *jenets*' exclusion from the religious and political communities of the Crown of Aragon. In another sense, this competition over boundaries and belonging opened up the potential to resist and subvert the sovereign's authority, to banish the king himself. Thus, far from Agamben's bleak vision, these encounters highlight not only the fragility and multiplicity of political authority in the medieval Crown of Aragon but also the centrality of the logic of the exception – mercenary logic – to the multiconfessional communities of the Crown of Aragon.

vi. STRUCTURE

This dissertation is divided into five main chapters, which together follow the journey of the *jenets* into and ultimately out of the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. Chapter Two examines the pre-history of the alliance of the *jenets* with the Crown of Aragon. In short, it asks who the *jenets* were. Moving between Arabic, Latin, and Romance sources, it also makes the claim that this history demands a new methodology to properly understand the journey of the *jenets* into the service of the Crown. Primarily on the basis of treaties and records of negotiations, Chapters Three and Four map the contexts in which and the processes by which the Crown of Aragon recruited Muslim soldiers for service in its armies. These chapters argue that the Catalan kings were late-comers to a multiconfessional and Mediterranean-wide economy of violence, which they belatedly attempted to legitimize and profit from and which inevitably shaped their relationship with the *jenets*. Chapter Five examines in detail the relationship between the

Catalan kings and their Muslim soldiers. More particularly, it explores the military, legal, and symbolic significance of the *jenets* to the political authority of the Crown of Aragon, revealing the logic of exception at the heart of their relationship. Finally, Chapter Six examines the life of the *jenets* beyond the Christian sovereign and the limits of their service. It asks how Christian soldiers, administrators, and villagers reacted to the presence of the Muslim *jenets* as agents of the Crown of Aragon. Most significantly, it explores the relationship of the *jenets* to the Crown's Mudéjars and the potential for resistance and rebellion in their shared religious identity.

2. BANDIT TO HOLY WARRIOR

The life of the bandit, like that of the sacred man, is not a piece of animal nature without any relation to law and the city. It is, rather, a threshold of indistinction.

(Giorgio Agamben)¹

i. METHOD

Before following the five *jenets*, who crossed from the kingdom of Granada into the Christian Crown of Aragon on mules in 1285, asking how and why they crossed this religious frontier, it is worth stepping back and asking the deceptively simple question: Who were the *jenets*? For Andrés Giménez Soler, the first to mention these soldiers in his foundational 1905 article, the answer was in fact simple: the *jenets* were Zanāta Berbers.² And in 1927, when Faustino Gazulla wrote the second and only systematic attempt to study the *jenets*, he simply followed his predecessor, which is to say, the matter went unquestioned.³ For his part, Giménez Soler based the argument on a brief,

¹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 105.

² Andrés Giménez Soler, “Caballeros españoles en Africa y Africanos en España,” *Revue Hispanique* 12 and 16 (1905), 299-372.

³ Faustino Gazulla, “Las compañías de Zenetes en el reino de Aragón,” *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 90 (1927), 174-96. Like Giménez Soler’s, Gazulla’s study is generally problematic, failing to adhere to modern scholarly standards of analysis, annotation, and transcription. In this sense, Brian Catlos’ recent “Mahomet Abenadalill: A Muslim Mercenary in the Service of the Kings of Aragon (1290-1291),” in *Jews, Christians, and Muslims in and around the Medieval Crown of Aragon: Studies in Honour of Prof. Elena Lourie*, ed. Harvey Hames (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 257-302, is a welcome corrective. For his part, Catlos does not take on the question of the “jenets” as a whole and accepts the conclusions of his predecessors regarding their origin. See also Elena Lourie, “A Jewish Mercenary in the Service of the King of Aragon” *Revue des études juives* 137 (1978), 367-73 as well as her “Anatomy of Ambivalence: Muslims under the Crown of Aragon in the Thirteenth Century,” in *Crusade and Colonization: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Medieval Aragon* (Variorum, 1990), 1-77, esp. 8 where she makes the intriguing claim that the *jenets* were members of the Banū Ashqilūla, rivals of the Banū Naṣr. In fact, both rival groups in al-Andalus made use of North African cavalry. John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* (Yale, 1977), esp. 186-7, briefly mentions the *jenets*. Scattered references to the *jenets* and documents can also be found in the monumental works of Àngels Masià i de Ros, *Jaume II: Aragó, Granada, i Marroc: Apportació Documental* (Barcelona: CSIC, 1989) as well as his *La Coroná de Aragon y los estados del Norte de África: Política de Jaume II y Alfonso IV en Egipto, Ifriquia y Tremecén* (Barcelona, 1951), and Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera amb l’Islam en el segle XIV: Christians i sarraïns al País Valencià* (Barcelona: CISC, 1988). For a later period, see

though inaccurate, historical synopsis as well as a series of etymological observations linking the word *jenet* to the Berber *Zanāta*.⁴ He devoted a paragraph to the argument and moved on. A student of North Africa might immediately object, however, that saying that the *jenets* were *Zanāta* – a broad ethnic group of Berbers – is only slightly more revealing than calling them North African. After all, from which *Zanāta* tribes were they? And how and why did these particular North Africans end up on the Spanish frontier? The aim of the following pages is not to challenge the claim that the word *jenet* came from the Berber *Zanāta* or to overthrow Giménez Soler and Gazulla's claim the *jenets* were *Zanāta*, which is true in a certain sense, but rather to point out the limits and consequences of their methodology, to show what is lost by assuming and moving on.

First and foremost, neither scholar uses material from the Chancery Registers of the Crown of Aragon Archives (Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó), the core documentation for the history of this empire, to address the question of who the *jenets* were. By overlooking evidence, for instance, from before the events of Albarracín (1284-1285), they rob the arrival of these five *jenets* of at least one critical context, that is, how the Crown thought of these troops before their incorporation. But however fascinating and significant this perspective may prove, as will be shown below, it ultimately fails to reveal fully who the

Roser Salicrú i Lluch, "Caballeros Granadinos emigrantes y fugitivos en la Corona de Aragón durante el reinado de Alfonso el Magnánimo," *II Estudios de la frontera. Actividad y vida en la frontera* (Jaén: Diputación Provincial de Jaén, 1998), 727-48.

⁴ Giménez Soler, "Caballeros," 348-9: "La mayoría fueron de la tribu zenata y todos gentes principales, bien emparentadas y poderosas, expatriados por causas políticas, sublevaciones generalmente; los más se quedaron en Granada, en donde se les recibía con los brazos abiertos por constituir ellos solos el nervio de sus ejércitos; algunos prefirieron venir al servicio de cristianos, pero es muy presumible que éstos no lo hicieron por propia voluntad sino por algo les ocurrió en la corte de los alahmares [Banū Naṣr]... En Granada los zenetes formaron un bando que tomó parte muy activa en las revueltas y gobernación del Estado." Aside from the baseless assumption that Muslims could never have chosen to enter the service of a Christian state, Giménez Soler's claim that the *Zanāta* troops in Naṣrid Granada were all exiles is false. The participation, moreover, of these troops in revolts against the Naṣrids must be dated to a period well after the introduction of *jenets* to the Crown of Aragon. Elsewhere, Giménez Soler also incorrectly claims that the *jenets* never served as the personal guard of the Catalan king. He makes no mention of the Marīnids (Banū Marīn) or the *Zanāta Ghuzāh*, who formed the core of the *jenets*.

jenets were. Second and more importantly, neither Giménez-Soler nor Gazulla uses the relevant and abundant Arabic material, robbing these soldiers of yet another, critical context.⁵ Thus, this chapter essays a new methodology by trying to answer the question of who the *jenets* were. It proposes, in short, that in order to examine a frontier group like the *jenets*, the historian, too, must move back and forth across boundaries – linguistic and disciplinary.

ii. “THE WORDS OF THINGS ENTANGLE AND CONFUSE”⁶

The scholar who has struggled through the Chancery Registers will find the Latin, *jenetus*, or Romance, *jenet*, scattered throughout the documentation of thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the period when these soldiers regularly entered the service of the Crown.⁷ By and large, the word has been ignored in this context, passed over, for instance, in Jeroni Alterachs y Avarilló’s hand-written catalog to the Chancery Registers as a surname belonging to a Mudéjar, a subject Muslim, a fact that may account for the dearth of studies and the abundance of unexplored material in the archive.⁸ Nevertheless,

⁵ Giménez Soler (352) does, in fact, turn to one Arabic source, which he call the “Quitab alictis,” a work by the nineteenth-century historian Aḥmad b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī entitled, *Kitāb al-istiḡsā li-akḥbār duwal al-maḡrib al-aḡsā* (Casablanca, 2001), in order to identify a *jenet* named “Alabes Abenraho.” He correctly associates him with the Banū Raḥḥū but fails to identify the *jenet* exactly and overlooks the importance of this family in general. Giménez Soler (370) also uses two documents from the *Cartas Árabes* of the ACA but in a context unrelated to the use of *jenets*.

⁶ From Wallace Stevens, “The Comedian as the Letter C”: “He first, as realist, admitted that / Whoever hunts a matinal continent / May afterall stop short before a plum / And be content and still be a realist. / The words of things entangle and confuse. / The plum survives its poems. It may hang / In the sunshine placidly, colored by ground / Obliquities of those who pass beneath, / Harlequined and mazily dewed and mauved / In bloom. Yet it survives in its own form, / Beyond these changes, good, fat, guzzly fruit.”

⁷ In Latin, *janetus* is a variant. *Genet* is the Catalan, which appears regularly in the later documents, and is pronounced like the Romance *jenet*. Saracen footsoldiers were denoted by *pedites* (Lat.) or *peons* (Cat.). For examples of Muslim footsoldiers see, ACA, CR, *Templarios*, no. 101 and ACA, R 40:16v. See Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 186-7, for several cases of *jenets* in the Crown’s employ in the second half of the fourteenth century. In essence, these documents disprove Giménez Soler’s claim that the *jenets* were only a short-lived phenomenon.

⁸ The hand-written “Catálogo de los documentos de los registros,” begun by the archivist Avarilló in the eighteenth century, is a partial catalog to the thirteenth-century documentation and resides on the shelves at

despite these troops' virtual disappearance from Catalan history, the term *jenet* has had a remarkable afterlife.⁹ In modern Castilian, for instance, one finds the word, *jinete*, or in Catalan, *genet*, meaning horseman. As a corollary, the word has also given itself over to a specific type of spur, saddle, and stirrup. Migrating to French and English, the word transferred its meaning from rider to mount: *jennet* refers to a small Spanish horse, a mixture of North African and Iberian breeds, that was particularly prized by the wealthy men of Europe.¹⁰ Later, in English, the word continued its slow spin out of orbit, coming to signify a mule, hence the contemporary, *jinney* and *hinny*. However trivial these equine expressions may be, the Muslim cavalryman has a spectral presence in these linguistic fragments that resists historical amnesia.

The connection is more explicit when turning to martial vocabulary. The Castilian *jineta* refers to a short javelin or two-headed lance, typical of Berber soldiers and adopted by Spanish Christians in the fifteenth century.¹¹ And the late-medieval knight that rode *a la jineta* as opposed to *a la brida* was a lightly-armored soldier, who carried a light shield (*adarga*) and tucked his legs into short stirrups – like the modern

the ACA. While it is an indispensable guide, as the foregoing shows, no scholar should rely exclusively upon it for research.

⁹ See, for instance, the epigraph with which the dissertation begins.

¹⁰ *Genet* is another French variant. The “Spanish Jennet,” which featured prominently in the Spanish conquests of the New World, was a blend of North African and Iberian breeds. They were highly regarded not only for their quality but also their multitude of colors and patterns. See the Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Jennet.” For one of many literary references, see Walter Scott, *Ivanhoe* (London, 2000), 23: “A lay brother, one of those who followed in the train, had, for his use upon other occasions, one of the most handsome Spanish jennets ever bred in Andalusia, which merchants used at that time to import, with great trouble and risk, for the use of persons of wealth and distinction.”

¹¹ J. Ferrandis Torré, “Espadas granadinas de la jineta” in *Archivo Español de Arte* (Madrid: 1943), XVI:142-66. I discuss the Berber equivalent – the *madās* (pl. *amdās*) – below. In a lovely coincidence, Joan Barceló i Cullerés uses the word *jineta* as the name of his young, Jewish protagonist in a children’s novel about the Spanish Inquisition, *Ojos de Jineta* (Barcelona: La Galera, 1985). Cf. J. Corominas and J. A. Pascual, *Diccionario crítico etimológico Castellano e Hispánico* (Madrid: 1980), s.v. “Jineta” ascribes but simultaneously questions its origin in the Arabic, *Gharnāta* (Granada). Perhaps it is worth noting, here, that the Castilian verb *jinetea* signifies riding a horse in a military parade. Did this refer to the *jenets*’ close association with the Catalan and Castilian sovereigns? See Chapter 5 for the role of *jenets* in the royal court.

jockey – so that he could stand while in a gallop (see Figure 1).¹² First Arab Muslim knights in al-Andalus and later Christian soldiers adopted the practice from Berber horsemen (see Figures 2 and 3).¹³ Sixteenth and seventeenth-century Spanish and Portuguese exercise manuals on riding *a la jineta* attest to the dominance of the style by that period.¹⁴ From these linguistic cognates, both the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica and Alcover's *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, without mentioning Muslim mercenaries, draw the apparent conclusion that these words derive from Arabic and, more particularly, from the name of the Berber tribe, the Zanāta (Cat. Zeneta, Cast. Zenete).¹⁵ And as noted above, both Giménez-Soler and Gazulla take the connection to be self-evident: the *jenets* were Zanāta Berbers.

¹² On the transformation from heavy to light cavalry, see Alvaro Soler del Campo, *La evolución del armamento medieval en el Reino Castellano-Leonés y al-Andalus (siglos XII-XIV)* (Madrid: 1993), esp. 157-72; Rachel Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrides (1232-1492)* (Paris: De Boccard, 1990), 252-3; and *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph Strayer, 13 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1982-1989), s.v. "Cavalry." The *adarga* refers to the Arab *darqa*, meaning shield.

¹³ Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa badriyya fī dawla Naṣriyya*, ed. Muḥammad Zaynahum Muḥammad 'Azab (Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 2004), 41-2 on the Andalusī adoption of the Berber style. I discuss this text in detail in the final section of this chapter. See also Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane*, 254. The *jineta* style and evidence of its transfer from Muslim to Christian soldiers is also documented in several art historical sources. In the illuminations from the thirteenth-century *Cantigas de Santa Maria*, for example, only Muslim soldiers are seen riding *a la jineta*. See, *Cantigas de Santa Maria* (1281-1284) [Código Rico, Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial, ms. T.I.1]: fols. 68v (Cantiga 46), 240r (Cantiga 181), 246v (Cantiga 187). See also A. de Carlos, "El arte militar en las Cántigas de El Escorial," *Reales Sitios* X (1973), 32-40. Similarly, a detail from the Cathedral of Tolédo, which depicts the fall of Marbella in 1485, shows Naṣrid soldiers riding *a la jineta* while their Christian captors ride with long stirrups, their legs almost straight. By contrast, in sixteenth-century murals depicting the Battle of Higuera (1431) in the *Sala de Batallas* at the monastery of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, both Christian and Muslim soldiers are seen riding *a la jineta*. For more on these murals, see P. Silva Maroto, "El arte en España en la época del primer marqués de Santillana," in *El marqués de Santillana, 1398-1458. Los Albores de la España moderna. El Humanista* (Hondarribia, 2001), 183-5 as cited in Ana Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera: La guardia morisca de los reyes de Castilla* (Madrid: UNED, 2007), 65.

¹⁴ For instance, Eugenio Mançanas, *Libro de enfrenamientos de la gineta* (Toledo: En casa de Juan Rodríguez, mercader de libros, 1583); Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, *Libro de exercicios de la gineta* (Madrid: Pedro Madrugal, 1600); Gregorio Tapio y Salcedo, *Exercicios de la gineta* (Madrid: Diego Diaz, 1643); Antonio Galvão Andrade, *Arte de cavalleria, de gineta, e estardiota bom primor de ferrar, & alueitiara*, (Lisbon: Na Officina de Joam de Costa, 1678), esp. 451-2. Machuca, *Libro de exercicios*, 2r, explicitly claims a North African origin for the style but stakes its perfection in the New World: "Aunque es verdad que Berberia dio a España principio della, y España a las Indias, en esta parte se ha perficionado mas que en otra." Machuca also makes reference to the Muslim cavalry in his lessons. These texts were consulted at the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University.

¹⁵ *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Cambridge, 1911), s.v. "Jennet" and J.M. Alcover, *Diccionari català-valencià-balear* (Barcelona: 1930-1969), s.v. "Genet."

However tempting this conclusion may seem, at least one significant entanglement arises from relying on this etymology as proof of the soldiers' ethnicity. Given the entropy of the term *jenet*, one must ask: Did the word continue to signify a Zanāta horseman or had it, in a post-modern fashion, already swung out of its orbit, coming to signify the style of riding over the rider by the time it reached the Chancery Registers?¹⁶ In other words, even if the Zanāta Berbers inspired the term *jenet*, it does not follow that the *jenets* were Zanāta. In the absence of proof, which neither Giménez Soler nor Gazulla provides, the etymological argument falls short. Adding fuel to the fire, even the few, precious Arabic charters – to which both Gazulla and Giménez Soler could have had access – that mention the transfer of Muslim cavalry soldiers to the Crown of Aragon are discouraging. They refer generically to knights (*fāris*, pl. *fursān*) where their Catalan or Castilian counterparts refer to *jenets*.¹⁷ In the end, the language games cannot tell us who these horsemen were.¹⁸

¹⁶ This is precisely the problem with Alcòver's attempt to claim that "genet" signifies a Berber tribesman. He cites examples from Jaume I's *Llibre dels feyts* (full text in *Les quatre gran cròniques*, ed. Ferran Soldevila, Barcelona: Editorial Selecta, 1971), chaps. 378 and 551, which are entirely ambiguous with regard to ethnicity.

¹⁷ See ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, 84 (s.a.) and 148 (1301). These documents were consulted directly at the ACA. The majority of these documents were also edited and translated in *Los documentos árabes del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón*, eds. and trans. Maximiliano A. Alarcón y Santón and Ramón García de Linares (Madrid, 1940). I chose not to rely on their transcriptions.

¹⁸ For the postmodernist, the term "language game" reflects the recognition that language is rule-based and contingent but not universal. Taking one, idiomatic use of language and applying it to another context as universal is precisely what Lyotard called the failure to recognize the *différend*. He goes on to call this an ethical failure. See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. George Van Den Abbeele (University of Minnesota, 1988), 13.

iii. A THRESHOLD OF INDISTINCTION

Turning therefore to the Chancery Registers, one notes that the story of the *jenets* does not begin at 1285, where Gazulla picks up the thread, but at the very end of the lengthy reign of King Jaume I (1213-1276).¹⁹ Before proceeding, however, an archivist's caution is in order: given that this is also the period when the Chancery Registers come into existence, any etiology based upon these sources can only be provisional, potentially a mirage of ink and paper and nothing more.²⁰ That said, although the early successes of Jaume's reign against the Muslims, above all his conquest of Valencia, earned him the epithet *el Conqueridor*, his last decade betrayed an ambivalence to the point of fumbling as Crusader-King. Inspired, for instance, by an invitation from the Mongol Khan and a desire to curry favor with Pope Clement IV, Jaume led a crusading expedition to the Holy Land in 1269 that ended in failure, when the king and the majority of his host disembarked at the marshy port of Aigues-Mortes in Southern France.²¹ Rumors spread that Jaume wished to return to his mistress, adding insult to injury. Stung, Jaume tried to muster support for a new crusade at the council of Lyon in 1274 but, once more, had little

¹⁹ For the career of Jaume I, see the king's "autobiography," the *Llibre dels feyts* as well as the classic guides: Joaquín Miret i Sans, *Itinerari de Jaume I 'El Conqueridor'* (Barcelona: 1918) and Ferran Soldevila, *Vida de Jaume I, el Conqueridor* (Barcelona: 1958). For more recent studies, Blanquer Cebrià, *Jaume I a través de la historia* (Valencia: 1984) and Caterina Válin and Tomàs Vibot, *El rei en Jaume I, un heroi històric, un heroi de llegenda* (Mallorca: 2006). Jaume remains an extremely popular figure in Catalan culture. See, for instance, the three-part historical novel of Albert Salvadó, *Jaume, El Conqueridor* (Columna, 2001). In English, see the surveys of Thomas Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon* (New York: Oxford, 1986) and J.N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516*, 2 vols. (Oxford: 1976-1978).

²⁰ For a history of the Registers of the Crown of Aragon, see the elegant introduction to Robert I. Burns, *Diplomatarium of the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: The Registered Charters of its Conqueror James I, 1257-1276*, 3 vols. to date (Princeton, 1991-). I return to the question of the "origin" of the *jenets* in the next chapter. See also J. E. Martínez-Ferrando, *El archivo de la corona de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1944), esp. chap. 2.

²¹ For more on the centrality of Aigues-Mortes to the Crusade, see William Chester Jordan, *Saint Louis and the Challenge of the Crusade* (Princeton, 1979). For more on the Mongol Khan's invitation, see Denis Sinor, "The Mongols and Western Europe" in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth Meyer Setton, *The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. Harry W. Hazard (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969-89), III:513-44.

success. At home, the king fared even worse, facing troubles with his barons: their criticisms of encroaching royal power had crystallized around Jaume's taxes to support Castile in its war against Granada. Tired, it seems, of the king's efforts to play the crusader at their expense, the barons revolted. Although Jaume's instinct was to show leniency and negotiate, he ultimately sided with his aggressive son, the Infante Pere, who crushed the baronial rebellion in 1275.²² While this fire was temporarily put out, however, a worse one flared. Following closely on the heels of a similar revolt in Castile-controlled Murcia (1264-1266), a general Muslim uprising under the leadership of al-Azraq, "the Blue-Eyed One," erupted in Valencia in 1275, the second rebellion in the kingdom since Jaume's conquest.²³ Ironically, it would be the lingering incompleteness of his epithet-granting achievement that finally undid Jaume, *el Conqueridor*.²⁴ The aged king died on June 27, 1276 at Valencia. Meanwhile, the Infante Pere labored on to suppress the rebellion, only able to leave the battle briefly in November to accept the Crown.

With a single exception, the *jenets* first appear in the Chancery Registers during the events surrounding the Valencian uprising not as soldiers of the Crown of Aragon but

²² The documents related to the baronial rebellion are clustered around Register 18 of the ACA. A sentence is pronounced against Ramon Folc in ACA, R. 47:14v (s.a.): "Coram vobis Arnaldo Taverner et Bernardo de Prato, iudicibus a domino Rege Aragonum delegatis, proponit idem dominus Rex nomine suo et hominum suorum, contra nobilem Raimundum Fulconis, vicecomitem Cardonen[ses]."

²³ For more on al-Azraq see Robert I. Burns and Paul E. Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror* (Brill, 1999). As they point out, al-Azraq lived on after his defeat in 1277 as the bogeyman "el Drach" in children's tales: "¡Que vindra el Drach! (El Drach will get you!)" See also Burns, *Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Societies in Symbiosis* (Cambridge, 1984).

²⁴ Perhaps tellingly, the inscription on Jaume's tomb, "Contra Sarracenos semper praevaluit," was only added a century after the king's death. See Ricardo del Arco, *Sepulcros de la casa real de Aragón* (Madrid, 1945), 192 as cited in Robert I. Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia* (Princeton, 1973), 25.

invaders into its kingdoms.²⁵ In a circular, dated May 15, 1277, to the vicars and bailiffs of Girona, Besalú, and other locations, King Pere III (1276-1285) ordered trade restrictions on account of the situation in Valencia, which he described as follows:

Because in the kingdom of Valencia many of the *jenets* have risen up (*cerverit*), and the *alcaydus*²⁶ and Saracens of the castle of Montesa have broken the agreements that we had with them, for the restitution of this castle, therefore, we are at war with them. We order you immediately to forbid the export from our land to any parts horses or large palfreys (*roncini*)²⁷ under the penalty of the loss of said horses and palfreys.²⁸

Thus, the *jenets* are at the very heart of the Valencian uprising, the source of its violence and its main actors. Pere's decision to ban the trade of horses reveals his awareness that

²⁵ Although there are no notices in the Chancery Registers, we know that *jenets* also participated in the Murcian revolt of 1264-66 against Castile. Jaume comments on this fact in his *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 378: "And we had already heard that the King of Castile [Alfonso X] had fallen out with the king of Granada [Ibn al-Aḥmar, Muḥammad I of the Banū Naṣr] and that the king of Granada had, for a long time, had recourse to the Moors on the other side of the sea; and that *jenets* had crossed to his land and could take all the king of Castile's land. / E haviem oït d'abans que el rei de Castella s'era desavengut ab lo rei de Granada e que el rei de Granada de llong temps havia percaçats los moros d'allèn mar, e que passaven los genets en sa terra, e que allèn porien cobrar tota la terra del rei de Castella." And later, *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 423: "While we were in Oriola, where we stayed well for eight days, one night, two *almogàvers* (i.e. troops specialized in raids) of Lorca came to us, and knocked on our door near midnight. They reported to us that eight hundred *jenets*, with two thousand loaded mules and two-thousand men-at-arms guarding them, were entering supplies into Murcia. / E nós qui érem en Oriola, que hi érem romases bé per vuit dies, una nuit vengeren-nos dos almogàvers de Lorca, e tocaren a la nostra porta, e podia ésser bé mija nuit. E dixeren-nos que ens feïen saber los de Lorca que vuit-cents genets amb dos millia atzembles carregadas, e dos millia hòmens d'armes que les tocaven metien conduit en Múrcia." See *Llibre dels feyts*, chaps. 554-66 for Jaume's account of the Valencian uprising.

²⁶ The *alcaydus* was a Mudéjar community leader (Rom. *alcait* or *alcayt*, from Arabic, *qā'id*).

²⁷ *Roncinus* (Cat., *rossí*) might also be translated as an old horse or a work horse.

²⁸ ACA, R 39:200v (17 May 1277): "Petrus dei gracia, Rex Aragonum, fidelibus suis vicario et baiulo Gerunde, salutem et graciā. Cum in regno Valencie multitudo cerverit janetorum et alcaydus et Sarraceni castri de Montesa fregerint nobis pacta et convenientias quas habebant nobiscum, super restitutione dicti castri [ideo] sumus in g[u]erra cum eis mandamus vobis, quatenus //visis//, non permitatis extrahi de terra nostra nec duci ad aliquas partes equos aut roncinos magnos sub pena amissionis dictorum equorum et roncinatorum quos equos et roncinos fideliter reseructis. Datum Xative XVI kalendas Junii, [a]nno domini MCCLXX septimo." He wrote similarly to the nobleman of Tortosa, asking for food for the army. ACA, R 39:203v (12 June 1277): "Petrus et cetera fidelibus suis paciariis et probis hominibus Dertuze, salutem et graciā, cum in regne Valencie, secundum quod vos scire, credimus m[ultitudo] cerverit janetorum et alcaydus ac Sarracenorum Castri de Montesa fregerint nobis pacta et convenientias, quas habebant nobiscum s[u]per resti[tu]cione dicti Casti de Muntesia propter quod sumus in guerra cum eis et racione ipsius guerre victualia in dicto regno Valencie necessario habemus propter defecem de victualia dictum regnum aut alia tera nostra recipiat detrimentum, dicimus et mandamus vobis, quatenus, non permitatis [ex]trahi de Dertusa per aliquos sive duci ad aliquas partes excepto dicto Regno Valencie vel aliud bladum ita tamen quod qui voluerint extrahere inde bladum vel triticum amino ad ducendi illud ad regnum Valencie, faciatis recipi securitatem, Da[tum] Xative II idus Junii, anno domini MCCLXX septimo." Cf. ACA, R 39:194v.

these cavalry soldiers were the military base of the rebellion. But the identity of these soldiers is unclear from the circular. They are distinguished from the “Saracens” of Valencia, that is, the Mudéjars, who are cited for having “broken agreements” and failing to turn over a castle to the King, complaints that have a tempered air of feudal disloyalty not religious contempt or xenophobia.²⁹ In the same vein, al-Azraq, the Mudéjar leader of the rebellion, is referred to as “our traitor (*proditor noster*)” rather than a foreign invader.³⁰ Indeed, as both Burns and Boswell have shown brilliantly, the Crown of Aragon considered its Muslim subjects at once its vassals (*homens nostres e vassals*) and its property (*nostres propis*), an embrace that can neither properly be called tolerant nor intolerant.³¹ This relationship, moreover, explains why the threat presented by the Mudéjars in Pere’s eyes was that they would form a fifth column within Valencia:

The Saracens [of Valencia] rebelled (*rebellarunt*)³² with soldiers (*militis*) from castles and forts against the Lord King and his land, leading, moreover, Saracen spies from Granada and North Africa into Valencia at the greatest cost and dishonor to his land and all of Christendom (*Christianitatis*).³³

²⁹ The Castilian word *Mudéjar* (Cat. *Mudèixar*) comes from the Arabic, *Mudajjan*, literally “those who remain or lag behind.” It should be noted, however, that the term rarely appears in Catalan or Castilian texts before the 15th century. More commonly, one sees *sarraceni*, *moros*, *sarraï*. See *EL*², s.v. “Mudéjar” for more detail.

³⁰ In three separate charters sent to the Count of Urgell in 1257 and 1258, during the first Valencian uprising, King Jaume referred to al-Azraq as “our rebel (*proditor noster*).” Here, for instance, Jaume rebukes the Count of Urgell for his failure to fulfill his feudal duties during the rebellion of al-Azraq, ACA, R 10:67r (4 April 1258): “Iacobus dei gracia et cetera viro nobili et dilecto Alvaro eadem urgellensi comiti, salutem et dileccionem. Rogamus dicimus et mandamus vobis firmiter, quatenus, ad nos visis presentibus cum vestris militibus et armis veniatis paratus servire nobis contra Aladrach proditorem nostrum feudum quod pro nobis tenetis. Et hoc non mu[t]etis nec differ[at]is aliqua ratione quoniam alias litt[er]as super hoc v[obis] de cetero non mittemus. Datum Dertuse, II nonas Aprilis, anno Domini MCCL octavo.”

³¹ John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure*, and Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 282-3: “Some might prefer to minimize or dismiss the feudalistic style of these words, taking them as bold variants for subject or citizen, and refusing to credit the residual original meaning of words in shaping reality; even at that extreme, however, the terminology still reveals that Muslims high and low entered the Christian political order, becoming an accepted, integral element equal in some way with the other components of the Arago-Catalan feudal state.”

³² A syncopated perfect with contracted vowel that would read “rebellaverunt” in Classical Latin.

³³ This quotation is extracted from a condemnation of Count Ramon Folc. Pere argues that Folc’s rebellion drew his attention away from Valencia. ACA, R 47:14v (1284): “... fuerat etiam longo tempore pro eo quia Sarracenem in ipso Regno existentes extexerant se contra ipsum dominum Regem et terram suam, et rebellarunt cum militis castris et fortaliciis contra eundem dominum Regem adducendo etiam indices

In other words, within the context of the uprising, the Mudéjars are definitively cast as insiders – disloyal and treacherous subjects but subjects nevertheless.

By contrast, the *jenets* are not rebels. They are never spoken of as the king's subjects or, indeed, as the subjects of any one king or kingdom in these documents.

While some appear affiliated with castles in Valencia, others, one learns from war reports, enter Valencia from Naṣrid Granada or Marīnid North Africa during the rebellion.³⁴ A fascinating surrender treaty – negotiated directly with commanders of these troops – reveals the Crown's awareness of the *jenets*' disaggregated organization.³⁵ At the end of August 1276, Pere signed an agreement with “shaykh (*vello*) Abrurdriz Hyale Abenayech, knight (*cavero*) Abenzumayr Abenzaquimeran, and wazīr (*alguazir*) Abulfarary Asbat,” who represented several castles in Valencia. They would pay the king an unspecified amount and vacate their locations within three months. They agreed, moreover, that none of their “*jenets* and other cavalry of Moors, in this land, in Granada, or any other place ... would do harm to the kingdom of Valencia or any other part of the king's land (*Senyuria*).”³⁶

Sarracenos ad terram Valencie de partibus Granate et de partibus Barberie in maximum dispendium et desonorem terre sue et tocius Christianitatis in tantum quod ipse Dominum Rex coactus fuit magnos contra ipsos Sarracenos exercitus congregare. Et cum magnis [...]dibus, laboribus et expensis ipsos Sarracenos devincens divina gracia adiuvatem sue dicioni reduxit.”

³⁴ See for instance, ACA, R 40:13v (12 September 1277): “We know for certain that neither Abouyceff [the Marīnid ruler Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb, who ruled from 1258-1286], King of Morocco, nor any armies of *jenets* have crossed to this side of the sea. / Nunc autem cum pro certo didicerimus quod Abouyceff, Rex de Marrochs, nec aliqua familia janetorum non transfretaverint ad partes Cismarinas.” The *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 556 states, however, that other Muslim *jenets* did enter the Crown during the rebellion: “While we were in Játiva, we received news of those *jenets* who had entered into our land. / E nós estan en Xàtiva haguem ardit d'aquells cavallers genets que eren entrats en la terra.”

³⁵ For more on surrender treaties from the period, see Burns and Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures*. They deal with two treaties from the 1240s. In these earlier treaties, the Muslims negotiated from a position of greater strength than in the treaty below. It is also worth noting the observation made by the authors that the Arabic counterpart did not always agree in content or meaning to the Latin (or in this case, Aragonese) text. We do not possess an Arabic partner to this surrender agreement.

³⁶ ACA, R 38:27r-27v (30 August 1276): “Esta es carta de treuga et de pammento que es fera entrel Senyor Infant Don Pedro fíyo primero et heredero del muy noble Don Jayme Rey d’Arago et qui deus perdone et

These earliest documents, therefore, reveal several interesting facts about the *jenets*. First, the *jenets* are a particular and distinct form of cavalry – different from “other cavalry of Moors” – although in what sense remains unclear. Second, like the many-headed hydra, they attack from every direction: these troops are not tied to any particular state but rather scattered “in this land,” “in Granada,” and indeed, “any other place.” And finally, less than a decade before the events of Albarracín, the Crown regarded the *jenets* as hostile, in fact, as the central threat during the Valencian uprising. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the Chancery Registers, which is to say, of the nascent Catalan state, the figure of the *jenet* is as vague and untamable as the frontier

entrel vello noble Abrurdriz Hyale Abenayech et el caverro noble Abenzumayr Abenzaquimeran, el alguazir Abulfary Asbat, aixi quel dito Senyor Infant atreuga a t[o]dos los castellos et //las que// que son alçadis alas pennas contra ell dito Senyor Infant en todo lo Regno [de] Valent et de su termino et de Exativa et de Si[...]ino. Sine es alfandech de Merinyen et Alarch et Aquilar et Alaguar et Ataya et Salxet et Gartx et Serra Dalastar et Sorra de Confrides et Berdia et Uxala et Alyubayal et Alocayba et Pop et Rellen qui no son en esta tregua mas quel Senyor Enfant ne pueda fer su voluntad. Et atorga el Senyor Infant avantdito esta tregua por tres meses del dia que esta carta s[e]ra feyta adelant assi quel Senyor Infant ni ell ni homen ninguno de su terra no faga mal alos ditos castellos et pena\\$/ que son puestas en la tregua antes vayan todos los moro[s] daqueles castellos et pennas dentro el tiempo dela tregua salvos et seguras con todo el lur assi commo fan lu[r] ... Sennoria suya qui son en paz. E los dito[s] Abrurd[r]iz Yhale [Abenayech] et Abenzu[mayr] \Ab]ulfary/ <treguam> otrossi a toda la terra del regno de [.....] toda la [.....] a los logares del dito Senyor Enfant de quiere que sean por ellos [et] por todos lures parentes et los jenetes et otras caveras de moros qui sean aqui en esta terra et en Gran[a]da et //de// \en/ qual que lugar otro que ninguno dellos no fagan dayno ne negun por ellos non fagan dayno en el regna de Valent ne en [fol.27v] ninguno otro lugar de Seynuria [de]l pre[sen]t Et si per avent[ur]a ... recebian ningun[os] [loga]res dela senyuria del senyor Infant av[ant]dito dentro esti t[ie]mpo ... ellos que los emeden a vista [del] Senyor I[n]fant empero si negun logar daquellos que se son alçad[is] no queria tenir esta tregua quel Senyor Enfant pueda [.....] contra ellos a su voluntat et que no les sea tenuto dela tregua qua[n]to et aquellos qui no [...]iessen la tregua. E desta tregua ganara[.] carta et atorg[am]iento del //Senyor// Rey de Granada et todas estas cosas prometen de cumplir et de tener a buena fe et sens engano. Datum Xative III dias ala exida dagosto en lanyo de MCCLXXVI.” On 6 September 1276, Pere indeed issued an order, which survives in the Registers, to his officers in Algeciras (*al-Jazīra al-Khadrā*’, a port briefly under Castilian rule in this period) that this treaty should be upheld. ACA, R. 38:33v (6 September 1276): “Infans Petrus et cetera, fidelibus suis baiulo, iusticie, iuratis et universis hominibus Alyazire, salutem et gratiam. Sciatis quod nos accipimus et habemus ab hodierna die dominica usque in tres meses continere vent[ur]os et completos treguas cum janetis et omnibus aliis Sarracenis locorum Regni Valencie et castrorum quis contra nos alciavunt exceptis tamen castris et locis ac que tenet alcaydus Abraham et excepto castro de Alcalano, Vallis de Alfandec, de Marynenen, et Sarracenis dictorum castrorum et rebus eorumdem. Quare mandamus vobis, quatenus, dictam treguam per totum dictum tempus observetis et infra dictum tempus non oportet vos similiter vel res vestras cavare a janetis vel aliquibus Saracenis dictorum castrorum et locorum qui sunt in tregua predicta quam quidem treguam preconzant per Alyaziram nisi presentibus faciatis. Datum Xative VIII idus Septembris anno domini MCCLXXVI.”

itself. They inhabit a threshold of indistinction between inside and outside. Thus, on its own, the earliest evidence from the Chancery Registers amounts to little concrete.

As a last ditch effort, some evidence from the later Registers may be marshaled to make claims about the ethnicity of these troops. For instance, in November of 1290, the royal treasurer, Arnaldus de Bastida, issued payments to a group of *jenets* as well as certain “Arab Saracens.”³⁷ The juxtaposition here between *jenets* and Arabs is both significant and consistent with an ethnic usage. On another occasion, in March of 1291, King Jaume II (1291-1329) dispatched a letter to an Arab soldier, “Mahomat, son of Abulgayri el Arabi,” agreeing to his terms to bring “good Arab knights” into the Crown.³⁸ Among the hundreds of documents referring to Muslim cavalry in the service of the Crown, these are the only two occasions that refer to Arab cavalry as opposed to *jenets*; however, if the distinction is meaningful, these documents do not make it clear.³⁹

Pushing further and without reference to Arabic sources, one can also identify certain

³⁷ Arnaldus de Bastida was ordered to pay Abenadalil (see Chapters 4 and 5 for more detail on this figure) and his *jenets* 1127 *duplas* for two months salary as well as 5000 additional *sous* to “certain Arab Saracens,” ACA, R 82:168v (21 November 1290): “Arnaldo de Bastida quod solvat Abenhadalillo, capiti jenetorum, mille centum viginti septem duplas quas ei [d]ebent pro [qui]tacione sua et familie sue, duorum mensem, et ex alia parte, quinque mille solidos pro quitacione quorundam Sarracenorum Alarabum. Et facta solucione et cetera. Datum Barchinone, XI kalendas Decembris.”

³⁸ ACA, R 252:189r (10 March 1291): “Al amado Mahomat fijo de Abulgayri el arabi, salut e amor. Recibimos vuestra carta en que nos ficiestes saber que si nos aviamos voluntat de levar companna con nos de alarabes cavalleros buenos e bein guisados que vos lo embiassemos decir e lo firmassemos con el portador de vuestra carta. Ond nos entendido esto e todo lo al que en la dita carta vuestra nos embiastes decir gradecemos vos lo muyto porque vos fazemos saber que nos avemos menester XL cavalleros porque vos rogamos que vos vengades luego a nos con los ditos XL cavalleros e avemos firmado con Habraym qui vuestra carta nos aduxo en esta manera que daremos a vos e a dos fijos vuestros decena dobla cada mes e de vestir X cannas de buen panno una vegada en el anno e que aduyades vuestra mujer e vuestros fijos a nuestra tierra e darles emos de mientre que seredes en nuestro servicio. Daremos otrosi a los VII cavalleros daqueles que vos mas querredes VIII doblas al mes e a los XXX cavalleros romanents cinquena dobla al mes e X cannas daquele panno que nos les querremos dar para vestir una vegada en el anno. Otrosi vos faremos saber que tenemos por bien de quitarvos la quinta de la cabalgadas que faredes en enmendar los cavallos que perdredes. E porque esto sea mas seguro embiamos vos esta carta siellada con nuestro siello. E rogamos vos que no tardedes e que seades en Valencia de todo en todo a XX dias del mes de abril que si aquel dia no erades venidos no podriades ir con nos en el viaje. Dada en Xativa, X dias andados de mes de Março.” This document was also quoted in its entirety by Giménez Soler, 351-2, n.1. For a discussion of the terms of this agreement and similar contracts, see Chapters 4 and 5.

³⁹ The only two occasions to my knowledge and during the period examined here, 1265-1309.

prominent *jenets* as Zanāta Berbers. For instance, certainly from the period of 1285 to 1288 and perhaps before, several Almohad (Ar. al-Muwaḥḥidūn) Princes – who, although it is often forgotten, were ethnically Zanāta – having escaped North Africa after the collapse of the Almohad Empire, entered the service of the Crown as *jenets*.⁴⁰ As a counterexample, however, one might point to the existence of a Jewish *jenet*, who was most certainly not a Berber.⁴¹ Nevertheless, this bundle of examples is just that and amounts to nothing conclusive.

The study of the *jenets*, therefore, demands a new approach, one that breaks from the disciplinary boundaries that have held this surprising history in a half-light that has contributed both to its marginalization and misunderstanding. Even in its broadest brushstrokes, the history of the Zanāta Berbers in Arabic sources provides the key to the *jenets*; however, only by reading all these sources in close context, by weaving between Arabic, Latin, and Romance, chronicle and register, can the historian catch sight of the soldiers themselves, as they translated from one language into another, from one kingdom into another.⁴²

⁴⁰ Despite the fact that the founder of the Almohad movement, Maḥdī Ibn Tūmart, and the majority of his followers were Masmūda Berbers, the family of ‘Abd al-Mu’min (d.1163/558), which succeeded him, was in fact Zanāta. For references to these Princes, see ACA, R 58:49r; 68:186v; 70:168r; 71:51v; 71:52r; 72:33r; 72:35r, with full editions in Appendix A. See also Ambrosio Huici Miranda, *Historia política del imperio almohade* (Universidad de Granada, 2000), vol. II, 629-32. *ET*², s.v. “al-Muwaḥḥidūn.” Finally, see Chapter 4 for more details on these Almohad princes in the service of the Crown.

⁴¹ Elena Lourie, “Jewish Mercenary.” See Chapter 5 for a full treatment of the issue of the Jewish *jenet*. With the aid of a handful of documents overlooked by Lourie, I argue that Abrahim el Jenet did not, in fact, fight alongside the *jenets*.

⁴² Cf. the methodology described by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History: Mughals and Franks* (Oxford, 2005).

iv. A CURIOUS EMBRACE

Our most thorough source for the history of the Berbers of North Africa, Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* (The Book of Advice), describes the Zanāta – to whom he devotes the largest section of his universal history – as a race comprised of numerous tribes that dominated the central Maghrib (contemporary Morocco), so numerous, in fact, that the entire region came to be called the land of the Zanāta, *waṭan al-zanāta*.⁴³ Ibn Khaldūn roughly divides the history of these tribes into two periods of ascendancy: in the fourth/tenth century, under the Maghrāwa (specifically, the Banū Khazar) and Banū Yifran, and again, in the seventh/thirteenth century, under the great Berber dynasties, the Marīnids, from whose court Ibn Khaldūn wrote, and the ʿAbd al-Wādids.⁴⁴

In that first period, although the tribes were composed of a variety of transhumant stock breeders, cultivators, and city dwellers, the Zanāta had already developed a reputation for their formidable warriors, above all their cavalry (Ar. *fāris*, pl. *fursān*).⁴⁵

⁴³ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:4: “The majority of them were in the Central Maghrib, to such a degree that it was associated with them and known for them. Thus, it is called the land of the Zanāta (*al-akthar minhum bi'l-maghrib al-awsaṭ, ḥattā innahu yunsabu ilayhim wa-ya'rafu bihim fa-yuqālu waṭan al-zanāta*).” For an introduction to the debates surrounding Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* and the Berbers in Islamic historiography, see E.-F. Gautier's *La passé de l'Afrique du Nord: les siècles obscurs* (Paris, 1952); M. Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History* (London, 1957); Y. Lacoste, *Ibn Khaldoun. Naissance de l'histoire: passé du tiers monde* (Paris, 1966); Aziz al-Azmeh, *Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship* (London, 1981); Aziz al-Azmeh, *Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation* (London, 1982); Maya Shatzmiller, *L'historiographie mérinide: Ibn Khaldūn et ses contemporains* (Leiden: 1982); Ahmed Abdesslem, *Ibn Khaldūn et ses lecteurs* (Paris: 1983); Maya Shatzmiller, *The Berbers and the Islamic State: The Marinid Experience in Pre-Protectorate Morocco* (Markus Wiener, 2000).

⁴⁴ The first of the two dates refers to the Islamic (*hijrī*) calendar. Ibn Khaldūn, VII:21: “Then the Maghrāwa, with the help of the Banū Khazar, possessed another state over which they fought (*tanāza ʿūhā*) with the Banū Yifran and Ṣanhāja. Then, these generations died out and [their] rule of the Maghrib was stripped by another generation of them [Zanāta]. To the Banū Marīn passed the rule (*mulk*) of Morocco (*al-maghrib al-aqṣā*), and to the Banū ʿAbd al-Wād the central Maghrib (*al-maghrib al-awsaṭ*). (N.B. On occasion, scholars refer to the ʿAbd al-Wād as the Banū Zayyān.)

⁴⁵ *ET*², s.v. “Zanāta.” Ibn Khaldūn, VII:17: “The Zanāta were the greatest of all Berber tribes, most numerous in aggregate and in terms of tribes (*wa-kānat zanāta a ʿẓam qabā'il al-barbar wa-aktharahā jamu'an wa-buṭūnan*).” See also, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Idrīsī (12th century), *Kitāb nuzhat al-mushtāq fi ikhtirāq al-āfāq*, 9 vol. (Rome-Naples, 1970-84): “The majority of Zanāta are cavalry who ride horses (*wa-akthar zanāta fursān yarkabūn al-khayl*).” On the Maghrāwa, Ibn Khaldūn, VII:50: “These Maghrāwa tribes were the largest of the Zanāta groups as well as the most brave and powerful (*hā'ulā'i'l-*

The Zanāta, in particular the Maghrāwa tribe, formed the backbone of the Spanish Umayyad's resistance to the encroachments in North Africa of the Fatimids and their Ṣanhāja Berber supporters, the Zirids.⁴⁶ As Ibn Khaldūn describes, the alliance between the Umayyads and these Berber tribes involved a curious embrace of reciprocal manipulation.⁴⁷ The Umayyad Caliphs (*khalīfa* pl. *khulafā'*) played the various Zanāta tribes off of one another, showering honorific robes (*khil'a*, pl. *khila'*) and titles on one chief to incite the jealousy of others.⁴⁸ Through this policy, engineered by the ambitious chamberlain (*ḥājib*) and later Sultan, Ibn Abī 'Āmir al-Manṣūr, the Umayyads pursued a short-lived imperial project in North Africa.⁴⁹ For their part, the Zanāta chiefs, above all

qabā'il min maghrāwa kānū awṣā' buṭūn zanāta wa-ahl al-ba's wa'l-ghalb)." Cf. al-Bakrī, *Al-Mughrib fī dhikr bilād Ifrīqiya wa'l-Maghrib* (Frankfurt: 1993).

⁴⁶ Ibn Khaldūn gives two accounts for the devotion of the Maghrāwa to the Umayyads. In the first, after the first Arab conquests of the Maghrib, the Maghrāwa chief Ṣawlāt b. Wazmār, having accepted Islam, visited the Caliph 'Uthmān b. 'Affān in Medina, where he expressed devotion to the Umayyads and received official recognition from them. In the second, Ṣawlāt was captured during battle, but owing to his position in the tribe, was sent to see 'Uthmān. He then converted earnestly to Islam. See Ibn Khaldūn, VII:51: "So Ṣawlāt and all of the Maghrāwa devoted (*ikhtaṣṣa*) themselves to 'Uthmān and the Banū Umayya. They were devoted only to Quraysh and supported with zeal the cause of the Umayyads in Spain as will be seen in their history (*wa-ẓāharū da'wat al-Marwāniyya bi'l-Andalus ra'yan li-hādhā al-walā'* 'alā mā turāhu ba'da fī akhbārihim)." See also, Ibn Khaldūn, VI:314-5 and VI:320 for conflicts against the Fatimids and Zirids. See also Ibn Idhārī al-Marrākushī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa'l-Maghrib*, 4 vols. (Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1998), I:239-52.

⁴⁷ See generally, *Maḥākhir al-Barbar* [*Fragments historiques sur les Berbères au Moyen Age, extraits inédits d'un recueil anonyme compilé en 712/1312 et intitulé: Kitab Maḥākhir al-Barbar*, ed. E. Lévi-Provençal (Rabat, 1934)], 3-37.

⁴⁸ See *EF*², s.v. "Khila'" as well as Chapter 5, which discusses the significance of the Catalan kings giving robes to the *jenets*. To put the above in broader historical context, initially, the Umayyads pursued an indirect approach to the administration of the Berbers of North Africa, letting them administer all but the coastal cities as proxies of the state. Ibn Khaldūn, VII:40: "When al-Ḥakam died and Hishām al-Mu'ayyad [366-399/976-1009] rose to power (*waliya makānahu*), Muḥammad b. Abī 'Āmir became all powerful in the position of chamberlain (*inṣarada ... bi-ḥijābatihī*) and withdrew from all but the first stronghold along the shore (*al-'udwa*), the city of Ceuta (*Sabta*), and took command of it (*dabatahā*) by means of the Sultan's army and men of state and filled it with protégés (*qalladahā al-ṣanā'i'*) amongst the lords of swords and pens (*arbāb al-suyūf wa'l-aqlām*). He relied upon the Zanāta kings to control everything else (*mā warā' dhālik*) and obliged them with gifts and honorific robes (*khila'*). He undertook to honor their arrivals [at court] and enrolled whoever amongst them wished to enroll in the *diwān* of the Sultan. Thus, they devoted themselves (*jarradū*) to the state and the dissemination of its message (*bathth al-da'wa*)." ⁴⁹

⁴⁹ In 342/953, Muḥammad b. Khazar, chief of the Maghrāwa, briefly defected to the Fatimids, after the Umayyads gave command of Tlemcen and its appurtenances (*a'mālihā*) to Ya'lā b. Muḥammad, chief of the Banū Yifran (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:55). In 381/991, the situation had reversed and the Umayyads were courting Zīrī b. 'Aṭīyya, chief of the Maghrāwa, in order to inspire the jealousy and obedience of the the Banū Yifran chief, Badawī [occasionally spelled, Yadū] b. Ya'lā, the son of the Ya'lā b. Muḥammad.

those of the Maghrāwa, turned this strategy to their own advantage by using the threat of rebellion to negotiate for land grants (*iqṭāʿ*), rights, and honors.⁵⁰

Of more particular interest to the subject at hand, however, is the fact that throughout this first period of ascendancy, the Umayyads recruited Zanāta troops into al-Andalus.⁵¹ They called these new troops *Tanjiyūn* (people from Tangier) on account of the fact that they were recruited from that port in North Africa.⁵² And in the period of the

Khaldun, VII:61: “In 381, [Ibn Abī ‘Āmir] al-Manṣūr sent an invitation to him [Zīrī b. ‘Aṭiyya] at Fez in order to advertise the fact that he was honoring him (*ashāda bi-takrīmihi*) as well as provoke (*aghrā*) the jealousy of Badawī b. Ya‘lā and inspire obedience (*ṭā‘a*).” Zīrī, for his part, derided the honor conferred on him of being called *wazīr*. When one of his entourage (*hasham*) referred to him as *wazīr*, he responded, “*Wazīr* who, you idiot (*luka‘* [sic])? I am no one, by God, except an *amīr*, son of an *amīr*. How strange is this trifling from Ibn Abī ‘Āmir!” (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:62). Rather than playing the *ḥājib*’s game, Badawī chose to revolt against the Umayyads (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:62-3). Later, Ibn Abī ‘Āmir al-Manṣūr pushed Zīrī from power and tried to rule over the entire Maghrib through a series of governors. After al-Manṣūr’s death, Zīrī’s son, al-Mu‘izz, was recalled to restore order in Fez (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:66-8). See also Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, I:252-3.

⁵⁰ For example, when Zīrī b. ‘Aṭiyya complained of the honors he received from the Umayyads above, al-Manṣūr immediately dispatched more gifts (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:62). See also, the text of al-Mu‘izz b. ‘Aṭiyya’s truce with the Umayyads in 391/1001. The truce demonstrates that the strategy ultimately worked to the Zanāta’s favor; al-Mu‘izz gained unimpeded control over the Maghrib from the Umayyads, who were unable to maintain their policy of playing the various tribes off of one another (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:71-2). See also Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, I:253-4, which details the fact that al-Mu‘izz had to deliver money as well as prized horses as part of the truce. In addition, each one of the Berber leaders also had to deliver a son hostage to the Umayyads: “Each one placed a hostage (*raḥḥanahu*) his son” (Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, I:254). See the Chapter 6 of this dissertation for the parallel use of hostages in the Crown of Aragon’s dealings with the *jenets*.

⁵¹ Cf. above, Ibn Khaldūn, VII:40. The recruiting efforts were led by the same Ibn Abī ‘Āmir al-Manṣūr, the key intermediary between the Berbers of North Africa and the Umayyads of Spain. He initially attracted Zanāta tribes seeking refuge from Zīrid North Africa to the Umayyad cause. Later, he transferred them to the Umayyad court at Cordoba (Ibn Khaldūn, VI:367). See also the case of Abū Yādās b. Dūnās, a leader of the Banū Yifran, who in 382/992 sought refuge in Umayyad Spain, where he was given a salary and lands (*al-jarāya wa’l-iqṭāʿ*) and his troops were all registered in the *diwān* (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:45-6). Undoubtedly, given their loyalty, the Zanāta were the preferred recruits for the Umayyads, but other Berber tribes are noted to have entered into the service of the Umayyads. Ibn Abī ‘Āmir, for instance, recruited several Ṣanhāja chiefs, during the intrigues between Zīrī b. ‘Aṭiyya and Badawī b. Ya‘lā (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:61-2). This alliance with the Ṣanhāja, however, was short-lived.

⁵² E. Levi-Provençal, *Histoire de l’Espagne musulmane*, 3 vols. (Maisonnette, 1999) [Henceforth, *HEM*], III:75. For an instance of this usage, see Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, II:147. Ibn Ḥayyān, *al-Muqtabis* (Madrid, 1979), V:120, distinguishes between the Berber tribes (*qabā’il al-Barbar*) already in al-Andalus, presumably from the earliest conquests, and those frontiersmen from the coast (*nuzzā’ min al-‘udwa*) of North Africa, which is to say, brought as mercenaries or salaried troops (*murtaziqa*) from Tangier in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The original Berber tribes fought as volunteers, with some pay and right to booty, but were not enrolled in the Umayyad armies. By contrast, according to Ibn Khaṭīb, *al-Iḥāṭa fī akhbār al-gharnāta* (Cairo, 1975), I:103, the enlisted Berbers (*murtaziqa*) received 200 dinars after every mission. On the figure of the *nāzi’*, pl. *nuzzā’*, see Ana Fernández Félix and Maribel Fierro, “Christianos y conversos al islam en al-Andalus bajo los omeyas. Una aproximación al proceso de islamización a través

Caliph al-Ḥakam II al-Mustanṣir (350-366/961-976), these mercenary troops entirely displaced the Arab Syrian *junds*, becoming the dominant force on the Muslim-Christian frontier and shifting the balance of power distinctly to Muslim Spain.⁵³ Simultaneously, the Berber tribes also became a powerful political force in al-Andalus.⁵⁴ Their involvement in the succession crisis following the death of al-Ḥakam II led to a civil war (*fitna*), the bloody sack of Cordoba – which had actively resisted the Berber candidate – in 403/1013, and ultimately, one could say without exaggeration, to the downfall of the Umayyad Caliphate in Spain.⁵⁵ Of central importance to this reading, however, are two observations: First, a large and influential contingent of Zanāta mercenaries settled permanently on the Christian-Islamic frontier in the fourth/tenth century. Second, the Umayyad-Zanāta history reveals a mutually coercive dynamic – between state and warrior band – that would echo throughout the history of the *jenets* in Christian and Islamic lands.

de una fuente legal andalusí del s. III/IX,” *Anejos de Archivo Español de Arqueología* XXIII (2000): 415-27.

⁵³ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:367: Ibn Abī ‘Āmir recruited the Zanāta “with whom he entirely replaced the personal troops of the Sultan and the Umayyad *junds* and the Arab tribes (*alladhīna adāla bi-jumū ‘ihim min junūd al-sultān wa-‘asākir al-umawiyya wa-qabā’il al-‘arab*).” See also Ibn Khaldūn, VII:109: “They [the Zanāta Berbers] overcame the Spanish Arab *junds* (*ghālabū junūd al-Andalus min al-‘arab*).” See also Ibn Sa‘īd al-Andalusī, *Al-Mughrib fī ḥulā al-maghrib* (Dār al-Ma‘ārif: Cairo) I:60: “By employing Berbers (*iṣṭinā’ al-barbar*) and slaves in order to use them against the Arabs.” Al-Ṣafadī, *Kitāb al-wāfī bi’l-wafayāt* (Wiesbaden, 1962), III:313, says that there were 4200 Berber horsemen added to the army of al-Andalus during this period. See also Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, II:279. Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabis* in E. Garcia Gomez, “Al Hakam II y los Berberes según un texto inédito de Ibn Hayyan,” *al-Andalus* XIII (1948): 208-26, esp. 212-3/219-20. For more on the reform of the Umayyad army, see *HEM*, esp. III:72-83. The Caliph al-Nāṣir opposed the use of Berbers extensively but the influence of al-Manṣūr over al-Ḥakam led to the introduction of these troops in larger numbers.

⁵⁴ Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, II:279. On the conflicts between the Berbers and the population of al-Andalus, see Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabis* (Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1965), VI:78.

⁵⁵ Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Bayān*, III:203.

V. IMBRICATION

Ibn Khaldūn's first period of Zanāta ascendancy ends with the rise of the Almoravids (fifth to sixth/eleventh to twelfth centuries), backed by the Ṣanhāja Berbers, and subsequently the Almohads (sixth to seventh/twelfth to thirteenth centuries), supported by the Maṣmūda Berbers.⁵⁶ During the period of Almoravid and Almohad rule in North Africa and Spain, the Zanāta tribes, no longer in favor, found themselves widely dispersed: some, like the Maghrāwa, were entirely destroyed; others submitted to the new powers; and yet others declared short-lived independence on the frontiers.⁵⁷ According to Ibn Khaldūn, the old Zanāta tribes showed little desire or ability to rise above this condition ever again.⁵⁸ Only with the collapse of the Almohad power, he explains, did a new set of Zanāta tribes – a “second wave (*al-ṭabaqa al-thāniya*),” untouched by luxury – seize the opportunity to build new states:

[The Zanāta] remained in that land [the desert], wrapped in clothes of pride (*mushtamilīn lubūs al-‘izz*) and ceaseless disdain (*mustamirrīn lil-anafa* [sic]) for others. The majority of earnings were from livestock (*an ‘ām wa ‘l-māshiya*), and they satisfied their desires for wealth by pillaging travelers (*ibtighā ‘uhum al-rizq min taḥayyuf al-sābila*) and by the ends of the spears (*fī ṣill al-rimāḥ al-mushra ‘a*). They made war with other tribes, fought against other nations and states, and had victorious battles over kings, of which little is known.... During these ancient periods (*al-aḥqāb al-qadīm*), no king of this generation of

⁵⁶ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:120. See also *ET*², s.v. “al-Muwahḥidun” and “al-Murābiṭūn.” The Ṣanhāja and Maṣmūda Berbers comprised the two other major ethnic groups of North Africa. See also, *Mafākhīr al-Barbar*, 43-60.

⁵⁷ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:378 for the defeat of the Zanāta by the Almoravids. Ibn Khaldūn, VII:95 demonstrates that later some Zanāta supported the Almoravids against the Almohads. On the destruction of the Maghrāwa by the Almoravids, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:95: “So the rule of the Maghrāwa disappeared from the whole of the Maghrib as if it had never existed (*wa- ‘nqaraḍa amr maghrāwa min jamī‘ al-maghrib ka-anna lam yakun*).” See also Ibn Khaldūn, VII:109-13: Some, like the Banū Damar and Banū Birzāl, who had crossed into Spain, took advantage of the chaos resulting from the collapse of the Umayyads to declare themselves independent.

⁵⁸ See, for instance, the example of the Banū Warā. Ibn Khaldūn, VII:100: “They have remained in the same condition since the disappearance of the first Zanāta [dynasties]. They are, up to this day, a people taxed and distressed by states (*lam yazālū ‘alā ḥālīhim mundhu inqirāḍ zanāta al-awwalīn, wa-hum li-hadhā al-‘ahd ahl maghārim wa- ‘askara ma ‘ al-duwal*).” See E.W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon* (1984), s.v. “Askara.”

Zanāta encouraged men of letters (*ahl al-kitāb*)⁵⁹ to record events or write history (*taqyīd ayyāmihim wa-tadwīn akhbārihim*).⁶⁰

While his description underscores the military potential of these new tribes, one should not mistake Ibn Khaldūn's view of the Berbers as romantic – as noble savages entirely cut off from urban civilization (*'umrān ḥaḍarī*).⁶¹ In the period before the Almohad collapse, the 'Abd al-Wādids had already established an alliance with the Almohad Caliphs; their foundation of a kingdom at Tlemcen (*Tilimsān*) reflected only one of many ways their rule developed out of Almoravid and Almohad models.⁶² For their part, the Marīnids, based in Fez (*Fās*), manipulated religious ideology to their advantage by establishing alliances with religious leaders in urban centers, building *madrasas*, and establishing a sense of religious mission through *jihād* in al-Andalus.⁶³ The image of a marauding horde, innocent of the city and law, fits poorly with this awareness. These

⁵⁹ Alternatively, one could read "ahl al-kitāb" in this context as Christians and Jews.

⁶⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:124-5. See Lane, s.v. "Mushra'a": *al-rimāḥ al-mushra'a* means "spears directed."

⁶¹ There is a considerable bibliography treating the conception of the nomad in Ibn Khaldūn. See, for instance, Michael Brett, "Way of the Nomad," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 58:2 (1995), 251-69; Maya Shatzmiller, *L'Historiographie Mérinide*, 132: "Le 'Ibar n'est qu'un traitement plus complet du thème du *maḥākhir*. Si on veut il serait la réalisation la plus profondément intelligente et magnifique du but que se donnait en termes brutaux l'auteur de *maḥākhir*, à la différence de tous les auteurs du XIVe siècle – prouver par l'histoire les gloires des Berbères." See also Rina Drory, "The Abbasid Construction of the Jahiliyya: Cultural Authority in the Making," *Studia Islamica* 1:83 (1996), 33-49; Shatzmiller, *Berbers and the Islamic State*; Jean Morizot, *L'Aurès ou le myth de la montagne rebelle* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991).

⁶² *EF*², s.v. "Tilimsān." With regards to the 'Abd al-Wādīd relationship to the Almohads, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:344: "The Banū 'Abd al-Wād were faithful and sincere to the Almohads in their service (*akhlaṣa banū 'abd al-wād fī khidmatihim wa-naṣīḥatihim*). The 'Abd al-Wād were first subjected by an Almohad army under the command of Abū Ḥafṣ, companion of Ibn Tūmart and founder of the Hafsīd Dynasty according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:149. Another significant aspect of continuity between the Almohads and 'Abd al-Wādīds was their use of Christian mercenaries. Upon capture of Tlemcen, Yaghamrāsan b. Zayyān, the dynasty's founder, incorporated Christian (*al-'asākīr min al-rūm*) and Kurdish (*ghuzz*) lancers and archers (*rāmiḥa wa nāshiba*) according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:162. See also, Ibn Khaldūn, VII:174: "After the death of al-Sa'īd [the last Almohad Caliph, Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Sa'īd (640-646/1242-1248)] and the defeat of the Almohad army, Yaghamrāsan employed some of the corps of Christian troops that were in al-Sa'īd's army (*qad istakhḍama ṭā'ifa min jund al-naṣārā alladhīna fī jumlatihī*), grateful to add to their number to his army and as well as display them in his military processions (*al-mawāqif wa'l-mashāhid*)." These Christian troops grew so powerful that they conspired against Yaghamrāsan. A failed coup attempt prompted the populace to turn against these troops and massacre them according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:174-5. Cf. the use of Muslim soldiers in Catalan and Castilian military processions as described in Chapter 5.

⁶³ See Shatzmiller, *The Berbers and the Islamic State*, esp. 43-54.

redoubtable Zanāta tribes of the “second wave,” in other words, were canny and well-suited to take advantage of the religious and political situation of the Maghrib and Spain at the end of the thirteenth century.⁶⁴

Returning, then, to the decades preceding the *jenets*’ entry into the Crown of Aragon, two important developments in North Africa frame this border-crossing. First, from the wreck of the Almohads in 676/1276, three new dynasties – the Ḥafṣids (an offshoot of the Almohads) at Tunis, the ‘Abd al-Wādids at Tlemcen, and Marīnids at Fez – emerged, effecting a profound shift in the political, commercial, and diplomatic landscape of the Western Mediterranean.⁶⁵ While all three shared a reliance on Zanāta cavalymen, the rivalry between these states produced a surprising and complex array of diplomatic arrangements.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Compare this vision with that presented in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minnesota, 1987), trans. Brian Massumi, 380-1, where the nomadic subject represents radical or absolute de-territorialization. In their defense, Deleuze and Guattari’s image of the nomad is not concerned with the historical nomad but rather a model for resistance to sovereign power.

⁶⁵ In 676/1276 the Marīnids under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq sacked Tinmallal (*Tinmal*), the sacred center of the Almohads in the Atlas mountains, although the break-up of the Almohad Empire began much earlier. The Ḥafṣids declared themselves independent in 1229/627, and the ‘Abd al-Wādids in 637/1239. The Marīnids dealt the final blows, conquering Marrakesh (*Marrākush*) in 1269/668 and Tinmallal seven years later. The Almohad Abū’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Sa’īd (640-646/1242-1248) described the collapse of the empire in 645/1247-8, Ibn Khaldūn, VII:354: “Ibn Abī Ḥafṣ has seized Ifrīqiya, then Yaghmrāsan b. Zayyān and the Banū ‘Abd al-Wād captured Tlemcen and the Central Maghrib. They [the ‘Abd al-Wād] have proclaimed the rule (*aqāmū fihā da’wa*) of Ibn Abī Ḥafṣ and have given him to hope of taking Marākash. Ibn Hūd has torn away a part of al-Andalus, and proclaimed the rule of the ‘Abbāsids, and Ibn al-Aḥmar, on the other side, has proclaimed the rule of Ibn Abī Ḥafṣ. Meanwhile, these Marīnids conquered the outskirts (*dawāḥī*) of the Maghrib and pronounced the intention to conquer our cities (*tamalluk al-amṣār*). Then, their Amīr, Abū Yahyā conquered Mīknāsa and proclaimed there the rule of Ibn Abī Ḥafṣ as well as openly declared their tyranny (*jāhara bi’l-istibdād*). If we permit these humiliations and ignore these events, then ... our divine mission is about to end (*tanqariḍ al-da’wa*).” Cf. *al-Dhakhīra al-saniyya* (Rabāṭ, 1972), 26-9.

⁶⁶ Despite not being Zanāta themselves, the Ḥafṣids continued the tradition of using Zanāta soldiers in their armies and playing the various tribes off of one another to manage the threat they presented according to Ibn Khaldūn, VI:607-610. See, in particular, Ibn Khaldūn, VI:610: “The Almohads inspired an anxiety in [Abū Zakariyā, the Ḥafṣid general] regarding the tyranny (*istibdād*) of Yaghmrāsan and counseled him to create hostility between him and the Zanāta princes of the Central Maghrib, to place obstacles in his plans, and to adorn them [the other Zanāta princes] with the similar tokens of power (*albāsahum mā labasa min shārat al-sulṭān wa-ziyyihi*).” Cf. Chapter 5 on gift-giving in the context of the Catalan court.

For instance, despite their initial hostility during the Catalan conquests of the Balearics (1229) and Valencia (1238), the Ḥafṣids eventually developed a consistent and pacific relationship with the Crown of Aragon. This relationship, it bears highlighting, developed out of and depended upon the influence already established by Christian adventurers – merchants, missionaries, renegades, and mercenaries – who lived at or attended the Ḥafṣid court.⁶⁷ After the Catalan conquest of Sicily (1282), the Ḥafṣids' relationship with the Crown of Aragon moved from alliance to something more like prey and predator. Indeed, so confident was the Catalan king that he went so far as to contemplate imposing a Christian convert, Peter of Tunis, on the throne.⁶⁸ In 1282, under the pretense of support for a rebellion, the Catalan fleet landed at Collo (Ar. al-Qull) and in 1284, seized the island of Jerba but quickly recognized the limits of its ambitions.⁶⁹ In 1285 at Coll de Panissar, King Pere agreed to a monumental fifteen-year peace with Tunis.⁷⁰ The 1285 treaty not only stipulated that the Ḥafṣids pay an annual tribute to the

⁶⁷ For instance, ACA, R 46:120r (19 September 1283) records the arrest of certain Christian mercenaries for plotting against the Ḥafṣid sultan. Dufourcq, "Hafside," 3. Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 96 and 262-3. On merchants turned ambassadors, see Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 104: "Vingt ans après l'époque où Tunisiens et Catalans s'étaient entre-tués dans les eaux de Valence et sous les murs de Peniscola, ils étaient devenus frères d'armes sur le sol d'Ifrîqiya. Quelques «chevaliers» ou parfois des simples «cavaliers» pouvaient devenir influents auprès des certains membres du *makhzen*." See also, A.-M. Addé, F. Micheau, and Ch. Picard, "Communautés chrétiennes en pays d'Islam. Du début du VIIe siècle au milieu du XIe siècle," *Boletín de la Asociación Española de Orientalistas* 35 (1999): 388-9. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of and bibliography for Christian mercenaries in North Africa.

⁶⁸ ACA, R 53:114v as cited in Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 260. Peter of Tunis was a son of Abū Ishāq (678-82/1279-83), who had sought refuge in Sicily after a coup against his father.

⁶⁹ Brunschvig, *Berbérie orientale*, 96 and E. Solal, "Au tournant de l'histoire Méditerranéenne du Moyen Âge: L'expédition de Pierre III d'Aragon à Collo (1282)," *Revue Africaine* 101 (1957): 247-71.

⁷⁰ ACA, R 47:81r-82v (June 1285). The copy of the Treaty of Panissar in the ACA has degraded beyond legibility. I relied here on the edition available in M. L. de Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au moyen âge* (Paris, 1866), 286ff [Henceforth, *Mas Latrie*]. Brunschvig, *Berbérie orientale*, 96 explains the motivations for signing the treaty rather than continuing aggression. At the time of Alphonse's ascension to the throne, the political climate had changed significantly: "Cette même année 1285 avait vu, par une singulière coïncidence, la disparition de ses trois principaux adversaires dans l'affaire de Sicile : d'abord Charles I lui-même en janvier, puis le pape Martin IV en mars, et en octobre, après un début heureux de la « croisade » anti-aragonaise, le roi de France, Philippe III. La politique chrétienne changeait brusquement de protagonistes, et quelque peu d'orientation, dans le bassin occidental de la Méditerranée." Cf. ACA, *Cartas Arabes*, no. 150 (29 July 1287), which extended the truce, and is discussed in Chapter 4 below.

Crown of Aragon but also that all Christian mercenaries living in Tunis would come under the direct jurisdiction of the Catalan King.

Like the Ḥafṣids, the ‘Abd al-Wādids sought alliances across the Mediterranean, particularly on account of their ambitious neighbor, the Marīnid Sultan.⁷¹ As above, a powerful contingent of Christian mercenaries, who served in their struggles against the Marīnids, facilitated connections with the Christian states of Spain.⁷² The tripartite alliance between the ‘Abd al-Wādids, Castilians, and Naṣrids that emerged against the inexhaustible Marīnids, however, ended abruptly with the death of the founder of the ‘Abd al-Wādid dynasty, Yaghamrāsan, in 681/1283. Heeding the advice of his father, ‘Uthmān b. Yaghamrāsan (681-703/1283-1303) decided to sue for peace with the Marīnids.⁷³ Thus, by 1285, the ‘Abd al-Wādids had taken an introverted posture, hoping that the Sultan of Fez would focus his attention elsewhere.

For their part, the principal protagonists of this study, the Marīnids, followed a different path from the Ḥafṣids or ‘Abd al-Wādids. With the exception of the year 673/1274 – when the Crown of Aragon lent the Marīnids ships and soldiers for a siege of Ceuta – during this period, that is, leading up to 1285, the Marīnids were openly hostile toward the Crown of Aragon and Castile.⁷⁴ The sultan Abū Yūsuf (656-685/1258-1286)

⁷¹ See *ET*², s.v. “‘Abd al-Wādids” for a general introduction.

⁷² Ibn Khaldūn, VII:174-5. The ‘Abd al-Wādids used these Christian troops in their battles against the Marīnids. At the Battle of Īslī (1271/670), the ‘Abd al-Wādid and their Christian mercenaries were badly defeated. The Christian captain, “Bīrnabas” was captured by the Marīnids according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:380. See also, Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 314ff, for more detail on the Christian mercenaries at Tlemcen.

⁷³ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:443: At the time of his death, “Yaghamrāsan appointed his son, ‘Uthmān, his successor, and it is said that (*za ‘amū anna*) he advised him not to allow himself (*lā yaḥduthu naḥsaha*) to be drawn into battle with the Marīnids or a contest against them (*musāmatahum fī ghalab*) and not to expose himself on their territory in the desert, but to take refuge (*yalūdha*) behind walls until they summon him [to battle].”

⁷⁴ Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 164. For Ceuta, see ACA, R 19:6r (18 November 1274): “Nos ab vos et vos ab nos et puis que romanga aquella pau entrels vestres fills et los nostres en tal manera que vos nos façatz <aiuda> a pondre Cepta et que nos envietz X navs armades et X galees et entre altres lenys et barques que sien a summa de L.... Et quens envietz D entre cavallers et homes de linyatge.” The

displayed a particular passion for *jihād* and conducted four expeditions for the purpose of aiding the Spanish Muslims in 674/1275, 675/1276, 682/1283, and 683/1284.⁷⁵ The anonymous *al-Dhakhīra al-saniyya* described the first Marīnid expedition that departed for Spain in 674/1275 as follows:

In the year 674 on the first day of Muḥarram, the commander of the Muslims Abū Yūsuf arrived at the Fortress of the Crossing (*qaṣr al-majāz*) and settled there. He undertook transporting the holy warriors to al-Andalus with swift horses (*bi'l-khayl al-'itāq*), equipment (*al-'udda*), and weapons. It was a mercy of God that every day crossed a tribe of the Banū Marīn and groups of volunteers (*muṭṭawwi'ūn*) as well as tribes of Arabs, including the Sufyān, Khalaṭ, 'Āṣim, Banū Jābī, Athbaj, Banū Ḥaṣṣān, Riyāḥ, and Shabānāt. And when he had completed the transfer of the Banū Marīn and the Arabs, he undertook to transfer his armies and his entourage (*dawārahu*). Thus, they crossed, company after company (*fawjan ba'da fawj*), tribe after tribe, group after group. The boats and ships journeyed morning and evening from the break of day to night (*kāna al-marākib wa'l-sufūn ghādiyāt wa-rā'ihāt ānā' al-layl wa-aṭrāf al-nahār*) from the crossing to Tarifa (*Tarīf*), and they crowded the passage (*ma'bar*): "They crossed morning and evening to assault the foe / As if the ocean were a pavement for their steeds, / With the seaweed bearing the chargers up / As if the two shores were joined together, / And all had become a single causeway to tread." And when all had crossed and had settled (*istaqarrū*) in al-Andalus, the Muslim armies spread from the city of Tarifa to Algeciras, then, Abū Yūsuf crossed last with his noblemen,

Marīnids also incorporated Christian mercenaries into their army after their conquest of Fez in 646/1248. But the Christian soldiers quickly conspired with the citizens of Fez to re-establish Almohad authority. They assassinated the Marīnid captain in charge of the city, dragged his head through the streets, and pillaged his harem. The Marīnids retook this city in 658/1250 and displayed the impaled heads of all the rebels on the city ramparts as a warning to other conspirators according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:358-61. Cf. ACA, R 15:130v, which corroborates the claim.

⁷⁵ On Abū Yūsuf's desire, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:394: "From the beginning, the commander of the Muslims, Abū Yūsuf was disposed to perform *jihād* (*kāna ... mu'thiran 'amal al-jihād*), addicted to it (*kalifan bihi*), and opting for it (*mukhtāran lahu*) to such a degree that it became the greatest of his hopes." For the second expedition see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:403-405. During the third *jihād*, Abū Yūsuf allied himself with Alfonso X el Sabio (1252-1284), King of Castile, against his rebellious son, Don Sancho. According to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:424, Abū Yūsuf agreed to the alliance "hoping to multiply the divisions between them [the Christians] (*rajā'an li'l-karra bi-iftirāqihim*).” For the fourth expedition, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:427-32. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Marzūq, *Musnad al-ṣaḥīḥ al-ḥasan fī ma'āthir wa-maḥāsin Mawlānā Abī Ḥasan* (al-Jazā'ir: 1981), 115, gives slightly different dates: 664, 677, 681, and 684. He adds that Abū Yūsuf was known as "The Worshipper King and Holy Warrior Sultan" (*yu'rafu bi'l-malik al-'ābid wa'l-sulṭān al-mujāhid*), a title that makes him a fitting counterpart to the St. Louis of France (*Musnad*, 116). Ibn Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 58-61, says that he crossed over three or more times, in 662, 677, and 684. The dates from the 660s, which clearly precede Abū Yūsuf's formal *jihād* in 674/1275, most likely refer to the dispatch of Marīnid *Ghuzāh* in that period to al-Andalus.

ministers, officials of state, along with a group of holy men (*ṣulahā*) of the Maghrib.⁷⁶

Thus, in the period of the Valencian uprising – which is to say, when the *jenets* begin to appear in the Chancery Registers – Abū Yūsuf transferred a large body of volunteer (*muṭṭawwi‘a*) and salaried (*murtaziqa*) Zanāta and Arab troops onto the Iberian Peninsula. He established a beachhead at Algeciras, where he constructed the fortress, *al-Binya* (“the Edifice”) to house his holy warriors (*mujāhidūn*) as well as protect the local populations from their depredations.⁷⁷

According to Ibn Khaldūn, the *jihād* began with a vanguard of five thousand Marīnid cavalry soldiers, whom he simply calls “the Zanāta,” under the command of Abū Ya‘qūb b. Yūsuf, the sultan’s son. The expedition ravaged the frontier, and in these raids, Ibn Khaldūn adds, the Zanāta knights distinguished themselves.⁷⁸ Were these Marīnid soldiers the *jenets* that first appear in the Chancery Registers? During Abū Yūsuf’s third *jihād* in 1284, King Pere sent the following letter to the Master of the Templars and various Castellans:

⁷⁶ *Dhakhīra al-saniyya*, 145-6. The edition of the *Dhakhīra* available to me excludes three lines from the edition employed by Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 155-6. I am indebted to his elegant translation of this passage (particularly the poetry). My translation here is more literal given my need to distinguish clearly the various types of troops employed in the *jihād*. With somewhat less elegance than the *Dhakhīra*, Ibn Khaldūn also describes the levy (*naḡīr*) and transport of these troops for the first *jihād* (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:394-5). They left Fez in April of 1275 (Shawwāl, 673) for Tangier (*Tanja*) where Ibn Khaldūn explicitly says they were given provisions and salaried (*astawfā ‘aṭā’ahum*), a fact which highlights that they were not all volunteers. They crossed on twenty ships provided by al-Azaḡī, the lord of Ceuta. See also *Dhakhīra al-saniyya*, 143-4 for the details of the Sultan’s arrangements with al-Azaḡī.

⁷⁷ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:399: “Looking to establish a city along the shore for the purpose of housing his troops, isolated from civilians (*ra‘iya*) so that they would be protected from the depredations (*ḡarar*) of the army. So, he chose a place near al-Jazīra and ordered the construction of the city known as *al-Binya*.”

⁷⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:398: “The Zanāta once more showed their clear-sightedness and determination; their zeal was roused. They proved their loyalty to their Lord (*ablat fī ṭā‘a rabbiḥim*) and restless in the cause of their religion.” *Dhakhīra al-saniyya*, 146-7, gives more detail on the devastation wrought on the frontier by these troops. Ibn Marzūq, *Musnad*, 394, explains that in the time of the Marīnid Sultan Abū’l-Ḥasan (1331-1348), among the duties of the Naṣrid Sultan was to supply the Marīnid Zanāta troops with money and supplies, including a yearly shipment of 500 equipped horses.

We know for certain that *jenets* and armies of the King of Morocco [i.e. Abū Yūsuf b. Ya‘qūb] and many others are coming shortly to inflict harm to the kingdom of Valencia. Therefore, we tell, urge, demand and counsel you to prepare yourselves and your soldiers, weapons, foodstuffs, and other equipment for the defense of the aforementioned kingdom.⁷⁹

Pere’s warning explicitly connects the *jenets* to Abū Yūsuf’s *jihād*. This connection not only provides an explanation for the *jenets*’ appearance during the Valencian uprising but also suggests that the term *jenet* or *Zanāta*, as Ibn Khaldūn used it, functioned in a broad sense, as a synecdoche for the Marīnid cavalry, composed, as the *Dhakhīra* notes, of both Berber and Arabs soldiers from the Maghrib.⁸⁰

Despite the alarm raised by Pere, the Marīnid *jihāds* ended shortly after he issued this circular. When Abū Yūsuf departed the Maghrib for his fourth *jihād* in August 1284 (Jumādā II, 683), the alliance between the ‘Abd al-Wādids, Granada, and Castile had already fallen apart. Both Yaghamrāsan and Alfonso X *el Sabio* of Castile died in 1283 after lengthy reigns. Weakened, the Castilians sued for peace with Fez in 1284, ending this period of Marīnid military intervention.⁸¹ Marīnid influence in al-Andalus, however, waned with Abū Yūsuf’s death in 1286. Embroiled in threats to his reign, the new sultan, Abū Ya‘qūb b. Yūsuf (685-706/1286-1307), turned his focus back to the Maghrib, where

⁷⁹ ACA 61:108v (27 April 1283): “Fatri [Raimundo] de Ribelle, castellano Emposte, quia pro certo didicimus janetos et familiam bellacorum Regis Marrochorum et aliorum plurium venturos in brevi pro inferendo dampno in Regno Valencie, vobis dicimus et rogamus ac vos requiri[mus] et monemus, quatenus, paretis vos et milices vestros, armis, victualibus, et aliis apparatibus ad defendendum Regnum predictum. Ita quod prima die proxime venturi mensis Iunii sitis in dicto Regno ip[so] ab inimicorum incursibus defensuri. Datum Cesarauguste, V kalendas Madii”

⁸⁰ This assertion gains greater credence below in the descriptions of Ibn al-Khaṭīb.

⁸¹ For the treaty between the Castilians and the Marīnids, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:433. The treaty stipulated that taxes be lifted from Muslim merchants (*raf‘ al-ḍarība ‘an tujjār*) and that the Christians abstain from fomenting Muslim disputes (*tark al-taḍrīb bayn mulūk al-muslimīn wa’l-ḍukhūl baynahum fī fitna*). Interestingly, the Marīnid sultan also requested that all science texts (*kutub al-‘ilm*) that fell into the hands of the Christians during their conquests be returned. These books were, in fact, packed onto mules and delivered to the sultan according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:434-5.

it remained for the next decade.⁸² To put it differently, 1284 saw the beginning of a dramatic demobilization of the Marīnid holy warriors along the Christian-Islamic frontier. A period of relative peace emerged, during which the Christian kingdoms of Spain were thoroughly imbricated in the politics of North Africa not only through the formal means of diplomacy but also through the informal channels carved by Christian merchants and soldiers living in North Africa.

vi. HOLY WARRIORS

The second, major development in this period that set the stage for the arrival of the *jenets* in the Crown of Aragon was the creation in Naşrid Spain of a permanent corps of North African soldiers devoted to holy war, the *Ghuzāh*.⁸³ Ibn Khaldūn, who devotes the final part of his *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* to the *Ghuzāh*, traces the origin of these troops to the revolt at Salé (Ar. Salā) of one Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh, grandson of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Marīnī, the founder of the Marīnid dynasty, against the Sultan Abū Yūsuf b. Yaʿqub in 658/1260.⁸⁴ In his rebellion, Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh was supported by three nephews of

⁸² Ibn Khaldūn, VII:436: Amongst the first acts of Abū Yaʿqūb’s reign was to sign a truce with the Naşrid sultan, Ibn al-Aḥmar, and renounce Marīnid control of all fortresses in al-Andalus with the exception of Algeciras and Tarifa (*Tarīf*).

⁸³ Or, more properly, *al-ghuzāh al-mujāhidūn*, who are misleadingly called the “Volunteers of the Faith” by Arié, Harvey, and others. In fact, as even Arié explains, they were a combination of salaried and unsalaried troops. *Ghāzī* (pl. *ghuzāh*) denoted someone who took part in a *ghazwa*, meaning a raid into non-Muslim territory. Lévi-Provençal claims that the term *Ghuzāh* only referred to Berber troops, which, at least during the Naşrid period, is not true. In Naşrid sources, such as those of Ibn al-Khaṭīb, they are not called the *Ghuzāh* but rather the Western Army (*al-jund al-gharbī*), “western” used here in the sense of “from the Maghrib.”

⁸⁴ Generally, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:760-90, the chapter entitled “The *Ghuzāh* Holy Warriors in al-Andalus (*al-ghuzāt al-mujāhidūn bi’l-Andalus*).” For the revolt of Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:366-8 and VII:770-1. After the Sultan Abū Yaḥya (1244-1258) conquered Salé, he placed Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh, his nephew, in command of the city. The Almohads quickly recaptured the city. While Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh struggled to retake the city, Abū Yūsuf was named sultan to his great displeasure. Eventually regaining the port city, Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh allied with its Christian merchants to overthrow the new Marīnid sultan. The Europeans filled the port with innumerable warships. But according to Ibn Khaldūn, the Christians double-crossed Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd Allāh. Taking advantage of the Ramaḍān celebrations (*yawm al-ḥiṭr*), they besieged Salé. Abū Yūsuf marched his troops against the city, massacring all the

the sultan: Muḥammad b. Idrīs, ‘Āmir b. Idrīs, and Raḥḥū b. ‘Abd Allāh, a band (‘*uṣba*) bound by their descent from Ṣawt al-Nisā’, one of the wives of ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Marīnī.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, Ya‘qūb b. ‘Abd Allāh’s putsch had no success. The Sultan Abū Yūsuf first marched against the three princes and their followers, who had retreated to the Ghumāra Mountains in the western Maghrib, beyond Marīnid control.⁸⁶ Foreseeing their defeat, the young rebels repudiated Ya‘qūb b. ‘Abd Allāh and negotiated terms. Crucially, rather than killing the princes, the Sultan Abū Yūsuf strong-armed them into accepting his terms: they would perform *jihād* in Spain; in short, they were exiled, banned from the kingdom. In 662/1262, therefore, the cousins, now bandits, crossed into Spain at the head of three-thousand Marīnid cavalry and became the first commanders of the *Ghuzāh*.⁸⁷ The arrival of these Marīnids had a critical impact on both the frontier and the Naṣrid court:

The Banū Idrīs and ‘Abd Allāh and their cousin, ‘Iyād, arrived in al-Andalus at a time when it lacked protection (*aqfara min al-hāmiya jawwuhā*). The enemy (*al-‘adūw*) seized its frontier (*ista’sada*); their mouths drooled (*taḥallabat*) with anticipation of the pleasure [of seizing it]. But they [the *Ghuzāh*] took hold of it like vicious lions with sharpened swords, accustomed to encountering champions and striking them down with one deadly blow (*mu‘awwadīn liqā’ al-abṭāl wa-qarā’ al-ḥutūf wa’l-nizāl*). Toughened by life in the desert (*mustaghliẓin bi-khushūna al-badāwa*), the rigor of holy war (*ṣarāma al-ghazw*), and intrepid barbarity (*basālat al-tawaḥḥush*), they inflicted great harm to

Christians, and Ya‘qūb b. ‘Abd Allāh took refuge in the Ghumāra Mountains of the Western Maghrib. He lived in exile for almost a decade and was finally killed in 668/1269.

⁸⁵ See Ibn Khaldūn, VII:367-8 and VII:770. Abū Yūsuf traced his descent through Umm al-Yumn, the last wife of ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq, and mother of Ya‘qūb. Ibn Khaldūn, VII:350: “And Ya‘qūb belonged to Umm al-Yumn, daughter of Muhallī by Butwīya.” Ibn Khaldūn, VII:763: “The Banū ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq and Idrīs b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq were a band apart from the rest because ‘Abd Allāh and Idrīs were brothers from Ṣawt al-Nisā’ (*kāna Banū ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq wa-Idrīs b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq ‘uṣba min bayn sā’irihim li-anna ‘Abd Allāh wa-Idrīs kānā shaqīqayn li-Ṣawt al-Nisā’*).” Ibn Khaldūn calls her “daughter of ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq” on this occasion, but she was his wife as he notes elsewhere (Ibn Khaldūn, VII:350). See also *Dhakhīra al-saniyya*, 20.

⁸⁶ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:367-8.

⁸⁷ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:368 claims the year was 660. Ibn Khaldūn, VII:393: “After the Banū Idrīs and Banū ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq revolted (*astawshā*), they went to the Sultan Ya‘qūb b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq in 661, and he made peace with them. He forced (*intadaba*) them to perform *jihād* (*ghazw*) and to cross the sea because of the cries of the Muslims of al-Andalus.” See also *Dhakhīra al-saniyya*, 98.

their enemy.... They inspired zeal in the weakened Muslims behind the sea (*warā' al-baḥr*) [i.e. in Spain] and gave them hope of overcoming their oppressor.

They pressed the Amīr of al-Andalus to give them the leadership [of the *Ghuzāh*] on the coast (*bi-mankib*). So, he ceded (*tajāfā lahum*) to them the battle front, command of the *Ghuzāh* living on the shore (*ahl al-'udwa*) as well as the other tribes and fractions of Berbers. They passed [command] to one another and shared the tax revenues (*jibāya*) with him [the Amīr]. He also generously paid the salary of their soldiers (*bi-farq al-'aṭā' wa'l-diwān fa-badhalahu lahum*). They continue in this manner until today. Their impact on [al-Andalus] was great as we will note in the history that follows.⁸⁸

By uniting the various Zanāta tribes from both the first and second period of ascendancy that resided in al-Andalus, these Marīnid Princes tapped into an enormous violent potential, reflected in their ability not only to demand a portion of the Naṣrid tax revenue but also control of all the lands they conquered.⁸⁹ The pursuit of *jihād* also lent these three princes a fame that inspired other Zanāta princes, Marīnid and 'Abd al-Wādid, to imitation.⁹⁰ Thus, a miscellany of Zanāta leaders and tribes, exiles and volunteers, arrived in Spain, where they enjoyed relative independence from North Africa and considerable influence at the Naṣrid court. In short, the *Ghuzāh* represented a frontier institution that thrived on the margins of several states and posed a potential threat to the authority of them all.

⁸⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:378.

⁸⁹ See Chapter 5 for a comparison of this privilege with that given the *jenets* by the Catalan king. Cf. J.F. P. Hopkins, *Medieval Muslim Government in Barbary until the End of the Sixth Century of the Hijra* (London: 1958), esp. 53-5 and 75-8 on the use of Christian mercenaries to collect taxes. Was this use of mercenaries also implied by Ibn Khaldūn's text?

⁹⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:763: "So, they departed for al-Andalus in 661 and had a great impact on the *jihād* which brought great honor to their positions.... And many of the Zanāta princes (*aqyāl*) aspired to imitate their deeds. In the central Maghrib, the likes of 'Abd al-Malik b. Yaghamrāsan b. Zayyān, 'Iyād b. Mandīl b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, and Zayyān b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qawī gathered and undertook to crossover for the *jihād*. So, they crossed with whomever surrounded them (*khaffa ma'hum*) from their tribes in the year 676. So al-Andalus was filled with princes and men of royal stock (*a'yās al-malik*). While the vast majority of *Ghuzāh* were Zanāta Berbers, not all were. See, for instance, the case of Mūsā b. 'Alī, a Kurd who attached himself to the 'Abd al-Wādids and rose to the position of *hājib*. His close attachment to the Sultan led to a rivalry with the renegade, Hilāl the Catalan. Hilāl had him arrested and deported to Spain, where he entered the service of the *Ghuzāh* (Ibn Khaldūn VI:233).

Writing in the second half of the fourteenth century, a contemporary of Ibn Khaldūn, Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb (713-776/1313-1375) reveals in his *Lamḥa badriyya fī dawla Naṣriyya*, a panorama of Granada, a more precise picture of the *Ghuzāh* in al-Andalus. He explains that there were two armies in his time: Andalusī and Berber.⁹¹ The Andalusī troops were commanded by relatives of or men close to the Naṣrid Sultan. Traditionally, these troops were outfitted in the same manner as their Christian counterparts.⁹² They wore long coats of mail, bore ungilded helmets, suspended their shields, had large pommels, carried long lances, and traveled with a herald on a horse behind them. In his day, however, Ibn al-Khaṭīb continues, this style had changed. The cavalry wore shorter coats, gilded helmets, Arab saddles, North African leather shields, and light lances (see Figure 3).⁹³ Writing a century earlier and at the time when the *Ghuzāh* first arrive, however, Ibn Saʿīd al-Andalusī (d.685/1286) confirms that the Andalusī cavalry still made use of heralds, which is to say, they had yet to adopt the new fashion that Ibn Khaṭīb reports in his *Lamḥa*.⁹⁴ In other words, at the end of the thirteenth century, the knights of al-Andalus – and indeed, those of Christian Spain – were heavy cavalry, the high-maintenance armored vehicles of the Middle Ages that had

⁹¹ Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 41: “They had two types of army: Andalusī and Berber (*Junduhum ṣinfān: Andalusī wa-Barbarī*).”

⁹² See Ibn Saʿīd al-Andalusī as cited in Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-ṭīb min ghuṣn al-Andalus al-raṭīb wa-dhikr wazīriḥā Lisān al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb* (Cairo, 1949), I:207-8.

⁹³ Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 41-2: “As for the Andalusī, a close relative (*al-qarāba*) or man of prominence in the state leads as their captain. Previously, their uniform (*ziyyuhum*) was like that of their neighbors and Christian counterparts (*jirānīhim wa-amthālihim min al-rūm*) with regards to wearing long coats of mail (*al-durūʿ*), suspending their shields (*al-tarsa*), using unadorned helmets (*al-bayḍāt*), ?? (*itikhād al-ʿirāq al-asinna*), having misshapen pommels (*qarābīs al-surūj*) on their saddles, and placing their standard-bearers (*ḥamalāt al-rāyāt*) on horses (*istirkāb*) behind them. Each one of them had a mark which distinguished his weapons and made him known to others. Now, they have moved away from this uniform, using shorter chain mail (*al-jawāshīn al-mukhtaṣara*), gilded helmets (*al-bayḍāt al-mudhahhaba*), Arab saddles (*al-surūj al-ʿarabiyya*), *Lamṭī* shields, and light lances.” See Dozy, s.v. “*Lamṭ*,” the *Lamṭī* shield was a round, leather shield used by North African cavalry. This shield may have been what was referred to as the *adarga*. See Galvão, *Arte de cavallaria*, “Que trate como será obrada a Adarga,” 188-9.

⁹⁴ Ibn Saʿīd is cited in al-ʿUmarī, *Masālik al-abṣār* (Ms. 62 of the *Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia* in Madrid, fol. 48v) as cited in Arié, *L’Espagne musulmane*, 250.

dominated military history for a thousand years. These soldiers rode low in their saddles, anchored with their legs outstretched (*a la brida*) in order to bear the weight of their lances and resist counterstrikes (see Figure 4). They could only change course with the greatest difficulty but, when true, inflicted granite blows to their enemies.⁹⁵ By the fourteenth century, however, according to Ibn al-Khaṭīb, these troops had gone through a radical transformation, adopting the style of lighter troops, although Ibn al-Khaṭīb does not explain why they abandoned their heavy armaments.

As for the Berber army, the *Ghuzāh*, Ibn al-Khaṭīb says that it was comprised of a variety *Zanāta* and Arab tribes from the Maghrib. Thus, despite being called the Berber army (*al-jund al-Barbarī*), these troops included both Arab and Berber troops, a fact consistent with the assessment above that the term *jenet* or *Zanāta* more likely referred to the provenance of the *Ghuzāh* cavalry (or the majority of its troops) rather than the ethnicity of each individual. Giménez Soler, one could say, was right in a certain sense to call the *jenets* *Zanāta*. Ibn al-Khaṭīb further explains that each of these tribes responded to its own chief, who, in turn, answered to a leader chosen from amongst the Marīnid elders, confirming again the relative independence of the *Ghuzāh*. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Khaṭīb is frustratingly terse in describing these soldiers' appearance. While some, above all their leaders, dressed like the cavalry of al-Andalus – lightly armored – the majority did not.⁹⁶ He does specify that they used a throwing weapon called a *madās* (pl.

⁹⁵ *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, s.v. "Cavalry," esp. III:203.

⁹⁶ Catlos, "Mercenary," 276-8 conflates the heavy Andalusī cavalry of the thirteenth century with the lighter Berber cavalry of the *jenets*. He applies Arié's description, based on Ibn al-Khaṭīb, of the Andalusī cavalry in "ancient times" to describe the *jenets* of Abenadalil. Catlos, "Mercenary," 273 also claims that Abenadalil was a member of the Naṣrid royal family, which would suggest that he was an Andalusī knight according to Ibn al-Khaṭīb's military taxonomy. I argue that this was not the case in Chapter 4 and that Abenadalil was, in fact, a *jenet*.

amdās), made of two sticks joined by a grip in the middle.⁹⁷ This *madās* is likely the predecessor of the two-headed *jineta* lance adopted by Spanish cavalry in the fifteenth century. One can argue, however, from the comments of Ibn Ḥayyān (d. 1076/469), writing three centuries earlier, that the Berbers had long specialized as light cavalry. Commenting on the Umayyad Caliph al-Ḥakam II's (350-366/961-976) reasons for recruiting Zanāta cavalry, Ibn Ḥayyān explains that the Caliph admired their lightness on horseback and use of a "raiding saddle (*sarj 'udwiyy*)," which may indicate the short-stirrup mount that would come to be known as the *jenet* saddle.⁹⁸ As light cavalry soldiers, the Zanāta could harass heavy soldiers without directly engaging them, a strategy that came to be known as *torne a fuy*, attacking and fleeing, or as Ibn Khaldūn famously called it, *al-karr wa'l-farr*.⁹⁹ Thus, beyond the simple calculus of numbers, the

⁹⁷ R. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, 2 vols. (Brill, 1881), s.v. "Dassa," citing the same text from Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 42: "As for the Berber, who come from the Marīnid, Zayyanid, Tajani, 'Ajisa, and Maghribi Arab tribes, they fall under the jurisdiction of their own captains and leaders to, in turn, answer to the leader of them all, who is drawn from the eldest of the Marīnid tribe.... The majority rarely wear the dress of this country with the exception of their chiefs, judges, scholars, and those in the western army (*al-jund al-gharbī*). The weapons of the majority are the long rod folded by a short rod with a handle in its middle that is thrown by the finger-tips and called the *amdās*." Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 42, also mentions that the Berbers had begun to train with European crossbows (*qusiyy al-firanjā*).

⁹⁸ Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabis*, (Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1965), VI:192-3: "He considered their dress (*ziyyuhum*) good, their lightness in riding noble ... and he inferred this from their equipment (*ālathim*) which was perfectly constructed and suited to their horses." See also, Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabis*, VI:190, where al-Ḥakam II remarks at the beauty of a raiding saddle (*sarj 'udwiyy*): "The sides of the saddle were soft and the pommel short, forward and flat(?) (*al-muqaddam wa'l-mu'jir*)." Cf. Machuca, *Libro de ejercicios de jineta*, 3r.

⁹⁹ The most famous description of this tactic can be found in Ibn Khaldūn, I:482-5 (*The Muqaddimah*, trans. Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967), 224-6, an elegant but occasionally, loose translation). Ibn Khaldūn saw *al-karr wa'l-farr* as inferior to and less courageous than fighting in close formation (*al-zahf*), I:480 (Rosenthal, 224) (my translation): "Close formation is more reliable and stronger (*awthaq wa-ashadd*) than fighting with the technique of *al-karr wa'l-farr*... because whoever turns their back on the enemy thins out (*akhalla*) the line... and it is clear from this evidence why God (*al-shāri'*) considered close formation stronger." There are a handful of thirteenth-century Christian sources that seem to describe this tactic. See Soler del Campo, *La evolución*, 159-60. He cites, for instance, *Primera Crónica General*, ed. Menéndez Pidal (Madrid, 1977), fol. 304 for the description of Muslim tactics at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212). Cf. *EF*², s.v. "Furūsiyya." See also Catlos, "Mercenary," 278; Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane*, 258; P. Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence et la Reconquête: XIe-XIIIe siècles* (1990), II:390; F. Lot, *L'art militaire et les armées au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1946), I:440. Jaume I also records the use of this strategy by Muslim footsoldiers during the siege of Peñíscola by the Archbishop of Narbonne (*Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 266): "On another occasion, the company of the Archbishop of Narbonne was skirmishing with those inside [the city] and were unaware of the custom of the Saracens, that they would flee, whenever they could, to draw them close to the city. When we saw that the [Saracen] footsoldiers were fleeing for this

Ghuzāh brought a unique strategic advantage to the Muslim-Christian frontier, a fact that accounts for the dramatic military impact of their arrival. From the perspective of military history, moreover, the importance of the *Ghuzāh* cannot be overstated. The steady diffusion and success of their style – traced by the journey of the term *jenet* – contributed to the decline of the heavy cavalry that had dominated Europe for a millennium.

Is it plausible, however, that Muslims who arrived to perform *jihād* on the Spanish frontier could make their way into the service of the Crown of Aragon? Giménez Soler thought it unlikely that any Muslim would voluntarily do so.¹⁰⁰ For his part, Ibn Khaldūn thought in less essentialist terms about the Zanāta princes who joined the *Ghuzāh*:

They entered al-Andalus under the pretense of performing *jihād* (*tawriyatan bi'l-jihād*) but they were only seeking refuge, fleeing from the place of the Sultan (*firāran 'an maḥallihi*). And, indeed, whenever the Sultan Abū Yūsuf grew suspicious (*rība*) that they might revolt (*intaqaḍū 'alayhi*), he would send them (*yushkhuṣuhum*) to al-Andalus.¹⁰¹

But even from exile, Ibn Khaldūn continues, the Zanāta Princes continued to prove dangerous to the Marīnid Sultan. They supported new rebellions in North Africa and, in fact, used their military might in Spain to aid a tripartite alliance against the Marīnids in

reason, we sent a message that they should not pursue them or the Saracens would do them great harm / Altra uogada la companya del arquisbe de Narbona hagueren torneg ab los de dins, e no sabien la custuma dels sarrins, que los sarrains los fugien per tal quels poguessen, tirar prop de la uila. E nos ueem que la companya de peu sanaguaua, per ço quan els fugien: e enuiam los missatge que nols, encalsassen, que sino los sarrains los farien gran don.” More recently, this tactic was also associated with ‘Abd al-Qādir, the nineteenth-century Algerian rebel, who employed this “guerilla tactic” during the earliest period of his resistance to the French army. See Amira K. Bennison, “The ‘New Order’ and Islamic Order: The Introduction of the *Nizāmī* Army in the Western Maghrib and Its Legitimation,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 36 (2004): 591-612.

¹⁰⁰ Giménez Soler, “Caballeros,” 348.

¹⁰¹ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:765.

the 1280s.¹⁰² At the same time, they became deeply involved in the court politics of Granada, leading to a series of marvelous scandals, the most famous of which pit the Marīnid Princes in exile against Ibn al-Khaṭīb in the middle of the fourteenth century. All this is to say that these soldiers were not entirely scrupulous, not single-minded, and not above attacking other Muslims. Nevertheless, from the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, despite these political intrigues, the *Ghuzāh* were also admirable defenders of Islam. In short, for Ibn Khaldūn the figure of the bandit and the holy warrior, who share the same liminal space, the frontier, were compatible.¹⁰³ And, indeed, Arabic sources give no indication that these *Ghuzāh* sold their services to the Crown of Aragon as *jenets*.¹⁰⁴

Yet the Chancery Registers of the Crown of Aragon, which proved so unsuccessful in a half light, can now reveal that the opposite was true, that the *Ghuzāh* definitively did cross into the Christian kingdom. Catalan documents record that in 1303, a certain Alabez Abberaho and his *jenet* cavalry entered the service of Jaume II, received control of three castles in Catalan-controlled Murcia, and assumed command of all the *jenets* in the kingdom.¹⁰⁵ This Alabez Abberaho, one notes, received the same rights from

¹⁰² A second generation of Marīnid princes, Muḥammad b. Idrīs and Mūsā b. Raḥḥū, the sons of the first rebels, tracing their descent through Ṣawṭ al-Nisā' and claiming priority over the throne, rebelled against Abū Yūsuf b. Ya'qūb in 1270 (669). Again, they sought refuge in the western Maghrib and were eventually defeated. First, they were exiled to Tlemcen and later given permission to pass into Spain for the *jihād* according to Ibn Khaldūn VII:377. On the same matter, see also Ibn Khaldūn, VII:763. During the third *jihād*, when the Naṣrids opposed the Marīnids, the Zanāta *Ghuzāh*, under the command of Ya'lā b. Abī 'Iyād, continued to support Ibn al-Aḥmar and inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Marīnid army that led to the capture of Mandīl, one of the sons of the Sultan Abū Yūsuf, according to Ibn Khaldūn, VII:766.

¹⁰³ Cf. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 104, citing Rodolphe Jhering, *L'esprit du droit roman*: "In the bandit and the outlaw (*wargus*, *vargr*, the wolf and, in the religious sense, the sacred wolf, *vagr y veum*), Germanic and Scandavian antiquity give us a brother of the *homo sacer* beyond the shadow of any doubt."

¹⁰⁴ There are notices for the second half of the fourteenth century that individual *Ghuzāh* leaders sought refuge in the Crown of Aragon and Castile but no mention of this being the regular and wide-spread practice revealed by the Chancery Registers.

¹⁰⁵ ACA, R 235:1v-2r *segunda numeración* (22 December 1303): "Sepan todos quantos esta carta veran como nos Don Jayme por la gracia de Dios Rey de Aragon atorgamos a vos Alabeç Abenrraho, e a vuestros

the Crown that the Marīnid Princes received for their service from the Naṣrids. And, more importantly, reading the Registers alongside Ibn Khaldūn, one can for the first time connect Alabez Abberaho to the well-recorded figure of al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, grandson of ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Marīnī and one of the seven sons of Raḥḥū b. ‘Abd Allāh.¹⁰⁶ In other words, the case of al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, Marīnid prince, bandit, and one of the sons of a founder of the *Ghuzāh*, demonstrates that these holy warriors, indeed their leaders, were amongst the first *jenets* to enter the service to the Crown of Aragon. Now, in the full

parientes, e a los cabos, e a los cavalleros qui son presentes agora en Valencia, e a aquellos qui son en Murcia que vos guardemos, e vos aseguremos mientras seredes en nuestro servicio en nuestra terra. Encara vos atorgamos que vos daremos nuestra carta a todos oficiales e subditos nuestros que vos aguarden e defienden, e que vos den compra, e venda en todos nuestros lugares, e de nuestra tierra. Encara vos atorgamos que a vos dito Alabeç liuraremos el castiello de Negra, e Lorchi, e Cepti que los tengades por nos a vuestro estage, e de los sobredito[s] asi como vassallo tiene castiellos por su sennor. Encara vos atorgamos, e queremos que quales quiere de vuestros cavalleros se querran ir que lo puedan fazer exceptado que no vayan a tierra de nuestros enemigos, ni fagan danyo a nos, ni a nuestra tierra. Encara vos atorgamos //que cada hora que vos querades// por gracia, en ayuda de vuestras messiones, toda la quinta o setmo de las cavalgadas que faredes en tierras de nuestros enemigos assi de las vuestras cavalgades como de los Christianos, qui con vos entraran. Encara vos atorgamos que cada hora que vos querades ir, ni partir por mar o por tierra, que seades salvos e seguros de toda nuestra gent en cuerpos e en averes. Encara [fol. 2r] mandamus e queremos que otros cavallero[s] gen[etes] [sine]s nuestra voluntat no [v]engan en nuestra tierra salvo [e]stos que agora son con vos en nuestra tier[ra]. E si algunos [hi] vin[dran] [s]in nuestra voluntat vos [n]o los aculgades en vuestra company[a] menos de nuestra voluntat. Encara que [t]engades e observeades la paz, e las treugas que nos avemos dadas, o daremos daqui adelant a qualsquiere lugares o personas de quales condiciones que sean. Encara que vos Alabeç rendades a nos o a qui nos mandaremos el dito castiello de Negra, e los otros logares sobreditos toda hora que nos los queremos cobrar de vos asi como vassallo es tenido de render casitello a su sennor. E nos seamos tenidos de render a vos vuestras rahenes. Encara vos atorgamos que qualsquiere castiellos o lugares [t]omaredes del Rey de Granada que sean vuestros. Encara queremos e mandamos que en las cavalgadas que faredes/ en tierras de nuestros enemigos Christianos no prengades, ni matedes, muller ninguna porque no es costumpne nuestra. E en testimonio destas cosas mandamos poner en est escripto nuestro siello pendent feytas estas posturas en Valencia dia lunes XXII dias andadas del mes de Deziembre en el anyo de mille CCC e tres.” Another edition, which differs mainly in matters of transcription, in Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 353-4, curiously cites Zurita, *Anales*, V:61 rather than the Registers. For more on the figure of al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, see Chapter 6. For his part, while claiming that this *jenet* was from the Marīnid royal family, Giménez Soler does not connect Alabez Abberaho to al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū despite the fact that his genealogy was recorded by an official of the Crown in the *Cartes Reials*. Relying on Giménez Soler’s research, Arié (*L’Espagne musulmane*, 243) does mention “Ibn Raḥḥū” but fails to identify the figure whose personal history is well recorded in the Arabic sources she employed in her study. Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, esp.79-85 offers a detailed summary of the career of “Alabbās ben Rahu” in the Crown of Aragon. Like Giménez Soler, she only says he was from the Marīnid royal family but does not connect him to the *Ghuzāh*. See also Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 44, who calls him “Ibn Raḥo.”

¹⁰⁶ See Ibn Khaldūn, VII:764-5 for his family tree. His brother, Mūsā, was leader of the *Ghuzāh* during the same period al-‘Abbās sold his services to the Crown of Aragon.

light of the sources, one can ask: How and why did Muslim holy warriors become mercenaries for a Christian king?

Figure 1: A Christian *Ginete* (ca. 1400)¹⁰⁷



¹⁰⁷ *The Vinkhuijzen Collection of Military Costume* (New York Public Library), vol. 702, plate 33.

Figure 2: A Christian Noblemen (ca. 1400)¹⁰⁸



¹⁰⁸ *The Vinkhuijzen Collection of Military Costume* (New York Public Library), vol. 702, plate 29.

Figure 3: A Muslim Knight (ca. 1450)¹⁰⁹



¹⁰⁹ *The Vinkhuijzen Collection of Military Costume* (New York Public Library), vol. 702, plate 37.

Figure 4: Heavy Cavalry (ca. 1445)¹¹⁰



Homme d'Arme des Compagnies d'Ordonnance.

1445.

¹¹⁰ *The Vinkhuijzen Collection of Military Costume* (New York Public Library), no. 125305.

3. HOLY WARRIOR TO *HOMO SACER*

Sovereignty only rules over what it is capable of interiorizing.
(Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille plateaux*)¹

i. RECRUITMENT

With a focus on Arabic sources, the previous chapter argued that the *jenets* were light cavalry from North Africa, who entered the service of the Crown of Aragon and initiated a revolution in the military history of Europe. While these troops originated in the armies of the Zanāta Muslim states of North Africa, the *jenets* also had a direct connection to the *Ghuzāh* – an unruly and motley collection of bandits, adventurers, and volunteers – who came to Naṣrid Spain from North Africa in the second half of the thirteenth century for the pursuit of *jihād*. This connection between the holy warrior *Ghuzāh* and the *jenets*, however, cannot rest unproblematically in this narrative. The events described in the previous chapter, leading to the year 1285, set the stage for some transformation, but it remained to be asked how and why these apparently hostile and dispersed troops become agents of the Crown of Aragon. Why, to put it simply, did the five *jenets*, with whom this project began, cross into Valencia in 1285?

In pursuit of answers, the present and following chapters focus on the question of recruitment in two senses. First, they approach recruitment as a physical and material process. Through the lens of the Latin, Romance, and Arabic documents of the Archive of the Crown of Aragon, they map the itineraries, participants, methods, and on occasion, results of several recruiting missions from the period of 1285 to 1308.² They ask not

¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minnesota, 1987), trans. Brian Massumi, 361 (originally, *Mille plateaux* (Paris: Minuit, 1980), 445).

² For this 25-year period, the documentation of the ACA includes but is not limited to approximately 300 registers (almost 100,000 folios), 200 boxes of royal letters, 25 account registers, and over 200 Arabic charters. These documents formed the basis of the research for this dissertation.

only how but also why, when, and from where the Crown of Aragon recruited foreign Muslim soldiers. By placing these missions in their broader contexts, underscoring echoes and repetitions, they aim not only to reveal a pattern of recruitment but also to map a network of Muslim-Christian interaction across the Mediterranean. The reading that follows intentionally lets states and religious authorities – traditional centers of power – slip from the picture in order to reveal that political and religious boundaries were far from lapidary. Nevertheless, it makes no room for romantic visions of a borderless Christian-Islamic frontier, a free-market of arms and men. The *jenets* were part of a transitory market of violence, a spider's web that connected the Crown of Aragon to Muslim Spain and North Africa. Within this religious and political frontier, authority was always multiple and legitimacy, continually contested.

In another, figurative sense, recruitment can be seen as a process of assimilation and alliance. Agreements sought to integrate Muslim soldiers into the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon and by extension, formalized and legitimized the Catalan sovereign's relationship with them in the form of contracts. Therefore, through close readings, these two chapters explore the shape and aims of negotiations and agreements. Did the Crown of Aragon treat the *jenets* as allies or enemies, citizens or foreigners? What did it mean that Christian sovereigns employed Muslim holy warriors? Perhaps surprisingly, it will be argued that these alliances did not represent a collapse of boundaries but rather reflected and enforced religious difference. In one sense, the curious example of the *jenets* extends Nirenberg's claim that religious violence can have the effect of preserving communal boundaries, marking Muslims from Christians.³ But rather differently, these

³ See David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence*, esp. 3. Cf. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 22: "Exception and example are correlative concepts that are ultimately indistinguishable and that come into play every time the very sense of the belonging and commonality of individuals is to be defined. In every logical system,

chapters also suggest that the use of Muslim violence against Christians by the Crown of Aragon played a role in constituting Christian sovereignty.

ii. AGAINST ETIOLOGY

Claiming that there is no evidence of their use prior to this date, Faustino Gazulla begins his history of *jenets* in the service of the Crown of Aragon in 1285, with the date of the first-known mission to recruit these soldiers.⁴ Indeed, from the perspective of the Chancery Registers, the year 1285 seems to be a levee-breaking moment, after which a flood of *jenets* appear regularly as agents of the Crown. Given the dramatic events that accompanied that same year – above all the withdrawal of the Marīnids from the Iberian Peninsula – one might be tempted to go further than Gazulla, to claim this as a point of origin, to say that these were the first *jenets* to serve the Crown of Aragon. But to call something a first is no middling matter: it imposes a certain sense – an interpretation – on all the documents that follow. In this case, to begin in 1285 insinuates a rupture: one moment the Muslim *jenets* are raiding Valencia; the next, they are trotting in with letters from the Catalan king. Accepting this narrative raises a challenge, which Gazulla, perhaps wisely, sidestepped, a challenge of accounting for radical change.

Aside from a general historiographical suspicion of ruptures and origins, two significant factors impede writing an etiology, a study of the origins of the *jenets*. First, as argued above, this is the period when the Chancery Registers come into existence and

just as in every social system, the relation between outside and inside, strangeness and intimacy, is this complicated.”

⁴ Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 174: “Jaime I no se sirvió de estas milicias en sus guerras, al menos no hallo indicios que den lugar a sospecharlo.” While the first and foundational study, Giménez-Soler’s 1905 article is an eccentric collection of vignettes that lacks a cohesive argument or systematic approach. He makes no explicit claim about the first use of the *jenets* by the Crown of Aragon.

before which they were kept irregularly, unsystematically, or simply not at all.⁵ Thus, any starting point may be nothing more than a fiction of the documents themselves. Second and more significantly, evidence from the earliest Registers hints at a longer and more convoluted history of interaction between the Catalan kings and Muslim soldiers leading to 1285.

An overlooked fragment from the archives – the earliest reference to the *jenets* – reveals the problem clearly. Dated October 13, 1265, during the reign of Jaume I and twenty years before anything employed by Gazulla, this document is brief – a list of expenses recorded by the Infante Pere:

Also, for the expenses of the *jenets* – 386 *sous*, 6 *deniers*

 Also, for the clothes of [i.e. given to] the *jenets* – 903 *sous*
 Also, for the clothes of the representatives (*nuncii*) of the *jenets* – 86 *sous*
 Also, for the cloth (*pannus*) of the *jenets* – 35 *sous*
 Also, 140 *sous*, 6 *deniers* for cloth, tunics (*aflabays*), and thread
 Also, for the shoes of the *jenets* – 15 *sous*
 Also, for the meat of the *jenets* – 35 *sous*
 Also, for thread – 8 *sous*, 8 *deniers*
 Also, for the meat of the representatives of the *jenets* – 5 *sous*, 8 *deniers*.⁶

While disconnected and fleeting, this account, recorded three years after the establishment of the *Ghuzāh* in al-Andalus and well before the first *jihād* of Abū Yūsuf, is the earliest proof of interaction between the *jenets* and the Crown of Aragon. The presence of representatives (*nuncii*) and the payment for their expenses suggest,

⁵ Burns, *Diplomatarium*, esp. introduction; and Martínez-Ferrando, *El archivo de la corona de Aragón*, esp. chap. 2.

⁶ ACA, R 17:57r-57v (13 October 1265):

“Item pro expensis Janetorum ----- CCCLXXXVI solidos, VI denarios
 “
 “Item pro vestibus Janetorum ----- DCCCCIII solidos
 “Item pro vestibus nunciorum Janetorum ----- LXXXVI solidos
 “Item pro pannis Janetorum ----- XXXV solidos
 “Item CXL solidos, VI denarios pro pannis et aflabays [from Ar. *al-jubba*] et custuris
 “Item pro sabates Janetorum ----- XV solidos
 “Item pro carnis Janetorum ----- XXXV solidos
 “Item pro custuris ----- VIII solidos VIII denarios
 “Item pro carnis nunciorum Janetorum ----- V solidos, VIII denarios.”

moreover, that these are the traces of a negotiation. The items provided to the soldiers – clothes, cloth, shoes, and provisions – as one shall see, are the typical gifts provided by the Crown to Muslim soldiers for their service.⁷ The terse and formulaic language suggests moreover that this was not the Prince’s first encounter with *jenets*: the scribe did not need to explain who the *jenets* were and what was going on.

Pushing further, one might also argue that since these notes appear amongst the expenses of the Prince Pere – expenses that include, for instance, 12 *sous*, 7 *deniers* to buy a tunic for “a Saracen of the Lord Prince” – these soldiers were entering his personal service.⁸ This assessment would, indeed, be consistent with the fact that the several, later Catalan and Castilian kings did keep a personal guard of Muslim *jenets* as part of their royal households.⁹ Therefore, this circumscribed use of the *jenets* – as bodyguards – may

⁷ Below and Chapter 5 for a discussion of gift giving.

⁸ R 17:57r-57v (13 October 1265): “Item Sarraceno domini Infantis pro tunica ----- XI solidos, VII denarios.”

⁹ See, for instance, ACA, R 82:164v (8 September 1290), where payments are made to *jenets*, including Lourie’s Jewish *jenet* (Abraham el Jenet), belonging to the king’s personal entourage: “Arnaldo de Bastida, quod cum Raimundus Colrati solvere de suo propri et Sahit, Jahis, Ju[c]ef[o], et M[.]zoto [...] Jucefo, Mançor, Sahit Abenali, Abrahame el Jenet, Abdella, Asma Alca[r]ax, Mu[...] Almutayre, Mahometo Alca[...], Daveto, Mahometo Abenjabar, A[.]ç[.] Gua[...], et Sahit et Asmeto Arami, janetis de //domino// domo domini Regis, octo mille cen... ..ginta solidos regalium qui debebantur eisdem janetis pro quitacionibus eorum [...] cautis ... albaranis dicti Arnaldi et etiam cum albaranis Arnaldi Eymerici, scriptoris portionis. Quod solvat dicto Raimundo dictum VIII mile CLXX[X] solidos Guillelmo facta solucione et cetera. Datum VI idus Septembris.” For the case of Castile, see Ana Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la Frontera: La guardia morisca de los reyes de Castilla (1410-1467)* (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2007). I would like to thank Professor Echevarría for providing me with the proofs of her book before its publication. I would also like to thank Professor Fernando Rodríguez Mediano (CSIC, Madrid) for pointing out the parallel to Franco’s use of North African soldiers during the Spanish Civil War. See, for instance, Fernando Rodríguez Mediano, “Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas, S2N2. Gestión racial en el protectorado Español en Marruecos” *Awraq*, XX (1999): 173-206; Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford, 2002); María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los moros que trajo Franco: La intervención de tropas coloniales en la guerra* (Barcelona: Martínez Roca, 2002); María Rosa de Madariaga, *En el barranco del lobo: Las guerras de Marruecos* (Alianza Editorial, 2005); *Marroquíes en la guerra civil española: Campos equívocos*, ed. J.A. González Alcantud (Anthropos, 2003); and Francisco Sánchez Ruano, *Islam y guerra civil Española* (La Esfera de los Libros, 2004).

have provided a bridge to Pere's decision to employ these soldiers more widely in a later period.¹⁰

Other, overlooked documents reveal that once king, Pere continued to employ *jenets* in the period before 1285.¹¹ For instance, the Chancery Registers records that in August 1284, a certain *jenet* named Muçe received “53 *sous* and 4 *deniers* that remained of his salary (*quitacione*).”¹² And in the same month, Pere ordered an official to give traveling expenses to Aixe, the wife of a *jenet* currently in his service, such that she could move to Valencia.¹³ Again, the matter-of-fact and formulaic quality of the documents suggests that the use of *jenets* was wider than apparent, was already established. One notes, for instance, that Muçe received the remainder of his salary, which is to say that he had been paid before and had completed some service without leaving any imprint upon the documentation. Thus, one might also argue that although several Almohad princes

¹⁰ See Chapter 5 for more concerning the role of the *jenets* in the king's household. I extend this argument to claim that this ceremonial role – as an extension of sovereign prestige – was essential to the shape that the institution ultimately took.

¹¹ See, in particular, Lawrence Mott, *Sea Power in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of the Sicilian Vespers* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), esp. 36-7 and 214-24 which discuss the presence of Muslim oarsmen, a fact that can be read in conjunction with the recruitment of Mudéjar crossbowmen above and below (ACA, R 56:7r). See also his “Serving in the Fleet: Crews and Recruitment Issues in the Catalan-Aragonese Fleet during the War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282-1302),” *Medieval Encounters* 13 (2007): 56-77, esp. 65-6, citing ACV, perg. 738 (n.d.), which mentions the recruitment of *jenets* from North Africa and Valencia for the fleet. This material at the ACV was also brought to my attention by Josep Turró toward the end of my dissertation research, and I hope to incorporate it into future revisions of this work.

¹² ACA, R 52:57r (29 August 1284): “Bernardo Scr[ibe] quod det vel assignet Muçe, genet, LIII solidos IIII denarios iaccenses qui sibi remanent [ad] solvendum de quitacione Albarrasini. Datum Turole, IIII kalendas Septembris.”

¹³ ACA, R 52:54v (15 August 1284): “Raimundo de Rivo Sicco quod det expensas Axie, uxorem Abdaluhafet, janeti qui est in servicio Regis, in veniendo [de] Elx usque ad Valenciam. Datum ut supra.” In addition to the two new, references above, Gazulla cites two, other documents that corroborate the presence of *jenets* in the Crown before the recruitment. See Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 178-9. I include here a corrected edition of one document. ACA, R 52:68v (4 November 1284): “Berengario de Conques, baiulo Valencie. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, solvatis Petro Bertrandi habitatori Valencie sexcentos XXX solidos regalium Valencie, quos Mahomat Abulhaye et Mançor Abnemudaffar et Abraham Abehalmema, sarraceni janeti [qui] in nostro servicio venerant, sibi debebant cum duobus publicis instrumentis, quorum unum est moriscum et aliud cristianice scriptum, que nos recuperavimus ab eodem. Et mandamus per presentes fidei nostro Raimundo de Rivo Sicco, quod de precio baiulie Valencie a vobis ipsos denarios in compotum recipiat. Datum Ces[arau]g[uste], II nonas Novembris.”

definitively served the Catalan kings from the period of 1285 to 1289, the fact that these princes had been in residence in Valencia from as early as 1269 may suggest that they, too, were already members of the Catalan army during this occluded period.¹⁴

Examining these earliest Register carefully, one also recognizes that the *jenets* were not the first or only Muslims in the service of the Crown of Aragon. Although early studies ignored the fact, as both Burns and Boswell have shown, the Crown employed Mudéjar soldiers in its armies.¹⁵ In part, the evidence of this fact is negative. Surrender agreements, such as those at Tudela (1115) or Chivert (1234), limited the service of Mudéjars to local or municipal defense.¹⁶ And on occasion, the Registers preserved exemptions from military service given to certain prominent or skilled Muslims.¹⁷ But

¹⁴ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:703 with full edition in Chapter 4 below. Cf. ACA, R 71:155r (29 July 1284), with full edition in Chapter 4 below, which may prove this claim. See also Appendix A.

¹⁵ See, for example, Albert de Circourt, *Histoire des mores mudejares et des morisques ou des arabes d'Espagne sous la domination des chrétiens*, 3 vols. (Paris: G.A. Dentu, 1846), esp. I:257; and Luis Querol y Roso, *Las milicias valencianas desde el siglo xiii al xv, contribución al estudio de la organización militar del antiguo reino de Valencia* (Castellón, 1935). For his part, Circourt considered the Mudéjars' exemption from the army the key to their success under the Crown of Aragon. Both Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, esp. 289-94, and Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 185-92, have definitively shown that Mudéjars were expected to service in the Crown's army. For his part, Boswell seems to conflate the Mudéjar and *jenet* soldiers, taking the term *jenet* to signify any light cavalry soldier, Mudéjar or foreign. See, Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 186, speaking of "*genets* de la casa." See also a series of relevant documents presented in, Mercedes García-Arenal and Béatrice Leroy, *Moros y judíos en Navarra en la baja Edad Media* (Madrid: Hipérion, 1984), esp. 77-8. Cf. Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 31-5; Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 263.

¹⁶ AHN, Ordines militares, codex 542, Montesa (28 April 1234), henceforth *Chivert Charter*: "Contra sarracenos alios aut christianos nisi forte aliqui sarraceni aut christiani facerent aliquid malefficiū vel forciām vel gravamen casto suo et rebus; et tunc mauri Exiverti una cum fratribus deffenderent se suaque secundum posse suo." Tomás Muñoz y Romero, *Colección de fueros municipales y cartas pueblas de los reinos de Castilla, León, Corona de Aragón y Navarra* (Alcalá de Henares, 1814 – Madrid, 1867), 416, henceforth *Tudela Charter*: "Et non faciat exire moro in appellito per forza in guerra de moros nec de christianios." As cited in Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 119, and Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 171 and 272. See also Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 290, where he cites evidence of Mudéjars defending their own town against attacks from North African soldiers. See also Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eight to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," *Islamic Law and Society*, 1:2 (1994): 141-87, esp. 179 in which Hanafi jurists urge Muslims under non-Muslim rule to remain neutral in battle unless their personal property is threatened. See also Chapter 5 for a discussion of Islamic law as it relates to the question of mercenaries with a relevant bibliography.

¹⁷ ACA, R 10:77r-77v (16 June 1258), an agreement with Teviçino, commander of three castles, offering him freedom from all regalian taxes and duties, including military service (*exercitus*). ACA, R 11:154r (7 October 1259), exemption for Mahomet and Abdela, brothers, from military service in return for certain work for the king. ACA, R 12:124v (October 1263), exemption for Çaat from military service. ACA, R

the implication of these concessions and privileges is that the Crown expected the rest of the Mudéjars to provide military service.¹⁸ Indeed, as pay registers demonstrate the Catalan kings valued Muslim archers – who specialized in using the heavy, so called “two-foot crossbow” because it was tensed under foot.¹⁹ It is also worth noting in this regard that the Catalan kings employed Mudéjars for the purpose of weapon-making.²⁰ Critically for this history, however, the Registers make no mention of any Mudéjar cavalry, which provides another explanation for the Crown’s desire to recruit *jenets* in addition to Mudéjar soldiers.²¹

All this is not to say that the Crown’s use of Mudéjar soldiers was without problems. During al-Azraq’s second uprising, when the *jenets* were attacking the Crown,

14:109r (21 January 1271), Nueçam and her husband receive freedom from regalian taxes and military service.

¹⁸ ACA, R 43:105v (18 January 1285) makes it clear that the Mudéjars of Valencia were under a feudal obligation to appear for service: “Universis aliamis Sarracenorum nostrorum Regni Valencie citra Rivum Xucare ad quos presentes pervenerint, salutem et gratiam. Cum racione negociorum in quibus sum[us] arduorum sicut scitis et in estate proxima esse speramus, nos deceat nostros exercitus facere preparari ac etiam congregari ut possimus resistere nostris hostibus qui co[...]ti sunt indebite auferre nobis regna nostra, nostrum nomine regum inmutando, fidelitatem vestram attente requirimus ac vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus visis hostentibus, paretis vestris cum [a]rmis et aliis apparatus vestras et pane ad quatuor menses. Ita quod in medio mensis Aprile proximo venturi sitis nobiscum ubicumque vobis [tunc] duxerimus in[iu]ngendum, ut simile vobiscum possimus dictos hostes nostros offendere d[omi]ni auxilio mediante. Scientes quod de dicto exercitu vos excusavissetis liberter si illud bono modo fieri potuisset. Datum in Monte Regali XV kalendas Februarii. Simile litera missa sint universis aliamis Sarracenorum Regni Valencie ultra Rivum Xucari.” See also Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 289.

¹⁹ Mudéjar crossbowmen are mentioned several times in this early period (ACA, R 33:63v, R 34:4v, R 34:26r, R 34:30r, R 34:32v, R 37:48r, 46:176v, R 65:20r). They also appear during the war against France and the Aragonese *Uniones*, both of which are mentioned below. Christian Catalan soldiers had adopted the use of a light crossbow at this period, a fact that may account for king’s interest in Mudéjar crossbowmen. See also examples provided in, Josep Torró Abad, *El naixement d’una colònia: dominació i resistència a la frontera valenciana, 1238-1276* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 1999), 38-42; Derek W. Lomax, *La orden de Santiago, 1170-1275* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1965), 127; Soler de Campo, *La evolución del armamento*, 61-75.

²⁰ A certain Mudéjar engineer (*faber*) named Mahomet was employed by the king in 1280 to make crossbow bolts (*cairells*). ACA, R 46:44v (8 July 1280): “Fideli suo Raimundo de Alos, baiulo Ilerde, salutem et gratiam, mandamus vobis, quatenus, Mahometo, fabro de Barbastrie, qui veniet coram nobis detis unam fabricam cum omnibus apparamentis ferraiie et ferrum ad sufficientiam qui operabitur cairolls et alia opera ferrea ad opus nostri et eidem dum operabitur ad opus nostri provideatis in suis necessariis. Datum in Obsidione Balagerii, VIII idus Iulii.” Saracens from Daroca and Calatayud were also called upon to make weapons in 1295 (ACA, R 89:172r).

²¹ The Mudéjars seem to have supplied mainly footsoldiers. Prospero de Bofarull y Mascaró, *Collección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la Corona de Aragón* (Barcelona: 1856), VI:196 (12 August 1283), specifies *lancers* and *ballesters*, pikemen and crossbowmen with quotation below.

King Jaume initially expressed anger and surprise at the refusal of certain Mudéjars to come to his aid.²² Eventually, however, both Jaume and Pere, who succeeded him, agreed to commute service into a payment for several Mudéjar communities.²³ Thus, while the Crown was willing to use its Mudéjar soldiers against other Muslims, at least on this occasion, it found the Mudéjars unwilling to do so. Nevertheless, despite questions of their loyalty, with regard to military service, the Catalan kings treated its Mudéjar subjects just as it did its Christian ones: it expected service in men or in kind, which is to say that the Mudéjars were not mercenaries but members of the Crown's feudal army.²⁴

Three important facts emerge from these crucial fragments belonging to the earliest Registers. First, not all *jenets* were hostile to the Crown. Before the mission of 1285, with which Gazulla begins his history, some *jenets* were willing to enter into its service. In other words, the cluster of documents highlighted in the previous chapter, in

²² *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 362: "While we were in Valencia, the *qā'id* of Valencia came to us with large group of Saracens and about ten elders from the village. He entered very happily and kissed my hand and asked how we were. And we said, 'Well by the grace of God, but that we are very distressed by the wrongs al-Azraq has committed in [taking] our castles and marvel at your allowing it.' [And he said:] 'Lord, if it distresses you, know that it distresses us and causes grief.' But they seemed happier and more content that we had ever seen them. We thought that they would be distressed by the wrong al-Azraq had done us and offer help, but none of them offered it. / E nos estan en Ualencia uench nos lalcit de Xatiua ab gran companya de sarrains e dels ueyls de la vila ben X, e entra molt alegrement denant nos, e besans la ma, e dix nos con nos anaua? E nos dixem que be, la merce de Deu: e quens pesaua molt lo mal quens hauia feyt Alazrat en nostres castells, e quens maraueylauem con ho soffrien ells. Seyor, si mal uos fa negu sapiats quens pesa molt ens es greu: e nos ueem los molt alegres e pagats, que anch nuyl temps nols hauiem uists tan alegres ne tan pagats. E nos nos cuydam quels pesas lo mal quens hauia feyt Alazrat, e quens prefferissen ajuda, anch ajuda negu dels nons profferiren."

²³ ACA, R 33:104v-105r records the payments of several Mudéjar communities for the army going to Valencia. ACA, R 39:227v (28 July 1277) as cited in Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 264, gives the Mudéjars of Alagon the choice of serving or paying the king 1000 *sous*. ACA R 39:223r (2 August 1277) records a similar choice given to the Mudéjars of numerous Aragonese villages. See also Ferran Soldevila, *Pere el Gran*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1950), II:1, doc.83 (25 July 1277) as cited in Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 289.

²⁴ Cf. Ana Echavarría Arsuaga, "'Vassal and Friend.' Strategies of Mudejar Submission and Resistance to Christian Power in Castile," in *Jews, Christians, and Muslims in and around the Medieval Crown of Aragon: Studies in Honour of Prof. Elena Lourié*, ed. Harvey Hames (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 183-96.

which the *jenets* appear attacking the Crown of Aragon during the Valencian uprising, presents only part of the picture. From the period of the arrival of North African *Ghuzāh* on Christian-Islamic frontier, these warrior bands inhabited a threshold between Christian and Islamic states, connected to both but bound to neither. Second, during his lieutenancy, Pere personally began dealings with these soldiers – perhaps using them as his personal guard – a fact that undoubtedly influenced his decision to regularize and legitimize their use during his reign. Third and finally, the Crown not only showed a willingness to employ Muslims widely in its armies but also experienced challenges in dealing with these soldiers, a fact that inevitably shaped its use of the *jenets*. Thus, in this history, no clear moment of genesis emerges. The first-known recruitment of the *jenets* did not represent a clean rupture from or even a strict continuity with this past. The historian reading through the Crown’s records can only join the story in that epic fashion, in the middle of things.

iii. THE SOVEREIGN CRISIS

Before investigating how the Crown of Aragon recruited these unruly and janus-faced Muslim bands, it bears asking briefly why King Pere turned to mercenary troops at all in the years leading to and after 1285. After all, in principle, the Crown of Aragon could expect all its subjects to contribute to the defense of its kingdoms without remuneration.²⁵ This obligation was enshrined in the twelfth-century *Usatges de*

²⁵ Ferrer i Mallol has recently suggested that despite the existence of rich documentary sources, scholars have paid little attention to the organization of Catalan armies in the Middle Ages: “Es un tema que no ha sido investigado todavía con la suficiente profundidad.” See her “La organización militar en Cataluña en la edad media,” *Conquistar y defender: los recursos militares en la edad media hispánica*, 1(2001):155. See also her *Organització i defensa d'un territori fronterer: la governació d'Oriola en el segle XIV* (Barcelona: Consell Superior d'Investigacions Científiques, Institució Milà i Fontanals, 1990) and Ludwig Klüpfel, “El règim de la Confederació catalano-aragonesa a finals del segle XIII,” *Revista Jurídica de Catalunya* XXXV

Barcelona within the article of *Princeps namque*.²⁶ And feudatories – including the Crown’s Mudéjars – were regularly expected to arrive for service “ready with horses, arms, and other supplies.”²⁷ War, in the ideal, was a matter of custom not business.

Broadly speaking, however, the rise of mercenary companies in the Crown of Aragon followed the pattern throughout Europe, where this feudal system was unraveling.²⁸ On the one hand, over the thirteenth century and backed by a brigade of Roman lawyers, the Catalan kings embarked on a new path of sovereign self-fashioning and aggressive territorial expansion.²⁹ Troubled by this royal ambition, powerful barons, whose influence rivaled or surpassed the king’s, often gave up any pretense of answering

(1929), 195-226 and 289-327, and XXXVI (1930), 298-331, esp. 298-308. Finally, see Donald Kagay’s *War, Government, and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Ashgate, 2007), a collection of his many essays.

²⁶ *Princeps namque* refers to the first words of the custom as recorded in the *Usatges de Barcelona*. See *Usatges de Barcelona. El codi a mitjan segle XII: establiment del text llatí i edició de la versió catalana del manuscrit del segle XIII de l’arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó de Barcelona*, ed. Joan Bastardas (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 1984), chap. 64 (usatge 68), 102: “Princeps namque si quolibet casu obsessus fuerit, uel ipsi idem suos inimicos obsessos tenuerit, uel audierit quemlibet regem uel principem contra se uenire ad debellandum, et terram suam ad succurrendum sibi monuerit, tam per litteras quam per nuncios uel per consuetudines quibus solet amoneri terra, uidelicet per fars, omnes homines, tam milites quam pedites, qui habeant etatem et posse pugnandi, state ut hec audierint uel viderint, quam cicius poterint ei succurrant. Et si quis ei fallerit de iuvamine quo in hoc sibi facere poterit, perdere debet in perpetuum cuncta que per illum habet; et qui honorem per eum non tenuerit, emendat ei fallimentum et deshonorem quem ei fecerit, cum auere et sacramento manibus propriis iurando, quoniam nemo debet fallere ad principem ad tantum opus uel necessitatem.” For the use of this principle in a later period, see Manuel Sánchez Martínez, “The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona,” in *The Hundred Years’ War: A Wider Focus*, ed. Villalon and Kagay (Brill, 2005).

²⁷ There are numerous musters in the Registers that repeat this requirement, see for instance, ACA, R 70:25v (5 December 1286), where a general order to the noblemen and military orders was issued in Valencia in 1286: “... Magistrum Templi, Magistrum Hospitalis, et Comendatorem de Alcanicio quibus super hoc scribimus et nobiles ac milites in Regno Valencie hereditates habentes ut ad deffensionem Regni Valencie et bonorum suorum, veniant et stent cum equis armis et aliis apparatibus suis ut si forte aliqui hostes nostri intrarent Regnum Valencie possint eis viriliter resistere ac eis dampnum inferre. Datum Maiorice, nonas Decembris.” Cf. *Usatges de Barcelona*, chap. 65 (usatge 69), 102.

²⁸ For a broader look at these changes, see Kenneth Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries* (Blackwell, 2001), Anthony Mockler, *The Mercenaries* (New York: MacMillan, 1969), V.G. Kiernan, “Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy,” in *Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660*, ed. Ashton (New York: 1965); and John Schlight, *Monarchs and Mercenaries: a reappraisal of the importance of knight service in Norman and early Angevin England* (New York University Press, 1968).

²⁹ Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 12: “Like contemporary kings, [Jaume I] liked to surround himself with Roman lawyers, affecting the imperial prerogatives and trappings of a true monarch. Neither the feudal barons, who saw him rather as a first-among-equals suzerain, nor the townsmen, who accepted him more as a partner and guarantor of communal semiautonomy, acquiesced completely in the royal vision.”

to the military adventures of their Lord-Kings.³⁰ The thirteenth-century canonist, Pere Albert, inscribed this tension and its concomitant fragmentation of loyalties into his customs of Catalunya: Albert required that the king reimburse Catalan vassals for the cost of transporting their troops to other kingdoms.³¹ On the other hand, the cash-starved Catalan kings welcomed the opportunity to replace feudal duties with “shield money” (*scutage*) – in essence, a war tax – laying a foundation for the commodification of violence in the medieval Mediterranean.³² By the end of the thirteenth-century, the Crown came to rely increasingly on smaller, professional armies and new military strategies, changes that were all but irreversible.³³ The rise of the *jenets* in this period therefore not only reflected but also precipitated the eventual demise of the feudal army.

More specifically, in the years leading up to 1285, the weakened seigniorial system combined with the dramatic consequences of a far-flung imperial plan for the

³⁰ For instance, the Count of Urgell refused to come to the king’s aid during the first revolt of al-Azraq in Valencia. In the last of several exasperated letters, Jaume I demanded the Count appear with his troops ready for battle. ACA R, 10:67r (4 April 1258): “Iacobus dei gracia et cetera viro nobili et dilecto Alvaro [per] eandem urgellensi comiti, salutem et dileccionem. Rogamus dicimus et mandamus vobis firmiter, quatenus, ad nos visis presentibus cum vestris militibus et armis veniatis paratus servire nobis contra Aladrach proditorem nostrum feudum quod pro nobis tenetis. Et hoc non mu[t]etis nec differ[at]is aliqua racione quoniam alias litt[er]as super hoc v[obis] de cetero non mitemus. Datum Dertuse, II nonas Aprilis, anno Domini MCCL octavo.” Similarly, during the war against Castile (1296-1304), the Count Ramon Folc of Cardona refused to come to aid of Murcia. For the relevant documentation, see Ferrer i Mallol, *Organizació i defensa*, 33-4. See also Ferrer i Mallol, “La organización militar,” 157: “Así pues, si el monarca convocaba a todos los catalanes a una empresa militar fuera de Cataluña, solía encontrar muchas resistencias, aunque se tratara de una empresa bien vista, porque no quería crear precedentes que dejaran al país a merced de todos los caprichos guerreros de los reyes sucesivos.”

³¹ Ferrer i Mallol, “La organización militar,” 157. Pere Albert studied in Bologna and was cathedral canon at Barcelona from 1233-1261. His *Tractatus de consuetudinibus Cathalonie inter dominos et vassallos* represented a fundamental work of feudal law during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See *The Customs of Catalonia between Lords and Vassals by the Barcelona Canon, Pere Albert: A Practical Guide to Castle Feudalism in Medieval Spain*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002), 36-42 (arts. 37-39).

³² Ferrer i Mallol, “La organización militar,” 164. The defense of Murcia in 1296 from Castilian invasion, for instance, represented a middle point in this transformation. See C. Vela i Aulesa, “‘Per ço com gran fretura és de vianda en nostra host...’ L’avitallament de l’exèrcit de Jaume II en la campanya de Murcia (1296),” *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante, Historia Medieval*, II (1996-1997), *Congreso Internacional, Jaume II 700 años despues. Actas*, 607 and 609. Also ACA, R 340:132v and 158r (13 and 15 June 1296).

³³ See the thoughtful discussion of these changes in Francisco García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam: estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares (siglos XI-XIII)* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), esp. 137 and 153.

domination of the Central Mediterranean. King Pere's swift and bold seizure of Sicily from Charles of Anjou in 1282 unleashed the wrath of the French Pope, Martin IV, who excommunicated Pere, placed Sicily under interdict, and offered the Crown of Aragon to the son of Philip III of France. When Philip accepted this offer on his son's behalf in 1284, a papal-sanctioned crusade against the Crown was unleashed. Meanwhile, half of Pere's noblemen declared themselves unwilling to defend him; his brother Jaume of Mallorca chose to side with the Pope; and finally, the powerful nobleman Juan Nuñez de Lara declared Albarracín an independent lordship in support of the French. Thus, with his navy engaged in Sicily and Calabria, many of his noblemen in open revolt, and the threat of a French invasion, Pere was running short of allies. In this situation, a crisis for Catalan sovereignty, the king turned to the Muslim *jenets*.

iv. THE MISSION OF CONRAD LANCIA

King Pere charged Conrad Lancia, his confidant, the cousin of his wife, and his Master of Accounts (*Maestre Racional*), along with a Jew named Samuel, his own Arabic secretary (*alfaquimus*), with this mission.³⁴ In and of themselves, these choices are telling. Lancia was the medieval equivalent of a *Pied-noir*. His father, Frederico Lancia, had lived in Tunis. A Christian mercenary in the service of the Ḥafṣids, Frederico served

³⁴ Muntaner, *Crònica*, chap. 18, for Lancia's relationship with Pere. For more on the office of the *Maestre Racional*, see A. Masiá i de Ros, "El Maestre Racional en la Corona de Aragón," *Hispania* X (1950): 25-60 and J. Lalinde Abadía: "Contabilidad e intervención en el Reino aragonés," *Estudios de Hacienda Pública* (Madrid, 1976): 39-55. The *alfaquimus* should not be confused with the Mudéjar *alfaqui* (Ar. *al-faqīh*), who was a jurist; the *alfaquimus* was a doctor or educated man (from Ar. *al-ḥakīm*), who wrote and read the king's Arabic letters. See for instance, ACA, R 43:129v (15 February 1278) where Samuel, son of Abraham Bonnemati, is named "alfaquimatus" of the king. His responsibilities are described as "Scriptor noster maior de Arabico."

the sultan loyally by defending the city against Saint Louis' Crusade in 1270.³⁵ It is worth remembering, however, that both the Crusaders and Christian mercenaries in Tunis at this moment had papal approval for their separate but opposing efforts.³⁶ Rising to fortune through his relationship to the Hohenstaufen family, heirs to the Sicilian throne, Conrad became a key agent of Catalan ambitions in the central Mediterranean. As commander of the navy, he supported the coup that placed Abū Ishāq (678-82/1279-83) on the Ḥafṣid throne, and according to the chronicler Muntaner, raised the Catalan flag above the walls of Tunis.³⁷ In 1280, Pere rewarded his admiral by making him governor of the Mudéjar-dominated kingdom of Valencia, thus placing him in another intermediary role with Muslims.³⁸ Pere's choice to assist Lancia, Samuel, while less prominent, was no less significant. As cartographers, translators, diplomats, and administrators, Jews were found throughout the Crown of Aragon in critical, mediating roles between Christians and Muslims.³⁹ Indeed, as Goitein has shown, this was true throughout the Mediterranean.⁴⁰ And, as seen below, Samuel moved effortlessly between different contexts, playing an essential role in this effort to recruit Muslim soldiers. Thus, Pere chose two men who had ties to local Muslim leaders as well as sultans, a fact that

³⁵ Robert I. Burns, "Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen: The 13th-century Spaniards in the Cause of Islam," *Catholic Historical Review* 58 (1972), 341-66. See also Brunschvig, *Berbérie orientale*, 49-63, esp. 53.

³⁶ M. Gual Torrella, "Milicias cristianas en Berberia," *Boletín de la Sociedad Arqueologica Luliana* LXXXIX (1973), 58; Burns, "Renegades," 350.

³⁷ ACA, R 40:95r (13 May 1278) and Muntaner, *Crònica*, chap. 30. See also Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 240 and Dufourcq, "Hafside," 10.

³⁸ ACA, R 42:214r (January 1280) and Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 201.

³⁹ For instance, Abraham and Jehuda Cresques, authors of the famous Catalan atlas. See, Yoro K. Fall, *L'Afrique à la naissance de la cartographie moderne: les cartes majorquines, XIVe-XVe siècles* (Paris: 1982) for a brilliant discussion of these maps and their role in shaping the Catalan view of North Africa. See also Ramon Pujades i Bataller, "La cartografia portolana a la Corona d'Aragó: l'escola malloquina," in *Cresques Abraham. L'Atlas Català* (Barcelona, 2005), 26-31.

⁴⁰ See D. Romano, "Judíos ecribianos y turjamanes de árabe en la Corona de Aragón (reinados de Jaime I a Jaime II)," *Sefarad* 38 (1978), 71-105. More generally, see Shelomo Dov Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 6 vols. (University of California, 2000), esp. I:148-272.

demonstrates that he both valued and hoped to leverage his connections throughout the Mediterranean as a means of confronting this political crisis.

Although Gazulla fails to mention it, this recruitment effort began among the Crown's own Muslims. In preparation for the war against France, Pere ordered the Mudéjars of Aragon and Valencia to prepare an army.⁴¹ More particularly, Samuel was ordered to visit these communities in order to gather companies of "well-appointed" (*be aparelats et be adobats*) archers and lancers (*balesters et lancers*).⁴² Some Mudéjar communities, barring those exempt from service, chose to offer money for the war in the place of men.⁴³ For instance, Lancia received over 4000 *sous*, delivered in one sack by the Muslims of Valencia, which was used to cover the salaries and expenses of other Mudéjar soldiers.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, those soldiers who joined the royal army received

⁴¹ ACA, R 43:105v (18 January 1285): "Universis aliamis Sarracenorum nostrorum Regni Valencie citra Rivum Xucare ad quos presentes pervenerint, salutem et gratiam. Cum ratione negotiorum in quibus sum[us] arduorum sicut scitis et in estate proxima esse speramus, nos deceat nostros exercitus facere preparari ac etiam congregari ut possimus resistere nostris hostibus qui co[...]ti sunt indebite auferre nobis regna nostra, nostrum nomine regium inmutando, fidelitatem vestram attente requirimus ac vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, visis hostentibus, paretis vestris cum [a]rmis et aliis apparatus vestras et pane ad quatuor menses. Ita quod in medio mensis Aprile proximo venturi sitis nobiscum ubicumque vobis [tunc] duxerimus in[iu]ngendum, ut simile vobiscum possimus dictos hostes nostros offendere ... auxilio mediante. Scientes quod de dicto exercitu vos excusavisset liberter si illud bono modo fieri potuisset. Datum in Monte Regali XV kalendas Februarii. Simile litera missa sint universis aliamis Sarracenorum Regni Valencie ultra Rivum Xucari." Cf. a similar order to the Aragonese Mudéjars of Huesca, ACA 62:143v (17 May 1285) as cited in Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 263.

⁴² Bofarull, *Collección de documentos inéditos*, VI:196 as cited in Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 172: "us pregam e us manam que aquels de cascade de les vostres aliames quel dit alfaquim nostre elegira a asso nos trametau ab companya de balesters et de lancers de cascuna daqueles aliames be aparelats et be adobats et nos darem a aquels bona soldada...."

⁴³ ACA, R 49:76r (7 May 1281) records one such exemption: "Dilecte suo Alamanno de Gudal, superiunctario Tirasone, salutem et dileccionem, cum intelleximus quod Comendator domus Dominici Sepulcri Catalonie habet in Ilucha duos Sarracenos nomine [A]bderrasmen et Abraam, fratres et ipsos ipsius domus. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, si ita est non compellatis ipsos Saracenos ad contribuendum in redemptione exercitus que a Sarracenos dicti loci exh[i]gatur si tamen non consuerunt ire in exercitus vel in ipsius redemptione contribuere." Similarly, ACA, R 57:157v (19 July 1285).

⁴⁴ ACA, R 58:101v (12 July 1285): "... Item ex alia parte salvistis et tradidistis nobis ultra sumam predictam quatuor mille trescentos nonaginta tres solidos et quatuor denarios regalium Valencie in uno sacco quos alyame Sarracenorum Regni Valencie mitebant per vos Sarracenis quos miserant ad servitium nostrum ratione dicti exercitus pro eorum salario et expensis requibus." Cf. ACA, R 58:111r (15 October 1285).

assurances from the king that their goods would be protected in their absence and that they would be exempt from any extraordinary taxes related to the war.⁴⁵

But the effort did not end here. In October of 1284, at Tarragona, Pere ordered Lancia to prepare a mission to Granada. While there, Pere told his Master of Accounts to secure the release of Catalan sailors and ships that had been recently captured by Granada.⁴⁶ Two months ahead of Lancia's departure, Pere had also made the extraordinary gesture of releasing all of his Muslim captives from Granada. He ordered a royal official, Bernard Scribe, to give each one a tunic and sufficient money to "return to their king." In the same document, he also asked that a certain Abraham Abençumada, a Muslim *alaminus*, give Lancia three thousand *sous* that he had collected from "the Saracens of the mountains of Valencia" to cover the costs of the upcoming mission to Granada.⁴⁷ Two days later, the king issued another order, asking Bernard Scribe to

⁴⁵ ACA, R 46:221r (9 July 1284), Conrad Lancia was ordered to exempt the Muslims of Uxó from contributing the war tax because of other services they provided. ACA, R 57:203r (13 September 1285), an order to the procurator of Valencia to not compel any Muslim present at the defense of Girona to contribute to the war tax. ACA, R 62:81v (7 September 1284), the Mudéjars of Almonezir were exempted from certain debts they accrued during the period that they served on the Navarrese front: "Guillelmo Else, intelleximus quod ratione oblig[acion]is quam asseritis vobis fuisse factam per //no// nobilem Petrum Corneli de Castro and Villa de Almonezir ratione cuiusdam peccunie quantitatis quam dictus nobilis vobis debet ut dicitur pig[n]orastis et etiam pignorat[is] Sarracen[os] de Almonezir. Unde cum dicti Sarraceni sint in servicio domini Regis et nostro in hunc exercitum quem dominus Rex proponit facere contra regnum Navarre, mandamus vobis ex parte domini Regis et nostra, quatenus, dictos Sarracenos non pignoretis dum fuerint in dicto servicio. Immo restituatis eisdem [quos]qua pignora eis fecistis. Dominus [...] Rex faciet ipsos vobis stare iuri super omnibus querimoniis quas habeatis contra eos." Similarly, see ACA, Pere II, *Pergaminos*, 117, no. 485 (26 June 1285) as cited in Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 264.

⁴⁶ Gazulla, "Zenetes," 177, n.2 mentions but does not quote the following document. ACA, R 43:82r (10 December 1284): "Viro nobili et dilecto Conrado Lancee, maiori host[i]ario nostro ac magistro rationali, curie nostri, mandamus, quatenus, incontinenti cum fuerit Granate, certificens vos si Beregenarius Bovis vel marinarii sui et lignum suum et homines Guillelmi Moliner et lignum suum cives Valencie fuerunt capti et et detenti per aliquos de dominacione Regis Granate et ipsos cum eorum [b]onis et quolibet alios de dominacione nostra quos inveneritis fuisse captos et detentes per aliquos de dominacione dicti Regis Granate sub pace et treuga, recuperetis et dicto Rege Granate secundum quod [...] super hoc fecistis memoriale. Datum et cetera."

⁴⁷ ACA, R 52:66v (28 October 1284): "Bernardo Scribe, mandamus vobis, quatenus, per Raimundum de Rivosicco faciatis tradi nobili Corrado Lancee, hostiarii maiori ac magistro rationali domus nostre, Sarracenos captivos quos ipse tenet, que s[unt] de terra [Re]gis Granate, et unicuique dictorum Saracenorum faciatis dari predictum Raimundum [t]unicam et ex[p]ensarium usque ad dictum Regem Granate. Preterea volumus quod per Abraham Abençumada, Sarracenum alaminum nostrum, faciatis dari

reimburse Lancia for 500 *sous* that Lancia gave a certain Petrus de Andosiella, a connection whose relevance will become apparent.⁴⁸ What prompted this dramatic release of prisoners and these large sums of money to be exchanged? Why were the Crown's Mudéjars expected to finance what appeared to be a diplomatic effort? The king described Lancia's mission in a charter of procurement as follows:

Know all that we, Don Pedro, by the grace of God, king of Aragon and Sicily, order you, our special procurator, noble and beloved, Conrad Lancia, chamberlain of our house, and master of accounts, to speak with the captains of the *jenets* and with others regarding the date of their arrival and stay with us in our service. And regarding what we must give them [i.e. salary], we hold firmly to whatever will be said and done or promised by the said Conrad in this [negotiation], and this we will observe. And that this charter should be firm, and no doubt enter, we order it sealed.⁴⁹

dicto Corrado Lancee //III// tria milia solidorum regale Valencie de denariis quos ipse recipit et pro nobis colligit de Sarracenis montanarum dicti Regni Valencie pro expensis et necessariis suis quas ipsum facere oportet in viatico quod pro nobis facit ad Regem Granate, et per presentes litteras mandamus dicto Raimundo de Rivosicco quod dicta III milia solidorum in compotum recipiat sibi Abraham superius nominato. Datum Tirasone, V kalendas Novembris [1284].” An unreliable edition of this document can be found in Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 177, n.1. The *alaminus* (Ar., *al-amīn*) was a Mudéjar judicial official or community leader.

⁴⁸ ACA, R 52:67 (30 October 1284): “Bernardo Scribe, mandamus vobis, quatenus, per Raimundum de Rivo Sicco faciatis dari incontinenti nobili Corrado Lancee, hostiario maiori domus nostre ac magistro rationali, D solidos regalium qui per eum tradantur Eximino Petri de Andosiella pro legatione nostra apud Regem de Tremiçe si dicto Corrado visum fuerit, quod legatio perfici debeat supradicta, preterea faciatis dari per eundem Raimundum predicto Eximino Petri de Andosiella CC solidos regalium pro vestibus. Datum Tirasone, III kalendas Novembris.”

⁴⁹ ACA, R 47:130v (28 October 1284): “Sepan todos que nos don Pedro, por la gracia de Dios de Aragon et de Sicilia Rey, estableçemos procurador nuestro sp[ecia]l vos noble y amado nuestro Corral Lança, Portero Mayor de nuestra casa, et M[a]estro Racional, a faular con los cabos de los genetes et con los otros sobre fecho de lur venida et morada con nos en nuestro servicio, et sobre aquello que ende les auremos de dar, prometemos nos aver por firme qual que cosa por el dicho Corral en aquello sera dicho et fecho o prometido de nuestra parte, et aquello observaremos. E por que aquesta carta sea firme, et non vienga en dubda, mandamos la seellar con nuestra siel pendent. Dato en Taracona, XXVIII dias andados de Octubre, anno domini M CC LXXX, quarto.” A full quotation appears in Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 178 although he mistakenly cites ACA, R 47:24v. The text appears twice in the Registers. It appears first at R 47:130r in a truncated form in Castilian (as opposed to the Romance above) and reads as follows: “Conoscida cosa sea a todos quantos esta carta vieren como nos don Pedro et cetera, establecemos et ordinamos procurador nostro cierto et special a nos don Corral Lança, portero maior de nostra casa et maestro racional, mostrador desta carta en fecho de la messatgeria que por nos avedes a dezir et mostrar al molt noble Rey de Granada, prometendo nos aver por firme et por valedo todo aquello que por vos en aquela messatgeria sera fecho e encara ordenado assi como si por nos personalment fuisse fecho otorgado o ditcho, et por que las cosas damont dichas non vingan en dubda et ayan mayor f[i]rmatat, mandamos esta carta sielar con nostro siello mayor colgado. Datum ut supra.”

Lancia, in short, was sent to recruit *jenets* for the Crown. Pere was thus conducting a hasty truce with Granada and freed Muslim captives as a gesture of good will to coincide with Lancia's arrival. For his part, hazily sketching the details of Lancia's mission to Granada above, Gazulla drops the matter of the recruitment here.⁵⁰ He points to the arrival of *jenets* in April 1285 at Coll de Panissar, the front against the French, as a sign of Lancia's ultimate success.⁵¹ In point of fact, however, nothing links these soldiers to Lancia's mission. Indeed, they could have been any of the *jenets* operating within the Crown before Lancia's departure. Did Lancia's mission have any discernable impact?

In a sense, the clearest impact of Lancia's mission is that it brought the *jenets* into the focus of the state, and thus rendered them visible on the surface of the Chancery Registers. This fact, however, is of more than narrow, paleographic significance: it also reflected a fundamental shift in the relations of the Crown with the *jenets*. By bringing *jenets* into the state's administrative and legal apparatus, Lancia's mission formalized the sovereign's relationship with them. One can, however, push further than this abstract assessment, to ask how this process happened and what it meant. A thorough re-examination of the Chancery Registers – the same documents Gazulla employed – reveals not only surprising new information but also insight into the incorporation of the *jenets* into the service of the Crown of Aragon.

At the same time Lancia departed for Granada, a second mission with the same orders, led by Petrus Andosiella (briefly mentioned above) left for Tlemcen (*Tilimsān*),

⁵⁰ Gazulla, "Zenetes," 177-9.

⁵¹ ACA, R 58:24v (14 April 1285): "Universis officialibus nostris ad quos presentes pervenerint, salutem et gratiam. Noveritis quod nos scribimus genetis nostris qui sunt in Tirasone quod veniant ad Nos ad exercitum nostrum de Panissars, quare mandamus vobis, quatenus, ipsis per loca nostra transeuntibus de dicta in dictum provideatis quilibet vestrum in baiulia sua in victualibus prout in albarano fidelis nostri Salamonis de Portelle videritis contineri. Dat[um] in Colle de Panissars, XVII kalendas May anno predicto." Full quotation in Gazulla, "Zenetes," 178, n.2.

the capital of the ‘Abd al-Wādids.⁵² Lancia, moreover, did not limit his mission to Granada: in 1286, he traveled to Ḥafṣid Tunis, where he had considerable influence.⁵³

The recruiting effort, in other words, cast a wider net than imagined by Gazulla.

Perhaps more significantly, Gazulla also overlooks the fascinating itinerary of Lancia’s mission, which can be reconstructed from receipts for letters of credence (letters of introduction) that he was issued.⁵⁴ Lancia traveled first to the border regions of Almería (Ar. al-Mariyya), momentarily under Christian rule, and Crevillente (Ar. Qirbilyān). Almería was a contested zone: known for its *ribāṭs*, military-religious fortresses for those devoted to *jihād*, it had been and would later be an important base of Marīnid and *Ghuzāh* raids into Christian Spain.⁵⁵ Crevillente, by contrast, was a curiosity, a neutral “village-state” that was nominally under the control of the Banū Hudhayr until 1318. The *Raiz* (from Ar. *al-ra’īs*), or Muslim governor, managed to maintain his independence by acting as an intermediary – or better, a double agent –

⁵² ACA, R 47:130v (28 October 1284): “Item fecimus cartam de credencia Eximino Petris Dandossiella apud Rege de Tirimçe. Datum ut supra, vocatur Rex Hamum[...], fijo de Gamamça Benzayen.” “Rex Hamum[...],” must refer to Abū Sa’īd ‘Uthmān b. Yaghamrāsan (1282-1303), the son of Yaghamrāsan b. Zayyān (1236-1283), the founder of the dynasty after the collapse of the Almohads. This note appears immediately after the letter of credence for Conrad Lancia that appears below.

⁵³ See the instructions for Lancia’s mission, ACA, R 64:192r-192v.

⁵⁴ ACA, R 47:130v: “Item fecimus ei carta credencie inferius nominatis / Abzultan Hademi, alguazir del Rey de Granada / Muça Abenroth / Guillelmo Nehot, consul d’Almeria / Raiz Abuabdille Abenhudeyr, seynnor de Crivelen / ad Iça Abenadriz, catiu del Rey / Raimundo de Santo Licerio / Petro Morelle quod traderet Raimundo de Santo Literio super custodie Içe / supradicte. / Item dedimus dicto Corallo litteram de conductu apud officiales Regis Castelle. Datum ut supra. / Postam fecimus ei litteras credencie inferius nominatis et aliam etiam procurat[i]onem super facto jenetorum / Çahit Azanach / Çahim Abebaguen / Tunart.”

⁵⁵ For the Crusade against Almería in 1309, see Chapter 6 of this dissertation. See, *ET*², s.v. ‘al-Mariyya’ as well as J.A. Tapia Garrido, *Almería musulmana (711-1147 y 1147-1482)* = vols. ii and iii of *Historia General de Almería y su provincia* (Almería, 1976-8); ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Sālīm, *Ta’rīkh madīnat al-Mariyya al-islāmiyya* (Beirut, 1969); Andrés Giménez-Soler, *El sitio de Almería en 1309* (Barcelona: 1904); Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 103-16; Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 173-80; and Arié, *L’Espagne musulmane*, 89-93.

between the Crown and Naṣrid Granada.⁵⁶ The Crown believed, therefore, that these contested frontier regions were somehow related to its effort to recruit the *jenets*.

Lancia also held a letter of introduction to meet with Iça Abenadriz, a high-profile Marīnid captive of the Crown, who was held in the custody of a certain Petrus Morelle. The Registers reveal that Abenadriz remained in captivity with his wife until 1288, when the Marīnid sultan finally negotiated his release. And in a moment that reflected the spirit of the period, the same Abenadriz returned freely to the Crown in 1291 as an ambassador from the Marīnid court.⁵⁷ Given the importance that this figure held in the sultan's eyes, Dufourcq argued that Abenadriz was a member of the royal family but failed to pursue the matter further. Iça Abenadriz (ʿĪsā b. Idrīs) was in fact a nephew of Abū Yūsuf, but, more significantly for the matter at hand, also a member of the Banū Idrīs, the rebels who were exiled to Spain and formed the first *Ghuzāh* in the previous chapter.⁵⁸ Given the purpose of Lancia's mission – to recruit North African cavalry – one cannot dismiss his meeting with Abenadriz as a mere coincidence. Leaving Crevillente,

⁵⁶ Pierre Guichard, "Un seigneur musulman dans l'Espagne chrétienne : le 'ra'is' de Crevillente (1243-1318)," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez*, 9:283-334 and Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 43-5. For the history of Crevillente after its incorporation into Valencia, see Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 33-8. See, for instance, ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 136, no.476 (29 April 1307), in which the *Ra'īs* is asked to spy on the *jenets* for the Crown (edition in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 245-6).

⁵⁷ ʿĪsā b. Idrīs appears several times in the registers both in administrative documents and diplomatic agreements. He was held captive by the Hospitallers. See, for instance, ACA, R 65:113r (22 March 1286), the king orders Raimundus de Rivo Sicco to provide provisions for ʿĪsā and his wife: "Raimundo de Rivo Sicco, man[damus] vobis, quatenus, provisionem quam dare debetis Içe Abenadriç et uxore sue de mandato domini Regis traditis eidem personaliter et non alii sive tradi faciatis. Datum Barchinone, VIII kalendas Aprilis." He appears again in instructions issued by Alfonso III (1285-1291) to Petrus de Deo regarding the return of captives from North Africa at ACA, R 64:176v (March 1286): "Item si parle d'en Iça Abennadriz e quel demanas in que li diga quel Seynor Rey lo li redera volenter. E quen Abeniuçef que savinga ablo castel d'Emposta maestro de l'espital de la Renenço que sopresa del espitaler per aver aquel Iça. E atreçi que en Pere de Deu cobre tots los catius Christians de la terra del Rey que son per la terra d'Abeniuçef." See ACA, R 64:176r for the negotiations for his return in 1286. In 1288, he definitively returned to Morocco with the ambassador Abengalel, whom I discuss below. See also AHM, Suppl. Vol. III, fols. 130r, 142r, 151r, 151v, as cited in Dufourcq, *L'Espagne Catalane*, 217. Finally, ʿĪsā reappears as a diplomat from the Marīnids to the Crown at ACA 90:18v (28 August 1291).

⁵⁸ I discussed the revolt of the Banū Idrīs in detail in the previous chapter. See also Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 214 for the reference to Abenadriz.

Lancia then passed through the dangerous frontier with Granada, carrying letters of safe conduct addressed to any Castilian or Granadan officials who might stop him. In Granada, Lancia met the Sultan's *wazīr* as well as a certain Muḥa Abenrroth, in whose name one might read Mūsā b. Raḥḥū, a son of Raḥḥū b. 'Abd Allāh, who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, founded the *Ghuzāh* along with the Banū Idrīs.⁵⁹ According to Ibn Khaldūn, Mūsā was captain of the *Ghuzāh* on three occasions, the last after Abū Yūsuf's death in 1286.⁶⁰ Perhaps, again, it is no coincidence that Mūsā's brother, al-'Abbās b. Raḥḥū, with whom the previous chapter closed, served the Catalan kings as a *jenet* in 1303. Lancia received his final letters of introduction to meet with three "captains (*cabos*) of the *jenets*" named Ḥahit Azanach, Ḥahim Abebaguen, and Tunart.⁶¹ The presence of these captains at the Naṣrid court suggests that they were also members of the *Ghuzāh*.

Lancia's itinerary adds several new details to our knowledge of the first-known effort to recruit *jenets*. The Crown sought *jenet* cavalry not only in Granada but also in the states of North Africa, reflecting awareness that these soldiers were not bound to any one Muslim state but rather dispersed as companies throughout them all. Within Granada, however, Lancia focused his effort entirely upon the *Ghuzāh*, confirming that these soldiers – frontier bandits and holy warriors – were a central source of the troops that would be called *jenets*. In other words, the Catalan kings did not see the *Ghuzāh*'s devotion to *jihād* or their repeated attacks on their kingdoms as an impediment to

⁵⁹ I considered reading the name as Mūsā b. Roth, which might indicate he was a Jew. While there were many prominent Jews in the Naṣrid court, none, to my knowledge, held the name "Roth." "Roth," moreover, from the Middle German, "Rot," meaning red, was more commonly a name for Jews of Germanic as opposed to Sefardic origin.

⁶⁰ Ibn Khaldūn VII:766.

⁶¹ I am inferring here that these were the captains in Lancia's charter of procurement on the basis of what follows below.

recruitment. One is also struck by the exceptional complexity of this diplomatic mission. Lancia's recruitment effort brought him into contact with Christians, Muslims, captives, spies, soldiers, and kings. Negotiations were carried on all levels, official and informal, between states as well as individuals. In this mission, one cannot speak of center and periphery, state and non-state actors, allies and enemies, with any kind with clarity. Instead, one sees transitory overlaps, convergences, and networks.

The overlooked itinerary also provides closure to Lancia's mission. In this unexplored list of names, one finds the key to reconnecting a series of documentary fragments, once adrift without a context, to Lancia's mission. In April of 1285, five *jenets*, the representatives of a certain "Çahim Abennaquem" – one of the three captains of the *jenets* mentioned in Lancia's itinerary – entered the lands of the Crown of Aragon on borrowed mules.⁶² They had come to negotiate terms for their employment directly with King Pere. Royal officials stopped them in Játiva, where the *jenets* were stripped of their swords.⁶³ On mules and unarmed, these knights were denied their military status, lowered to that of Mudéjars, subject Muslims, and placed under Catalan law.⁶⁴ They then met with Abrahim Abençumada, the Muslim *alaminus* from Valencia, who had earlier provided money for Lancia's mission.⁶⁵ They appeared next in Villafranca, where they borrowed 15 *sous* from a royal official and accrued some other debts that they failed to

⁶² Çahim's name is spelled in several different ways in the Registers, but they undoubtedly refer to the same person.

⁶³ After the negotiations, Pere ordered that the *jenets* be given 50 sous to recover their swords. ACA, R 58:22v (3 May 1285): "Baiulo Exatium quod donet Alaçeno militi Sarraceno nuncio Cahim filio Jahie Abennaquem quinquaginta solidos \regalium/ pro redimendio et quitandis ensibus quod idem Alaçenus et alii qui cum eo venerunt pignori obligaverunt in Exatium."

⁶⁴ See the discussion of sumptuary laws in the Crown of Aragon in Chapter 5.

⁶⁵ I infer this fact from ACA, R 56:93v (3 May 1285), which I discuss below.

settle before leaving.⁶⁶ Finally, they made their way to Coll de Panissar, near Teruel, where the King was waging war against the French, signing his monumental peace treaty with the Ḥafṣids, and had already deployed other *jenets* to the war front.⁶⁷

In May of 1285, King Pere wrote a letter to his *alfaquimus*, Samuel, who, despite the Registers' virtual silence on the matter, had journeyed to Granada with Lancia. In the letter, the king announced the success of his negotiation with the representatives of Çahim Abennaquem.⁶⁸ He ordered that Abraham Abençumada should cease interfering in the negotiations "because we [the King] got along well with them [the *jenets*]." Thus, Pere reveals that the *alaminus* of Valencia also played a role in the recruitment and negotiation. One might argue, then, that Abençumada's payment to Lancia on the eve of his departure and participation in the negotiation was part of the Valencian Mudéjars' attempt to fulfill their feudal duty to the Catalan king. In which case, the Mudéjars were substituting foreign Muslim soldiers for their own, a fact that offers yet another

⁶⁶ After the negotiations, Pere had these debts excused. ACA, R 58:22v (3 May 1285): "To Bernard Martin, bailiff of Villafranch. You should not press the representatives of Çahim, son of Jahie Abebbaquem, for those fifteen *solidi* that you gave them. On the contrary, if they have any debts, you should pay them. / Bernardo Martini, baiulo Ville Franche, quod non exigit a nunciis Sarracenis de Cahim, filio Jahie Abebbaquem, illos quindecim solidos quos eisdem accomodavit. Immo si aliquos fideiussores ab eis recepit absolvat, cum dominus Rex mandet per presentes [dict]os quindecim solidi recipi in comptum per Guillelmum de Rocha a dicto Bernardo Martini. Datum ut supra."

⁶⁷ All orders and letters surrounding the negotiation between the *jenets* and King Pere were dated in Figueres and Coll de Panissar.

⁶⁸ ACA, R 56:93v (4 May 1285): "Samueli Alfaquimo Regis, sabet que vidiemos vuestras letras, et daquello que nos embiastes dezir sobre feito de Çahim, sus mandaderos vinieron a nos et lu[e]go partieronse daquellas demandas assi que deven venir luego a nuestro servicio. E non queremos [que] Abraham Abençumada nin otro se faga faulador desto, ca nos nos aveniemos bien con ellos. Por estis plaze a nos la porferta que nos fiziestes de vuestras mulas al dito Çahim. E si vos se las enviaredes, nos vos pagaremos el precio dellas. De lo que al que nos enviastes dezir de la salud et del estamiento de Dona Agnes et de la otra companyna nostra que son aqui, gradeçemos vos lo muyto. E pregamos vos que todavia nos lo fageds saber. Pero envastes nos dezir algunas cosas que nos non podiemos entender declaradament. E cuydamos que fue por que deziades que demades venir a nos. E si vos alla non faziades nunguna plazria a nos vestra venida. Empero o por vestras letras o por vestra venida queremos nos que mas largament et clarament nos lo fagades saber. Datum Figeriis, IIII nonas Maii [1285]." A problematic edition of this document exists in Gazulla, "Zenetes," 179, n.2. (Gazulla mistakenly cites ACA, R 56:93r.) As Gazulla points out, this document also hints at the intimate relationship between the king and his *alfaquimus*. Samuel asked Pere about the health of Doña Agnes and the king's friends. Cf. Catlos, "Mercenary," 295.

explanation for the introduction of the *jenets*.⁶⁹ The letter solves a second, more mundane mystery when Pere explains to Samuel that he has decided to give the *jenets* the *alfaquimus*' mules as a gift.⁷⁰ Samuel, in other words, was the Jew who lent the *jenets* mules in Granada.

Thus, having successfully completed the negotiations, Pere showered the *jenets* with gifts similar to those conferred in the negotiation of 1265. As he did then, Pere paid for the expenses of the representatives in coming to the Crown.⁷¹ He further issued an *expensarium* – the medieval equivalent of an expense account – to cover the costs of Çahim and his troops in coming to Coll de Panissar.⁷² Gifts were also presented to the five *jenets*. Tunics and stirrups were given to all five.⁷³ But three were singled out according to their importance. Alaçeno, “Saracen soldier and representative to Çahim, son of Abennaquem,” was given clothes of colored cloth and silk. Hameto Abenobrut received a tunic and colored shoes. Mahomet de Villena accepted clothes of plain cloth

⁶⁹ Cf. ACA, R 82:61v-62r (2 July 1290) in which the Christians and Muslims of Valencia are ordered to pay for the use of *jenets* to protect their kingdom. Cited with full edition in the following chapter.

⁷⁰ In fact, only two of these mules belonged to Samuel. See ACA, R 58:22v (3 May 1285) where Pere orders the mules to be given to Çahim and promises to reimburse Samuel: “Alfaquino Samueli quod mittat Cahim filio Jahie Abennaquem illas duas mulas suas et dominus Rex satisfaciet sibi de precio ipsarum.” He gave a third mule that belonged to Petrus de Sancto Clemente. A receipt for his repayment exists at ACA, R 58:23r (11 May 1285): “Fecimus albaranum Petro de Sancto Clemente de CCCL solidos quos dominus Rex sibi debet pro precio unius mule quem Muçe de Portella ab eo emit de mandato Regis et dedit nuncio de Çahen et assignavimus eos sibi su[per] denarios compositionis hominum Montis Albi, solutis et cetera. Datum in Colle de Paniçars, V idus Maii.” An *albaranum* was a receipt or license, from the Arabic *al-barā'a*.

⁷¹ ACA, R 58:22v (4 May 1285): “Berengario Scribe quod loco Bernardi Scribe donet Alaçeno militi Sarraceno nuncio Cahim filio Jahie Abennaquem ducentis solidos Barchinonenses pro expensis s[u]is et illorum qui sechum venerunt.”

⁷² ACA, R 58:22r (4 May 1285): “Raimundo de Rivo Sicco quod cum Cahim filius Jahie Abennaquem debent venire ad dominum Regem cum genetis et familia Sarracenorum quod tradit eidem unum expensarium per quem faciat provideri sibi et familie sue predictae in expensis eisdem neccesariis quousque fuerint cum domino Rege. Datum Figeriis, quarto nonas Maii.” The word “familia” denoted both family, in the common sense, and troop in Latin. In this case, both could be readings since *jenets* often brought their wives and families with them. See Chapter 6. See also Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 180, n.3. He edits this document but passes over it without comment. For some reason, he ignored all the other, related documents in this folio and the verso.

⁷³ ACA, R 58:22v (4 May 1285): “Bernardo Scribe quod donet tunicas ad quinque troterios Sarracenos nuncii genetorum.”

and shoes from Narbonne.⁷⁴ Both Alaçeno and Hameto were also given saddles and horse bridles.⁷⁵ Alaçeno received a good bridle (*frenum bonum*) whereas Hameto received one of lesser price (*frenum de minori precio*), indicating that Alaçeno was the leader of the *jenet* mission to the king.⁷⁶ Dressed in Parisian silks and Narbonese shoes, these soldiers were assimilated – at least in appearance – into the Iberian military aristocracy; they took on the guise of the *Ghuzāh* captains that Ibn al-Khaṭīb described almost a hundred years later.⁷⁷ Of course, gifts were not plain and clean.⁷⁸ These lavish rewards symbolized the *jenets*' new incorporation into the Crown and its system of reciprocity. Moreover, through the gifts of cloth, the return of their swords, and, indeed, their new alliance with the king, the *jenets* were lifted out of the status of Mudéjars, and released from the sumptuary laws of the state.⁷⁹ What did this process of interiorization mean? At the risk of getting ahead of oneself, the incorporation of the *jenets* into the service of the Crown of Aragon paradoxically suggests their exceptional status, their continued existence as outsiders, in a fashion that recalls the compelling figure of the sacred man – the *homo sacer*. Interrogating this ambiguous status as well as the

⁷⁴ ACA, R 58:22r (4 May 1285): “Bernardo Scribe quod donet Alaçeno Sarraceno militi nuncio Cahim filio Jahie Abennaquem, unam aliubam et tunicam panni coloris et calligas presseti vermillii. Et quod donet Hameto Abenobrut aliubam et tunicam exalonis et calligas panni coloris. Et donetis Mahometo de Villena aliubam et tunicam de bifa plana et calligas narboni [...] Datum Figeriis, IIII nonas May.” This transcription differs in minor details from that presented in Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 181, n.3.

⁷⁵ ACA, R 58:23r (4 May 1285): “Bernardo Scribe quod donet Alaçeno geneto militi sellam et frenum bonum et Hammit Abenhobeit, sellam et frenum de minori precio. Datum ut supra.”

⁷⁶ These saddles were *jenet* saddles, which are specified elsewhere in the Registers, underscoring that these troops differed from other cavalry. ACA, R 71:110v (19 December 1287, my emphasis): “Fuit mandatum Guillelmo Bastida quod redimat quandam *sellam genetam* domini Regis quod est in Osca pignori obligata et quod aportet ipsam domino Regi. Datum circa Caesarauguste, XIII kalendas Januarii.” See also ACA 71:24v for the gift of a saddle to Abutçeyt Asseyt with full edition in Chapter 5.

⁷⁷ See Chapter 2.

⁷⁸ The coercive nature of gift-giving is described beautifully in Lewis Hyde, *The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property* (Vintage, 1983).

⁷⁹ See Chapter 5 for a full discussion of sumptuary laws as they related to Muslims in the Crown of Aragon.

mercenary logic that bound the *jenets* to these Christian sovereigns, however, is the subject of another chapter.⁸⁰

§

It is the nature of archival research that one can pick up a narrative thread, stitched across several folios, and at the next turn of the page, lose it entirely. While it appears that Çahim's company of *jenets* agreed to enter into the service of the king, they disappear entirely from the royal records after that moment. The direct profit of Andiosella's mission is similarly lost.

Nevertheless, Pere's preparations against the French invasion proved successful. During the siege of Girona, the chronicler Desclot records that over 600 Muslim crossbowmen valiantly defended the city alongside Count Ramon Folch.⁸¹ Moreover, he claims that the arrival of ten thousand *jenets* (*deu milia Serrayns ginets*) at Perpignan prompted the French to withdraw.⁸² Desclot's descriptions, while numerically suspect, demonstrate that Mudéjar archers and *jenets* did play a visible and significant role in the defense of the Crown. For their part, the French also considered the support of Muslims as essential to the Catalan victory. The papal legate, who preached the French crusade against the Crown of Aragon, complained of Pere's use of Muslim soldiers: "He [King Pere] has joined with himself Saracens to destroy the Christian faith, and with their aid he

⁸⁰ See Chapter 5.

⁸¹ Desclot, *Llibre del rei en Pere*, chap. 153: "Entrels quals ni havia sicents qui eren ballesters serrayns del regne de Valencia, e aportaven tots ballestes de dos peus." See also Chaps. 156 and 163. See also Joseph Strayer, "The Crusade Against Aragon," *Speculum* XXVIII (1953), 102-13 and Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 264.

⁸² Desclot, *Llibre del rei en Pere* (full text in *Les quatre gran cròniques*, ed. Ferran Soldevila, Barcelona: Editorial Selecta, 1971), chap. 140: "Mas atendaren se allens prop aquella nit; e lendema mati vench hun avolot en la ost del rey de França, mentre ques dinaven ço es assaber: quel rey d'Arago ab tot son poder e ab deu milia Serrayns ginets, e ab be cent milia homens de peu, que passaven d'amunt per la montanya, e que vienien a entrar en Perpinya, per ço com deyen, quells homens de la villa de Perpinya li devien lliurar la villa, e puig lo rey d'Arago ques meses alli, e vedaria lo pas als Francesos que no passassen deça, e axi tendria al mig lloch aquells qui passats eren, e quels donat batalla."

strives to withstand us, for by his own strength which is naught he could not stand alone.”⁸³ More likely, however, the tide of the confrontation with the French turned with the return of the Catalan admiral, Roger de Lauria’s fleet from Sicily. Lauria destroyed Philip III’s ships in the Bay of Roses in September of 1285, cutting off the French forward position in Gerona. From here, Catalan and *jenet* troops forced the French back towards Perpignan, where King Philip died at the beginning of October, which however unsatisfying for the triumphal narrative, effectively put an end to the offensive. For his part, Pere hoped to punish his rebellious brother, Jaume of Mallorca, but also died a month later on November 11, 1285, leaving the matter of Mallorca unresolved.

⁸³ Desclot, *Llibre del rei en Pere*, chap. 136 as cited with translation in Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 291: “Ans se pres ab Serrayns per destróir lo crestianisme; e ab ells se cuyda defendre a nos, que ab son poder no poria, car nol ha.”

4. THE MERCENARY MEDITERRANEAN

The sovereign crisis that defined the reign of King Pere expanded over the following two decades, and the manner in which his successors – his sons – responded to internal and external threats to their authority represented an expansion of Pere's strategy. The treaties and negotiations between the Crown of Aragon and the various Muslim kingdoms of Spain and North Africa examined in this chapter reveal that the *jenets* continued to hold a central place in Catalan sovereign and imperial ambitions. More significantly, these treaties also locate the *jenets* within a broader network, a well-established Mediterranean economy of arms and men to which the Catalan sovereigns were only belatedly responding. This chapter argues, however, that this mercenary Mediterranean was not a free-for-all – a borderless utopia – to which the Crown of Aragon brought order, but rather a coherent system with a competing sense of limits and legitimacy that profoundly shaped the emerging alliance between the Crown of Aragon and the *jenets*.

i. AN ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE

Before his death, King Pere had stipulated the division of the lands of the Crown between his sons, Alphonse and Jaume. Jaume, who would later become King Jaume II, inherited the island of Sicily, while Alphonse III (1285-91), the elder son, inherited the central kingdoms and the Crown itself. The division, however, had little effect on the dangers that the new king faced. As a whole, the Crown of Aragon remained under ecclesiastical censure and therefore, under continued threat from France. And Sicily, the catalyst for this tension, thus remained the focus of Alphonse's reign. This island – or

more precisely, the Crown's desire to control the central Mediterranean through it – was the thread that tied Catalan actions abroad and at home in this period. Close to Africa, it bound the Crown to the affairs of the Muslim states of North Africa, above all the tumultuous Ḥafṣid state.¹ But the effort and wealth spent on Sicily and North Africa had repercussions at home. Alphonse drew the ire of the Aragonese barons, who acted to seize control of his purse strings. The revolt of their *Uniones* began in Valencia in 1285 and threatened to tear the Crown apart from within.

Rather predictably, Alphonse moved first to secure control over his Mediterranean possessions. At the end of 1285, Conrad Lancia, the leader of Pere's first mission to recruit *jenets*, subdued the island of Mallorca and expelled Alphonse's recalcitrant uncle, Jaume. Emboldened, Alphonse pushed his armada onward and completed the long-lingering conquest of the Balearic Islands under the pretense that the islands' Muslims were aiding the sultan of Tunis. In 1287, the Catalan navy seized the small island of Minorca and sold the majority of its Muslim population into slavery.² At the same time, a Catalan fleet under the command of Roger de Lauria also captured the Kerkennah (Ar. Qarqana) islands, an archipelago off the coast of Tunis, from which they terrorized the North Africa coast, carrying off Muslim captives, whose last traces can be found in the receipts of slave markets in Italy.³ In these aggressive actions, one sees a

¹ See Brunschvig, *Berbérie orientale*, 96ff.

² Alphonse's pretext for conquering Minorca was that the island's inhabitants assisted the Muslims of Collo against Pere III in 1282. See J.E. Martínez Ferrando, S. Sobréques i Vidal, and E. Bagué, *Els descendents de Pere el Gran: Alfons el Franc, Jaume II, Alfons el Benigne* (Barcelona: Editorial Teide, 1954), 26. Among the records for Muslim slaves sold from the conquest of Minorca, one finds several mentions of Muslim *jenets* buying or being given these slaves. Whether or not the *jenets* were also involved in the conquest of Mallorca is not clear. See ACA, R 70:46r (8 February 1286), 70:49v (13 February 1286), 70:61v (5 February 1286), 72:24v (4 March 1288). Cf. Catlos, "Mercenary," 296. See Chapter 6 for more detail on these slave sales.

³ Muntaner, chaps. 155 and 159; *Annales Januenses*, V:70 (1285); Giuseppe La Mantia, *Codice diplomatico dei Re Aragonesi di Sicilia, Pietro I, Giacomo, Federico II, Pietro II, e Ludovico, dalla Rivoluzione Siciliana del 1282 sino al 1355, con Note Storiche e Diplomatiche* (Palermo: Boccone del

direct parallel to Pere's tactic of landing at Collo in 1282 and later seizing Jerba in 1284; however, whereas Pere recognized the limits of his ambitions in Tunis and settled for a tributary relationship with Abū Ḥafṣ (683-694/1284-1295) at Coll de Panissar (where the five *jenets* were headed) in 1285, Alphonse did not. He broke from the treaty and reopened the possibility of taking Tunis.⁴ Thus, it is in this wider context – a renewed effort to conquer Tunis while fighting the *Uniones* at home – that three interlocking Catalan missions to recruit *jenet* cavalry in 1286 must be examined.

In December of 1286, a certain Pere de Deo and Abraham Abengalel, a Jew, were sent as ambassadors to the court of the Marīnid Sultan Abū Ya'qūb (685-706/1286-1307).⁵ Alphonse asked the men to immediately convey two sentiments to the Muslim ruler: first, that “from Pere, his father (*pare seu*) and Jaume, his grandfather (*avi d'aquest Rey*), he has learned of the good will of the sultan,” and second, that “from his father, Pere, he also has learned of the aid (*valença*) of his [the sultan's] knights (*companya sua de cavalers*) that profited the king in his war against the French.” In this manner, Alphonse confirms that the Marīnids acknowledged if not authorized the participation of their cavalry during the Crown's struggles against the French in 1285. Alphonse instructed his ambassadors, moreover, to inform Abū Ya'qūb that “he has learned that the

Povero, 1917), I:609-612. See also Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 266-7: “Quant aux entreprises ifriqiyennes de Lauria, elles ne se limitèrent pas à Djerba : l'amiral se tourna aussi vers les îles Kerkennah, qui s'échelonnent au large de la région de Sfax ; il commença à y faire des coups de mains dès 1284, mais il ne les annexa à sa principauté djerbienne qu'en 1286. Ainsi après la Sicile, Pantelleria, Malte et Djerba, les Kerkennah tombèrent peu à peu entre les mains des Catalans. C'étaient toutes les îles de la Méditerranée centrale que dominaient la Maison de Barcelone et ses vassaux.” See also Ibn Khaldūn, VI:697-698, Lauria is referred to as “*al-Marākiyā*,” the Marquis and lieutenant of “Frederick (*Fadarīk*),” son of Alphonse (*Alrīdākūn*), king of Barcelona.

⁴ See Chapter 2, above, for a discussion of the context and motivations for signing the Treaty of Panissar.

⁵ The instructions for their mission are located at ACA, R 61:176r-176v (22 December 1286) and ACA, R 191r-192r (21 April 1287), see Appendix B. Pere de Deo had begun negotiations with Abū Yūsuf before his death in 1285 (ACA, R, 64:26). Complete editions of these documents were also published in Ludwig Klüpfel, *Die äussere Politik Alfonsos III von Aragonien (1285-1291)* (Berlin: 1911), 167-71. My edition differs in minor matters of transcription. Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 184 cites the second document with a partial transcription but no reference. See also, Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 282. Cf. ACA R, 64:150r.

Sultan can offer him 2000 *jenets* for his mission (*II mile janets ab sa messio*).” Thus, the ambassadors were ordered to secure five years of peace with Abū Ya‘qūb. During that period, Muslim and Christian merchants could move safely between the states. Abū Ya‘qūb would initially provide Alphonse with 500 *jenets* for the coming summer, and Alphonse, in turn, would provide the sultan with five galleys or more if required.⁶ There were, however, restrictions placed on the use of these troops and navies: Alphonse promised only to assist the sultan against his Muslim enemies just as the sultan would aid him against his Christian enemies (*Item que Abenjacob li vayla contra tots los Christians del mon. El Senyor Rey a el contra tots los Sarrayns del mon*).⁷

What was the purpose of this treaty? The final stipulations of the negotiation reveal the mission’s broader intent: an alliance against Tunis. First, Aragon would agree to release into Marīnid custody a captive referred to only as Margam in the Chancery Registers. Margam is undoubtedly the figure of Murghim b. Šābir, whose captivity in Barcelona was noted by Ibn Khaldūn.⁸ This prisoner was both the chief of the Arab Dabbāb tribe and more importantly, a prominent enemy of Abū Ḥafṣ, a fact that explains his role in the alliance. Second, the treaty stipulated that the ships that Alphonse or Jaume of Sicily would supply were to be employed immediately against Tunis. And third, in the event the Marīnids captured Tunis, the annual tributes and other rights (*els*

⁶ ACA, R 64:191r (21 April 1287): “E con vendra al especificar de la valença que demanen valença de D cavalers janets a aquest estiu a messio et a despesa d’Abenjacob. E sil Senyor Rey navia mes obs que el los li trameta, el Senyor Rey fees lurs obs a aquels mes que mester auria.

“Item quel Senyor Rey li enviara en sa valença V galees armades ab sa messio. E si mester na mes de X tro en XV galees que les li prestara, et que les pusen fer armar ab la sua mesio de les gens del Senyor Rey. E si altre navili a mester dela terra del Sen[y]or Rey, quel puse[n] aver et armar a messio d’Abenjacob.”

⁷ This restriction is repeated several times in different treaties. See, for instance, a treaty between Jaume II and Muḥammad II of Granada (ACA, R 252:121r [18 November 1295]) with full edition below. Other examples and a discussion of their relevance below.

⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:703: “At the same time, Murghim b. Šābir b. ‘Askar, admiral of the Banū Dabbāb, was a captive. In the year 82 (682/1283-4), the Sicilian enemy captured him near Tripoli (*Ṭarāblus*) and sold him to some men from Barcelona. Consequently, the Tyrant (*al-tāghiya*) [i.e. Alphonse] purchased him.”

los tributz els altres dretz) of the Catalan sovereigns would be maintained.⁹ But the proposed anti-Ḥafṣid alliance was anything but straight-forward. At the heart of these negotiations lay the offer to not only trade goods but also violence – to send Catalan forces to live and fight with North African armies while bringing Muslim *jenets* into a Catalan army. Violence, in short, was treated as a commodity alongside others. But why did these sovereigns choose to exchange troops rather than act jointly, each commanding their own armies? Why would each rely upon the loyalty of troops from another faith? The significance of their willingness to do so is not mitigated by the fact that this proposed agreement was never signed.¹⁰

At the same time, however, the Catalan ambassador Pedro Garcia did succeed in signing a treaty with the ‘Abd al-Wādid sultan, Abū Sa‘īd ‘Uthmān b. Yaghamrāsan (1282-1303/681-703), for the exchange of troops.¹¹ In this case, however, the ambassador’s success derived from an unexpected source. Diplomatic relations between the Crown and Tlemcen were never strong, but an influential and multi-national group of Christian mercenaries under the command of Jaume Pere, an illegitimate son of King

⁹ ACA, R 64:191v (21 April 1287): “Item que per rao dela valença quel Rey d’Arago faria o fer faria per lo Rey de Sicilia a Abenjacob en la conquesta de Tunij, no peresquen enans sien salus a els los tributz, els altres dretz que <au o aver deven> en Tuniz per qualque manera.”

¹⁰ Although the *jenets* were broadly under the control of the Marīnids, one rarely sees the troops coming from Marīnid North Africa directly. Cf. ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, no. 16 (5 Rabi’a I, 723 = 14 March 1323), in which the Marīnids offer the Catalans Muslim troops again.

¹¹ ACA, R 64:178r-179r (April 1286). Full edition in Klüpfel, *Die äussere*, 171-3. As above, my edition differs mainly in matters of transcription. For the broader context of Garçia’s mission, see Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 321-3. In the treaty the sultan is called, “Acmet Abuçayt Benyachmataca Benzayen, Rey de Tirimce.” See also, Zurita, *Anales*, II:281. Christian and Muslim ambassadors from Tlemcen arrived at the Catalan court in 1288, revealing that the sultan also employed interconfessional groups in his negotiations. See, ACA, R 72:37v (8 April 1288): “Nos Alfonsus et cetera, recognoscimus et confitemur, vobis fideli thesaurario nostro Arnaldo de Bastida quod de mandato nostro dedistis et solve[tis] nunciis Regis Tirimce tam Christiano quam Sarraceno tam in expensis necessariis eisdem quam in naulio cuiusdam Berna[dus] armate quam eisdem nauliavisti septingentos triginta solidos Barchinonenses quod quidem denarios volumes vobis recepi in compotum. Datum Barchinone, VII idus Aprilis.”

Pere, was in the service of Abū Sa‘īd.¹² These and other mercenary companies had long been scattered throughout the *ribāṭs* of North Africa; they spoke Arabic, mingled with Muslims; some had pretensions to independence, but all served the sultans by gathering taxes and keeping nomadic tribes at bay.¹³ Once criticized by both the Catalan kings and the Papacy for their support of Muslims – their betrayal of their faith – now, these Christian mercenaries became the key to Garcia’s success and the centerpiece of his mission.¹⁴

Alphonse’s instructions to the ambassador begin like those for Pere de Deo, asking the ambassador to “express his desire to be friends with him [the sultan] just as his

¹² Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 314-6 and 472ff. A bastard son of Jaume II, Jaume d’Aragó, also rose to prominence in the fourteenth century. Dufourcq concisely sums up relations between the ‘Abd al-Wāḍids and the Crown of Aragon: “Si le Maghrib central évita une plus grande emprise aragonaise, ce fut, comme nous l’avons dit, en partie parce que le Barcelonais ne put y fournir un effort considérable, en partie parce que le commerce avec les Génois et les autres Italiens rendait moins indispensable le trafic catalan et permettait d’éluder les exigences du roi d’Aragon, mais ce fut sûrement aussi parce que les Abdalouadides se montrèrent souples et insaisissables, comme les Hafside” (*ibid*, 312). See also, Desclot, *Crónica*, chaps. 5 and 6 on the “Lord of Constantine.”

¹³ In the twelfth century, for instance, the Barcelonan viscount Bereguer Reverter entered the service of the Almohads. He signed his letters to the Count of Barcelona and minted coins in Arabic under the name of “Ibn Rabatar,” which can be read as a sign that he knew some Arabic. See José Alemany, “Milicias cristianas al servicio de los Sultanes de Al-Maghrib,” *Homenaje a don F. Codera* (Zaragoza: 1904); Istvan Frank, “Reverter, victome de Barcelone,” *Boletín de la academia de buenas letras de Barcelona XXVI* (1954-56), 196-204; and F. Clément, “Reverter et son fils, deux officiers Catalans au service des sultans de Marrakech,” *Medieval Encounters* 9 (2003), 79-106. More generally on the Christian mercenaries, see A. Giménez Soler, “Caballeros españoles en Africa y Africanos en España,” *Revue Hispanique* 12 (1905), 16 (1907); J.F.P. Hopkins, *Medieval Muslim Governments in Barbary* (London, 1958); M. Gual Torrella, “Milicias cristianas en Berberia,” *Boletín de la Sociedad Arquelogica Luliana LXXXIX* (1973), 54-63; Burns, “Renegades;” J. Montoya Martínez, “El frustrado cerco de Marrakech, 1261-1262,” *Cuadernos de Estudios Medievales VIII-IX* (1980): 183-92; C. Battlé, “Noticias sobre la milicia cristiana en el norte de África en la segunda mitad del s. XIII,” in *Homenaje al profesor Torres Fontes* (Murcia, 1987), 127-37; Simon Barton, “Traitors to the Faith?: Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300,” in *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence – Studies in Honour of Angus MacKay*, eds. Collins and Goodman (Basingstoke, 2002), 23-45; Bartolomé Bennassar and Lucile Bennassar, *Les chrétiens d’Allah: l’histoire extraordinaire des renégats, XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris: Perrin, 1989); and Roser Salicrú i Lluç, “Mercenaire castillans au Maroc au début du XVe siècle,” in *Migrations et diasporas méditerranéennes (Xe-XVIe siècles)*, eds. M. Balard and A. Ducellier (Paris, 2002).

¹⁴ On papal attitudes toward Christian mercenaries, see James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-1550* (University of Pennsylvania, 1979), esp. 45 and 52, as well as *Mas Latrúe*, docs. 10, 15, 17, and 18. In 1214, Innocent III excommunicated all Christians who offered military aid to Muslims (AHN, Codices, 996b, fol. 44r [23 January 1214] as cited in Barton, “Traitors of the Faith,” 24-5). Closer to home, the Archbishop of Toledo similarly condemned the mercenaries in North Africa in 1222 or 1223 (BN, Madrid, MS 13,022, fol.92r-v as cited in Barton, “Traitors of the Faith,” 25).

father, King Pere, and grandfather, Jaume, were.”¹⁵ But the negotiations turn immediately to the question of Christian soldiers in Tlemcen. Alphonse requested that all these Christian troops, regardless of origin, be placed under Aragonese jurisdiction (*fuero d’Aragon*) and under the command of an *alcayt* (from Ar. *al-qā’id*, leader), nominated by the Catalan king.¹⁶ Above all, Alphonse seemed concerned with the treatment of these troops: the negotiations stipulated their salaries, the manner in which the soldiers would be housed, that they should be properly provisioned with horses, camels, and mules, and finally, that they should have a priest accompanying them.¹⁷ In short, the King aimed to place new controls over all aspects of the soldiers’ physical, legal, and spiritual lives. In the first two respects, by acting to impose state control over these soldiers, by placing them under Aragonese law, Alphonse aimed to make these soldiers his subjects or, put differently, Aragonese citizens. Thus, by extension and by contrast to earlier attitudes, he also conferred a new legitimacy on their activities.¹⁸ In the latter respect, as regards the soldiers’ spiritual lives, one might say that Alphonse simultaneously aspired to mark these mercenaries out as Christians, to draw a religious boundary. What, one must wonder, motivated these terms?¹⁹ In any case, in return for the service of Catalan mercenaries, Alphonse requested that Abū Sa‘īd supply the Crown with Muslim troops

¹⁵ ACA, R 64:178r: “Primerament que pone su amor con el de seer amigos segunt que fue con su padre el Rey don Pedro et [con] su avuelo el Rey don Jayme.”

¹⁶ ACA, R 64:178v: “Item que todos los Christianos que seran en la terra del Rey de Tirimçe de qualesquier condiciones o senyorias, que sean juzgados por fuero d’Aragon por aquel alcayt que el Rey don Alfonso ala enbiarra.”

¹⁷ For the last of these stipulations, see ACA, R 64:187v: “Item que de por a un clerigo quel dicho hi levara soldado de cavallero.” Generally, on Christianity in North Africa in this period, see H. Khoeler, *L’Eglise Chrétienne du Maroc et la mission franciscaine (1221-1790)* (Paris: 1934) and A. López, *Obispos en la Africa septentrional desde el siglo XIII*, 2nd ed. (Tánger: 1941).

¹⁸ Burns, “Renegades,” 354.

¹⁹ See Section 3 of this chapter.

whenever their help was required (*cada que mester oviere su ajuda*).²⁰ Thus, like the strokes of an engine, the movement of *jenets* was linked to the movement of troops of the opposite faith, moving in the opposite direction. But one notes, in this case, that this exchange was not an innovation of the Muslim and Christian states. At Tlemcen, Alphonse moved belatedly to legitimize, control, and profit from a powerful network of Christian soldiers. Put simply, the states followed a pattern – an economy of violence – established by the mercenaries themselves.

At the same time Pere de Deo traveled to the Marīnid court, yet another mission, under the leadership of Conrad Lancia, was ordered by Alphonse to the last of the three great North African powers, the Ḥafṣids.²¹ Lancia's instructions were short; his purpose, narrow. He was meant to renew and enlarge the parts of the treaty signed by King Pere at Coll de Panissar, particularly those parts related to Christian soldiers in the service of the sultan. As with Garcia's mission to Tlemcen, Alphonse requested that all Christian soldiers, regardless of origin, should be placed under the jurisdiction of a Catalan *alcayt*.²² And as above, provisions were also made for salaries and housing.²³ But Lancia's instructions make no mention of *jenets*. Given the emerging alliance against Tunis, one could argue that these negotiations merely aimed to maintain the *status quo*

²⁰ ACA, R 64:179r: "Item promete el dicho Rey de Tirimçe de aiudir con su companya al dicho Rey d'Aragon cada que mester oviere su ajuda o por el serva amenestado."

²¹ ACA, R 64:192r-192v (March 1286). The document appears directly after the instructions for Pere de Deo above. See also Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 282-4 for an extended discussion of the document. We know that Lancia did in fact travel to Tunis on 2 February 1287 (ACA, R 72:48v). See the previous chapter for a discussion of the identity of Conrad Lancia.

²² ACA, R 64:192r: "Primerament que tots los Christians de sou de qual que lengua sien, sien deus l'alcayt del dit Rey d'Arago et que preguen sou per sa sua man et ques jutgen per ell."

²³ The *alfondech* (Cat.) or *funduq* (Ar. for caravansai) of Mallorca was to be handed over to Aragon. ACA, R 64:192v: "Item quel alfondech de Malorche sia del Rey d'Arago."

and the fact that no treaty followed them meant little to the Catalan king.²⁴ Indeed, Alphonse's aims lay elsewhere in the most fascinating part of his Mediterranean strategy involving the *jenets*.

ii. THE LAST ALMOHAD

One must step back fifteen years, to the collapse of the Almohad Empire, to understand what followed. Below, Ibn Khaldūn explains what became of the royal family at that time:

Abū Dabbūs was the last caliph of the Banū 'Abd al-Mu'min (the Almohads) in Marrakesh when he was killed in the year 668 (1269). His sons scattered (*iftaraqā banūhu*) and were overthrown (*taqallabū*) in the land. One of them, 'Uthmān, fled to eastern al-Andalus and settled (*nazala 'alā*) with the tyrant of Barcelona (*ṭāghīya Barshilūna*) and was treated well. There, he found the sons of his uncle (*a'qāb 'ammihī*), the lord (*al-sayyid*) Abū Zayd al-Mutanaṣṣir, brother of Abū Dabbūs, living in the lands of the enemy (*fī mathwāhum min iyālat al-'adūw*). They held an esteemed position (*makān wajāh*) on account of the conversion (*nuzū*) of their father from his religion [Islam] to theirs [Christianity].²⁵

After the Almohad sultan, Abū Dabbūs al-Wāthiq bi'llāh (665-668/1266-69) rode into battle in September 1269 (2 Muḥarram 668) against the Marīnids and fell in open battle, his son, 'Uthmān, chose exile in Spain, seeking the protection his cousins, the sons of Abū Zayd – who was the last Almohad governor of Valencia, brother to Abū Dabbūs, and himself, a convert to Christianity.²⁶ From here, Ibn Khaldūn is silent until 'Uthmān's

²⁴ The Christian mercenaries at Tunis were the longest standing troops, and all the treaties concerning Catalan mercenaries seem to follow the standards established by Guillem Moncada, a Catalan captain.

²⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:703. Cf. al-Nuwayrī, *al-Maghrib al-Islāmī fī 'l-'aṣr al-wasīṭ* (Casablanca: 1985), 451-2. For more on the term *nuzū*, see Fernández Félix and Fierro, "Christianos y conversos al islam," and Chapter 2 above, on the figure of the *nāzi*, pl. *nuzzā*.

²⁶ See Robert I. Burns, "Príncipe Almohade y Converso Mudéjar: Nueva Documentación Sobre Abū Zayd," *Sharq Al-Andalus* 4 (1987), 109-22 as well as his "Daughter of Abu Zayd, Last Almohad Ruler of Valencia: The Family and Christian Seignory of Alda Ferrandis 1236-1300," *Viator* 24 (1993), 143-87. "Abuceyt," governor of Valencia before its conquest by Jaime I, is described in the Chancery Registers as a "grandson of the Caliph (Aceydo Abuceyt nepoti regis Almomeleni)." See *Colección diplomática de Jaime I, el Conquistador*, ed. Ambrosio Huici Miranda, 3 vols. in 6 (Valencia: 1916-1922), doc. 279. He

reappearance in North Africa in 1289. What became of this Almohad prince during the twenty years that he disappeared from the Arabic record? Gazulla, in his study of the *jenets*, cites two documents culled from the Chancery Registers that reveal that several sons of Abū Dabbūs along with their wives (*uxoribus et filiis filiorum Maramuni* [from Ar., *amīr al-mu'minīn*]) had taken up residence in Calatayud in 1285 and Valencia in 1287.²⁷ But he drops the matter there, stating “but since this has nothing to do with Zanāta troops [i.e. the *jenets*], we will have to set it aside for another occasion.”²⁸ In fact, several documents overlooked by Gazulla reveal that these princes, four in all, did serve as *jenets* for both Pere and Alphonse.²⁹ On May 15, 1286, for instance, amongst numerous salaries paid to *jenets* during the battles against the Aragonese *Uniones*, one finds that “Abdelhuahit, *jenet* and son of the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*” was given the 450 remaining *sous* of the 750 owed him for the loss of a mule.³⁰ On the same day, Mahomet, another “son of the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*” and three of his brothers were paid salaries for the months of December to March as well as given clothes as gifts for their service.³¹ And on

was, in other words, one and the same man described by Ibn Khaldūn. After his conversion, he married Maria Ferrandis. Amongst the known Christian and Muslim sons and daughters of Abū Zayd were: Alda Ferrandis, Fernādo Pérez, Sancho Ferrandis, Elisenda, Mahomat Abiceit, Ceyt Abohiara, Zeyt Edris, Azanay, Muça, Azmal, Aazón, and Francisco Pérez.

²⁷ Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 179-80, citing ACA, R 58:49r (3 September 1285) and ACA, R 71:52r (5 May 1287). Catlos, “Mercenary,” 291 cites but does not quote a further document, ACA, R 65:186v (2 March 1286), concerning the wives of the Almohad princes. Huici Miranda, *Historia política del imperio Almohade*, II:573-4 seems to base his information of Gazulla’s article. See Appendix A for editions of all ten documents relevant to the Almohad princes from the Chancery Registers.

²⁸ Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 180: “Pero como nada tiene que ver con las compañías de zenetes, habremos de dejarlo para otra ocasión.” Gazulla, to my knowledge, never did return to the subject. On the basis of a document recording the payment of three months’ salary to the Almohad Princes, Catlos, “Mercenary,” 296, claims that they provided military service to Alphonse but does not call them *jenets*.

²⁹ ACA, R 72:33r (11 April 1288) indicates that they were four brothers, of whom at least three were accompanied by wives: “... quod daret IIII filiis Miramamonino et uxoribus trium eorum...”

³⁰ ACA, R 71:51v. This debt remained unpaid as late as April of 1288, just before ‘Abd al-Wāhid left the Crown of Aragon. See ACA, R 72:35r (10 April 1288). As discussed in the following chapter, in its contracts with *jenets*, the Crown generally agreed to compensate soldiers for horses and mules lost during service.

³¹ ACA, R: 71:51v and 71:52r. The latter is partially damaged and appears directly above the one cited by Gazulla, in which an “appropriate house” is ordered to be given to the wives of sons of the Almohad caliph.

August 13, 1287, several *jenets* were issued safe conducts to gather with the Almohad Princes.³² In addition to confirming that these princes were *jenets*, these fragments reveal one interesting fact unknown Ibn Khaldūn. Abdelhuahit (or more properly, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid) the eldest son of Abū Dabbūs, who held the title of Caliph for five days after his father’s death, joined ‘Uthmān in Valencia.³³

On July 29, 1287 (18 Jumādā II 686), an Arabic treaty, which survives amongst the records of the Crown, was signed between Alphonse and the same “‘Abd al-Wāḥid, son of the *Amīr al-Mu’minīn* al-Wāthiq bi-llāh” at Jaca.³⁴ In the treaty, the exiled Almohad prince and *jenet* of the Catalan king agreed to terms with Alphonse for “as long as he rules Tunis (*ayya mā ḥakamnā Tūnis*).” In other words, after the collapse of negotiations with the Marīnids, it appears that Alphonse was now seeking a new path to Aragonese hegemony in Ḥafṣid Tunis. Indeed, just as Pere and Conrad Lancia had helped Abū Ishāq (678-82/1279-83) to seize the Ḥafṣid throne, Alphonse was now aspiring to string his own marionette, to place a *jenet* in his service on the throne.

In most respects, the treaty resembles those sought with the Marīnids and ‘Abd al-Wādids above. In addition to respecting the tribute that the Ḥafṣids paid the Crown of

Cloth was also ordered to be given to their wives as well as a certain “Issacho Sanagi” of their “family” (ACA, R 72:33r). One might read “Sanagi” as “Zanjī,” which could indicate that “Issacho” was a slave in the possession of the family.

³² ACA, R 70:168r (13 August 1287).

³³ ‘Abd al-Wāḥid may have also served King Pere during the events of Albarracín above. In July 1284, Alphonse ordered that a *jenet* named Abduluahet receive compensation for “two animals and two men” during service for his father at Albarracín. See ACA, R 71:155r (29 July 1284): “Bart[ho]lomeo de Villa Francha, cum Abdul[u]ahet, janetus, sit in servicio domini Regi[s] patris nostri et nostri in Obsidione Albarracini, mandamus vobis, quatenus, donetis ei rationem pro duabus bestias et duobus hominibus sicut datis aliis quibus nunc rationem datis. Datum in Obsidione Albarracini, III kalendas Augusti.”

³⁴ ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, no. 155. There have been detailed studies of this document. See, for instance, Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 285-6 and Bruschvig, *Berbérie orientale*, 98-100. Note, however, that both Dufourcq and Bruschvig rely on the Latin copy of the document, published by La Mantia, *Codice*, 377-83. The Arabic treaty was dated as follows: “This was signed at Jaca with two days remaining in the month of July 1287, the equivalent of 18 Jumādā II, 686 (*kutiba fī Jāqa yawmayn bāqiyayn min shahr yūliyah ‘ām alf wa-mi’atayn wa-sab‘ wa-thamānīn al-mawāfiq li-thāmin ‘ashar min shahr jumādā al-ukhrā sanat sitt wa-thamānīn wa-sittimi’a*).”

Aragon, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid agreed to terms concerning trade and Christian mercenaries. With regards to the latter, he granted Alphonse the ability to name the captain (*qā’id*) over all Christian knights and others troops regardless of origin.³⁵ He agreed to the salaries, housing, the availability of wine (one barrel, *barīl al-sharāb*, every five days for a knight), and religious freedoms for these soldiers.³⁶ But the most surprising and unique aspect of the treaty concerns a sweeping promise of military support by ‘Abd al-Wāḥid:

Moreover, we promise you upon our word (‘*alā ‘ahdinā*) that whenever you call upon us (*nuṭlabu ‘ankum*) by letter or messenger, we will help you with all our might to oppose and harm (‘*inād wa-ḡarr*) anyone, whether Christian, Muslim, or otherwise, of whatever nation (*umma*), religion (*dīn*), or creed (*i’tiqād*), and we will do this without deceptions (*khad’*), malice (*khubth*), or treachery (*ghadr*).³⁷

Thus, unlike the previous treaties, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid’s seems to cross confessional lines by promising support against both Christians and Muslims; in short, the Almohad *jenet* offered an alliance without compromise.³⁸ What was different about this context?

Principally, this was not an agreement between sovereigns or states. And the imbalance of power between the negotiators found expression in the treaty’s lack of reciprocity. For his part, Alphonse only promised to offer ‘Abd al-Wāḥid support against his Muslim enemies, which is to say, only ‘Abd al-Wāḥid was expected to fight his co-religionists.³⁹

³⁵ ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, no. 155: “We promise you that we want all Christians, whether knights or squires or otherwise (*jamī’ al-naṣārā fursān kānū aw ashqūṭīrīn* (from Cast. escudero) *aw ghayrahum*) from whatever place or kingdom, whether they are under your authority (*ḥukmikum*) or amongst those paid for their military service (‘*an rātīb bi-rasmi silāh*) that are in our land to be under the authority (*taḥta ṭā’a wa-ḥukm*) of your captain who is [assigned] by you and by your command.”

³⁶ Note, for instance, that in the passages relating to religious practices, which stipulate that the soldiers will have a church and be able to lead religious processions, the treaty refers to “‘*ibādat Jāshū Qarīshī*,” avoiding the use of ‘Isā, the Muslim name for Jesus. Does this betray a misunderstanding or a touch of religious polemic embedded in the agreement?

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Both Brunschvig and Dufourcq overlook this clause of the treaty.

³⁹ Ibid: “And moreover, we [Alphonse] promise to be a good ally and support you with all of our might to defend or inflict harm on all Muslims with whom you are at war.”

What came of Alphonse's attempt to place a *jenet* on the Ḥafṣid throne? The Catalan admiral, Roger de Lauria (called *al-Marākiyā*, the Marquis, by Ibn Khaldūn) began the coup attempt by raiding the region of Mahdia (*al-Mahdiyya*) in 1287 and 1288.⁴⁰ The raids were so severe in fact that a *jihād* was proclaimed by the coastal *ribāṭs* against the Christian invaders.⁴¹ At this point, Ibn Khaldūn, still mentioning only one of the brothers, 'Uthmān b. Abī Dabbūs, picks up the narrative thread again.⁴² After twenty years of exile, Ibn Khaldūn explains, 'Uthmān still maintained the hope to returning to the Almohad throne. And in the Aragonese captive, Murghim b. Šābir, the Catalan captive described above, he saw his opportunity to secure a foothold in North Africa. Thus, using his influence at the Aragonese court, 'Uthmān secured the release of Murghim and arranged to employ Catalan ships and soldiers for his venture with the promise to reimburse the Crown after his victory. The two, 'Uthmān and Murghim, made landfall in North Africa in 668/1289, where with the aid of Murghim's tribe, the Dabbāb, and the Catalan fleet, they undertook the siege of Tripoli, just beyond the grasp of Abū Ḥafṣ and where Murghim held the most influence. According to Ibn Khaldūn, the siege lasted three days before the Catalan-Tripolitan coalition began to unravel. The historian al-Nuwayrī (d.733/1333) clarifies, moreover, that 'Abd al-Wāḥid in fact died in these early battles, leaving 'Uthmān in command, a fact that may explain 'Abd al-Wāḥid's total elision from Ibn Khaldūn's narrative.⁴³ Perhaps seeing the siege of Tripoli as misguided, the Catalans chose to collect the debt owed them and abandon the siege.

⁴⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, VI:697-8.

⁴¹ Ibn Nājī, *Ma 'ālim al-Imān fī ma 'rifa ahl al-Qayrawān*, 4 vols. (Cairo: 1968), IV:58-59 and 69 as cited in Brunschvig, *Berbérie hafside*, 98.

⁴² Ibn Khaldūn, VI:703-4.

⁴³ al-Nuwayrī, 452.

For his part, ‘Uthmān took refuge amongst his Arab allies.⁴⁴ At some point, the Almohad prince must have fallen out with his Arab allies as well: according to Ibn Khaldūn, ‘Uthmān died on the Catalan-controlled island of Jerba. His last gasp in exile was also that of the Almohad Empire.⁴⁵ As for Alphonse, facing a new Castilian alliance with the French, he reluctantly re-established diplomatic ties with Abū Ḥafṣ. In December of 1290, Bernat de Belvis received orders to continue the negotiations of Conrad Lancia with the Ḥafṣid Sultan.⁴⁶

§

Mapping Alphonse’s efforts above to recruit *jenets* reveals a broad network of Muslim-Christian interaction, of which Lancia’s dynamic, earlier mission was only a small element. The need for *jenets* led Catalan ambassadors to all corners of North Africa.⁴⁷ These negotiations place the movement of *jenets* within a Mediterranean economy but more particularly, an economy of violence – the trade of arms and men. Significantly, the reading above also emphasized the fact that territorial authorities were late-comers to this world of exiles, holy warriors, and adventurers. For his part, Alphonse sought to leverage the informal power of Christian soldiers abroad for the benefit of Catalan policy in the central Mediterranean and simultaneously deal with the

⁴⁴ The matter seems to have been more fraught than Ibn Khaldūn suggests. Dufourcq (*L’Espagne catalane*, 288) explains that only part of Murghim’s ransom was paid to a certain Bertran de Canelles. He also suggests, on the basis of Muntaner (chap. 159) that the Catalans attacked Murghim at “Tolmeta” in order to settle the debt. A document that was overlooked by Dufourcq, ACA, R 83:82v (17 September 1290), reveals that the remaining 6000 *duplas* were finally delivered by Murghim in that year, two years after his release, presumably to secure the release of his son, who was held in Sicily.

⁴⁵ Ibn Khaldūn is not clear about precisely when he died. Cf. al-Nuwayrī, 452. See also ACA, R 99:260v which suggests that he was still on Jerba in 1294. King Jaume II maintained diplomatic contacts with the Almohad prince, see ACA, R 252:99r (29 July 1294) as cited in Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 290. Brunschvig, *Berbérie orientale*, 115-6 suggests, furthermore, that as late as 1309, ‘Uthman b. Abī Dabbūs was conspiring against the Ḥafṣids.

⁴⁶ Belvis’ instructions are almost identical to Lancia’s above. See ACA, R 73:90r (1 December 1290), with a full edition in Klüpfel, *Die äussere*, 173-4.

⁴⁷ Even the fleeting, splinter states at Bougie and Constantine received embassies during this period.

revolt of the *Uniones* at home. In the end, however, both projects resulted in a blow to sovereign power. Alphonse's hope of placing a *jenet* on the Ḥafṣid throne failed miserably, and while the *jenets* did play a prominent role in the royal battles against the *Uniones*, Alphonse ultimately had to confirm the privileges of the Aragonese barons on December 28, 1287.⁴⁸ Recognizing that the king's relationship with Muslim Spain and North Africa was a threat to their own power, the *Uniones* required that the king seek their consent before sending more ambassadors abroad.⁴⁹

iii. LIMITS OF THE LAW

Before turning to other recruitment efforts, it is worth reflecting on the structure of the agreements above. In a period defined by crusade and *jihād*, one is struck by the fact that formal treaties provided Muslim soldiers for service in Christian armies, and Christians, in Muslim armies. And precisely because of their formality, these exchanges imply something more than the well-known history of individuals – el Cid, Abū Zayd, or Giraldo Sempavor – who freely traded allegiances on the Christian-Islamic frontier. Primarily, they certainly imply the mutual agreement of Muslim and Christian states, but they may also imply the mutual approval of Muslim and Christian religious lawyers, who

⁴⁸ See, for instance, the activity of *jenets* in the areas of Calatayud, Cutanda, and Alfamén during 1287. ACA, R 74:5r (14 October 1287) and ACA, R 74:11r (23 October 1287). Bisson noted these events but overlooked the broader use of *jenets*. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon*, 90: "When the Aragonese barons tried to impose their *fueros* on Valencia by force, Alphonse was obliged to resist them with Moorish mercenaries."

⁴⁹ Zurita, *Anales*, II:289: "También pedían que como no se hubiese guardado que los ricos hombres y las otras personas contenidas en el privilegio general fuesen de su consejo y se hubiesen enviado por el rey embajadores al rey de Castilla y a Abenjuceff rey de Tremecén y al rey de Granada y al curia romana y a Francia y a Inglaterra, y hecho algunas donaciones y enajenaciones y empeños de cosas que tocaban a la comunidad del reino sin preceder consejo, le pidiesen que fuesen revocadas."

served these states' rulers as advisors.⁵⁰ Although nothing explicitly demonstrates the approval of these lawyers, this possibility raises the question: Could Islamic or canon law permit these soldier exchanges?

Glancing at the opinions of the Malikī jurists who dominated Spain and North Africa in this period, one might easily conclude that the answer was that Islamic law could not and did not.⁵¹ According to Saḥnūn (d. 250/854), Mālik (d. 176/796), himself disapproved of Muslims traveling to non-Muslim territory (*dār al-ḥarb*),⁵² let alone serving in Christian armies. This uncompromising position was upheld by later Mālikī jurists such as Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (d. 520/1122), Ibn Rabī' (c. 719/1320), and al-Wansharīsī (d. 914/1508), the last the author of the often-cited and so-called "Statute of the Mudejars," which called for the emigration of all Muslims from Christian Spain.⁵³

⁵⁰ P.S. van Koningsveld and G.A. Wiegers, "The Islamic Statute of the Mudejars in the Light of a New Source," *al-Qantara* 17 (1996), 54, raises this question concerning the presence of jurists during the negotiation of treaties.

⁵¹ In the brief section that follows, my aim is only to summarize the state of the field on this matter. I follow closely the conclusions of Barton, Muldoon, Abou el Fadl, Miller, van Koningsveld, and Wiegers as cited below.

⁵² See Abū Sa'īd Saḥnūn, *al-Mudawwana al-Kubrā* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), III:278 as cited in Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," *Islamic Law and Society* 1:2 (1994), 141-87, cit. 146.

⁵³ See Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Rushd, *al-Muqaddimāt al-Mumahhidāt*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥajjī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988), II:151-4; idem, *al-Bayān wa'l-taḥṣīl wa'l-sharḥ wa'l-tawjīh wa'l-ta'līl fī masā'il al-Mustakhrajah*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥajjī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988), IV:170-1 as cited in Abou El Fadl, "Muslim Minorities," 151. On Ibn Rabī', for whom only a privately owned manuscript exists, see van Koningsveld and Wiegers, "Islamic Statute," 24-5. See also Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī, *Mi'yār al-mu'rib wa-al-jāmi' al-mughrib 'an fatāwā' 'ulamā' ahl Ifrīqiya wa'l-Andalus wa'l-Maghrib*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥajjī, 13 vols. (Rabat-Beirut, 1401/1981), II:121-4, 130-3, and 140-1. These *fatāwā* were also edited separately in Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī, *Asnā al-matājir fī bayān aḥkām man ghalaba 'alā waṭanihi al-naṣārā wa-lam yuhājir wa-mā yatarratahu 'alayhi min al-'uqūbāt wa'l-zawājir*, ed. Ḥusayn Mu'nis (Maktabat al-thaqāfa al-dīniyya, 1996). More generally, on the duty to emigrate, see M.K. Masud, "Being a Muslim in a non-Muslim polity: Three alternative models," *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 10 (1989), 118-28; M.K. Masud, "The obligation to migrate. The doctrine of the Hijra in Islamic law" in *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination*, eds. Dale Eickelman and James Picatori (London, 1990), 29-49; Michael A. Köhler, *Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient: eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben*, 12 vols. in 13 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991); Maribel Fierro, "La emigración en el Islam: Conceptos antiguos, nuevas problemas," *Awraq* 12 (1991), 11-41; B. Lewis, "La situation des populations musulmanes dans un régime non-musulman: réflexions juridiques et historiques"

Any Muslims, these jurists added significantly, who offered military support to non-Muslim states should be considered outlaws (*muḥāribūn*) and polytheists, which is to say that they could be legitimately killed.⁵⁴ The basic assumption that these jurists shared was that Muslims could not freely or properly practice their religion abroad.

Nevertheless, as Abou El Fadl and others have recently argued, these positions should not be taken as fully representative of the Mālikī tradition or Islamic law.⁵⁵ Primarily, to do so would be to overlook the particular historical circumstances in which these jurists wrote: in these three cases, after the fall of Toledo, Murcia, and Granada respectively. Each one, in other words, issued his opinion in a period of religious crisis and territorial contraction. Secondly, focusing on these hardline opinions overlooks the variety of opinions both within the Mālikī school and beyond it. The Mālikī jurist al-Māzarī (d.536/1141), for instance, considered it permissible for Muslims to live in non-Muslim territory if they continued to struggle to restore that territory to Muslim rule or spread the message of Islam in it.⁵⁶ Examining other schools of law further reveals that

in *Muslims in Europe*, eds. B. Lewis and D. Schnapper (Poitiers, 1992), 11-34; and Kathryn A. Miller, "Muslim Minorities and the Obligation to Emigrate to Islamic Territory: Two *Fatwās* from Fifteenth-Century Granada," *Islamic Law and Society* 7:2 (2000), 256-88.

⁵⁴ *Mi'yār*, II:129-30. See also van Koningsveld and Weigers, "Islamic Statute," 26-7 citing the unpublished manuscript of Ibn Rabī'. On the *muḥārib*, which may also be translated as bandit, and the question of *ḥirāba*, banditry, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge, 2001), 51-61.

⁵⁵ As Abou El Fadl says succinctly: "The persistent existence of Muslim minorities residing outside *dār al-Islām* challenged this dichotomous view. The linguistic dichotomy between *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* obscures a much more complex historical reality. The juristic discourse on the issue was not dogmatic and does not lend itself to essentialist positions" ("Muslim Minorities," 141). For diverse examples of sources available in translation, see Vincent Lagardère, *Histoire et société en occident musulman au Moyen Age: analyse du Mi'yār d'Al-Wansharīsī* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1995).

⁵⁶ *Mi'yār*, II:133-4. See also Abdel Majid Turki, "Consultation juridique d'al-Imam al-Māzarī sur le cas des musulmans vivant en Sicile sous l'autorité des Normands," *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph*, 50:2 (1984). Abou El Fadl, "Muslim Minorities," 151. Another Mālikī jurist, 'Ubaydallāh al-Maghrawī al-Wahrānī issued a fatwa in 909-10/1504 advising Granadans to practice their religion in secrecy, which Abou El Fadl argues suggests that there was some debate within the school. See also L.P. Harvey, "Crypto-Islam in 16th Century Spain," *Actas del Primer Congreso de estudios arabes e Islamicos* (Madrid, 1964) and his *Islamic Spain*, esp. 55-67.

there was little or no general consensus on these issues.⁵⁷ Facing circumstances similar to the Malikīs – the expansion of non-Muslims into Muslim territory – Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanafī scholars responded very differently.⁵⁸ They held that any territory in which Islamic law continued to be practiced freely should be considered part of Islamic territory (*dār al-Islam*).⁵⁹ And to cite one example relevant to this discussion, the Shāfi‘ī jurist Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 974/1566) urged Muslim states to offer military support to any territory that allowed Muslims to practice their religion openly.⁶⁰ Could such a view have shaped these soldier exchanges? Lastly, accepting the opinions of these jurists wholesale also overlooks the gap between theory, which constitutes the vast bulk of surviving evidence, and practice, for which little evidence remains. As van Koningsveld and Wiegers have shown, the Muslims of Spain were not limited to the opinions of Malikī jurists. Some traveled as far as Egypt to seek opinions, which is to say that in practice, individuals actively shaped the meaning of the law to suit their purposes.⁶¹ And it is in this regard, moreover, that the value of the treaties is most apparent. If they reflected the influence of

⁵⁷ Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History* (Princeton, 2006), 11-19 and 54-96, which succinctly outlines the debates surrounding the meaning of *jihād* from the classical to the early modern periods.

⁵⁸ Ḥanafī scholars generally held that the duty to emigrate to Muslim territory was abrogated during the lifetime of Muḥammad. See, for instance, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī's Siyar*, trans. Majid Khadduri (John Hopkins, 1966), 187 as cited in Abou El Fadl, “Muslim Minorities,” 145.

⁵⁹ Abou El Fadl, “Muslim Minorities,” 159-63. The claim was made, for example, by al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) as cited in Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī, *al-Majmū' Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), XIX:264 as cited in Abou El Fadl, “Muslim Minorities,” 150. See also, as cited in Abou El Fadl, the case of Shams al-Dīn al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1595-6) who defended the right specifically of the Muslims of Aragon to remain in Christian Spain.

⁶⁰ Abū al-‘Abbās Shihāb al-Dīn Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, *Fath al-Jawād Sharḥ al-Irshād* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1971), II:346 as cited in Abou El Fadl, “Muslim Minorities,” 167. As Abou El Fadl points out, al-Shāfi‘ī himself went further to make the defense of such territory obligatory in order to prevent that land from returning to a pre-Islamic state (*dār al-kufr*). Cf. *ibid*, 179, which suggests that Muslims in non-Muslim territory should remain neutral during battles unless their personal property is threatened, an opinion that may have shaped the attitudes found in the Mudéjar surrender agreements. As a digression, see also B.M. Nafī, “Fatwā and War: On the Allegiance of American Muslim Soldiers in the Aftermath of September 11,” *Islamic Law and Society* 11:1 (2004), 78-116.

⁶¹ See van Koningsveld and Wiegers, “Islamic Statute,” 35-49 on the opinions of the four Qāḍīs of Egypt regarding the obligation to emigrate from non-Muslim territory. Interestingly, even the Malikī jurist of Egypt considered it permissible for the Muslims of Aragon to delay their emigration.

these lawyers, then they provide a unique view of Mālikī legal praxis, one that suggests that these jurists took a far more pragmatic position in practice than their published opinions might suggest.

As Simon Barton has recently shown, the case was similar for canon law: rigid attitudes masked flexibility.⁶² Over the thirteenth century, more particularly, after Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), the Papacy eased or added subtlety to its stance toward Christian mercenaries. Fearing that they would alienate Christians living abroad, some Popes began to recognize the spiritual needs of Christian mercenaries. Honorius III (1216-1227) absolved these soldiers of their sins and urged the Almohad Caliph to allow them to practice Christianity freely.⁶³ For his part, Innocent IV (1243-54) saw the Muslim sultans' dependence upon these troops as an asset and used the threat of withdrawing his approval of their residence in North Africa for diplomatic leverage. By the time of Nicholas IV (1288-1292), the Pope, not unlike al-Māzarī above, claimed that the presence of Christian soldiers might have a positive effect on the conversion of the Muslims.⁶⁴ And perhaps most significantly for the Catalan case, Ramón de Penyafort (d.1275) – the leading jurist in Christendom, master-general of the Dominican Order, and closer advisor of Jaume I – carefully distinguished in his own work between legitimate and illegitimate mercenaries – those with or without legal permission – serving in North

⁶² See also, Burns, “Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen.” I would like to thank Benjamin Yousey-Hindes of Stanford University for kindly giving me a copy of his unpublished essay, “The Papacy and North Africa, 1049-1292.” More generally, see Peter Linehan, *The Spanish church and the Papacy in the thirteenth century* (Cambridge, 1971) and Damian J. Smith, *Innocent III and the Crown of Aragon: the limits of papal authority* (Ashgate, 2004).

⁶³ D. Mansilla, *La documentación pontifica de Honorio III (1216-1227)* (Rome, 1965), docs. 243, 439, 562, 579, 588, 590, and 595 as cited in Barton, “Traitors of the Faith,” 37.

⁶⁴ Barton, “Traitors of the Faith,” 37. See also Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels*, 41, 52 and 54; Alemany, *Milicias cristianas*, esp. 137-42; Mas Latrie, docs. 10, 15, 17, and 18. The related question of whether it was licit in Islamic law for a Muslim ruler to use Christian soldiers was addressed by al-‘Utbī in Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, *Kitāb al-bayān*, III:10-1. Al-‘Utbī concludes that it is legitimate to use such troops but that their specific rights differ from that of Muslim soldiers.

Africa.⁶⁵ In short, as with the Crown above, the Papacy and Church seemed to moved belatedly to recognize and profit from the presence of Christian soldiers in Muslim kingdoms.

While the foregoing discussion is by no means exhaustive, it does demonstrate that religious discourse possessed a greater versatility than initially imagined. Jurists worked to accommodate legal theory to changing historical circumstances, a dynamic that is also evidenced by the treaties examined above.⁶⁶ But perhaps more significantly, these agreements also placed Islamic and Christian legal traditions in dialogue with one another. In these cases, negotiators were not only trying to accommodate juridical discourse to circumstance but also to the demands of another legal tradition. In this respect, one notes a curious symmetry in these agreements. Muslims and Christians moved in distinct directions, for distinct purposes: the Crown of Aragon agreed to use its Muslim soldiers against its Christian enemies just as Muslim sultans agreed to use their Christian mercenaries against Muslims. The legitimate use of violence in one tradition depended upon its parallel and opposite use in another. In this exchange of violence, one encounters a curious transgression of crusade and *jihād* that nevertheless reproduced their logic by inversion. Put bluntly, Christian kings temporarily sponsored *jihād* so long as Muslim sultans sponsored its opposite, crusade. Whether or not these restrictions were observed in practice, however, is the concern of a later chapter.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ *Raymundia seu documenta quae pertinent ad S. Raymundi de Pennaforti vitam et scripta*, ed. Balme (Rome, 1901), 35 as cited in Burns, “Renegades, Adventurers, and Sharp Businessmen,” 354.

⁶⁶ Abou El Fadl, “Muslim Minorities,” 143: “The reaction of different jurists reflected a dynamic process by which doctrinal sources, legal precedents, juristic methodologies and historical reality interacted to produce results.”

⁶⁷ See Chapter 6 for the case of al-‘Abbās b. Rahḥū in particular.

iv. BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL

After the pacification of the *Uniones* in 1287, Alphonse had only a short reprieve before having to deal with the French again. Angered by the Catalan king's support for Alfonso de la Cerda, a pretender to the Castilian throne, in 1289, Sancho IV of Castile allied himself with the French against the Crown of Aragon, opening up the possibility of a war on two fronts. Precisely as Pere responded to the sovereign crisis of 1285, Alphonse dispatched an ambassador to the Naşrid Sultan Muḥammad II (671-701/1273-1302) in order to recruit *jenets* for the war against France and Castile. And indeed, Alphonse's mission echoes almost perfectly Pere's of four years earlier. This near reprise of Lancia's successful mission, nevertheless, aims to reveal how informal patterns of recruitment intertwined with the formal diplomacy, described above.

In December of 1289, the king issued safe conducts to a motley crew of representatives – Christians, Jews, and Muslims – headed by Abraham Abenamies, a Jewish ambassador, to go to the Granadan court.⁶⁸ And, as Pere did for Conrad Lancia's

⁶⁸ The multi-confessional make-up of Abenamies' delegation is reflected in the letters of safe conduct issued by the king on his behalf, ACA, R 84:10v (12 January 1290): "Since we are sending Abraham Abenamies of our house to the illustrious king of Granada for certain negotiations of ours, we order you [to safeguard] the same Abraham, his family, and the Christians, Jews, and Muslims that he must take with him / Cum mitamus Abraham Abenamies de doma nostra ad illustrem Regem Granate pro aliquibus negociationes [nost]ris, mandamus [vobis], quatenus, eidem Abrafim vel familie sue vel Christianis etiam Judeis aut Sarracenis quos secum ducere debet." Two documents from the reign of Pere III indicate that Abengalel had already been to the Naşrid court in 1280. ACA, R 47:122r: "Al molt alt et molt noble et molt poderos Alamit Abuatdele Amiramuzlemin, fill del molt alt et molt noble et poderos [Ami]ramuzlemin Abuatdele Abennagar et seynor de Granada, de nos en Pere per la gracia de deu d' Arago et de [S]icilia Rey, salutes moltes cum amic que molt amam et en qui molt nos fiam.... E nos tramerrem d'aqui a pocs deis Abraham Abengalel, jueu nostre qui s[o]braço et sobre altres coses vos dira alcunes coses de nostra part." While returning from that mission, moreover, Abengalel was attacked by Castilian pirates. See the poorly preserved ACA, R 48:83v (15 June 1280): "<Universis officialibus ... rogamus per litteras nostras Illustrem Regem Castelle quod facere restitui Ab>raffim Abingal<el, iudeo nostro Valencie, merces> et alias res quas quidam pirate dicti <Regis abstulerunt dicto> Abraffimo qui veniebat <de Rege Granate> ad quem ipsum miseramus. Et [super] hiis in <ipso Rege> repulsam invenerimus, id<circo eidem Abra>ffim licenciam <dedimus pignorandi res> et <bona h>ominum <Rege> Castelle ex<cepto> quod nolumus quod in [terra] <nostra possit pignorare aliquos> mercatores <Cas>stelle venientibus cum mercibus apud Valenciam ne redditus [...] tabelle ... Valencie diminuanter. Ipso etiam assecurante quod pignora que f[...] <tornare in posse vestro et postquam ea tenueritis, teneatis per unum m<ensem> de

mission, the king released Granadan captives as a gesture of good will.⁶⁹ Alphonse's instructions to Abenamies are clear: he proposed a tripartite alliance with Granada and the 'Abd al-Wādids against the Marīnids.⁷⁰ Although the Crown of Aragon had only just proposed peace with the Marīnids and making a new enemy at this moment seemed a strange tactic, Alphonse was aware that the Naşrids resented Abū Ya'qūb's influence in the Iberian Peninsula and would be amenable to any anti-Marīnid alliance.⁷¹ In return, Alphonse asked that Granada, which had entered into a truce with Castile, remain neutral

manifesto inf[ra] <quantum m[...] st[...]tens et moneatis legitime <dictis homines Castelle> quod satisfaciant dicto Abraffim in predictis rebus [...] oblati \et in dampnis que inde sustinuit/ et nisi infra ipsum [mensem] <sibi satisfac>erint ac restituerint res predictas vendatis tot de ipsis pignoribus quod sufficiant <ad restitut>[ionem] predicatrum nostrum ablatarum predicto Abraffim et expensarum quam iuraverit se f[eci]sse pro <predictis>. [.....] per vos facta \et omnium etiam dampnorum que per predictis <sustinuisse probaruit>/ et quicquid super fuit de ipsis pignoribus, hominibus quibus facta fu[rare res]titua[ti]s. Datum Ilerde idus Iunii." The latter document is severely deteriorated and was read with the aid of an ultraviolet lamp. For more on Abenamies, see D. Romano, "Judíos ecribianos y turjamanes," 90-5. See also, Catlos, "Mercenary," 258-60.

⁶⁹ Alphonse requested that captives be turned over to Abenamies and that an order be issued publicly throughout the kingdom of Mallorca not to attack the ships or men of Granada and to cease "exporting" or trading Saracen captives without an *albaranum*, which demonstrated clear proof of the Saracens' origin and status at the time of imprisonment. ACA, R 82:3v (8 January 1289): "Petro de Libiano, baiulo maiori R[egni] Maiorice. Mandamus et dicimus vobis, quatenus, illos duos Sarracenos //quos// [qui] sunt capti in Regno Maiorice de Rege Granate quod [vobis] host[en]det Abrafim Abenamies vel aliquis lo[co] sui faciatis absoluti et tradi incontinenti dicto Abrafimo vel cui ipse voluerit loco sui ut ipsos poss[it] ex] parte nostra adducere et tradere dicto Regi Granate. Mandamus etiam vobis, quatenus, f[aci]atis preconicari public[am] per dictum Regnum Maiorice ne aliqui ausi inferre aliquid dampnum vel malum dicto Regi Granate vel [ter]re eiusd[em] sub pena corporis et bonorum et inhibeat fortiter et diligenter ne aliqui arment ibi nisi prius assecrav[er]int legit[ime] quod dicto Regi Granate vel terre sue nullum malum inferrant sive dampnum, et ne aliqui possint extrahere al[ios] Sarracenos de Regno predicto sine albarano vestro ob hoc ne dictus Rex Granate inde dampnum valeat sustinere, tal[iter] quod non possitis a nobis [de] negligencia reprehendi, preterea dicimus vobis, quatenus, signif[i]catis mercatoribus dicti Regni quod dic[tus] Rex G[ra]nate remisit eis unum bisancium et medium pro centenario de gracia. [Datum] ut supra." See also on the same folio, ACA, R 82:3v (8 January 1289): "Raimundo Scorne. Ma[ndamus et] dic[imus] vobis, quatenus, illos Sarracenos quos tenet baiulis [V]alencie captos qui sunt de Reg[ne] Granate et quod ut dicitur [vos emper]astis faciatis absolvi in[conti]nenti et tradi fideli nostro Abrafimo Abenamie[s] et etiam illis [dictos] Sarracenos qui sunt in domo hospitale Va[lencie] et qui fuerunt capti per Raimundum de Sancto Licerio et per [Arnaldum] de Turricella et quos vo[s] etiam ut dicitur emperastis, ob hoc ut ipsos omnes [p]ossit [ex] parte nostra adducere et tradere dicto Illustri Regi Granate. Datum ut supra." The order is repeated at ACA, R 84:10v (12 January 1290).

⁷⁰ See ACA, R 73:70r-71r (January 1290) for the full text of Alphonse's instructions to Abenamies. Gazulla, "Zenetes," 188 quotes the document but without proper reference. ACA, R 73:70r: "Item [dia] del part del Senyor Rey al Rey de Granada que ell no enten a aver pau ne amistat ab Abenjacop ans li fer saber que si ell gerreya ab ell quen naltra al Rey de Granada. E encara que ha trames missatge al Rey de Trimçe per refermar pau ab ell e tot aço fa per ço con lo Rey de Granada ho conseilla e enten que ell li es e li sera leyal amich."

⁷¹ To be precise, the Banū Ashqīlūla, rivals of the Banū Naşr, were allied with the Marīnids against the Granadan sultan.

during the coming war.⁷² And, without a sense of contradiction, he requested 400 or 500 *jenets* for his own armies to use against the French and Castilians. Intriguingly and critically, Alphonse added a clause that in the event that the king of Granada could not provide these *jenets*, the Catalans could recruit (*trer*) them through one of his agents (*u hom seu*).⁷³ The Naşrid sultan agreed to these terms, dispatched 300 *jenets* – somewhat less than Alphonse requested – and released all his Aragonese captives as a reciprocal gesture of good will.⁷⁴

Thus, at the level of state diplomacy, Alphonse succeeded in obtaining *jenets* for his war against France and Castile, but evidence exists that he also had success in recruiting further Muslim cavalry through an informal channel hinted at above. In February of 1290, two months after Abenamies' mission, Alphonse issued three letters, each to a captain of *jenets* residing in the kingdom of Granada:

Don Alphonse, by the grace of God, King of Aragon, Mallorca, Valencia, and Count of Barcelona, to you, Don Iuceff Abenzubayba, greetings and good will. We have understood from Adabub Adalil that you with a company of *jenets* wish to enter into our service, which pleases us greatly. And we hope that after seeing this letter, you will come to Valencia, where we have ordered our faithful scribe, Raimund Escorne, to collect from us your salary (*quitacio*) and whatever you require. And we promise you that when we have won with the aid of God a settlement to the war, if you have not returned to the land of the King of Granada, that as long as you wish to stay in our land that you will lack nothing (*no vos faleçremos de lo que ayades menester*) until

⁷² Muḥammad II supported Sancho IV (1284-1295) against Alfonso X (1252-1284) of Castile during their rift in early 1280s, making Sancho well-disposed to ally with the sultan of Granada after Alfonso's death. See Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 159-60.

⁷³ ACA, R 73:70r: "Item que prec lo Rey de Granada CCCC ho D jenets los quals pusca aver contral Rey de França et el princep [Don Sancho] et si per aventura asso no podia el fer que consienta quel Senyor Rey d'Arago los pusca fer [t]rer de la sua terra per u hom seu."

⁷⁴ No text of the treaty exists, but the following document confirms that Granada agreed to the terms of Abenamies' negotiations. ACA, R 77:25v (ca. 1289-90): "Memoria a Acart de Mur que quan sia ab la Rey de Granada referm ab el per part del Ray d'Arago la amor que a estada tractada entre els la qual amor referme en aquella metexa manera ab lo rey de Granada per don Alfonso, Rey de Castella. Item que endreç ab lo dit Rey de Granada ques meta en la guerra contra don Sanc[ho] CCC cavallers de Genetes el Seynor Rey assegurarai li sa bastantement lur seu. Item que enlo refer[.] Reys d'Arago et de Castella, ni aquells Reys atresi no puxam fer amor ab don Sancho sens lo Re[y] de Granada. Item que endreç quel Rey de Granada [...] et absolva les catius de la terra Rey d'Arago que ten preses."

you win the love of the King of Granada, because we know that every man who serves us, serves the King of Granada (*tot homne qui a nos sierva, sierve al Rey de Granada*). Dated Saragossa, 24 February.

Likewise to Don Mahomet al Granadaxi.
Likewise to Don Mahomet Abenadalil.⁷⁵

Two facts revealed by Alphonse's letter indicate that these *jenet* captains negotiated their entry into the service of the Crown of Aragon independently of the Naşrid sultan. First, one notes the presence of a Muslim intermediary by the name of Adabub Adalil. Was this the agent for whom Abenamies sought permission, the agent who would recruit *jenets* in the event the sultan could not fulfill the Crown's demand? One might also guess at the identity of this agent. "Adabub Adalil" may be a mangled version of Aboabdille Abnadalil (properly, Abū 'Abd Allāh b. al-Dalīl), who served with his company of *jenets* in the defense of the Crown in 1290. Aboabdille appears just once in the Registers, when in July of 1290, Alphonse ordered the payment of this *jenet* from money owed by the "Christians, Jews or Saracens" of Valencia for the defense of the kingdom.⁷⁶ As a side

⁷⁵ Gazulla, "Zenetes," 188-9 provides an incomplete edition of the document. See also, Catlos, "Mercenary," 259 for his comments on the document. ACA, R 73:77v (24 February 1290): "Don Alfonso por la gracia de dios Rey d'Aragon, de Maylorcha, de Valencia, et comde de Barchinone, a vos don Iuceff Abenzubayba, sal[uts] et buena voluntat. Entendimos por Adabub Adalil que vos con compayna de genetes queredes venir a nostro servicio la qual cosa a nos plase muyche. E rogamos vos que luego vista la carta vengades a Valencia on nos avemos ordenado que fiel nostre escriviano Raimund Escorna vos de recaudo de venir a nos de quitacio et de lo que ayades menester. E prometemos a vos que quando nos ayamos ganado con la aiuda de dios nostro entendimienta de la guerra que sino os avedez tornar a la [tierra] del Rey de Granada que tanto quanto vos querades estar en nuestra terra que no vos faleçremos de lo que ayades menester fasta que vos ganemos la amor del Rey de Granada como quier que sepamos que tot homne qui a nos serva, sierve al Rey de Granada. Datum Cesarauguste, VI kalendas Marcii.

"S[e]mblant a don Mahomet al Granadaxi.
"Semblant a don Mahomet Abnadalil."

⁷⁶ In this document, Aboabdille receives 13,000 *sous* for his and his troops' salaries from the merchant, Jacobus Carbonelli, who in turn, was meant to recover this money from the "Christians, Jews, or Muslims" of Valencia. Passing along the debt in this manner was the King's standard practice. See ACA, R 82:61v-62r (2 July 1290): "Nos Alfonsus et cetera confitemur et recognoscimus vobis Iacobo Carbonelli, mercatori, quod ad opus quitacionis nobilis Aboabdille Abnadalill et jen[e]torum qui cum eo vener[u]nt in servitium nostrum et in deffensionem terre nostre mutuastis nobis bono amore tresdecim mille solidos regalium de quibus tradid[i]stis pro nobis et de mandato nostro fideli scriptori nostri Raimundo Scorne X mille solidos, et residuos III mille [solidos] tradidistis fideli [th]esaurario nostro Arnaldo de Bastida, que quidem tresdecim solidos [re]galium renunciantes exceptioni non numerate et non r[ece]pte peccunie et doli, promittimus bona fide solvere vobis vel cui volueritis loco vestri ad volun[tatem] vestram sine omni

note, therefore, one sees the citizens of Valencia, including Jews and Muslims, called upon again to finance the king's use of *jenets* in defense of the kingdom. If Aboabdille and Adabub were one and the same man, one might therefore conclude that the Catalan agent operating in Granada was both a *jenet* in the king's service and relative of Mahomet Abenadalil (Muḥammad b. al-Dalīl), who received one of the three letter Alphonse issued.⁷⁷ Abenadalil's recruitment, by extension, would represent another case in which informal and underground connections – in this case, family ties – served the Crown in its search for *jenets*.⁷⁸ Movement across this frontier, in other words, was not

dilatione, excusatione et exceptione et absque omni d[amp]no et missione vestri et vestrorum de primis denarios quos recipi[...] et colligi faciamus in Regno Valencie, qualibet racione vel cause a Christianis, Iudeis vel Saracenis tam de donare auxilii s[...] si[.] Je que nunc nobis dari debet in Regno predicto [...] quia dictos denarios conceritimus in deffensionem terre nostre quam etiam [fol. 62r] quibuscumque aliis denariis ... ipsas collectas vobis quos volueritis loco vestri, et ipsas colligatis et levetis bene et fideliter pro nobis, ac de eisdem teneamini con[...]are cum dicto thesaurario nostro vel cum qu[.] ipse [vo]luerit loco sui ac eidem tornare quidque de eisdem collectis super fuerit, solutis vobis et retenes primum XIII mille solidos quod sup[ra]dictis, preterea convenimus et promittimus vobis bona fide quod per [v]os vel quem volueritis loco vestri et non per aliquem alium facimus fieri dictas collectas, et per presentes mandamus dicto thesaurario nostro, quod cartas que ferre habuerint de ipsis collectis tradat et tradi faciat vobis et non alui alii loco nostri, et solvat compleat et observet integritur et observari faciat et compleri, assignationem nostram predictam ut scimus continetur. Et facta et cetera. Datum in Gabannis. VI nonas Iulii.” Cf. Catlos, “Mercenary,” 261, n.16, argues that the reference to Aboabdille is a scribal error and that the document concerns only Mahomet Abenadalil.

⁷⁷ The fascinating figure of Mahomet Abenadalil (the spelling of his name varies in the Registers) is the subject of Catlos' thoroughly researched, “Mahomet Abenadalil: A Muslim Mercenary in the Service of the Kings of Aragon (1290-1291).” Catlos, “Mercenary,” 273, also suggests that Mahomet Abenadalil was a member of the Naṣrid royal family, which would indicate that he was an Andalusī knight and not a *jenet*; however, I believe Catlos misreads the document that he uses to support his claim. He reads ACA, R 55:49v (1291) to say that Abenadalil was a cousin of the sultan (my emphasis): “El senyor rey feu li reposta que li plauria que fos axi et que esperava son ardit de ço que ja li avien dit de sa part don Mahomet Abenadalill *cosi seu* et Abraham Abenamies...” I read the entire document as follows: “Estant lo senyor Rey en lo dit loc de Calatayu vent I cavalier per nom Hazen de part del Rey de Granada ab cartes sues \lo qual Rey de Granada se apela Mahomet Abenabdille Abenasser/ en los quals li fetya saber que per molts bons deutes que avia aves ab los seus antecessors, volia atressi aver ab ell, amor et bon v[o]lensa. El Senyor Rey feu li resp[o]sta que li plauria que fos axi et que esperava son ardit de ço que ja li avien dit de sa part dito Maho[met] Abenadalill, *casa seu*, et Abraham Abenamies qui al entrant de son regne en Maylorche vengan a el de sa part. E auda daço resposta tota via hi veuria, ell et hi compliria son deute.” The document is referring to Abenadalil as a member of the king's household, a fact established in numerous other documents, who was traveling to Granada, via Mallorca. To my knowledge, two more notices of the *jenet* captain Mahomet al Granadaxi appear in the archive: ACA, R 91:17v-18r (1 February 1291) and ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620:69r (16 May 1294). He remained in the service of the Crown of Aragon for a longer period than Mahomet Abenadalil.

⁷⁸ For a fascinating exploration of and meditation on filiative bonds, see Daniel Boyarin, *Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: 1994).

solely at the discretion of sovereigns. The second fact that indicates these soldiers entered Valencia under their own auspices is the context of their departure from Granada. Alphonse promised all three captains that they may remain in his service until such time as they regain the love of the sultan, which is to say that these captains had fallen out with Muḥammad II. One can only speculate about the cause for this rift. It may have been personal; however, the *jenets*' willingness to enter the service of the Crown of Aragon against Castile may also indicate their disapproval of Muḥammad's standing truce with Castile. During this period, for their part, the North African *Ghuzāh* in al-Andalus ignored Muḥammad II's calls for peace and continued their attacks on Castile.⁷⁹ But, significantly, Iuceff Abenzubayba, Mahomet al Granadaxi, and Mahomet Abnadalil's entry into service of the Crown of Aragon did not represent a rupture with or betrayal of Granada. Alphonse confirmed in his letter that "that every man who serves us, serves the King of Granada." In short, although these *jenet* captains came to Valencia as exiles or bandits, through the mercenary logic of the medieval Mediterranean, they could legitimately serve both the Christian Crown of Aragon and Muslim Granada simultaneously.

The Crown records do reveal that numerous *jenets* assisted Alphonse in his confrontation with the French and Castilians in this period. The *jenet* company of Mahomet Abenadalil, whose activity is well documented, first traveled to the Navarese frontier, where the French forces were launching an invasion in late 1289.⁸⁰ In 1290, they

⁷⁹ Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 159.

⁸⁰ Catlos, "Mercenary," 261 suspected Abenadalil's company served on the Navarrese border. A small document from the Chancery Registers, in which Alphonse orders the nobleman Lope Ferrench de Luna to return booty that his armies had seized from Abnadalil's troops while they were in Navarre, confirms that Catlos is correct. ACA, R 81:215r (25 November 1290): "Fuit scriptum Luppo French de Luna quod predictam quam quidam jeneti Abenadalili capitis jenetorum extraherunt de Navarr[a] [.].na[.] judemo eis

made raids across the Castilian frontier into Soria.⁸¹ Nevertheless, despite military aid from Muslim states and mercenary companies, Alphonse found it difficult to manage a war on so many fronts and was forced to come to a settlement on the matter of Sicily. At Tarascon in February of 1291, Alphonse agreed to withdraw support from his brother, Jaume of Sicily, and be reconciled with the Pope. Peace, however, would have to wait. The Treaty of Tarascon collapsed with Alphonse's sudden death in June of 1291.

v. THE END OF THE SOVEREIGN CRISIS

The lengthy reign of Jaume II (1291-1327) is marked by a super-abundance of archival records, a sign of his devotion to administration. Indeed, on the shelves of the *Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó*, one finds more records for this king than the previous three combined. Whereas his father and grandfather displayed military brilliance, Jaume displayed a passion for government. It is no coincidence, moreover, that this bureaucratic scribomania accompanied a dramatic rise in sovereign power. As Bisson says concisely, during King Jaume II's reign, "the pendulum swung back in favour of royal authority."⁸² More precisely, the sovereign crisis – the state of exception – that defined earlier reigns would find a solution during Jaume's tenure.

At first blush, Jaume's rule appeared to follow the pattern set by his predecessors. Struggling to keep control of the newly reunited Crown of Aragon, he faced opposition from his barons, still unwilling to support Aragonese rule in Sicily. And like his predecessors, Jaume sought to enlist support from the Muslim states of Spain and North

ablata fuit per aliquos de familia dicti nobilis faciat eis restitui. Datum Barchinone VII kalendas Decembris." See also Chapter 6.

⁸¹ Mahomet Abnadalil's itinerary is described in detail by Catlos, "Mercenary," 264-73.

⁸² Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon*, 94.

Africa.⁸³ The archives reveal that Jaume employed *jenets* abundantly throughout the realm in these early years.⁸⁴ That Muslim mercenaries were connected with the success of royal authority is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that rebellious barons themselves sought to recruit their own *jenets*. In 1293, when Artal de Alagon, one of the leaders of the *Uniones*, rose up again, he also sent ambassadors to Granada – including a *jenet* already in his service – to request the support of more Muslim cavalry. For his part, Jaume could not tolerate the possibility and moved rapidly to prevent any of the Aragonese noblemen from having access to Muslim troops.⁸⁵ Jaume's efforts in this

⁸³ In 1291, for instance, the Jewish ambassador Abraham Abengalel brought Jaume news that the 'Abd al-Wādid Sultan 'Uthmān b. Yaghmarāsan (681-703/1282-1303) would give the king paid *jenets* to use against his Christian enemies: "And in addition, in aid against Our Christian enemies, you [agree to] transfer this summer in our ship, one hundred paid *jenet* knights for three months." ACA, R 55:49v (October 1291): "E atressi en ayuda de sos enamics Christians que le tramesos al estiu ab navili del Senyor Rey C cavalier janetz pagats per III mesos et que li trameses resposta." Tilimsān had become a tributary of the Catalan state in this period. As the treaty drawn up between Abengalel and Abu Sa'īd indicates, the 'Abd al-Wād ruler paid some 2000 *doblas* (or *duplas*, gold coins) yearly "as your ancestor gave to us." See ACA, R 55:54r-54v (my emphasis): "Al molt noble e molt honrat Abuçahit Rey de Tirimçe [Abū Sa'īd b. 'Uthmān b. Yaghmarāsan] de nos en Jacme et cetera, salutem ab atalantament de bona amor. Recebem vestres letres les quales a nos aporta, lo feel nostre Abraham Abengallel, jueu nostre, e entesem diligenment, aquelles coses quens fees a saber, axi de la amor que volietz haver ab nos, axi con nos e los nostres ab los nostres hagneren, con encara sobre los perferes contengudes en les vestres letres, et encara aquelles quens dix lo dit Abraham Abengalell, per ques fem saber que a nos plau, que la amor sia entre nos e que nos ne nostra armada, no fassam ni lexem fer mal, en vestra terra ni en vestra iurisdicció, e quels mercaders vestres venguen salvament en nostra terra, e los nostres, en la vestra, cascuns dels vestres, e dels nostres pag[fol.54v]ans los dretz acostumatx, vos atressi daretz et trametrets a nos demantinent, duo mille dobles e puy cada any nos complirets altres duo milia dobles, *axi con vestres antecessores denaren als nostres*. E aytamben en aiuda dels nostres enamics Christians, vos trametetz al estiu ab lo nostre nauili C cavaller janetz pagats per vos per tres mesos. E ab missatge vestre, et ab lo dit Abraham Abengalell lo qual vos tramet[etz], d'aquestes coses haiam vestra resposta. Datum en Cal[a]tayu ut supra."

⁸⁴ For the year 1293 alone, see ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 6, no. 919 as well as the numerous entries for the years 1293-1294 in ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620, fols. 69r, 107r, 134r. This latter set of documents, an account book of the Master of Accounts, Arnaldus Bastida, appears to be a copy made in the fourteenth century.

⁸⁵ See the following two documents, one to Poncius de Miravallibus asking him to take troops to the frontier in Valencia to prevent the entry of any *jenet* troops into the Kingdom, and a second to Petrus de Libiano, bailiff of Valencia, informing him of the situation. ACA, R 98:110v (15 May 1293) and ACA, R 98:110v-111r (15 May 1293). ACA, R 98:110v (my emphasis): "Cum pro certo didicerimus *nobiles Aragonum noviter ad regnum Granate suos nuncios transmiserint pro petendo et habendo auxilio ab eodem*. Intellexerimus etiam alios nuncios ad dictum regem Granate misos fuisse per illustrem Alfonse, filium illustris dompni Ferrandi de Castellam, quod intellexerimus etiam quod *nobilis Artaldus de Alagone nunc misit ad dictum regem maiordumum suum simul cum quodam Sarraceno janeto pro habendo ab eo aliqua janetorum comitiva pro inferendo nobis dampnum*, et nos eorum tractatibus et conatibus intendamus et velimus resistere, sic quod non terre seu subditis nostris dampnum seu nocumentum aliquod inferre non possint."

regard were also part of a larger effort during his reign to limit the power of private armies and factions, to monopolize violence in the hands of the state.⁸⁶ The *jenets*, in other words, helped to make the Catalan king the sole authority within the disparate and heterogeneous territories of the Crown of Aragon. In this way, Jaume succeeded where previous rulers could not; he silenced the barons and their *Uniones*, who all but disappeared, and he regained the independence Alphonse had lost. On the domestic front, the ultimate success of the recruitment of *jenets*, one might therefore say, was not the assimilation of Muslim soldiers but rather the assimilation of the Crown's own subjects into the nascent state.

In 1295, Jaume also put the matter of Sicily to rest. On June 20, at the Treaty of Agnani, Jaume agreed to return the island to the Holy See in exchange for Sardinia and Corsica. Although the matter of Sicily was far from resolved, as far as the Crown of Aragon was concerned the crisis had passed. For his part, Jaume immediately began a new and confident program of expansion directed towards the Mediterranean. Under the pretense of support for Alfonso de la Cerda, the Castilian pretender, Jaume invaded Murcia, the coastal region south of Valencia. Throughout this period of hostility with Castile, Jaume enlisted the support of his Muslim neighbor, Granada. In 1295, the *alfaquimus* Samuel, who had supported Lancia's mission a decade earlier, secured an agreement with Muḥammad II for the support of the invasion of Castilian Murcia, in which the Granadans would supply their *jenets* for use only against Christians, and Aragon would supply ships at Granada's cost for use only against Muslims.⁸⁷ This treaty

⁸⁶ Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon*, 94.

⁸⁷ ACA, R 252:121r (18 November 1295): "Encara vos prometemos que demientre que esta paç durare entre vos o luno de vos que mas viviere e nos e querreder armar en nuestra tierra con vuestros dineros e espensas de una galera fast dieç empero contra moros e non contra Christianos en tal manera que de la ganancia que feçieren las ditas galeas ayamos nos la quinta sacado de personas e de villas e castiellos e de

was renewed in identical terms in 1301 by Bernat de Segalars.⁸⁸ Without belaboring the details, with regards to the *jenets* it was a period of *status quo*.

But in April of 1302, Muḥammad II died suddenly, and everything changed. Despite a period of military advantage for Granada and Aragon, Muḥammad III (701-708/1302-1309), known to posterity as *al-Makhlū‘*, the Deposed, entered into negotiations with Ferdinand IV of Castile. Perhaps for this reason, Jaume sent Bernat de Sarria to Abu Ya‘qūb, the Marīnid sultan, promising Catalan knights and ships for the sultan’s war against the ‘Abd al-Wādids but hoping, through this gesture, to repair his lapsed relationship with the Marīnids in the event that Castile and Granada were reconciled.⁸⁹ What accounted for the Granadan sultan’s change of heart?

Upon his ascension to the throne, Muḥammad III faced an uprising of the *Ghuzāh*. In 1302, the captain, Ḥammū b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Raḥḥū, grandson of one of the first leaders of the *Ghuzāh* to enter Spain, revolted, seizing the fortress of Bedmar near Jaén

tierras e el almirayl e los homnes de las galeas que ayan los dreytos de la ganancia según que acustumpnado es. E otrosi si nos cavaleros genetes avemos menester que vos dito Rey de Granada e vos almir su fijo o cualquier de vos después días del otro liuredes e enviades a nos de dieç fasta çincientos caballeros genetes cada un anyo que mester los ayamos empero contra Cristianos e non contra moros assi que desspues que fueren en nuestra tierra les demos del nuestro o les fagamos dar lures espensas e quitaciones convenientes segunt que vos les avedes acustumpnado de dar. E otrosi la ganancia que fiçieron los dito genetes sea toda dellos sacado personas villas castiellos o tierras e sacado la quinta de la ganancia la qual sean tenidos de dar a vos assi como nos la deviamos prender dellos.” Note the stipulation concerning the right of *jenets* to keep the fifth of booty traditionally reserved for the Catalan king. I return to this and other matters related to the experience of *jenets* in the service of the Crown of Aragon in Chapter 5.

⁸⁸ See his instructions, ACA, R 252:64r (15 September 1300); the text of the treaty, ACA, R 252:216r (29 January 1301) and ACA, R 334:26r (16 August 1301); the signed treaty, ACA, Pergaminos, Jaume II, no. 17 (April 1301); and in Arabic, ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, no. 148 (last day of Rabī‘ II, 701/31 December 1301).

⁸⁹ See ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 10, no. 1334 (27 January 1303). Instructions for Sarria, ACA, R 334:64r (14 April 1302). Aragon had contributed ships to the defeat of the Marīnids at Tarifa 1294 by Castile but maintained an appearance of neutrality throughout the period. See Dufourcq, *L’Espagne catalane*, 227: “Telles étaient pour l’Aragon complexes données du problème hispano-marocain en 1293. Il n’est pas étonnant que dans ces conditions Jacques II ait été amené à suivre une politique non moins complexe, souvent étrange en apparence, et parfois teintée d’hypocrisie ; mais il devait nécessairement songer à ménager tantôt Grenade et le Maroc, tantôt la Castille. Il faut étudier les étapes successives de ce qu’on peut appeler son « double jeu ».”

(Ar. Jayyān), and declaring himself independent of the new sultan.⁹⁰ When Fernando's ambassadors arrived at Muḥammad's court in 1303, they offered to aid in the conquest of Bedmar to the Mediterranean straits, a region dominated by North African *Ghuzāh*, in exchange for Granada's acknowledgement that it was Castile's vassal.⁹¹ Why, however, did Muḥammad turn to the support of Castile on these terms and not to Aragon, with whom it had a standing alliance? Muḥammad understood that he could not rely on the Crown to turn against the *Ghuzāh* – which is to say its own *jenets*. Of course, neither the Catalans, for whom this alliance threatened their control of the Mediterranean straits, nor the *Ghuzāh* welcomed the alliance between Castile and Granada. Thus, events began to converge towards a new confrontation, a new crisis. As early as October of 1303, Muḥammad complained to Jaume that “Aragonese *jenets*” were raiding Castilian territory.⁹² In June of 1304, Jaume himself secured transfer of another one to two thousand *jenets* from the Marīnids for use against Castile.⁹³ And perhaps most tellingly, in August of 1304, Bernat Sarria, Jaume's ambassador to Fez a year earlier, reported through a Muslim agent in Granada that some noblemen and knights (*alguns rics homens e cavalers*) were so displeased with Muḥammad's recent alliance that they were willing

⁹⁰ Today, the fortress of Bedmar is called “Castillo al-Matar.”

⁹¹ *Biblioteca de autores españoles*, 267 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1851-1975), vol. LXVI, *Cronica de Don Fernando Cuarto*, 133. See also Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 167.

⁹² ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 15, no.1969 (13 October 1303): “Otro si sabed que de que nos ovimos nuestro amor e nuestra paz puesta con el rey don Ferrando, que esos genetes que se fueron para vos que saltean los caminos e roban e lievan quanto fallan, tan bien de la tierra del rey don Fernando commo de la nuestra; por que vos rogamos rey, asi commo nos fiamos de la vuestra verdad e asi commo nos vos enbiastes decir por la vuestra carta, que guardariesdes muy bien la tregua e la vuestra verdad, quel non querades consentir e que nos fagades tornar todo lo nuestro e si non lo al, non seria tregua.” See also, ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 16, no.2026 (27 January 1304).

⁹³ ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, no. 84 (19 Dhu'l-Qa'da 703 / 14 June 1304): “And when there is dispute between you and the people of Castile, you may have from here from our army 1000 or 2000 as long as you require (*Wa-matā kān baynakum wa-bayn ahl Qashtāla nifāq fa-yajūzu 'alaykum min hunā min jayshinā alf aw alfān matā aḥtajtum ilayhim*).”

to join the Crown against Castile.⁹⁴ In other words, the Crown of Aragon had become a refuge for Muslim soldiers, not (or not merely) seeking profit but rather hoping to continue the struggle against Castile. It was in this climate, for instance, that the prominent *Ghuzāh* captain al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, an uncle of the rebel Ḥammū b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Raḥḥū, entered into the service of Crown of Aragon.⁹⁵ A royal official reported to Jaume: “Believe, my lord, that from what he says, Ibn Raḥḥū and the others want to serve us and in this they are worth more than all other armed knights (*quens hic valen mes que no farien atretans cavayls armats*), and know, my lord, that throughout the frontier, your enemies tremble and have great fear of them.”⁹⁶ Not all recruitment, in other words, was initiated by the Catalan state and for its own benefit.

Despite all these preparations, open war with Castile was narrowly averted. At Agreda in 1304, Castile agreed to compromise with Aragon on the matter of the straits: Aragon would retain Alicante and the parts of Murcia north of Segura but abandon the cause of the Castilian pretender, Alfonso de la Cerda. Most significantly, for the first time in two decades, Granada faced the possibility of an alliance between the two main Christian powers of the peninsula. Confessional and political boundaries seemed to suddenly align, and the state of exception, which brought the *jenets* and the Crown of Aragon into a formal alliance in the first place, appeared to be dissolving. Where would the loyalty of the *jenets* fall? This question, which goes beyond the matter of recruitment, is addressed in the final chapter of this dissertation.

⁹⁴ ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 120, no. 1172 (8 August 1304): “Encara ma comptat lo dit Muça que alguns rics homens e cavalers del rey de Granada eren molt despegats dels tractaments quel dit rey avia ab los castelans, e an me trames a dir que si vos los aviets mester a vostre servi, quels puriets aver, a son de CC a CCC jenets.”

⁹⁵ See Chapter 6 for more on this figure.

⁹⁶ ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 15, no. 1971. See Chapter 6 for a complete discussion of this document.

vi. THE CONSERVATIVE DYNAMIC

The previous two chapters have examined in detail both the context in which and the process by which the Crown of Aragon recruited foreign Muslim soldiers into its service. Put differently, they mapped the efforts of the nascent Catalan state to convert suspects and enemies – foreign Muslims – into its agents. A clear pattern emerged. Strikingly, the Crown of Aragon employed multi-confessional groups – groups that combined Christians, Jews, and Muslims – in its missions to recruit *jenets*. Negotiations happened on both formal and informal levels, between diplomats, spies, captives, and subject populations. One can read these missions as microcosms of the dynamic Mediterranean, in which confessional and political boundaries were transgressed with ease, in which the territorial state was one of many sources of authority. But more precisely, these missions reveal that the Crown of Aragon recognized that it was a late-comer to world of bandits, adventurers, and holy warriors. It did not invent the *jenets*. The *jenets* emerged from the alliance of a mecenary Mediterranean with the Catalan state.

But the institution that this interconfessional alliance served gives one pause. In moments of crisis, the Crown employed *jenets* to suppress internal and external threats and to extend the reach of its nascent state, to monopolize violence. It might be said that the Crown pursued *jihād* against its own citizens, a curious conclusion that nevertheless is a perfect expression of sovereign violence and the sovereign exception at the heart of political authority. The Catalan kings achieved this aim by not only buying but also selling violence across confessional and political boundaries. These transactions, however, did not signal the collapse of those boundaries. The inclusion of the *jenets* in the service of Crown of Aragon served the preservation of a logic that ultimately sought

their exclusion, a paradox that was reflected in the *jenets*' ambiguous status within the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, an ambiguity that is examined in the following chapter.

5. THE SOVEREIGN BOND

Machiavelli famously warned the Prince against using mercenaries in his armies, explaining that nothing binds the soldier-for-hire, nothing, that is, but greed.¹ The mercenary follows a simple logic, the logic of commodity exchange: service for pay wherever it may lead him, whatever the cause. He is, to put it simply, faithless (*infedeli*) and in the case of the *jenets*, rather literally, infidel. The previous chapters have examined the pre-history of the *jenets* – as exiles, bandits, and holy warriors on the Naşrid frontier – as well as the context in which and the means by which the Crown of Aragon recruited these troops. In times of sovereign crisis, the Crown turned to motley and marginally legitimate groups to seek out and recruit *jenets* from Granada and North Africa. And by examining diplomatic charters and instructions – looking from above – the last chapter made the claim that soldier exchanges reflected a conservative dynamic, enforcing the very boundaries they seemed to cross. On the basis of the rich documentary evidence from the Crown’s Chancery Registers, the following chapters – looking from below – turn to the lives and activities of the *jenets* themselves. More particularly, this chapter attempts to trace the journey of the *jenets* into the lands of the Crown of Aragon and their incorporation into the Catalan army. With Machiavelli in mind, it focuses on the relationship between the sovereign and the *jenets*. What bound

¹ Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ed. Burd (Oxford, 1891), chap. XII (my translation): “Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will be neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they neither fear God nor have faith in men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is: in peace, one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a small stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. / Le mercenarie ed ausiliari sono inutili e pericolose; e se uno tiene lo Stato suo fondato in su l’armi mercenarie, non starà mai fermo nè sicuro, perchè le sono disunite, ambiziose e senza disciplina, infedeli, gagliarde tra gli amici, tra i nimici vili, non hanno timore di Dio, non fede con gli uomini, e tanto si differisce la rovina, quanto si differisce l’assalto: e nella pace siei spogliato da loro, nella guerra da’ nemici. La cagione di questo è che [le] non hanno altro amore nè altra cagione che le tenga in campo, che un poco di stipendio, il quale non è sufficiente a fare che e’ vogliano morire per te.”

these foreign soldiers to the Catalan king? What place did they have in his political ambitions? And what did it mean – if anything – that the *jenets* were not simply faithless mercenaries but more properly, soldiers of another faith and another law?

i. AN IMPASSE

Arriving by land or sea, *jenets* entering the service of the Crown of Aragon found a world simultaneously familiar and strange. Like the five *jenets* with whom this dissertation began, most entered through the kingdom of Valencia. Crossing over the rough and arid hills that surrounded this territory, they would have caught sight of an expansive, green plain, covered with an arterial network of canals and framed by the blue Mediterranean.² One might say that it was Valencia's delicate nature, environmental and political, that lent its inhabitants an unusual mixture of ironic detachment and nostalgia. The Muslim poet Ibn Ḥarīq composed these lines on the eve of the kingdom's fall to the Catalans:

‘Valencia is the dwelling of all beauty.’
This they say both in the East and the West.
If someone protests that prices there are high
And that the rain of battle falls upon it
Say: ‘It is a paradise surrounded by
Two misfortunes: famine and war!’³

As the second chapter of this dissertation argued, however, the Catalan conquest of 1238 was far from clean and clear. In a truly Valencian fashion, crusading ideals mixed with

² The medieval kingdom of Valencia was larger than the modern Spanish province, including parts of modern Castellón, to the north, and Alicante, to the south.

³ Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Makhzūmī Ibn Ḥarīq of Valencia (d. 1225), who was the teacher of the well-known scholar Ibn al-Abbār, wrote these lines on the eve of the Jaume I's conquest (1238). See A.R. Nykl, *Hispano-Arabic poetry and its relations with the old Provençal troubadours* (Baltimore: 1946), 331 as cited in Burns, *Islam Under the Crusaders*, 3. Ibn Ḥarīq's contemporary, Pope Gregory IX (d. 1241) shared his enthusiasm (but not irony) for the beauty and wealth of Valencia (ACA, Bulas, legajo VI, no. 19 [8 January 1239]). As a digression, one notes that it is a regular conceit of postmodern critiques that irony and nostalgia are at cross purposes, see Susan Stewart, *On Longing: Narrative of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984), 23.

canny compromises. The Mudéjars maintained considerable military strength – castles and soldiers – that they alternatively employed against and in support of the Crown of Aragon.⁴ Significantly for the matter at hand, after 1262, these same Mudéjar strongholds received support from the North African *arrivistes* and holy warriors, the *Ghuzāh* (*al-ghuzāh al-mujāhidūn*), whom the Catalans called *jenets*.⁵ And like the Mudéjars, these *Ghuzāh* or *jenets* maintained complex relations with the Crown of Aragon.⁶ Nevertheless, despite this interconfessional imbrication, the overall tendency in Valencia was toward disunion. Muslim resistance to Catalan power peaked during the second revolt of al-Azraq, from 1275 to 1277, when Pere finally wrested control of the last, independent Mudéjar castles and pushed the *jenets* from his territory.⁷

⁴ Blasco de Alagón, who lived for some time in exile in Muslim Valencia, reported to King Jaume I before the conquest that the Muslims possessed forty or fifty castles in the kingdom. *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 128: “E es la meylor terra, e la pus bela del mon: que jo, Senyor, he estat en Ualencia be II anys, o pus, quan uos me gitas de terra. E no ha uuy deius Deu tan delitos logar con es la ciutat de Ualencia, e tot aquel Regne, e ten be VII iornades de terra de lonch: e si Deus uol que aquel conquirats, e uolra la meylor cosa haurets conquesta de delits, e de forts castells que sia el mon. E jo direus ço que a mim sembla: Si jous conseylaua que anassets assetjar I fort castell, dar uos hia mal conseyl, car be ni ha XL o L que mentre que menjar haguessen uos ni tot uostre poder nols poriets pendre.” For more on this figure, see Pascual Martínez Calvo, “La familia de Blasco de Alagón, su origen, La Ginebrosa, Alcaine, y Sástago,” *Castillos de Aragón* 6 (2002), 9-11. See also Desclot, *Crònica*, chap. 49 for more details of the military strength of Valencia before the conquest. For more on the military arrangements in the surrender agreements with Mudéjars, see Chapter 2. By some estimates, the Mudéjars comprised eighty percent of the Valencian population in the time of Jaume I.

⁵ See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the establishment of the *Ghuzāh*.

⁶ As discussed and cited in Chapter 2, a fragment from the Chancery Registers demonstrates that *jenet* companies negotiated directly with Prince Pere in 1265, perhaps even serving in his personal guard (ACA, R 17:57r-57v). This fact requires scholars to rethink the thesis put forward by Burns (*Islam under the Crusaders*, 352) and many others that the arrival of “fundamentalist” North Africans in Spain represented a step backwards in terms of religious interaction.

⁷ See the description of the revolt of al-Azraq in Chapter 2. See also the following surrender charter, in which several *jenet* companies agree to evacuate fortresses in Valencia in 1276. ACA, R 38:27r-27v (30 August 1276): “Esta es carta de treuga et de pammento que es fera entrel Senyor Enfant Don Pedro fiyo primero et heredero del muy noble Don Jayme Rey d’Arago et qui deus perdone et entrel vello noble Abrurdriz Hyale Abenayech et el caverro noble Abenzumayr Abenzaquimeran, el alguazir Abulfarary Asbat, aixi quel dito Senyor Infant attreuga a t[o]dos los castellos et //las que// que son alçadis alas pennas contra ell dito Senyor Infant en todo lo Regno [de] Valent et de su termino et de Exativa et de Si[...]jino. Sine es Alfandech de Merinyen et Alarch et Aquilar et Alaguar et Ataya et Salxet et Gartx et Serra Dalastar et Sorra de Confrides et Berdia et Uxala et Alyubayal et Alocayba et Pop et Rellen qui no son en esta tregua mas quel Senyor Enfant ne pueda fer su voluntad. Et atorga el Senyor Infant avantdito esta tregua por tres meses del dia que esta carta s[e]ra feyta adelant assi quel Senyor Infant ni ell ni homen neguno de su terra no faga mal alos ditos castellos et pena\s/ que son puestas en la tregua antes vayan todos los

This recapitulation of Valencian history was meant to say two prefatory things about the journey of the *jenets* into the service of the Crown of Aragon. First, these soldiers had surrendered Valencia less than a decade before Pere's efforts to recruit them in 1285.⁸ Their arrival, in other words, was more properly a return. Second, at the time the *jenets* abandoned Valencia, they were still newcomers. Thus, while they were not outsiders, they were also not insiders – not interchangeable with the Mudéjars. Their return, as such, was not a homecoming, and their journey cannot be considered simply in terms of an encounter between Islam and Christianity. What sort of path, therefore, did these foreign soldiers cut through this land?

Despite the loss of Mudéjar castles, much of Valencia would have appeared unchanged. Muslims still dominated the landscape, above all, the agrarian landscape, and

moro[s] daqueles castellos et pennas dentro el tiempo dela tregua salvos et seguras con todo el lur assi commo fan lu[r] ... Sennoria suya qui son en paz. E los dito[s] Abrurdr[i]z Yhale [Abenayech] et Abenzu[mayr \Ab]ulfary/ <treguam> otrossi a toda la terra del regno de [.....] toda la [.....] a los logares del dito Senyor Enfant de quiere que sean por ellos [et] por todos lures parentes et los jenetes et otras caveras de moros qui sean aqui en esta terra et en Gran[a]da et //de// \en/ qual que lugar otro que ninguno dellos no fagan dayno ne negun por ellos non fagan dayno en el regna de Valent ne en [fol.27v] nenguno otro lugar de Seynuria [de]l pre[sen]t Et si per avent[ur]a ... recebian ningun[os] [loga]res dela senyuria del senyor Infant av[ant]dito dentro esti t[ie]mpo ... ellos que los emeden a vista [del] Senyor I[n]fant empero si negun logar daquellos que se son alçad[is] no queria tenir esta tregua quel Senyor En[fant] pueda [.....] contra ellos a su voluntat et que no les sea tenuto dela tregua qua[n]to et aquellos qui no [...]iessen la tregua. E desta tregua ganara[.] carta et atorg[am]iento del //Senyor// Rey de Granada et todas estas cosas prometen de cumplir et de tener a buena fe et senes engano. Datum Xative III dias ala exida dagosto en lanyo de MCCLXXVI.” See also, Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 321-2.

⁸ A week after the surrender noted above, Pere issued an order to his officers in Algeciras (*al-Jazīra al-Khadrā*, a port briefly under Castilian rule in this period) that this treaty should be upheld, providing evidence that some *jenets* did in fact leave after the pacification of Valencia. ACA, R. 38:33v (7 September 1276): “Infans Petrus et cetera, fidelibus suis baiulo, iusticie, iuratis et universis hominibus Alyazire, salutem et graciam. Sciatis quod nos accipimus et habemus ab hodierna die dominica usque in tres meses continere vent[ur]os et completos treguas cum janetis et omnibus aliis Sarracenis locorum Regni Valencie et castrorum quis contra nos alciavunt exceptis tamen castris et locis ac que tenet alcaidus Abraham et excepto castro de Alcalano, Vallis de Alfandec, de Marynenen, et Sarracenis dictorum castrorum et rebus eorumdem. Quare mandamus vobis, quatenus, dictam treguam per totum dictum tempus observetis et infra dictum tempus non oportet vos similer vel res vestras cavare a janetis vel aliquibus Saracenis dictorum castrorum et locorum qui sunt in tregua predicta quam quidem treguam preconzant per Alyaziram nisi presentibus faciatis. Datum Xative VIII idus Septembris anno domini MCCLXXVI.”

possessed a degree of autonomy.⁹ Indeed, throughout the lands of the Crown of Aragon, the Mudéjars maintained their own mosques,¹⁰ merchant hostels,¹¹ community leaders,¹² law,¹³ and language.¹⁴ The *adhān* could still be heard, marking not only a familiar time

⁹ The prolific career of Robert Ignatius Burns has been devoted to reconstructing the life of Mudéjars in Christian Valencia; see his *Crusader kingdom of Valencia: Reconstruction on a Thirteenth-Century Frontier* (Cambridge, 1967); *Islam Under the Crusaders; Medieval Colonialism: Postcrusade exploitation of Islamic Valencia* (Princeton, 1975); and *Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the crusader kingdom of Valencia: societies in symbiosis* (Cambridge, 1984). For more recent treatments of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see the indispensable works of Josep Torró Abad, *El naixement d'una colònia*, and M.T. Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera amb l'Islam*. For the fifteenth-century context, see the seminal work of Mark D. Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the age of Fernando and Isabel: between coexistence and crusade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

¹⁰ The surrender agreement at Chivert (AHN, Ordines militares, codex 542, Montesa [28 April 1234]) preserved the right to maintain mosques and prayer. Jaume I also conceded to the Muslims of Játiva the right to build a new mosque in 1273 (ACA, R 21:151v [7 June 1273]). Jaume II protected the right of the Muslims of Alagón (ACA, R 90:85v [6 October 1291]) and Ricla (ACA, R 94:144v-145r [27 December 1292]) against Christian encroachments or opposition. In the latter case, Christians blocked Muslims from entering their mosque. See also, Ferrer i Mallol, *Els sarraïns*, 85-94.

¹¹ The *fundicum* (Lat., alt. *alfundicum*) or *funduq* (Ar.) was a Mediterranean-wide institution for housing foreign travelers. See Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Medieval World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1993). A separate *funduq* for Muslims was built in the *morería* of Valencia in 1273. In a document dated 16 December 1273, Jaume promised Bernard Botin, the owner of Valencia's *funduq*, five *mazmutinas* of compensation every year for the loss in income that would result from the construction of a new *funduq* in the city's *morería*, in which all Muslim travellers would be required to reside. ACA, R 19:83r (16 December 1273): "[C]oncessissemus tibi Bernardo Botin habitatori Valencie cum carta nostra quam a te recuperamus quem Sarraceni advenientes apud Valenciam hospitarentur in fundico tuo quod habes in Valencia de quo Guillelmus scribe facit et facere tenetur nobis qui[n]que mazmutinas censuales et quod tu ab ipso tenes ad censum octo mazmutinarum et nos modo fecerimus facti fundicum ad opus Sarracenorum in moreria Valencia in quo omnes Sarraceni advenientes Valencie [de]bent hospitari de nostro mandato. Idcirco emendam et satisfaccionem dampni quod tu sustines vel sustinebis in futurum quia Sarraceni in dicto fundico tuo non hospitantur per nos et nostros damus et concedimus tibi dicto Bernardo Botini et tuis in perpetuum illis qui[n]que mazmutinas luecias censuales quas nos percipimus et percipere debemus in dicto fundico ut est dictum et totum dominium quod in dicto fundico et totum dictum Guillemonum scribe racione dictarum quinque mazmutinarum annualium habemus et habere po[s]sumus et debemus."

¹² Mudéjars had a variety of community leaders: *alcaydus* (Ar. *qāḍī*), *alamin* (Ar. *amīn*), *zalmedina* (Ar. *ṣāḥib al-madīna*), *almotacen* (Ar. *muḥtasib*), and *almoixerif* (Ar. *musharraf*), whose roles seem to have overlapped extensively, particularly in rural communities. The spelling of these titles varies widely in the Chancery Registers. Ramón Martí tries to provide Christian equivalents for these terms in his *Vocabulista*. See his *Vocabulista in arabico publicato per la prima volta sopra un codice della Biblioteca Riccardiana di Firenze*, ed. Celestino Schiaparelli (Florence: 1871). See also J.P. Molénat, "L'élite Mudéjare dans la Péninsule Ibérique médiévale," in *Elites e redes clientelares na Idade Média: problemas metodológicos*, ed. F.T. Barata (Lisbon: 2001), 45-53.

¹³ While beyond the scope of the current discussion, the case of Islamic law demands some elaboration. Generally, the use of Islamic law in royal domains, though preserved, was allowed in cases involving two Muslim parties. Muslims could also seek an appeal before the king. See, for instance, ACA, R 10:138v (21 October 1259), in which the Muslims of Zaragoza are given the privilege of practicing the "sunna," by which the king meant the *sharī'a*: "Quod per nos et nostros concedimus et donamus vobis universis et singulis Sarracenos nostros Cesarauguste presentibus et futuris in perpetuum quod aliquis vel aliqui officialis nostri non compellant vos nec possint vel auderant compellere pro aliquibus causis vel

querimoniis que inter vos vertentur nisi tamen itadictam vestram aqunam et non aliter aliqua ratione nec ad faciendum super aliquibus causis quo inter vos vertentur testimonium nisi itadictam vestram aqunam. Mandantes baiule Manalem, iustice, iuratis et universis aliis offi[cia]libus et cetera quod contra hanc concessione nostram non veniant nec aliquem venire permitant aliquo modo vel aliqua ratione. Datum Ilerde XII kalendas Septembris anno Domini MCCL nono.” Valencia received a similar concession (ACA, R 40:114v). The earlier surrender charters of Chivert (1234), Játiva (1245), and Tudela (1115), however, added that in cases between Muslims and Christians, the Muslim participant would be judged by a Muslim judge while the Christian (or Jew) by a Christian bailiff: “Si aliquis christianus conqueratur de sarraceno, recipiat iustitiae complementum in posse zalmedinae vestry, secundum zunam sarracenorum” (*Chivert Charter*); “Si aliquot tempore orta fuerit contencio sive querela inter christianos et sarracenos vel iudeos alfachinus alcaydus iudicet sarracenos secundum legem suam et christianus baiulus Templi iudicet christianos et iudeos” (ACA, Jaume I, Pergaminos, 947, henceforth, *Játiva Charter*); and “quod sint et stent illos in iudicio et pleytos in manu de lure alcudi, et de lures alguaziles, sicut in tempus de illos moros fuit. Et si habuerit moro iudicio cum christiano, vel christianus cum moro, donet iudicium alcudi de moros ad suo moro, secundum suam zunam, et alcudi de christianos ad suum christianum secundum suum foro” (*Tudela Charter*). Cf. Lérida charter (1228) in Jaime Villanueva, *Viage literario de las iglesias de España*, 22 vols. (Madrid, 1803-1852), XVI, 181. Technically, Christian officials had no authority within Mudéjar communities (Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 65-66). In practice, this was not the case; complaints abound that royal officials violated Mudéjar legal autonomy (ACA, R 48:20v, 89:41r, 99:277r, 100:272v, and 213:275r for various examples). Despite the fact that these legal privileges were recorded for only certain locations, Burns has argued that Mudéjar legal autonomy was wide-spread and consistent despite assumptions that successive and different surrender agreements would have produced inconsistencies in the practice of Islamic law under Christian rule: “Some important conclusions emerge. An autonomous legal system functioned, with its own code, judges, courts, tradition, precedents, and mode of procedure. It did not represent a rare privilege designed to placate a few powerful strongholds, but was the ordinary lot of those surrendering—in short, of all Muslim residents who were not slaves.... The uneven bargaining power of the several communities at the time of surrender did not, as some historians assume, confuse and variegate the essentials conceded to all” (*Islam under the Crusaders*, 228). Cf. Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 142, who claims that the kingdom of Aragon was unique. Catlos has argued that the ability to appeal to the king’s authority in fact undermined Mudéjar legal autonomy: “Royal power supported and dominated the *aljama*, ensuring the survival of Islamic law, but paradoxically subverting it by presenting a higher, alternative jurisdiction” (*Victors and the Vanquished*, 177-8). The ability to seek appeals from other courts or political authorities, however, was a both formal and informal feature of Islamic law. In this sense, one might argue that appeals to the Christian king may have been viewed as another element of continuity rather than rupture. See David S. Powers, “On Judicial Review in Islamic Law,” *Law & Society Review* 26:2 (1992), 315-342, speaking specifically of jurisprudence in 14th-century North Africa. See also V.P. Scholz, “Legal practice in Malikite law of procedure,” *al-Qantara* XX (1999), 417-36 and Wael Hallaq, *Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law* (Cambridge, 2001). According to Boswell, Mudéjar legal autonomy began to vanish in the mid-fourteenth century (*Royal Treasure*, 108). All this says nothing of the practice of Islamic law in lands controlled by military orders, monasteries, or noblemen, of which little is known. See, for instance, Francisco Javier García Marco, *Las comunidades Mudéjares de la Comarca de Calatayud en el siglo XV* (Calatayud: Centro de Estudios Bilbilitanos, Institución Fernando el Católico, 1993).

¹⁴ The question of language is controversial. There is evidence in the Chancery Registers that Arabic continued to be used by Mudejars throughout the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon at the end of the thirteenth century: ACA, R 11:199 (Játiva), R 12:76v (Lérida), R 40:166 (Zaragoza), and R 48:7v (Algeciras). Cf. Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 384, claiming that Arabic was only used in Valencia. See R. I. Burns, “The Language Barrier: Bilingualism and Interchange,” in his *Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, 172-92; M. C. Barceló, “La lengua árab al País Valencia (segles VIII al XVI),” *Arguments* 4 (1979), 123-149; D. Bramon, “Una llengua, dues llengües, tres llengües,” in *Raons d’Identitat del País Valencia*, ed. Pere Sisé (Valencia, 1977), 17-47.

but also space.¹⁵ In these respects, as Burns has argued, the Mudéjars represented a “species of state within a state.”¹⁶ Muslim life was enfolded within a Christian kingdom – simultaneously included and excluded – but not yet lost.

The fact that Mudéjar leaders played a role in recruiting and financing the *jenets* supports a claim that these Valencian communities also housed and assisted the *jenets* as they crossed the kingdom.¹⁷ If the *jenets* prayed in local mosques, then perhaps they encountered firebrand, frontier preachers like Ibn Rabīʿ, whose *fatāwā* (legal responsae) decried Muslim soldiers in Christian armies, or the mysterious Alhaig (Ar. al-Ḥājj), whom the Catalans imprisoned for incitement.¹⁸ Expressions of welcome, in other words, may have mingled with those of resentment or betrayal. Nevertheless, whether invited or reviled, in Valencia the *jenets* were not far from the familiar. They could be forgiven for imagining that they were still traveling in a Muslim kingdom.

If at all, the illusion did not hold for long. In cities and on royal roads, spaces almost exclusively controlled by Christians, any Muslim – much less a foreign soldier – would have felt ill at ease, facing constant reminders of his subject status.¹⁹ The former

¹⁵ The Chivert charter, for instance, preserved the right to announce the call to prayer (*adhān*). Although Jaume II did implement the canonical ban on the Muslim call to prayer in 1313, Christian communities regularly complained that the practice continued (Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 188).

¹⁶ Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 273.

¹⁷ The case of the *alamin* of Valencia, Abraham Abençumada, has been discussed in Chapter 2. He clearly played a role in recruiting the troops of Çahim Abennaquem, as Pere’s letter to Samuel Alfaquimus implies: “... E non queremos [que] Abraham Abençumada nin otro se faga faulador desto, ca nos nos aveniemos bien con ellos...” (ACA, R 56:93v). See Chapter 2 for a complete edition of this document.

¹⁸ See also van Koningsveld and Wieggers, “Islamic Statute,” 26-7 on the opinion of Ibn Rabīʿ concerning Muslim soldiers. See also Chapter 4 for more detail on this figure. See Chapter 6 for more detail on the figure of Alhaig, who as one shall see, was perhaps inciting rebellion at the urging of the *jenets* themselves. Ḥājj or Ḥājjī, incidentally, denotes someone who has performed the Islamic pilgrimage, the *hajj*.

¹⁹ Traveling off the royal roads was forbidden by the Crown in order to prevent traders from avoiding taxes. See, for instance, ACA, R 48:135r (26 August 1280): “Universis officialibus, mandamus vobis, quatenus, mandatis omnibus mercatoribus defferentibus merces quibus pedagium debeat ex[i]gi quod transeant per itinera regalia per quam consueti sunt transire. Et si aliquam inveneritis transeuntem extra dicta itinera in fru[...]dem pedagogii sive lezde cide [i.e. cite] quic[ui]d portav[er]it emper[...]. Datum Tirasone VII kalendas Septembris anno predicto.” Mudéjars had to have special permission from a Christian bailiff to travel, and several examples of *guidatica* (safe-conduct licenses) given to Muslims to travel within and

Muslim population of the city of Valencia, for example, now lived in the city's shadow, in a *morería* located just beyond Valencia's western gate, the *Bāb al-Ḥanash*.²⁰ On royal roads, like any Muslim traveling in the kingdom, the *jenets* would have had to present letters of invitation or safe-conduct in Latin or Romance that in all likelihood, they could not read.²¹ They faced both suspicion and harassment. During their journey to meet King Pere, the representatives of Çahim Abennaquem, for instance, had their swords seized and impounded at Játiva.²² One imagines that these Muslim knights, riding on mules and unarmed, felt their status diminished, but they carried on all the same.

without the lands of the Crown of Aragon exist in the Registers for this period (ACA, R 40:63r; 40:106r, 70:58v; 94:123v; and 205:191r). As Boswell points out, the authority of these bailiffs over the Mudéjars was all-encompassing. He quotes the following description of their authority to punish: "...fustigando, cruce signando ... aures, manus et pedes, nares et alia membra auferendo et privando, relegando, exulando et quovis alio punitionis et condemnationis genere ... visum fuerit, absque aliqua appellatione, provocatione, et suplicatione vel recurssu..." (ACA, R 911:28r [22 October 1364]) (*Royal Treasure*, 116). See also, Ferrer i Mallol, *Els sarraïns*, 105-36, esp. 109, on the issue of travel.

²⁰ The *morería* lay roughly where Plaza San Miguel lies today (Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 148-50). See Manuel Danvila Collado, "Saco de la morería de Valencia en 1455," *El archivo* 3 (1889), 124-9. Over the fourteenth century, the majority of Mudéjars were concentrated in *morerías* attached to urban centers (Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 42). See also Josep Torró Abad, "El urbanismo Mudéjar como forma de resistencia, alquerías y morerías en el reino de Valencia (siglos XIII-XVI)," *Actas Del Simposio Internacional De Mudejarismo VI* (1993): 535-98.

²¹ For an example of an invitation, see ACA, R 73:77v (24 February 1289, also cited above), inviting three *jenets* from Granada to enter the kingdom with full edition above in Chapter 4. See also the license for five *jenets*, brothers who entered the service king's service in 1286. ACA, R 66197r (17 September 1286): "Universis et officialibus ad quos et cetera. Cum Giber et Jahia et Jucefus et Hiahiaten et Dapher, fratres janeti, venerint in servicio nostro et inde redeant cum familia et uxoris et filiis [ei]s et sint inter omnes quadraginta septem persone. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, in redeundo nullam impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis immo provideatis eisdem de securo transitu et du[c]atu. Datum ut supra." Cf. a safe-conduct (Lat. *guidaticum*) for *jenets*, ACA, R 81:52r (6 March 1290[1289]): "Universis officialibus et cetera. Cum Muça Abenbeyet, Açe Parrello, Yoniç, jeneti habeant mandato nostro venire ad [...]endo nobis etiam uxoris ac familiis suis. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, predictis jenetis, uxoris ac familiis suis veniendo ad nos nullum impedimentum aut contrarium faciatis aut fieri ab aliquo permittatis immo provideatis eisdem [qua]re fuerit de securo transitu et ducatu presentibus ultra XV dies proximos venturos minime valituris. Datum ut supra." With regards language, in only one case are we told explicitly that the *jenets* were provided with Arabic copies of royal documents. ACA, R 52:68v (4 November 1284, my emphasis): "Berengario de Conques, baiulo Valencie. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, solvatis Petro Bertrandi habitatori Valencie sexcentos XXX solidos regalium Valencie, quos Mahomat Abulhaye et Mançor Abnemudaffar et Abraham Abehalmema, sarraceni janeti [qui] in nostro servicio venerant, sibi debebant cum duobus publicis instrumentis, quorum unum est moriscum et aliud cristianice scriptum, que nos recuperavimus ab eodem. Et mandamus per presentes fidei nostro Raimundo de Rivo Sicco, quod de precio baiulie Valencie a vobis ipsos denarios in compotum recipiat. Datum Ces[arau]g[uste], II nonas Novembris."

²² In the following document, the Crown offered compensation for the swords that had been seized in Játiva. ACA, R 58:22v (3 May 1285): "Baiulo Exatium quod donet Alaçeno militi Sarraceno nuncio

Moving further from the frontier, in the kingdoms of Aragon and Catalonia, the sense of alienation may have increased. While Mudéjar communities in Valencia remained in constant contact with Granada, those in Aragon and Catalonia were more dispersed and isolated.²³ It is telling, for instance, that some of these Mudéjar communities sent troops or money in support of the Crown's efforts to quell the Valencian uprising, which is to say that some of these Mudéjars may have faced the *jenets* in war.²⁴ Here, the *jenets* would also have had to make their way through Christian villages or cities. Again, for example, the *jenets* of Çahim Abennaquem ran into problems in Villafranca, where they incurred and failed to settle debts with some Christians.²⁵ Was this a matter of miscommunication or malicious intent? If it was the

Cahim filio Jahie Abennaquem quinquaginta solidos \regalium/ pro redimendio et quitandis ensibus quod idem Alaçenus et alii qui cum eo venerunt pignori obligaverunt in Exatium.” It is not precisely correct, as Boswell suggests, that Mudéjars did not have “the right” to carry weapons. As with all legal matters concerning the Mudéjars, carrying weapons was a privilege that the Crown alternatively extended and withdrew. For instance, the surrender charter of Tudela (1115) preserved the privilege to bear arms: “Et non devetet nullus homo ad illos moros lures armas.” Mudéjar communities that specialized in the production of weapons for the king's army were clearly exempted from any bans (see Chapter 3). A general ban on their carrying arms (*arma et cultelli magni*) in the kingdom of Aragon were issued in 1281 (ACA, R 50:223r) but covered both Muslims and Christians. In the fourteenth century, Mudéjars faced heavier fines than Christians for violating the general ban on weapons (Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 272-3). Nevertheless, as Boswell points out, those Mudéjars who supported the king's war against Castile were still exempted from the ban. For the fifteenth century, see Ferrer i Mallol, “The Muslim Aljama of Tortosa,” *Scripta Mediterranea* XIX-XX (1998-99), 160 (ACA, R 841:49v) as cited in Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 263.

²³ See, for instance, the case of those Mudéjar communities north of the Elbe, described in detail by Brian Catlos in his *Victors and the Vanquished*.

²⁴ Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 264. Catlos cites the example of the Mudéjars of Alagón who were given the option of providing money or serving in King Pere's army against the Valencian Mudéjars rebelling at Montesa. ACA, R 39:227r (21 July 1277): “Petro, dei gracia, Rex Aragonum, fideli suo Mosse Alfaquimo, nostro baiulo Cesarauguste, salutem et gratiam. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, petatis et exigatis a Sarracenis de Alagone pro redemptione exercitus, mille solidos iaccenses et ad solutionem predictum mille solidi compellatis eosdem et bona eorum fortiter et districte nisi iam dicti Sarraceni composuerunt nobiscum a dicto exercitu. Datum in Obsidione de Muntesiā, XII kalendas Augusti, anno domini MCCLXX septimo.”

²⁵ See Chapter 3 for a full discussion of their itinerary. ACA, R 58:22v (3 May 1285): “To Bernard Martin, bailiff of Villafranch. You should not press the representatives of Çahim, son of Jahie Abebbaquem, for those fifteen *solidi* that you gave them. On the contrary, if they have any debts, you should pay them. / Bernardo Martini, baiulo Ville Franche, quod non exigit a nunciis Sarracenis de Cahim, filio Jahie Abebbaquem, illos quindecim solidos quos eisdem accomodavit. Immo si aliquos fideiussores ab eis recepit absolvat, cum dominus Rex mandet per presentes [dict]os quindecim solidi recipi in computum per Guillelmum de Rocha a dicto Bernardo Martini. Datum ut supra.”

latter, then on the part of whom, the transient *jenets* or their Christian hosts? Regardless, it is significant to note that this impasse only confronts the scholar. These soldiers somehow found a path through Christian-dominated territories.

Entering the service of the Crown of Aragon required a final encounter. The *jenets* would arrive before the king or one of his royal officials. The soldiers of Çahim Abennaquem met with King Pere on the battlefield at Albarracín in 1285. The *jenets* of a certain Bucar, by contrast, met with royal officials in 1289, in order to gather the supplies that they needed for military service.²⁶ At these meetings, the *jenets* received handfuls of documents – expense accounts, requisitions, promissory notes, and marching orders – which enabled them to conduct their duties, and were also copied into the Crown’s Registers. The journey of the *jenets* into the service of the Crown thus ended in a kingdom of paper and parchment.

Given the foregoing series of potentially uncomfortable encounters, this meeting between Muslim soldiers and elite Catalan bureaucrats may seem the most awkward. But to imagine the moment as Kafkaesque – opaque and dehumanizing – would be to misread it. As a centralized system for dealing with royal correspondence, land tenure, taxation, and the military, the Crown’s nascent Royal Chancery (*Cancellaria Reial*) mirrored the

²⁶ Specifically, they met with the king’s Master of Accounts or *Maestre Racional*. ACA, R 78:84r (24 April 1289): “Fuit mandatum Johanni Çapata et Guillelmo Durfortis quod faciant acurrimentum Bucar, jeneto nostro, et aliis jenetis [n]ostris qui [...] [v]enient de partibus Regni Valencie prout aliis de familia nostra cucuristis cum dictus Bucar in servitium nostrum habeat venire in [C]astellam. Et recuperetis presentem litteram et albaranum de eo quod sibi dederint racione predictum. Datum in [Ca]latayube, [V]III kalendas Madii.” Durfort (or Dufort) dealt directly and regularly with the *jenets* in his capacity as *Maestre Racional*, as evidenced by numerous entries in ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 774. Carmen Batlle has written about his family. See her “La casa barcelonina en el segle XIII: l’exemple de la familia Dufort,” *La Ciudad hispánica durante los siglos XIII al XVI: Actas del Coloquio celebrade en La Rabida y Sevilla*, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1985), 1347-60. Similarly, Raimundus Escorne met with the troops of Mahomet Abenadalil, Mahomet al Granadaxi, and Iuceff Abenzubayba when they arrived in Valencia and provide them their salaries and anything else they required. ACA, R 73:77v (28 February 1289): “...que luego vista la carta vengades a Valencia on nos avemos ordenado que fiel nostre escriviano Raimund Escorna vos de recaudo de venir a nos de quitacio et de lo que ayades menester.” With full edition above. See *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, s.v. “Acorriment.”

Islamic *dīwān*.²⁷ Indeed, a degree of institutional borrowing may be reflected in the fact that a key legal instrument, the *albaranum* – a license or promissory note – derived from the Arabic *barā'a*, meaning the same.²⁸ For their part, it should be added, the Crown's administrators would have been familiar with foreign Muslims. King Pere's Master of Accounts (*Maestre Racional*), Arnaldus de Bastida, dealt regularly not only with the *jenets* but also with Muslim diplomats, captives, and slaves.²⁹ Moreover, the Crown employed Arabic-speaking Jews, who, as the example of Samuel, the king's *alfaquimus*, demonstrated above, played an integral role in recruiting *jenets*.³⁰ In these last figures, the *jenets* may have also even seen a parallel to the Jewish administrators at the Marīnid court.³¹ Thus, one might argue that for the *jenets*, as professional soldiers, this final

²⁷ In the case of the Marīnids, the *dīwān al-inshā'* handled payments to the army as well as royal correspondence, providing a cognate to the role of the *Cancelleria Reial*. See Hugh Kennedy, *Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (Routledge, 2001), esp. 59-65 and 71-76. See also *EF*, s.v. "Diwān," esp. 331-2, and Lévi-Provençal, *L'Espagne musulmane*, 69 and 128. Cf. Jeremy Johns, *Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily: The Royal Diwan* (Cambridge, 2002), esp. 193-211.

²⁸ Alcover, *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, s.v. "Albaran."

²⁹ The figure of the *Maestre Racional* does not appear in the Chancery Registers until 1285. Before that point, Arnaldus de Bastida, for instance, was called the king's treasurer. For more on the figure of the *Maestre Racional*, see A. Masiá i de Ros, "El Maestre Racional en la Corona de Aragón. Una Pragmática de Juan II sobre dicho cargo," *Hispania* X (Madrid, 1950), 25-60 and J. Lalinde Abadía, "Contabilidad e intervención en el Reino aragonés," *Estudios de Hacienda Pública* (Madrid, 1976), 39-55. With regards to Arnaldus de Bastida's other interactions with Muslims, in 1285 King Pere ordered him to release several captives from Tunis who had paid for their redemption. ACA, R 65:127r (30 March 1285): "Arnaldo de Bastida. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, illos Sarracenos Tunicii quos baiulus [...] qui eos sub captione nostra tenebat, vobis tradidit de mandato //vestra// nostra mitatis incontinenti apud M[ai]orice Iacobo Turicelle ta[m] quod dictus Iacobus recipiat et teneat dictos [S]arracenos et recipiat mille duplas quas dicti Sarra[c]eni tenentur solvere nobis pro redemptione eorum quas solvisse teneantur primeros duos menses continue venturos et quod recepta dicta redemptione per dictum Iacobum deinde ipse Iacobo absolvat et deliberet Sarracenos predictos ab ipsa captione de qua redemptione volumus quod dictus Iacobus vobis respondeat loco nostri. Datum Barchinone, III kalendas [A]prilis." Arnaldus de Bastida helped administer the slave auctions in Mallorca after the fall of Minorca (ACA, R 70:42r [7 February 1287], 71:113v [10 April 1287], 72:41r [27 June 1288]). He also reimbursed Muslim diplomats for their travel expenses (ACA, R 74:71r [6 February 1288]). Fragments from his account book, including numerous payments to *jenets*, are recorded in ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 774.

³⁰ See Chapter 3.

³¹ For the case of Jewish administrators in medieval North Africa, see Maya Shatzmiller, *The Berbers and the Islamic State* (Markus Wiener, 2000), 55-68. See also D. Corcos, "The Jews of Morocco under the Marinids," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 54 (1963-64), 271-87; 55 (1964-65), 53-81 and 137-50 as well as Norman Stillman, "Muslims and Jews in Morocco," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 5 (1977), 76-83 and "The Moroccan Jewish Experience," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 9 (1978), 111-23. See Chapter 3 for more on Jewish administrators serving the Crown of Aragon as well as playing a direct role in the recruitment of *jenets*.

encounter with Catalan bureaucracy may have the most familiar, a matter of business as usual.

In this attempt to follow the *jenets* as they entered the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, to map their many encounters, what appeared familiar became strange, and strange, familiar. While none of these encounters could be labeled frictionless, it was ironically the last – the encounter with the Crown’s bureaucracy – that appeared the most transparent, ruled as it was by the simple logic of exchange, service for pay. The fact, however, that this last relationship was based upon the very paper and parchment used to reconstruct this journey raises the singular and signal caution that grounds this chapter. Although the documentation obscures the historian’s path, the *jenets* successfully found a way through Mudéjar and Christian villages. Navigating invisible corridors, trailing a series of unexamined relationships in their wake, and racing out of view, the soldiers reveal only one thing clearly, the yawning gap between the researcher and his or her subject.

ii. PROFESSION

As argued above, the fact that the Catalan kings hired *jenets* to serve in their armies hints at a fundamental change in medieval warfare. In principle, the Crown of Aragon could expect all its subjects to contribute to the defense of its kingdoms without remuneration.³² This obligation was enshrined in the twelfth-century *Usatges de*

³² Ferrer i Mallol, “La organización militar,” 155. See also her *Organització i defensa d’un territori fronterer* as well as Ludwig Klüpfel, “El règim de la Confederació catalano-aragonesa a finals del segle XIII,” *Revista Jurídica de Catalunya* XXXV (1929), 195-226 and 289-327, and XXXVI (1930), 298-331, esp. 298-308. Finally, see Donald Kagay’s *War, Government, and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon*.

Barcelona within the article of *Princeps namque*.³³ War, in the ideal, was not a matter of business but of custom. Over the thirteenth century, however, as Catalan kings embarked on a new path of political self-fashioning and aggressive expansion, this feudal system came under stress.³⁴ The cash-starved kings eagerly replaced feudal duties with war taxes and increasingly relied on paid and professional soldiers, mercenaries whom it could manage directly, marking a move toward smaller armies and new strategies.³⁵ By the end of the thirteenth century, the demise of the feudal army was all but inevitable.

As members of this emerging professional army, all *jenets* received a salary that was disbursed or managed centrally, as it would have been in the Islamic *dīwān*.³⁶

During the late thirteenth century, Arnaldus de Bastida, mentioned above, personally

³³ See Bastardas, *Usatges de Barcelona*, chap. 64 (usatge 68), 102: “Princeps namque si quolibet casu obsessus fuerit, uel ipsi idem suos inimicos obsessos tenuerit, uel audierit quemlibet regem uel principem contra se uenire ad debellandum, et terram suam ad succurrendum sibi monuerit, tam per litteras quam per nuncios uel per consuetudines quibus solet amoneri terra, uidelicet per fars, omnes homines, tam milites quam pedites, qui habeant etatem et posse pugnandi, state ut hec audierint uel viderint, quam cicius poterint ei succurrant. Et si quis ei fallerit de iuvamine quo in hoc sibi facere poterit, perdere debet in perpetuum cuncta que per illum habet; et qui honorem per eum non tenuerit, emendat ei fallimentum et deshonorem quem ei fecerit, cum auere et sacramento manibus propriis iurando, quoniam nemo debet fallere ad principem ad tantum opus uel necessitatem.” See also Sánchez Martínez, “The Invocation of *Princeps namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona.”

³⁴ Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 12: “Like contemporary kings, [Jaume I] liked to surround himself with Roman lawyers, affecting the imperial prerogatives and trappings of a true monarch. Neither the feudal barons, who saw him rather as a first-among-equals suzerain, nor the townsmen, who accepted him more as a partner and guarantor of communal semiautonomy, acquiesced completely in the royal vision.”

³⁵ Francisco García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam: estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares (siglos XI-XIII)* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998).

³⁶ The cases where Bastida or the royal treasurer attached to the king did not directly pay the soldiers or write *albarana* for them seem exceptional. Take, for instance, the payment of salaries to Mahomet Abenabderasmen Ataç and others by Petrus de Podio Rubeus (Puig Rubio), bailiff of Algeciras, on 20 September 1286. Petrus was ordered to take the *jenets*’ salary and any other expenses out of the *redemptione exercitus*, war tax, of the city in order to avoid their delay in arriving at the battlefield. ACA, R 67:77r-77v: “Petro de Podio Rubeo, baiulo Algezire. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, de illis tribus mille solidos regalium quos vos <recipere> debetis ab hominibus Algezire, ratione redemptione exercitus, detis et solvatis solutis et cetera Mahome[t] Aben[abderas]men Ataç quadringentos solidos, a Abdorramen filio Abdolmalich Abenfa[.]jina quingentos solidos, item Iuceffo Aveni Jacob Avenjacol Abenabdufah CCC LXX solidos, item a Magderva <quadringentos solidos, item a Amoç ducentos solidos, item a Mansor Matino Detzayn Abenmiquel sexaginta solidos, item Abraym Abenhome.... [ce]ntum vinginti [solidos], item a Assar centum solidos, item a Ayssa Avenfarrat tribus sociis suis nonag[intos] ... solidos. [I]t[em] a Alfaig [...]riem sociis suis centum vinginti solidos, item Machometo> [fol. 77v] Abenfayol quingentos solidos, quos omnes denarios predictis janetos debemus pro quitacionibus eorumdem sine acurapn[...] ... solucionibus et etiam caveatis vobis ne ratione predictae solutionis dicti janeti habeant retardare, alia[s] ... salvi faceremus expensas [qua]s dicti janeti facere haberent. Datum Valencie, XII kalendas Octobris.”

handled the vast majority of disbursements, paying the soldiers directly or, occasionally, authorizing local officials to do so.³⁷ Soldiers or their companies were paid upon receipt of an *albaranum*, copies of which have helped to fill the Chancery Registers.³⁸ Determining the average monthly salary of a *jenet* based upon these *albarana*, however, poses several problems (see Table 1). Not all promissory notes given to *jenets* specify the number of months' service or the number of soldiers being compensated, and as the case of one *jenet* named Muçe demonstrates, payments were occasionally made in installments.³⁹ To add further confusion to the matter, the Crown of Aragon relied upon several standards of currency.⁴⁰ In general, coinage followed the Carolingian system: livres (*librae*), sous (*solidi*), and deniers (*denarii*);⁴¹ however, each kingdom employed a different standard: those of Jaca, Barcelona, and Valencia.⁴² In addition, gold coins, the Castilian *dobla* and Islamic *dīnār*, circulated and were used to pay *jenets* on occasion.⁴³

³⁷ For an example of the latter case, see ACA, R 71:45r (29 April 1287): "Petro Peregrini quod det Mahometo Abolxahe, janeto, CCCC XL vii solidos regalium pro redemptione filii sui quos ex computari faciat de quitacione sua et filiorum suorum et de ea quod sibi debetur [pro] quitacione a tempore quo ivimus Menercam usque nunc et recipia[t] ipsi albar[ani] ... hoc Arnaldum de Bastida." I return to other aspects of this interesting document below. Several other documents demonstrate that Arnaldus de Bastida regularly wrote *albarana* (ACA, R 71:49v; 71:50v; 71:51v; 100:172v).

³⁸ See, for instance, ACA, R 65:186v (2 March 1286), in which Bastida is ordered to pay three *jenets* their salaries for two months with one *albaranum*: "[Arnaldo] de Bastida. Cum Sehit Abdella et Jucefo Aben Jacob et Cassim et Abra[hi]mo Benhamenia [solvat] pro quitacionibus eorum mensium Septembris et Octobris cum albarano Bartholomei de V[illa] Franch[a] ... solidos Barchinonenses quod albaranum [nos] recuperavimus." The amount that each *jenet* was paid appears in the documentary lacuna.

³⁹ ACA, R 52:57r (29 August 1284): "Bernardo Scr[i]be quod det vel assignet Muçe Genet LIII solidos IIII denarios iaccenses qui sibi remanent [ad] solvendum de quitacione Albarrasini. Datum Turole, IIII kalendas Septembris."

⁴⁰ For more on the currency of the Crown of Aragon, see James Broadman, *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain: The Order of Merced on the Christian-Islamic Frontier* (University of Pennsylvania, 1986), Appendix A. See also Burns, *Medieval Colonialism*, 27-33.

⁴¹ 1 pound = 20 sous = 240 deniers.

⁴² In the year 1300, one sous from Barcelona was equivalent to one sous, six deniers of Jaca and one sous, three deniers of Valencia. Incidentally, the Latin *solidus* gives us the Castilian *sueldo*, meaning salary; Catalan employed the form *sou*. *Solidus* is also related to *solidarius*, meaning soldier.

⁴³ For instance, ACA, R 82:66v (3 or 4 September 1290): "Eidem fuit scriptum [al]iud albaranum quod solvit nobili [Ma]hometo Abnadaly pro quitacione sua et familia s[u]e qua cum ei venerunt de Granata pro mense Augusti preterito DXXXVI duplas mirias. Item pro quitacione Sarracenorum peditum pro dicto mense et pro esmend[i] unius equi qui fuit interfectus in rambla Valencie super ludo janethie XXXII duplas

Setting aside the equivocal data, however, the remaining handful of documents indicates that the average pay for a *jenet* was approximately 4 *sous* per diem.⁴⁴ Interestingly, the Crown paid the same salary to Christian light cavalry forty years later during the conquest of Sardinia, indicating that the Catalan kings valued their *jenets*, at least professionally, no more or less than their Christian counterparts.⁴⁵ In addition, as Dufourcq has shown, Christian mercenaries operating in Muslim lands during Alphonse's reign received roughly the same compensation, three to six *sous*.⁴⁶ As argued above, this coincidence of salaries suggests that the *jenets* were part of a mercenary economy that spanned the Western Mediterranean, crossing religious and political boundaries, which is

et med[ia]m mirias;" and ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620:69r (1294): "Primerament nos mostra VI albarans den A Eymeric en los quals son deguts an Jahia Abenallu e an Ayça e an Mahomet Bennaçer et an Zahit Almelocaya e an Mahomet Algaçil //per quitacion lur// genets del Seynor Rey Namfos de bonamemoria per quitacion lur. L dobles miries. E CXX solidos Barchinonenses." For more on Islamic coins in the Crown of Aragon, see Joaquim Botet i Sisó, "Nota sobre la encunyació de monedas arábiques pel Rey Don Jaume," *Congrés d'història Corona d'Aragó, dedicat al rey En Jaume I y la seua época* (Barcelona, 1909-13), II:944-5.

⁴⁴ Çayt Abdella, 120 *sous* or 4 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 71:49v); Maymon de Picaçen, 266 *sous* of Barcelona or 3 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 71:50v); Mahomet and three brothers, 496 *sous* of Barcelona or 4 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 71:51v); Mahomet and three brothers, 448 *sous* of Barcelona or 4 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 71:51v); Zayt and brother, 248 *sous* of Barcelona or 4 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 71:51v); Mahomet Abelhaye, 337 *sous* of Jaca or 11 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 72:32v); Mahomet de Picaçen, 266 *sous* of Barcelona or 3 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 72:38v); Jucef Aben Jacob and Cassim, 372 *sous* of Jaca or 6 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 72:53v); and Muça Mufarrax, 510 *sous* of Barcelona or 4 *sous* per diem (ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620, fol. 107r). Cf. Table 1. Catlos, "Mercenary," 276, comes to a similar conclusion that the *jenets* were paid between four and six *sous* per diem.

⁴⁵ See Ferrer i Mallol, "La organización militar," 170. Light cavalry received 4 *sous* per diem while heavy cavalry received eight. See also, A. Arribas Palau, *La conquista de Cerdeña por Jaume II de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1952), doc. XIX. At the end of the fourteenth century, Ferrer i Mallol records that the heavy cavalry received nine *sous*, and the light, five, citing ACA, R 1245:21r-21v (30 September 1374). The discrepancy in pay between the heavy and light cavalry probably reflects the cost to the heavily armed knight of maintaining his equipment. Light cavalry, as will be highlighted below, served primarily in raids that also held the prospect of supplemental income. It is worth mentioning that among Arnaldus de Bastida's payments to *jenets* above, there exist payments to Christian soldiers (ACA, R 72:33r-38r), who similarly provided *albarana*; however, what service these soldiers provided is not clear from the documentation. Were they knights or foot soldiers? In any case, the majority of the payments were close to or under 4 *sous* per diem, suggesting again that the salary provided to *jenets* was not exceptional. For instance, one Romeus Turricelle received 3.5 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 72:33r); Bernardus, 1.6 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 72:33r); and Arnaldus de Verneto, 4 *sous* per diem (ACA, R 72:37r).

⁴⁶ Dufourcq, "Prix et niveaux de vie dans les pays catalans e maghribins à la fin du XIIIe et au début du XIVe siècles," *Le Moyen Age* 3:4 (1965), 506-8 as cited in Catlos, "Mercenary," 276.

to say that in assigning the *jenets* these salaries, the Crown of Aragon was merely adhering to unspoken, professional standards.

To the Crown, however, the *jenets* were not simply bodies to add to their armies: these horsemen brought with them a military innovation. At the end of the thirteenth century, Iberian knights – both Arab and Spanish – rode *a la brida*, low in their saddles, anchored with their legs outstretched in order to bear the weight of their heavy lances and armor as well as resist counterstrikes.⁴⁷ The arrival of North African *Ghuzāh*, the *jenets*, led to the diffusion of a second style, eventually and appropriately called *a la jineta*.⁴⁸ These lightly-armored Berber troops rode on saddles with low pommels and short stirrups, the so-called *sella jineta* of Catalan sources or *sarj* ‘*udwiyy* (raiding saddle) of Arabic sources, that allowed them greater maneuverability on horseback.⁴⁹ In addition, they carried short, two-headed lances (Ar. *madās*, pl. *amdās*, Rom. *jineta*) that they could throw while at a gallop.⁵⁰ By the fourteenth century, according to Ibn al-Khaṭīb, the *jenets* had also mastered the use of the Frankish arblete or crossbow to complement the throwing lance.⁵¹ The illuminations from the late thirteenth-century *Cantigas de Santa Maria* and the sixteenth-century murals depicting the Battle of Higuera (1431) in the

⁴⁷ See Soler del Campo, *La evolución del armamento*, esp. 157-72; *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, s.v. “Cavalry,” esp. III:203.

⁴⁸ See Chapter 2 for a complete discussion of the historiographical debates surrounding the introduction of the *jineta* style.

⁴⁹ This *jenet* saddle is mentioned several times in the Registers (ACA, R 58:23r, R 71:24v, and R 71:110v). See also, Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabis*, VI:190, where al-Ḥakam II remarks at the beauty of a Berber racing saddle (*sarj* ‘*udwiyy*): “The sides of the saddle were soft and the pommel short, forward and flat(?) (*al-muqaddam wa’l-mu’jir*).” See Lane, *Lexicon*, s.v. “‘Ādin,” esp. 1981 for the term ‘*udwiyy*. See also Machuca, *Libro de ejercicios de gineta*, 3r.

⁵⁰ On the *madās* (pl. *amdās*), see R. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, s.v. “Dassa.” See also Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 42: “The weapons of the majority are the long rod folded by a short rod with a handle in its middle that is thrown by the finger-tips and called the *amdās*. ”

⁵¹ Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 42 mentions that the Berbers had begun to train with European crossbows (*qusiyy al-firanjā*).

Sala de Batallas at the monastery of San Lorenzo de El Escorial testify to the coexistence of these contrasting styles – *a la brida* and *a la jineta*.⁵²

Despite being less well armed, or precisely because they were, the *jenets* had an advantage over the traditional heavy cavalry that dominated Muslim and Christian Iberia. These troops specialized in small, rapid incursions that the Crown's records refer to as "*jenet* raids."⁵³ During confrontations, these horsemen employed a tactic known as *tornafoyue*, or in Arabic, *al-karr wa'l-farr*, attacking and fleeing, that allowed them to harass heavy cavalry with the aim of drawing them away from the protection of archers and infantry.⁵⁴ With a mixture of horror and admiration, Don Juan Manuel (1282-1348), the prolific writer and nephew of Alfonso X, summarized Muslim military strategy by saying, "The war of the Moors is not like that of the Christians.... In every way, it is very different."⁵⁵ Despite his overstating the case, the Castilian prince was correct in this

⁵² *Cantigas de Santa Maria*, fols. 68v (Cantiga 46), 240r (Cantiga 181), 246v (Cantiga 187). In the illuminations of the *Cantigas*, only Muslim soldiers can be seen riding both *a la brida* and *a la jineta*. By contrast, in the later representations from the *Sala de Batallas*, both Christian and Muslim soldiers are seen riding *a la jineta*. See also Echevarría Arsuaga, *Cabelleros en la frontera*, 65 as well as Chapter 2 above for more detail.

⁵³ See García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam*. García Fitz argues that raiding should be seen as an extension of military strategy, with particular rules and logic, rather than as an example of the disorder of the frontier. The expression used in the Chancery Registers to describe these raids was *vadere ad jenetiam*, going on a *jenet* raid. See ACA, R 81:56v: "Mahamot el Viello, janetus noster, ac alii vad[unt] ad jenetiam...." See also ACA, R 85:21v: "D[ictus] Moxaref cum aliis tam Christianis quam Sar[acenis] qui vadunt ad jenetiam." Both these documents are cited and discussed below.

⁵⁴ See also Chapter 2 above. Ibn Khaldūn saw *al-karr wa'l-farr* as inferior to and less courageous than fighting in close formation (*al-zahf*), I:480: "Close formation is more reliable and stronger (*awthaq wa-ashadd*) than fighting with the technique of *al-karr wa'l-farr*... because whoever turns their back on the enemy thins out (*akhallā*) the line... and it is clear from this evidence why God (*al-shāri'*) considered close formation stronger." See Soler del Campo, *La evolución*, 159-60 citing *Primera Crónica General*, ed. Menéndez Pidal (Madrid, 1977), fol. 304 for the description of Muslim tactics at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212). Cf. *EF*², s.v. "Furūsiyya." See also Catlos, "Mercenary," 278; Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane*, 258; Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence*, II:390; Lot, *L'art militaire*, I:440. As an interesting digression, see Amira K. Bennison, "The 'New Order' and Islamic Order: The Introduction of the *Nizāmī* Army in the Western Maghrib and Its Legitimation," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (2004), 591-612.

⁵⁵ Don Juan Manuel, *Libro de los estados*, ed. Macpherson and Tate (Oxford, 1979), 144 as cited in Soler de Campo, *La evolución*, 163: "Sennor infante, la guerra con los moros no es commo la de los christianos, tanbién en la guerra guerriada commo quando çercan o convaten, o son cercados o convatidos, commo en

respect: the advantage offered by the *jenets* and sought by the Christian kings was not their strength but rather their difference. The same motivation, Ibn Khaldūn noted, inspired Muslim rulers to recruit Christian heavy cavalry.⁵⁶

Difference, however, did not mean isolation. The *jenets* were part of a heterogeneous Catalan army, an assortment of feudal and professional troops, and during periods of general levy, such as during the wars against France and Castile when the bulk of documentation concerning the *jenets* appears, these horsemen would have found themselves fighting shoulder to shoulder with a variety of Catalan troops.⁵⁷ Rather obviously, this fact implies that the *jenets* fought alongside Christian knights, but the extent of their interconfessional collaboration is occasionally surprising. In 1289, for example, King Alphonse issued the following order protecting a company of *jenets* and their Christian associates, departing for raiding activities together:

To all men of whatever frontier location of our land. Because Mahomet el Viello, our *jenet*, and others, both Christian and Saracen associates of the aforementioned Mahomet, have gone to conduct *jenet* raids (*vadunt ad jenetiam*) by our mandate, they must travel to frontier regions in order to defend our land and also inflict damage on our enemies.⁵⁸

las cavalgadas et cerreduras, commo en el andar por el camino et el posar de la hueste, commo en las lides; en todo es muy departida la una manera de la otra.”

⁵⁶ Ibn Khaldun, I:485-6 (Rosenthal, 227): “We have mentioned the strength that a line formation behind the army gives to the fighters who use the technique of *al-karr wa’l-farr*. Therefore the North African rulers have come to employ groups of Franks (*tā’ifa min al-Ifranj*) in their army, and they are the only ones to have done that, because their countrymen only know *al-karr wa’l-farr*.”

⁵⁷ Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera*, 101; García Fitz, *Castilla y León frente al Islam*, 137 and 153. More generally, see Phillipe Contamine and Olivier Guyotjeannin, eds. *La Guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age* (Amiens, France: Editions du CTHS, 1994) and René Quatrefages, *La revolución militar moderna: el crisol español* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 1996).

⁵⁸ ACA, R 81:56v (8 January 1289): “Universis hominibus quorumlibet locorum frontiarum terre nostre ad quos et cetera. Cum Mahomet el Viello, janetus noster, ac alii va[dunt] ad jenetiam tam Christiani quam Sarraceni socii predicti Mahomet habeant esse de mandato nostro in partibus frontarie pro tuicione [et] deffensione terre nostre ac etiam pro inferendo dampno inimicis nostris. Dicimus ac mandamus vobis, quatenus, quandocumque predictum Mahomat al Viello ac socios suos predictos contingerit venire seu accedere ad loca vestra in partibus frontarie tam cum cavalgatis quam sine cavalgatis ipsos solutis vestris predictis cum cavalcatis seu rebus eorum benigne recipiatis et eis[em] vel rebus suis nullum dampnum vel impedimentum faciatis immo iuvetis et dirigatis eosdem in hiis in quibus poteritis bono modo. Datum ut supra.” Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 194 cites this document and presents an unreliable edition. He also gives the wrong date for the document. In 1290, Mahomet Abenadalil also departed for raids along the border of

For their part, the captains Mahomet Abenadalil and al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, both either commanded or fought alongside Christian soldiers, including, in the latter case, fighting alongside heavily armed Templar knights.⁵⁹ Another captain, Moxarref Abenhalbet, who arrived from Castile, may have brought Christian troops with him, suggesting not only that the *jenets* collaborated with Christian soldiers of their own accord but also that these multi-confessional mercenary associations existed independently of medieval states.⁶⁰

While in the lands of the Crown of Aragon, the *jenets* also received the support of Muslim infantry.⁶¹ Although Mudéjar foot soldiers, particularly crossbowmen, served in

Calatayud alongside Christians. ACA, R 81:177r (5 September 1290), which has several lacunae: “... et conciliis ac subditis suis Calatayube, Daroce, Tirasone, [...] et omnium et singulorum aliorum locorum ... cum Castellanis seu Navarris, sciatis quod nos mitimus nobilem Mahomet Abnadalil vassallum nostrum ... sua janetorum et Raimundum Sancier de Calatayube et Garciam Sancier de Guorguet de domo nostra, cum aliquibus ... Christianorum cum eo ad ipsas partes pro defendendis locis predictis et inf<errendum> malum inimicis ... et cetera. Si aliquas treugas habetis vel <tenetis> cum Castellanis vel Navarris ipsis incontinenti easdem Et si contigerit ipsum Mahometum vel aliquos de familie sua intrare terram inimicorum nostrorum eosdem ... cum cavalc[at]is vel sine cavalcatis et detis eisdem ... et vendicionem et non permit[a]tis eis fieri ... cum aliquod prebentes ei[sd]em consilium et cetera. Et si contigerit predictem nobilem facere cavalcata[m] ... dicta litera present[...] nullum impedimentum et cetera. Datum ut supra.” Partial quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 266, n.30.

⁵⁹ For Abenadalil, see Catlos, “Mercenary,” 278-9, citing ACA, R 81:177r and ACA, R 83:70v-71r. For the case of Ibn Raḥḥū, see Chapter 6.

⁶⁰ ACA, R 85:21v (14 May 1290): “Universis hominibus quorumlibet locorum frontiarum dicti domini Regis qui non sint in treuga. Cu[m] Moxarref Abenh[a]lbet, jenetus, qui nunc venit cum familia jenetorum de partibus Castelle ad servicium dicti domini Regis ut sit in frontaria Aragone pro tuicione et deffensione eiusdem frontarie ac pro inferrendo dampno inimicis dicti domini Regis et nostris. Dicimus et mandamus vobis ex parte domini Regis, quatenus, quandocumque d[ictus] Moxaref cum aliis tam Christianis quam Sar[acenis] qui vadunt ad jenetiam existentibus in frontaria Arag[one] ad servicium dicti Regis [...]git venire seu accedere ad loca vestra in partibus frontarie tam cum cavalgatis vel s[ine] cavalgatis ipsos in locis vestris predictis cum cavalgatis et rebus eorum benigne recipiatis et eisdem vel rebus suis nullum dampnam vel impedimentum faciatis aut fieri permitatis immo iuvetis et dirigatis eosdem in hiis in quibus poteritis bono modo, salva semper custodia vestra et rerum vestrarum. Datum Calatayub, II idus Maii.” Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 194 offers a partial quotation of this document. Cf. Catlos, “Mercenary,” 296.

⁶¹ Mahomet Abenadalil appears to have been accompanied by certain “Saracen footsoldiers” as the following receipt for salaries may indicate. ACA, R 82:66v (3 or 4 September 1290): “Eidem fuit scriptum [al]iud albaranum quod solvit nobili [Ma]hometo Abnadalyl pro quitacione sua et familia s[u]e qua cum ei venerunt de Granata pro mense Augusti preterito DXXXVI duplas mirias. Item pro quitacione Sarracenorum peditum pro dicto mense et pro esmend[i] unius equi qui fuit interfectus in rambla Valencie super ludo janethie XXXII duplas et med[ia]m mirias. Datum ut supra.” Cf. Catlos, “Mercenary,” 267 n.35. When *jenets* were raiding Valencia from Granada in 1286, Pere warned his officials that they were accompanied by Muslim footsoldiers (*pedites*). ACA, R 70:25v (9 December 1286): “...Cum intelleximus quod jeneti et alii Sarraceni extranei tam equites quam pedites parant et intendunt intrare regnum nostrum Valencie et malum inferre ibidem....”

the Crown's army, it is not clear from the sparse documentation whether the Muslims who accompanied these *jenets* were Mudéjars or foreign soldiers themselves.⁶² While Mudéjar involvement in recruiting the *jenets* may suggest that military cooperation between these groups was likely, it was also precisely this collaboration – viewed as conspiracy – that the Crown worked to avoid during the Valencian uprising and later, during the events leading up to the Crusade against Almería, described in the last chapter of this dissertation.⁶³

Finally and most curiously, one finds the *jenets* fighting alongside *almogàvers* and *adalids*, lightly-armored Catalan and Aragonese foot soldiers that specialized in cross-border raids against Granada and Castile (see Figure 5).⁶⁴ Like the *jenets*, these raiders of obscure origin and composition increasingly moved from the political and social margins into the focus of the Crown in the thirteenth century.⁶⁵ The convergence

⁶² See Chapter 2 for more detail on Mudéjar soldiers in the service of the Crown of Aragon. These Muslim footsoldiers may have been recruited alongside the *jenets* from Granada and North Africa. For instance, Jaume II tried to recruit 300 *jenets* and 50 crossbowmen (*ballesteros*) from Tilimsān (ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 10, no.1334). Nevertheless, evidence of Mudéjar crossbowmen serving the Crown can be found in the earliest Registers (ACA, R 33:63v, 34:4v, and 37:48). See also, Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 293-4.

⁶³ See Chapter 6.

⁶⁴ In December 1290, an order was issued to all the officials of Aragon not to impede the movements of any *adalids*, *almogàvers* on foot or horse, or *jenets* entering Castile or Navarre. ACA 81:237v (13 December 1290): “Universis officialibus civitatum villarum et quorumlibet locorum Aragone. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, aliquibus [ad]alilis vel almugav[er]is equitum vel peditum vel aliis janetis si intrarent Castellam seu Navarram nullum impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis vel fieri ab aliquibus permitatis immo providiatis eisdem et familie eorum de securo transitu et [con]duct[u] ... restituentes et re[s]titui faciemus nichilominus eisdem omnes homines bestiarum et alias res quas habunt de terra dictorum inimicorum nostrorum et que nos vel aliquis nostrum ab eisdem cepistis vel etiam extorsistis. Datum u[t supra].” To make matters more confusing, Muslim raiders from Granada were occasionally called Muslim *almogàvers*: ACA, R 100:102r (14 November 1294); ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 36, no.4492 (30 March 1312).

⁶⁵ The *adalids* were the leaders of the *almogàvers*. The names of both groups derive from Arabic, *mughāwīr* (raider) and *dalīl* (guide). Desclot described them as a mixed group of Aragonese, Catalan, and “Saracen” lightly armed soldiers that lived in the mountains and forests. Desclot, *Crònica*, chap. 79: “Aquestes gents qui han nom Almugavers son gents que no viven sino de fet de armes, ne no stan en viles ne en ciutats, sino en muntanyes e en boschs; e guerreien tots jorns ab Serrayns, e entren dins la terra dels Serrayns huna jornada o dues lladrunyant e prenent dels Serrayns molts, e de llur haver; e de aço viven; e sofferen moltes malenances que als altres homens no porien sostenir; que be passaran a vegades dos jorns sens menjar, si mester los es; e menjaran de les erbes dels camps, que sol no s’en prehen res. E los Adelits que’ls guien, saben les terres e’ls camins. E no aporten mes de huna gonella o huna camisa, sia stiu o iverne;

of the *jenets* and the *almogàvers*, frontier groups who traditionally found themselves opposed, was perhaps the most uncanny result of the Crown's new army.

These interconfessional collaborations therefore raise a critical question: Did military profession override religious profession? Leaning away from the conclusion of the last chapter or, indeed, Machiavelli's generic condemnation, this history seems to place mercenary companies in a positive light. Ruled by the uncomplicated and modern spirit of commodity exchange – service for pay – these soldiers were incorporated into the Catalan army regardless of religion, *despite* religion. This observation has led Burns, among others, to argue that military exchanges were ironically a means – however fleeting – not simply of interaction but also of accommodation and assimilation between Muslims and Christians.⁶⁶ And as the long-standing use of Christian mercenaries by

e en les cames porten hunes calses de cuyro, e als peus hunes avarques de cuyro. E porten bon coltell e bona correja, e hun foguer a la cinta. E porta cascú huna llança e dos darts, e hun cerró de cuyro en que aporten llur vianda. E són molt forts e molt laugers per fugir e per encalsar. E són Catalans e Aragonesos e Serrayns.” Muntaner claimed that these troops only traveled with what they needed for the day without need of packhorses or mules. Muntaner, *Crònica*, chap. 62: “E aquets anaren cascú ab son çarró acostes: que no creats que menassen adzembla neguna, ans cascú portava lo pa en son çarró, axí com acostumats e nudrits los almugavers; que com van en cavalgada, cascú porta un pa per cascun dia, e no pus: e puix del pa e de l'aygua e de les erbes passen llur temps aytant com llur ops es.” See also M. Rojas Gabriel and D. M. Pérez Castañera, “Aproximación a almogávares y almogaverías en la frontera con Granada,” in *Estudios de Frontera. Alcalá la Real y al Arcipreste de Hila*, ed. F. Toro and J. Rodríguez Molina (Jaén: 1996), 569-82; J. Torres Fontes, “El adalid en la frontera de Granada,” *Anuario de estudios medievales* 15 (1985), 345-66; Paul N. Morris, “‘We Have Met Devils!’ The Almogavars of James I and Peter III of Catalonia-Aragon,” *Anistoriton* 4 (2000). Echevarría Arsuaga, *Cabelleros en la frontera*, 111-2 discusses *adalids* in detail. There is also a great deal of popular literature in Spanish based on the *almogàvers*, who have attained a near mythical status. Compare this with the identical role of the *dalīl* (pl. *adillā*) in the Naṣrid army. See Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane*, 245.

⁶⁶ Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 298: “Ideology or religion was no absolute obstacle to participation.” Burns, *Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, 15: “Military action, quite apart from Muslim-Christian hostilities, provided a friendly contact.” Lourie, “A Jewish Mercenary,” 368: “If the cultural heterogeneity, the frontier conditions and the combination of geo-political rivalries with religious warfare facilitated the employment of Muslim mercenaries by Christian princes (and vice versa), in spite of that self-conscious confrontation of Christianity with Islam which was one enduring aspect of the Reconquest, then uprooted, outcast, or merely adventurous Jews can scarcely have found the ‘ideological’ conditions uncongenial to the offering of their swords for sale in medieval Spain.” See also Barton, “Traitors of the Faith?” 38: “When all was said and done, the search for wealth, status and power, the chief motors of aristocratic behaviour down the ages, was always likely to take precedence over religious or ideological considerations.” Catlos, “Mercenary,” 302: “Neither Abenadalill's culture nor his religion presented a serious impediment for a certain integration in the Aragonese court, and the privileges which he was accorded and the esteem with which he was treated may even indicate a certain affection on the part of the king for his Muslim vassal.” Echevarría Arsuaga,

Muslim rulers indicates, military men on both sides seemed to value good pay above confessional loyalties. The world of mercenaries, one could say, approximated a free market, an interconfessional idyll, that the Crown merely turned to its advantage.

iii. PRIVILEGE

I do not know which to prefer,
The beauty of inflections
Or the beauty of innuendoes.
(Wallace Stevens)⁶⁷

The numerous privileges that the Crown conferred upon the *jenets* not only confirm the value of these troops but also help to unveil the manner in which the Catalan kings viewed their relationship with the *jenets*. To begin with the smallest of such privileges, the *jenets* regularly received clothes (*vestis*) or cloth (*pannus*) for making clothes.⁶⁸ Yet tempting as the conclusion may be, nothing indicates that they wore or were made to wear uniforms. For instance, although King Alphonse agreed to provide

Caballeros en la frontera, 86, speaking of conversions: “El ámbito militar se mostró especialmente receptivo a este tipo de mutaciones, probablemente porque contaba más el valor del enemigo que su religión, y porque el converso era incorporado inmediatamente a filas sin modificar su categoría dentro el ejército, ni en la sociedad, ya que se le consideraba protegido por el monarca.”

⁶⁷ “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” from *Wallace Stevens: Collected Poetry and Prose*, eds. Kermode and Richardson (Library of America, 1997), 74-6.

⁶⁸ On 20 December 1290, the king ordered his tax collectors not to assess charges on a shipment of cloth destined for his army of *jenets* in Valencia. ACA, R 81:243v: “Lezdariis Tamariti, Dertuse, Paniscole et omnium aliorum locorum in litore maris constitutorum. Cum nos mitamus apud Valencie sex trosellos pannorum in barcha Guillelmi de Portello pro induenda familia nostra genetorum que est in Valencia. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, nullum lezdam seu aliquod aliud ius exigatis a dicto barcherio seu deferentibus dictos pannos racione pannorum predictorum.” The *lezda* (Rom. *leuda*, Cat. *lleuda*), or occasionally *portaticum*, was a tax levied on all goods entering a port. On this tax, see Roser Salicrú i Lluch, *El trafic de mercaderies a Barcelona segons els comptes de la lleuda de Mediona: febrer de 1434* (Barcelona: Consell Superior d’Investigacions Científiques, Institució Milà i Fontanals, 1995). Clothes were also given to the troops of Maymon and Mahomet de Pitaçen. ACA, R 71:51r (9 May 1287): “Petro Peregrini quod det vestes Maymono, janeto sicut aliis jenetis. Et cum ei dederit et cetera. Datum ut supra,” and ACA, R 71:51r (9 May 1287), “Eidem quod det vestes Mahometo de Picaçon sicut aliis janetis. Et cum ei dederitis et cetera. Datum ut supra.” Similarly, clothes were provided to the Almohad princes (ACA, R 71:52r). See also the following fragmentary notice among the king’s accounts which suggests that giving clothes was customary. ACA, R 82:164v: “Eidem quod det v[e]stes ... <ja>neti ... Regis prout consuevit....” In his contract with Mahomat fijo de Abulgayri, Jaume II agreed to give his troops clothing once a year, ACA, R 252:189r (10 March 1291), with full edition above in Chapter 2: “X cannos daquel panno que nos les querremos dar para vestir una vegada en el anno.”

clothes to the troops of Mahomet Abenadalil in 1290, he did not seem concerned if they simply took his money to buy their own.⁶⁹ *Jenets* also received compensation for all travel related to their duties, both within and without the king's territories, a broader privilege than that which Pere Albert incorporated into his customs of Catalonia.⁷⁰ Moreover, unlike feudatories, *jenets* received horses and military equipment.⁷¹ In some cases, money was disbursed for a *jenet* to purchase these items;⁷² in other cases, horses, mules, or equipment were distributed directly by royal officials;⁷³ and in yet other cases,

⁶⁹ ACA, R 82:168v (21 November 1290): "Eidem [Arnaldo de Bastida]. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, visis presentibus, detis et solvatis Abenhadalillo, capiti jenetorum et familie sue v[e]stes competentes vel tresdecim mille solidos Barchinonenses pro eisdem. Et facta solucionem et cetera. Datum ut supra."

⁷⁰ For instance, Mahometus Abencinich, Asmet Almergi, and Mahometus Abencaremon, who were part of the king's royal guard, received compensation for a trip they took for the king to Granada. ACA, R 82:146r (4 September 1290): "[Arnaldo de] Bastida. Cum Mahometus Abencinich et Asmet Almergi et Mahometus Abencaremon, de domo nostra, de voluntate nostra [vad]eant apud Granate. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, donetis predictis Sarracenis expensas idoneas usque ad dictum locum R[e]cuperentis ab eo et cetera. Datum ut supra." The following *expensarium* issued to the troops of Çahen Abennaquen was also cited in Chapter 3. ACA, R 58:22r (4 May 1285): "Raimundo de Rivo Sicco quod cum Cahim filius Jahie Abennaquem debent venire ad dominum Regem cum genetis et familia Sarracenorum quod tradit eidem unum expensarium per quem faciat provideri sibi et familie sue predictae in expensis eisdem necessariis quousque fuerint cum domino Rege. Datum Figeriis, quarto nonas May." See also the section on family in the following chapter for more documents related to this privilege.

⁷¹ For instance, equipment given to the troops of Bucar (ACA, R 78:84r [24 April 1289], cited above). Some Christian soldiers, perhaps professional soldiers or intimates of the king, were also given horses for battle (ACA, R 72:37v). For other instances of military equipment, ACA, R 76:19v (23 February 1288[1287]): "Geraldo de Fonte, baiulo Valencie. Mandamus nobis, quatenus, sicut acurrimentum fecistis pro nobis Sayt et Muçe, jenetis nostris. Similiter, volumus quod donetis Çehen, jeneto nostro, qui nobiscum est in servicio nostro vel Açano[...] suo loco sui quiquaginta solidos regalium cum eos racione acurrimenti dari similiter mandemus eidem. Et facta et cetera. Datum ut supra." Cf. ACA, R 76:3r.

⁷² For instance, ACA, R 67:15r (20 May 1286): "Ismaeli de Portella. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, incontinenti detis Abdeluhayt, janeto, CCL solidos iaccenses quos sibi de gracia pro uno roncinio duximus concedendos et facta et cetera. Datum Cesarauguste, XIII kalendas Iunii." Similarly, ACA, R 79:59r (10 June 1289) [a second copy at ACA, R 79:59v]: "Arnaldo de Bastida. Mandamus vobis, [quatenus], detis Ahemet de Rami, janeto nostro, denaries qui sunt consueti dari pro [racione] quos sibi pro utis(?) roncinios de gracia d[u]ximus concedendos. Et facta et cetera. Retineatis ad opus scribanie iuxta precium dicti roncinii." ACA, R 79:62v (7 August 1289): "Arnaldo de Bastida et cetera. Mandamus vobis, quatenus visis presentibus, detis Cayt, janeto nostro, quad[ri]ngentes solidos [pro] utis(?) roncinio quos sibi de gracia concessi[mus]. Et facta et cetera. Retineatis scribanie XX solidos. Datum [...] VII idus [A]ugusti." Machomet Abel[h]aye was given 1210 *sous* for ammunitions. ACA, R 65:177v (29 March 1285): "Arnaldo de Bastida quod iuxta hordinacionem solvat Machometo Abel[h]aye quatuor mille ducenti et decem solidos barchinonenses quos dominus Rex sibi debebat pro quitacione sua cum II albaranis Bartholomei de Villa Francha que nos recup[er]a[vimus]. Datum Barchinone, IV kalendas Aprilis, anno domini MCCLXXX quinto."

⁷³ For instance, ACA, R 58:14r (15 March 1284): "Johanni Petri Orticii, mandamus vobis, quatenus, donetis Muçe janeto nostro unum roncinum precii LXX solidos iaccenses. Datum Osce, idus Marcii." Muçe Beniagub received a mule directly from the royal official, Petrus de Libiano. ACA, R 67:138v (1

jenets commandeered horses, whose owners were later compensated.⁷⁴ It should be added that the Crown insured these goods against loss or harm.⁷⁵ In one of many such instances, in July 1289, Arnaldus de Bastida compensated Hahen Abenhali 500 *sous* for

March 1287[1286]): “Petro de Libiano quod det Juçe Beniagub, janeto, unam mulam competentem. Datum Barchinone, kalendas Marcii.” And two orders given to Arnaldus de Bastida, the first for a bridle and the second for a horse. ACA, R 79:79v (26 January 1289): “Arnaldo de Bastida quod det Massot Canaç, jeneto nostro, una equitaturam idoneam vel trecentos solidos regalium pro eadem quos sibi de gracia duximus concedendos. Datum Valencia, VI kalendas Februarii,” and “Arnaldo de Bastida. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, detis Aeça Abenhaçipuet, janeto nostro, unum equum idoneum quod ei de gracia duximus concedendum. Et facta et cetera. Datum Valencia, VI kalendas Februarii.” A pack mule was provided to ‘Abd al-Wāhid, one of the Almohad princes (ACA, R 72:35r, redacted). The following two documents make clear that these animals were not simply gifts but for use in the *jenets*’ service to the king. ACA, R 82:164v (8 September 1290): “Eidem quod solvat Muçe Almentauri, janeto, quendam roncinum de precio [C]CC solidos cum quo possit servire domino Regi. Datum Valencie, VI idus Septembris.” Finally, see ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 6, no.919 (8 December 1300): “Jacobus dei gracia Rex Aragonum, fideli scriptori suo Guillelmo de Solanis, salutem et gratiam. Dicimus et mandamus vobis, quatenus, cum ad ciuitatem Murcie vos declinare contigerit ematis seu emi faciatis de denariis scribanie ad opus Abdalle, jeneti, quendam roncinum competentem quem sibi providimus de gracia concedendum, ut dictus jenetus nobis melius possit servire. Datum in Alcantarella sub sigillo nostro secreto, VI idus Decembris, anno domini millesimo trescentesimo.” Other examples, ACA, R 82:164v and ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620:134r.

⁷⁴ ACA, R 58:39r: “Bernardo Scribe quod emat roncinum fratris Berengarii et ipsum donet Maimon, jeneto.” ACA, R 72:9v (20 September 1287): “Eidem [Arnaldo de Bastida] quod solvat Batholomeo de Podio quadringentos solidos iaccenses quod Dominus Rex sibi debet pro precio unius equi quem ab eo emit et dedit Alabeç, janeto, et facta et cetera. Datum in Ortis de Lupa, XII kalendas Octobris.” ACA, R 82:183v (13 April 1291): “Arnaldo de Bastida et cetera. Cum nos assignavisse cum carta nostra Berengario de Vilaron DL solidos Barchinonenses, habendos solutis et cetera super denarios quos Episcopus Gerunde tunc nobis dare et solvere debebant quos quidem nos eidem debebamus pro precio unius equi quem ab eo emimus et dedimus Çahen, jeneto nostro, et dictus Berengarius nichil habuerit ut asserit de dictis denariis. Mandantes et cetera certificado ... et de dicto quantitate fuit sibi aliquid persolutum, i[...] quod inveneritis eidem inde deberi de quantitate predicta [supradic]tis eisdem. Et facto et cetera. Datum Gerunde, idus Aprilis.” Another example, ACA, R 82:183v. In a related situation, a member of the army of Artal de Luna was compensated for a mule that a *jenet* took in 1310. ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 30, no.3737 (18 February 1310[1309]): “<Nos Iacobus dei gracia Rex Aragonum, Valencie, Sardinei, et Corsice, comesque Barchinone, ac Sancte Romane Ecclesie vexillario, amir[an]tus, capitaneus generalis. Recognoscimus debere vobis Petro Ramiri de Cascant de familia nobile Arta[ld]i de Luna per emendum cuiusdam açemile vestre quam amisistis in servicio nostro in Ob>sidione <civitatis Almarie quamque geneti secum abduxerunt de orta dicte civitatis facto inde per vos averamento in cancelleria nostra centum octuaginta solidos Barchinonenses, quos solvemus> vobis vel <cui volueritis loco vestri in cuius testimonium presentem vobis fieri iussimus sigillo nostro sigillatam. Datam [Va]lencie, XII kalendas Marcii, anno domini MCCC nono.>”

⁷⁵ As stated above, the Crown regularly issued safe-guards (*guidatica*) to its *jenets* when they traveled. See, for instance, the *guidaticum* issued to a number of *jenets* such that they could rendezvous with other troops. ACA, R 70:168r (13 August 1287): “Fuit facta litera guidaticum alcayt Abrafim et Abrafimo Muça, Atiça Patrello, Atiça et Muça, et Caçim, Çayt, Abenbey Mahomet et Alaçemi, Hamu, [H]uniç, A[I]ji Accrayedi, Jacob, Maçet Mahomat Almotihal et Çahat Algorçili, jenetis [...] Barchinone et debebant se re[co]lligere cum aliquibus filiis Miramamonini. Datum ut supra.” See also the case of the troops of Muxarref Abenhalbet (ACA, R 85:21v), cited above. The king placed all their goods under royal protection during their journey into his kingdoms. A similar *guidaticum* was issued to the troops of Haçen Acholeycoli (ACA, R 90:112r).

“a certain horse of his that he lost in our service.”⁷⁶ Rather differently, Arnaldus de Bastida paid a certain Maymon 400 *sous* to recover a horse that the *jenet* had pawned in Valencia to cover a debt.⁷⁷ The Crown also extended indemnities to the bodies of the *jenets* themselves. A certain captain, Abduluahet, who served at Albarracín, received compensation rather matter-of-factly for “two animals and two soldiers” that he lost at that battle.⁷⁸ Similarly, the Crown intervened to redeem *jenets* from captivity.⁷⁹ In 1292, for example, King Jaume II paid a certain Paschasius Dominici the ransom for several *jenets* held captive in Castile.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ ACA, R 79:61r (12 July 1289): “Arnaldo de Bastida et cetera. Mandamus et cetera [quod] solvatis Hahen Abenhali, janeto nostro, quingentos solidos Barchinonenses quos sibi damus pro emenda cuiusdam [eq]ui sui quam amisit in servicio nostro. Et facta et cetera. Da[tum] Barchinone, [I]III idus Iulii.” Similarly, a certain Halfo Aderramen was compensated for a horse he lost in battle. ACA, R 79:79v (27 January 1289): “Arnaldo de Bastida. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, detis Halfo Abderramen, jeneto nostro, unum equum idoneum in emendam [...] equi quem amisit in servicio nostro in Borgia et recuperetis et cetera.” Arnaldus de Bastida also compensated the troops of Mahomet Abenadalil 164 *duplas* for nine packhorses lost in battle. ACA, R 82:87r (7 December 1290): “Fuit mandatum Arnaldo de Bastida quod solvat Mahometo Abenadalilo centum [se]xaginta quatuor dup[las] auri [m]jrias quas [domi]nus Rex debet ei pro emenda novem roncinorum quo[s] amisit in servicio domine Rege cum carta sua ut in ea continer et quod recuperet dictam cartam et presentem cum apocham de soluto. Datum Barchinone, VII idus Decembris, anno domini MCCXC.” With regards to the last document, see Catlos, “Mercenary,” 264, n.25, who cites a related document, and Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 191, n.1. This privilege was also extended to certain Christian soldiers (ACA, R 72:37v).

⁷⁷ ACA, R 82:165r (9 September 1290): “[Ei]dem [Arnaldo de Bastida] quod donet Maymono, geneto nostro, CCC solidos regalium pro redimendo quemdam roncinum suum quem pro eisdem denariis impignoraverat in Valencie cum de gracia concessimus istud sibi. Et facta et cetera.”

⁷⁸ ACA, R 71:155r (30 July 1284): “Bart[ho]lomeo de Villa Francha. Cum Abdul[u]ahet, janetus, sit in servicio domini Regi[s] patris nostri et nostri in Obsidione Albarrazini. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, donetis ei rationem pro duabus bestias et duobus hominibus sicut datis aliis quibus nunc rationem datis. Datum in Obsidione Albarrazini, III kalendas Augusti.” I made the case above in Chapter 4 that this Abduluahet, (‘Abd al-Wāḥid) was the Almohad prince who entered into an agreement with the Crown to lead a coup against the Ḥafṣid throne.

⁷⁹ I also take captivity, here, to include those *jenets* held by the king’s own subjects. I return to this matter in the following chapter in the section dealing with Christian villagers. For example, *jenets* traveling from Villena, near Alicante, were taken captive in 1290, and the Crown angrily ordered them released. ACA, R 85:113v (15 March 1290): “Iusticie et luratis Xative. Cum iam scripserimus vobis quod miteritis ad nos illos j[e]netos quos captos ten[etis], qui venerant de Billena, et istud no faceritis miraturo de vobis. Quare irato vobis dicimus et mandamus ex parte Domini Regis et nostra, quatenus, visis presentibus, mitatis ad nos jenetos predictos [c]um familia sua et omnibus equitaturis et rebus suis, significantes nobis, causam propter quam [...]istis eosdem. Et istud nullatenus differatis. Datum ut supra.”

⁸⁰ ACA, R 94:151r (29 December 1292): “Petro Sancii, iusticie Calatayube, dicimus et mandamus vobis, quatenus, incontinenti detis et solv[e]tis Paschasio Dominici de Pampilona illos denarios quos per vos eidem dari mandaverimus pro re[d]emptione illius janeti et uxoris sue ac filiorum eorum qui in posse dicti Paschasii Dominici capti detinebantur quosquidem sarracenos ad partes illustris domp[n]i Sancii Regis

However haphazardly applied, these privileges appear to confirm that the manner in which the Crown dealt with the *jenets* was decidedly professional. From clothes to horses, the Crown supplied the *jenets* with whatever they might need such that these soldiers could in turn serve them effectively. One could see these privileges as gestures of respect – reflections of the *jenets*’ importance and the Crown’s desire to keep them loyal.⁸¹ In the same vein, one could also read these privileges as an awareness on the Crown’s part of the challenges and hardships Muslim soldiers might face in a Christian kingdom. In short, they served to uncomplicate the life of the foreign *jenets*. A less generous reading might see these privileges as troubling. Without them, the *jenets* had no means of legal or physical protection; they were entirely dependent upon the Catalan sovereign, who treated them as his property, as commodities. In other words, these privileges symbolized the sovereign’s grasp on his foreign mercenaries, his absolute control of them.⁸² Nevertheless, both perspectives – entitling or enslaving – could be called aspects of a professional bond, a relationship that was impersonal and hierarchical. The sovereign paid, and the soldiers simply obeyed. There was nothing more to it.

Accepting such a conclusion, however, raises a singular challenge again. Standing back, one recalls that the Chancery Registers were devoted to recording the day-to-day activities of the Catalan kings. Given the self-conscious manner, moreover, in which the Catalan kings employed their bureaucrats – lawyers and administrators – to further their sovereign ambitions, the problem becomes more readily apparent. One

Castelle a captione predicta per dictum Paschasium absolvi mandaverimus et [...]. Regi Castelle predicto prout iam alias vobis dedimus in mandatis. Datum Calatayube IIII kalendas J[anuarii].” I return to this document in the following chapter.

⁸¹ Catlos, “Mercenary,” 302.

⁸² Cf. a similar argument in Robert I. Burns, “Royal Pardons in the Realms of Aragon: An Instrument of Social Control,” *XV Congreso De Historia De La Corona De Aragón. Actas*, 2 vols., 1:2 (1993), 36-44.

should be suspicious of the fact that the king is this world's prime mover. Put differently, if the sovereign appeared to drop privileges into the laps of the *jenets*, then it may be the case that the king's actions and words were all that his scribes cared to record. Accepting this bureaucratic vision of sovereignty thus risks confusing texts with the reality that they claim to represent.

It is worth recalling, in this context, that several *jenet* companies negotiated the terms of their service before entering the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. The *jenet* captain Çahim Abennaquem sent representatives – the five *jenets* riding mules – in advance of his arrival, suggesting that he negotiated from a position of strength.⁸³ Although the opposite could be said of Mahomet Abenadalil and his colleagues, who were seeking refuge, they received privileges greater than or equal to any other company.⁸⁴ The negotiations between the Crown and al-Abbās b. Raḥḥū are detailed in the final chapter of this dissertation. But in each of these cases, while evidence of negotiations survives, the content of these negotiations does not. One merely finds the final terms dictated by the Crown and dutifully copied into his Registers, maintaining the illusion of the *jenets*' transparent incorporation and passive consent to the Crown's vision.

⁸³ See also the case of the *jenet* captain Muxarref Abenhalbet, mentioned above, who led a contingent of Christian and Muslim soldiers from Castile into the service of the Crown of Aragon. The following safe conduct indicates that these *jenets* had already agreed to serve before their arrival. ACA, R 85:21v (14 May 1290): “Universis hominibus quorumlibet locorum frontiarum dicti domini Regis qui non sint in treuga. Cu[m] Moxarref Abenh[a]lbet, jenetus, qui nunc venit cum familia jenetorum de partibus Castelle ad servicium dicti domini Regis ut sit in frontaria Aragone pro tuicione et deffensione eiusdem frontarie ac pro inferrendo dampno inimicis dicti domini Regis et nostris. Dicimus et mandamus vobis ex parte domini Regis, quatenus, quandocumque d[ictus] Moxaref cum aliis tam Christianis quam Sar[acenis qui] vadunt ad jenetiam existentibus in frontaria Arag[one] ad servicium dicti Regis [...]git venire seu accedere ad loca vestra in partibus frontarie tam cum cavalgatis vel s[ine] cavalgatis ipsos in locis vestris predictis cum cavalgatis et rebus eorum benigne recipiatis et eisdem vel rebus suis nullum dampnam vel impedimentum faciatis aut fieri permitatis immo iuvetis et dirigatis eosdem in hiis in quibus poteritis bono modo, salva semper custodia vestra et rerum vestrarum. Datum Calatayub, II idus Maii.”

⁸⁴ Catlos, “Mercenary,” 258-9.

Nevertheless, some fragments do demonstrate that the *jenets* actively shaped and negotiated their privileges while in the service of the Crown. During the period 1285 to 1287, a certain Mahomet Abolxahe and his troops were among the first recorded *jenets* to serve the Crown of Aragon. These soldiers did not, however, receive two of the privileges that were routinely conceded in later periods. In 1287, King Alphonse agreed to help Mahomet recover his sons – who were also *jenets* – from captivity but docked all their salaries for the cost of doing so, which is to say that the privilege of redemption had not yet been established.⁸⁵ A change of policy, however, can be roughly dated to 1289. In that year, King Alphonse sent the following letter to his treasurer, Arnaldus de Bastida: “Because at the insistence (*ad instantiam*) of Halhon Abenaderrafmen, our *jenet*, we conceded to give any *jenet* help for his redemption [from captivity], we order you [Arnaldus], therefore, to give them whatever you see fit upon receipt of a promissory note.”⁸⁶ Although the documentation masks how and why Abenaderrafmen “insisted,” Alphonse’s turn of phrase, his innuendo, recovers the muted voice of the *jenets* and restores their agency in shaping this relationship.

The second privilege that Mahomet Abolxahe and his troops lacked and perhaps the most significant of all the *jenet* privileges was the right to the king’s customary fifth or *quinta* of all spoils.⁸⁷ While in 1285, King Pere conceded to Mahomet his *quinta*, he

⁸⁵ Alphonse ordered that the 447 *sous* for the recovery of Mahomet’s sons be deducted from all of their salaries. ACA, R 71:45r (3 May 1287): “Petro Peregrini quod det Mahometo Abolxahe, janeto, CCCC XL vii solidos regalium pro redemptione filii sui quos ex computari faciat de quitacione sua et filiorum suorum et de ea quod sibi debetur [pro] quitacione a tempore quo ivimus Men[o]rcam usque nunc et recipia[t] ipsi albar[ani] ... hoc Arnaldum de Bastida. Datum ut supra.”

⁸⁶ ACA, R 79:79v (31 January 1289): “Arnaldo de Bastida. Cum nos ad instantiam Halhon Abenaderrafmen, janeti nostri, concesserimus dare aliqui aliquiscui janeto auxilium redemptionis sue, mandamus vobis, quatenus, detis eidem quicquid vobis visum fuerit, recuperando albaranis et cetera. Datum in Cabanis, II kalendas Februarii.” On the same folio, in a document dated four days earlier, this *jenet* is called “Halfo Abderramen.”

⁸⁷ The king’s right to a fifth of all spoils was broadly applied. In 1277, for instance, Jaume I licensed two Christians to arm a ship against those who smuggled goods to Muslim territory and specified that these

also made it clear that the privilege was temporary, a compensation for horses that Mahomet's troops had lost at the battle of Albarracín.⁸⁸ Over the next two decades, the Crown did, however, extend this privilege without qualification to Mahomet Abenadalil, a certain Adalibi, Moxarref Abenhalbet, Mahomat fiyo de Abulgayri, and al-'Abbās b. Raḥḥū, who between them commanded several companies.⁸⁹ One recalls that the *Ghuzāh* – indeed, as the Arabic signifies – were raiders who thrived on the margins of al-Andalus and received a similar concession from the Naṣrids, suggesting that the *jenets*, not the Crown, were the prime movers of this privilege.⁹⁰

Both the right of redemption and the *quinta* confirm that *jenets* could and did negotiate with the sovereign, a fact that complicates the claim that their relationship was

corsairs must retain a fifth for the Crown. ACA, R 39:182v (6 April 1277, my emphasis): “Cum nobis dei gracia Rex Aragonum fuerit expositum quod aliqui Christiani portant apud Granatam et Barberiam et alias terras Sarracenorum de guerra victualia arma et res prohi[b]itas, voluntas istud quamcum possimus evitare damus licencia vobis Guillelmo Molinari et Jacobo Guarius de Valencia quod possitis armare lignum seu barcham contra quoslibet Christianos seu alias port[an]tes arma victualia seu res prohibitas ad terras Sarracenorum de g[u]erra et capere eam libere ac etiam reti[n]ere sis certam esse quod dicta victualia seu arma ad opus eorum seu in defensionem eorum portarent et non ad vendendu[m] est enim sciendum quod vos debitis de hiis quos ceperitis racione predicta computare nobiscum vel baiulo nostro Valencie ... *dare nobis vel sibi inde fideliter quintam partem*. Datum Valencie, VIII idus Aprilis anno domini MCCLXX septimo.”

⁸⁸ ACA, R 57:143r (4 July 1285, my emphasis): “Nos Petrus dei gracia et cetera, concedimus tibi Mahamet Benbulhayer, militi janeto nostro, quod *quintam nostram quam nobis ... teneremini de hiis que cum familia tua adquisieris ab inimicis, possis retinere et accipere ad illis de familia tua loco nostri donec de precio trium runciorum quas emisti ad opus aliquorum de familia tua fuerit tibi satisfactum*. Ita quod tu dones in scriptis Bernardo de //Paraliata// Paraliada vel alicui nobilium qui er[ant] ubi tu vel aliqui de familia tua dampnum feceritis inimicis quidquid adquisieris ab eisdem cum autem de dicta quinta tenearis nobiscum vel cum quo mandaverimus computare et satisficere (*sic*) et satisficere tibi de precio dictorum runcinorum vel quod ipsum recipias in solucionem quitacionis tue et dicte familie tue. Datum Barchinone, IIII nonas Iulii.” Although the argument above does not rely on the fact, I would argue that “Mahamet Benbulhayer” and “Mahomet Abolxahe” were one and the same name.

⁸⁹ Catlos, “Mercenary,” 279. “Adalibi” may in fact be another reference to Mahomet Abenadalil. On 19 April 1290, Alfonso wrote to his officials ordering them not to demand his *fifth* from the booty of “Adalibi.” See ACA, R 81:84r (19 April 1290): “Item fuit scriptum offi[ci]alibus quod non exigant quintam de cavalgatis quas Adalibi, janeti, et alii qui vadunt ad genetiam de ... domini Regis fa[ci]ent ubicumque cum ipsam quintam dominus Rex remiseret eisdem de gracia.” For Abenhalbet, see ACA, R 85:21v (14 May 1290) with full edition above, in which he received protection for all goods from raids with no mention of the *quintam*. For Mahomat fiyo de Abulgayri, see ACA, R 252:189r (10 March 1291) with full edition above in Chapter 2: “Otroso vos faremos saber que tenemos por bien de quitarvos la quinta de la cabalgadas que faredes en enmendar los cavallos que perdredes.” See Chapter 6 for an examination of al-'Abbās b. Raḥḥū's career.

⁹⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:378; Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-ṭib*, VII:7 and IX:54. See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion.

transparent, a matter of simple consent. The *jenets* held some power over the Catalan king. But more significantly, the right of the *quinta* suggests that their relationship was not simply grounded in a commodity exchange, service for pay. While other privileges suggest a professional bond, the *quinta* marked the *jenets*' independence from the Crown. By surrendering its claim to spoils, the Crown also recognized the *jenets*' ability to operate outside of its purview and more problematically, outside of the view of the Chancery Registers. Considering, moreover, the strong possibility that these spoils outweighed their salaries, one must also consider the possibility that raiding – rather than salaried service – was the principle motivation for and activity of the *jenets*. In this case, one could argue, the service of the *jenets* did not represent a simple exchange of roles – from a Muslim to a Christian army – but rather a continuity of their status as raiders and bandits, belonging to neither. This privilege, in other words, opens up the possibility that the relationship between the Catalan kings and the *jenets* hinged on something more than a small stipend.

iv. THE ROYAL COURT

Although the Chancery Registers preserve little detail on the matter, some *jenets* were certainly members of the king's court, part of his entourage.⁹¹ And it is as a member of "the king's household," interestingly, that one finds the sole instance of a Jewish *jenet*, Abraham el Jenet.⁹² While Lourie, who first mentioned Abraham, used the figure to suggest the pluralist character of Catalan military companies, Abraham's presence within the king's entourage should give one pause.⁹³ On the basis of the available documentation, Abraham's role can only be called honorific: he appeared in the king's court, received privileges parallel to the *jenets*, but never served in the king's army.⁹⁴ So, what, then, did the *jenets* of the king's household do?

⁹¹ References to *jenets* who were described as "de domo Regis," of the king's court, are scattered throughout the Registers: ACA, R 44:178v (16 April 1280); ACA, R 55:49v (1291); ACA, R 81:10r (3 January 1290); ACA, R 82:146r (4 September 1290); ACA, R 82:164v (8 September 1290); ACA, R 203:7r-8r (22 and 25 April 1305); ACA, R 203:13r (14 May 1305); ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 774, fol.85v-86r. The connection between these *jenets* of the king's household and the Naşrid *shurṭa al-ʿulyā* deserves fuller attention, but I cannot deal with it here. *ET*², s.v. 'Shurṭa.'

⁹² Elena Lourie first mentioned Abraham el Jenet, calling him a mercenary, but made no mention of his role in the king's household. See her "A Jewish mercenary in the service of the King of Aragon," *Revue des études juives* 137 (1978), 367-373 (reprinted in her *Crusade and Colonization: Muslims, Christians and Jews under the Crown of Aragon* (London: Variorum, 1990), essay VIII).

⁹³ Lourie, "A Jewish Mercenary," 369: "The presence of a Jew among the *jenets* would merely emphasize the potentially inter-denominational character of *jenet* bands."

⁹⁴ In addition to the documents mentioned by Lourie, I was able to uncover three other references Abraham el Jenet in the Chancery Registers. None of the documentation indicates that he joined the *jenets* in battle but rather deals with matters of debts, his salary, and his exemption from the sumptuary laws for Jews. I include here my full editions of all the documents. ACA, R 80:8r (12 July 1289): "Baiulo et iusticie Xative. In[t]elleximus quod occasione cuiusdam litere a nobis optente per Abrafim el genet, iudeum nostrum, in quam mandabamus vobis quod emperaretis mille solidos Regalium quos Abrafim de Dertusia et Coffen, iudeum Xative, tenent in rem[an]da de Aqmeli, Iudeo, qui est in Castella in deservicio nostro et lucrum quod cum eis fecerant et nisi per totum mensem Iunii proxime transactum ille Aqmeli venisset hostensurus iustam tam propter quam dicti denarii sibi non debent emperari, compelleretis dictos Abrafim et Coffen] ... <bona> eorum ad tradendum vobis loco nostri predictos mille solidos et lucrum quod inde fecerunt cum eis. Unde cum constet nobis quod dicti mille solidos Regalium quas dicti Abrafim et Coffen tenent et lucrum quod fecerant cum eisdem ... malarum ... nostri et non sit intencionis nostre quod aliquid emperetis v[el] accipiat de bonis dicti Mahry licet sit in Castella. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, visis presentibus desemperetis eidem Abrafim et Coffen predictos mille solidos et lucrum predictum et absolvatis eisdem et fideiusso[res] per eos vobis datos pro C morabatinos racione predicta ab ipsis Abrafim et [.....] restituatis eisdem pignora si qua habuistis ut recepistis [racione] predicta ab ipsis Abrafim et Coffen vel eorum fideiusoribus seu aliquo eorum IIII idus Iulii anno domini MCCLXXX nono." ACA, R 80:70v (18 October 1289) as cited in Lourie, "Jewish Mercenary," 369, n.10: "Iusticie Xative. Cum nos

Several *jenets*, who were either “vassals” of the king or members of his household, served in diplomatic roles between the Crown and various Muslim states. Both Mahomet Abenadalil and al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, who had been vassals, visited the king’s court as ambassadors from Granada and Fez, respectively, after their tenures of service had ended.⁹⁵ In 1290, with the Crown facing a combined French and Castilian threat, three *jenets* of the king’s household traveled to Granada “at the king’s wish.”⁹⁶

concessimus Abrahamo el Jenet illos mille solidos quos Abraham de Tortosa et Coffen, Iudei Xative, tenebant ad usururas pro Mealuchç Alhavi, iurelature, et intelleximus quod dicti Iudei in frauderi dicti Abrafim et contra mandatum quod nos fecimus in predictis dictos mille solidos dederunt et solverunt cuidam fratri dicte Mealuchç. Vobis dicimus et mandamus vobis, quatenus, si vobis constiterit ita esse compellatis dictos Iudeos ad solvendum dictos denarios Abrafimo supradicto cum ipsos concessimus sibi pro uno equo. Datum in Monte Sono, XV kalendas Novembris.” ACA, R 81:10r (3 January 1290) as cited in Lourie, “Jewish Mercenary,” 368, n.7: “... iuratis Valencie. Scire vos credimus quod licet iudei Barchinone et Valencie habeant privilegium ferendi capas quod illi Iudei [...] qui sunt de domo nostra non sunt astricti propter dictum privilegium ad faciendum capam. Quare vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, ... Abrafimus Abenamies qui de domo nostra est et Abrafim el Jenet de ficto domo nostra non compellatis aliquatenus ... aliquam capam ratione pri[vile]gii supradicti. Datum ut supra.” ACA, R 81:226r (6 December 1290) as cited in Lourie, “Jewish Mercenary,” 369, n.11: “Iusticie et baiulo Valencie. Quod compellant omnes illos, tam Christianos, Judeos quam Sarracenos, qui debeant aliquid Abrafim[o] el jenet, tam cum carta quam sine cart[a], ad solvendum illud sibi vel ad faciendum et cetera. Datum Barchinone VIII idus Decembris.” ACA, R 82:3v (8 January 1290): “[Raimundo Scorene] quod s[olva]t Abrafimo el Jenet illis quod invenerit eidem deberi et factum [et cetera]. Datum ut supra.” ACA, R 82:164v (8 September 1290) as cited in Lourie, “Jewish Mercenary,” 368, n.8: “Arnaldo de Bastida. Quod cum Raimundus Colrati solve de suo proprii et Sahit, Jahis, Ju[c]ef[o], et M[.]zoto [...] Jucefo, Mañcor, Sahit Abenali, Abrahame el Jenet, Abdella, Asma Alca[r]ax, Mu[ç]a Almutayre, Mahometo Alca[...], Daveto, Mahometo Abenjabar, A[.]ç[.] Gua[...], et Sahit et Asmeto Arami, janetis de //domino// domo domini Regis, octo mille cen... ..ginta solidos regalium qui debebantur eisdem janetis pro quitacionibus eorum [...] cautis ... albaranis dicti Arnaldi et etiam cum albaranis Arnaldi Eymerici, scriptoris portionis. Quod solvat dicto Raimundo dictum VIII mile CLXX[X] solidos Guillelmo facta solucione et cetera. Datum VI idus Septembris.” ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 774, fols. 62v-63r (ca. 1293): “Abrafim juheu el genet deu quelì atorech en d’Almau Sunerii en XXVI cartes del seu compte ---- XXX solidi, VI denarios Barchinones.” This is not to say Jews never served in the Catalan army. According to Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain* (Philadelphia, 1961), I:175, Jews from Girona participated in the defense of the kingdom against the French.

⁹⁵ Mahomet Abenadalil and Abraham Abenamies were sent to Granada together on behalf of the Catalan king, ACA, R 55:49v (no date). See also Catlos, “Mercenary,” 271 n.52 and 54, citing with full quotation ACA, R 90:18v (12 May 1291) and ACA, R 90:22v (2 September 1291), without quotation but presented here: “Universis officialibus et subditis suis ad quos presentes pervenerint et cetera, cum Mahometus Abenadalill et Abraham Abennamies venerint ad nos ex parte illustris regis granate et inde redeant ad eundem. Mandamus et dicimus vobis, quatenus, ipsis nunciis seu rebus eorum in redeundo apud Granatam nullum impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis, immo provideatis eosdem de securo transitu et ducatu. Datum ut supra.” For Ibn Raḥḥū, see Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 211, citing ACA, R 243:264v.

⁹⁶ ACA, R 82:146r (4 September 1290): “[Arnaldo de] Bastida. Cum Mahometus Abencinich et Asmet Almergi et Mahometus Abencaremon, de domo nostra, de voluntate nostra [vad]eant apud Granate. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, donetis predictis Sarracenis expensas idoneas usque ad dictum locum R[e]cuperentis ab eo et cetera. Datum ut supra.” This document was also cited above to document the privilege of compensation for travel.

And in 1295, during the crisis over Sicily and an impending war between Morocco and Castile, Jaime II dispatched Muça Almentauri of the royal household to Sicily and Ḥafṣid Tunis for negotiations.⁹⁷ The Catalan kings, thus, saw value in the fact that the *jenets* were outsiders and were willing to take advantage of them as intermediaries. This role echoes the Crown's use of marginal figures – Jews, captives, and collaborators – to recruit the *jenets* themselves. And it may have been precisely in this capacity – as a recruiter rather than as a soldier – that Abrahim el Jenet gained his association with the Muslim *jenets*.⁹⁸

Looking beyond the Crown of Aragon, one can seek a different explanation for the presence of the *jenets* in the royal court. In the fifteenth century, as Ana Echevarría Arsuaga has recently shown, the Castilian kings employed a small but privileged contingent of Muslim soldiers, *la guardia morisca*, as their personal protectors during a period of sovereign crisis, a parallel to the Christian guard maintained by the Muslim rulers of Spain and North Africa.⁹⁹ These troops were deeply loyal to the king such that,

⁹⁷ For the historical context, see Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, 227. See also two documents, *guidatica*, at ACA, R 100:400r (18 March 1295, documents trimmed along right margin): "... et universis ad quos presentes pervenerint fidelibus amicis et devotis suis. Cum Muca Almentare, sarracenus janetus [noster], lator presentium ad partes Sicile et Barberie de nostra licencia accedat ad presens vobis fidelibus mandamus et vos amicos [et d]evotos requirimus et rogamus, quatenus, predictum Mucam benigne recipientes periter et tractantes nullam sibi familie equitaturis [in] rebus suis in eundo stando et redeundo impedimentum itineris nec iniurias gravamina seu molestias inferatis ... permitatis ab aliis irrogari prout nobis cupitis compellere. Immo si locus afuerit et nos inde requisierit [i.e. requisiverit] provideatis eidem [nostris] amoris et honoris intuitu de securo transitu et ducatu. Datum Barchinone, XV kalendes Aprilis;" and "... dompne Infante Frederico, cum Muca Almentare, Sarracenus de [officio] nostro ad partes Saculas de nostra licencia [...] dat ad presens fraternitatem vestram Regnati, quatenus, predictam Muça benigne recipientes tractantes prout eius ... requirit si nullum impedimentum [...] dium seu gravamen per quoscumque sustiniatis fieri vel inferri. Datum Barchinone XV [kalendas] Aprilis." Although he is not referred to as a member of the royal household in these documents, Muça was referred to in this manner elsewhere. See ACA, R 82:164v (cited above); ACA, R 2003:7r-8r and 13r. He was in the Crown's service for at least twelve years, far longer than either Abenadalil or Ibn Raḥḥū, who each left a great deal more documentation.

⁹⁸ Lourie, "A Jewish Mercenary," 370 also offers this reading.

⁹⁹ For more on the *guardia morisca*, see Ana Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera: La guardia morisca de los Reyes de Castilla (1410-1467)*. I would like to thank Professor Echevarría for providing me with proofs of her book during my research at the CSIC in Madrid. Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la*

as Echevarría argues, while criticisms of the *guardia morisca* had an explicitly religious color, they were but thinly veiled attacks on the authority of the sovereign.¹⁰⁰ In the public imagination, that is, the sovereign and his foreign mercenaries were easily substitutable. Most curiously, however, while some of these troops were Christian converts, they all remained *morisco*, that is, retained the dress and style of Muslim cavalry.¹⁰¹ Echevarría suggests that the symbolic and performative value of this dress lay in elevating the sovereign by making manifest his dominance over Muslims.¹⁰² Given, however, the close symbolic and physical association between these troops and the sovereign himself, one could read the value of the *guardia morisca* differently. By their appearance, their status as outsiders, these troops also marked out the king's exceptionalism, his ability to stand apart from and above the law and its community. Thus, rather than confirming the Muslims' subservience, the troops' appearance confirmed the sovereign's dominance over his own subjects. And in this sense, one might say that in surrounding the king, the *guardia morisca* literally constituted the space of the sovereign. Most significantly, as in the case of diplomacy above, it was not *despite*

frontera, 89: "La función de la guardia real fue cada vez más importante a lo largo del reinado de Juan II, debido al enfrentamiento entre sus primos los infantes Enrique y Juan de Aragón y el condestable Álvaro de Luna por lograr el favoritismo real. La división de la nobleza entra las dos facciones complicó tremendamente la disponibilidad de tropas fieles para proteger al rey." Christian guards, referred to *ma' lūjūn* (barbarians) or *mamālīk* (slaves), were a regular feature of the Naṣrid court. See also J.E. López de Coca y Castañer, "Caballeros Moriscos al servicio de Juan II y Enrique IV, reyes de Castilla," *Meridies* III (1996): 119-36. For references in Arabic sources, see Ibn Khaldūn, VII:379; Ibn Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 36; al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-ṭib*, X:44.

¹⁰⁰ Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera*, 185-6.

¹⁰¹ Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera*, 108, citing the fifteenth-century *Hechos de condestable Miguel Lúcas de Iranzo*, ed. Carriazo (Madrid: 1940), 138: "En pos dél yvan dos pajes de hedad de catorce o quinze años, muy moriscos, en sendos cavallos de la gineta, con muy ricos jaeces. Detrás destos yvan fasta treynta o treynta e çinco de los criados continuos de su casa, a cavallo, bien ajahezados, vestidos e tocados a la morisca, las lanças en las manos e las adargas embraçadas, todos en muy buen orden puestos. E así dio una buelta por la çibdad, e saliendo por la puerta Barrera, se puso delante las tiendas." See also *Caballeros en la frontera*, 136-7: "Sin embargo, en el caso que nos ocupa nos encontramos ante una aparente paradoja, que es necesario examinar: los caballeros moriscos, conversos o no, mantuvieron el estilo musulmán de vestido, monta y armamento...."

¹⁰² Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera*, 137.

being Muslims but precisely *because* they were Muslims (or taken to be) that these soldiers could serve in these roles.

One could argue that only a handful of *jenets* may have served in the king's court. By extension, the presence of the *jenets* as diplomats or members of the royal guard could be seen as secondary to the professional and martial roles described above. The Registers, however, do not sustain this perspective. The earliest documents to mention *jenets* in the service of the Crown of Aragon, well before their presence in the king's army at Albarracín, place them in the royal household, perhaps even as early as 1265 alongside the Infante Pere.¹⁰³ In other words, these formal and honorific roles, grounded in the *jenets*' status as outsiders, may have been the very basis of their relationship with the Crown of Aragon.¹⁰⁴ And perhaps it is no coincidence that the Castilian *jinetear*, another relative of the word *jenet*, means to ride in a public procession, hinting at these soldiers' earliest role. So, if not professionalism, then what bound the *jenets* to the Crown of Aragon?

V. THE GIFT

The gift is to the giver, and comes back
most to him—it cannot fail...
(Walt Whitman)¹⁰⁵

Although the five *jenets* with whom this dissertation began – the representatives of Çahim Abennaquem – received lavish rewards in return for entering the king's service, gift-giving was a regular practice, a courtly ritual, seen widely in both Christian and

¹⁰³ See ACA, R 17:57r-57v (13 October 1265) cited with edition in Chapter 3 above. See also, ACA, R 44:178v (16 April 1280): “Noverit universis quod nos Petrus dei gracia Rex Aragonem, tradimus et concedimus vobis Muça Hivanface jeneto in domo nostra et Axone uxore sue quasdam domos in moraria Valencie que fuerant Xerqui Alhadit....” I return to this document in the following chapter.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Echevarría Arsuaga, *Caballeros en la frontera*, 170.

¹⁰⁵ Walt Whitman, “A Song of the Rolling Earth,” *Leaves of Grass* (Modern Library, 1921), 189-194, cit. 192.

Islamic contexts.¹⁰⁶ Despite their seeming formality – like medals pinned to the chest of a soldier – such gifts were laden with potential significance. Marcel Mauss called the gift-giving a total social fact (*fait social total*), a gesture that operated on economic, aesthetic, juridical, and religious levels simultaneously.¹⁰⁷ And, more relevantly for this discussion, as Lewis Hyde has commented, gift-giving should be seen as distinct from commodity exchange. While the exchange of money for goods or services – what the last section called professionalism – implies no lasting relationship, a mercenary fidelity, the gift creates a complex bond between two people by invoking the feeling of an unpaid debt.¹⁰⁸ As such, gift-giving offers another opportunity to examine the Crown’s relationship to the *jenets*.¹⁰⁹ What sort of bond did the gifts that the Catalan kings offered their Muslim soldiers imply?

After salaries, gifts concern the greatest number of documents referring to *jenets*. Prominent soldiers received prized horses as well as decorative saddles and bridles, each a confirmation of their status as knights or noblemen in the eyes of the king. For instance, King Alphonse honored one Abutçeyt Asseyt with a beige horse, three silver bridles, three *jenet* spurs, as well as a particular saddle decorated with lions that he had seen in possession of a Muslim craftsman named Marchellus Pictoris (Marcel the

¹⁰⁶ See Chapter 3 above for a detailed examination of the gifts given to the representatives of Çahem Abennquem, referencing several documents held at ACA, R 58:22r-23v, including gifts of bridles, trotting horses, and clothes. In the Islamic context, these were referred to as *marāsim*, court ceremonies, or *tashrīfāt*, honorific gift-giving. See *EL*², s.v. “Marāsim” and “Tashrīfāt.”

¹⁰⁷ Marcel Mauss, “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques” (1925), reprinted in *Sociologie et anthropologie*, ed. Lévi-Strauss (Presses Universitaires de France, 2004). See also the sweeping critique of Mauss by Lewis Hyde in his *The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property* (Vintage, 1983). Whereas Mauss saw gift-giving as inherently primitive, Hyde extends his analysis to the tension between commodity- and gift-exchange in contemporary culture. See also a more relevant historical application Mauss and Hyde’s analyses, Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France* (Oxford, 2001).

¹⁰⁸ Hyde, *The Gift*, xiv.

¹⁰⁹ Catlos, “Mercenary,” 288-9, includes a brief discussion of gifts that offers a different reading.

Painter).¹¹⁰ It is worth noting that such specialized *jenet* horses, *jenet* saddles, *jenet* bridles, and *jenet* weapons are mentioned throughout the Registers as valuable gifts given to non-Muslims, indicating not only an admiration for but also a steady diffusion of the style of riding *a la jineta*.¹¹¹ The *jenets*' ability on horseback, moreover, was a source of courtly entertainment. On two occasions, the Registers make mention of *jenets* participating in games or tournaments (*ludare ad jenetiam*), perhaps precursors to the *juego de cañas* (see Figures 6 and 7).¹¹² A certain Gaylen, for example, was

¹¹⁰ The king was willing to accept a substitute saddle if the abovementioned was not available. ACA, R 71:24r (5 March 1287[1286]): "Dilecto scutifero suo, Petro Eximini de Ayerbe. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, incontenenti visis presentibus ematis roncinum de pilo bagio qui est de Abutçeyt Asseyt, janeti nostri, et tres frono[s] pala fredri cum pirallos de pulcroribus quos inveneritis ad emendum et faciatis fieri duo pena vel tria de pulcris calcaribus janetis, ematis etiam quosdam arçons pictos cum leon[i]bus inseritis in eis [q]uos tenet Sarracenus Marchelli Pictoris et [si dicta] sella per facta fuerit similiter ematis eam [c]u[m] roncinum cum omnibus supradictis [et] cum ea emerit[is] [n]obis inc[on]tinenti mitatis ubicumque fuerimus et istud non differatis ... nos [...] faciemus ... vestram volunt[at]em in precio predictorum. [D]atum [Cui]tad[el]l[a] [...] no[n]a[s]" A Mudéjar with the seemingly Christian name Marchellus makes apparent one of the regular challenges of dealing with the documentation of the Crown of Aragon. See R.E. Latham, *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* (Oxford, 1981), s.v. "Calcar." This type of decorative saddle may have been precisely what the Crown associated with Muslim noblemen. Desclot described a similar saddle used by Ibn 'Īsā, the Muslim lord of Játiva during Jaume I's conquest. See Desclot, *Crònica*, chap. 49 (my emphasis): "E aparech li be que fos hom honrat, que ell vench cavalcant en hun cavall molt bell; e la sella e el pitral era obrat ab fulla d'aur, el fre e les regnes de seda ab platons de argent e ab obra entretallada, e pedres e ab perles encastrades. E fo vestit de scarlata ab fresadures d'aur. E no aportava nengunes armes, sino una spasa pendent en son coll, molt richa e ab molt rich guarniment."

¹¹¹ ACA, R 90:79v (5 October 1291): "Matheo de Pinus Dalbet. Que nos concessimus de gracia speciale Sancio de Antilione sellam nostram genetam et frenum jenetum ac etiam quemdam cal[...] que vos pro nobis tenetis. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, sellam, frenum, et cal[...] predictam tradatis dicto Sancio vel cui volerit. Tribus traditis presentem recuperis cum apocha de soluti. Datum ut supra." The Marīnid king also delivered several *jenet* bridles to Jaume II (ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 163, extra series, no.1934). In 1309, the ambassador Pere Boyl also brought several gifts back from the Marīnid Sultan, including five Berber horses, five *jenet* saddles, five *jenet* bridles(?), five silver *jenet* swords with fine leather grips, and one large, round tent. ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 624, fols.111r-112r: "V cavalls [B]arbareschs ab V celles genetes e V feres(?) genets, e V espaes genetes guarnides dargent ab correges de ceda e I gran tenda redona obrada." In 1286, Samuel Alfquimus had military items confiscated from him, including a *jenet* saddle, a Berber shield, a sword, and Turkish bow: "sellem janetam et adargam et unum ensem et unam atçagayam et unum archum turquesium." See David Romano, "Los hermanos Abenmenassé al servicio de Pedro el Grande de Aragón," in *Homenaje a Millás-Valladolid*, eds. Almagia, Almagro, and Alverny (1956) II:243-92, cit. 280 as cited in Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 254.

¹¹² *Juegos de cañas* consisted essentially of mock battles between Christians and Muslims (Christians dressed as Muslims) and acrobatic feats on horseback (see Figures 4 and 5). For instance, Tapia y Salcredo, *Exercicios de la gineta*, 35-7, gives a detailed description: "E los juegos de cañas se solia usar, que la mitad saliessen vestidos de Christianos, y la otra mitad de Moros, con todos los requisitos de su trage, y era muy vistoso, el de las Tocas Moriscas, por fer tan extraordinario; y haziase desta fuerte. Tomando el un cabo de la Toca, que cuelgue por las espaldas doblado; el qual caiga desde la oreja izquierda tan largo como dos palmos, y vaya la toca por encima de la cabeça, y caiga por encima de la oreja

compensated the remarkable sum of 500 *sous* for wounds he sustained during one such event for the pleasure of the king.¹¹³ Along the same lines as equestrian gifts, the Crown presented certain *jenets* with falcons, which were admired throughout Spain and North Africa.¹¹⁴ These diversions, horsemanship and falconry, one might argue, were part of

derecha, y vaya por debaxo de la barba, demanera que desde la barba a la Toca aya un palmo de hueco, y suba por encima de la oreja izquierda a la cornilla dela cabeça, demanera, que desde alli vaya rodeando la cabeça por la frente; un porquito alta: y desde alli caiga por encima de la oreja izquierda, y venga por detrás de la cabeça un geme grande; porque esta buelta no ha de ser tan baxa como la que fe da por debaxo de la barba y luego suba por la oreja derecha, y vaya a la punta de la frente, por donde està la otra buelta, un poco mas baxa, y de alli vaya por encima de la oreja izquierda rodeando la cabeza toda hasta que venga a para en la frente, demanera, que casi venga por junto a las cejas, y de tantas bueltas a la cabeça, hasta que la Toca se acabe, demanera que venga acabarse sobre la oreja derecha, y alli se da una laçada con el cabo de la Toca, que sea pequeña, y lo doblado de la laçada venga a la parte de arriba. La buelta que cae sobre el pecho se llama Barbicacho, y se ha de abrir, y cruzarse, demanera, que a los lados venga a hazer dos conijales, los quales se prenden con dos alfileres, quedando la Toca tendido por el pecho. Este es el mas artificioso tocado, y mas gracioso que se puede llevar, y que mas imita a la buena Gineta de los Moros. Tambien la ponen otros con solo el Barbicacho, y otros modos que no son tan buenos. Ha de tener de largo viente varas entre los hombres de cavallo.” Tapia y Salcredo, *Exercicios de la gineta*, 83-5. See also, Machuca, *Libro de exercicios de gineta*, fols. 84-9. More generally, see J.R. Juliá Viñamata, “Jocs de guerra i jocs de lleure a la Barcelona de la baixa edat mitjana,” *Revista d’Etnologia de Catalunya* I (Barcelona, 1992), 10-23. Idem, “Las manifestaciones lúdico-deportivas de los barceloneses en la Baja Edad Media,” *Espai i temps d’oci a la Història. Actes de les XI Jornades d’Estudis Històrics Locals* (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d’Estudis Balàrics, 1993), 629-42. Cf. the mock battles between Christians and Muslims in fifteenth-century Castile, described by Teófilo F. Ruiz, “Elite and Popular Culture in Late Fifteenth-Century Castilian Festivals: The Case of Jaén,” in *City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe*, eds. Barbara Hanawalt and Kathryn Reyerson (University of Minnesota, 1994), 296-381.

¹¹³ ACA, R 88:163v (23 August 1290): “Eidem [Arnaldo de Bastida] quod [det] Gayleno, janeto nostro, quinquaginta solidos regalium pro eando vulnere [quod] super sibi fecerunt quando ludebat ad genetiam.” Cited with partial quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 289. Mahomet Abenadilil was also compensated for a horse lost in a similar match. ACA, R 82:66v (6 September 1290): “Eidem fuit scriptum [al]iud albaranum quod solvit nobili [Ma]hometo Abnadaly[pro] quitacione sua et familia s[u]e qua cum ei venerunt de Granata pro mense Augusti preterito DXXXVI duplas mirias. Item pro quitacione Sarracenorum peditum pro dicto mense et pro esmend[i] unius equi qui fuit interfectus in rambla Valencie super ludo janethie XXXII duplas et med[ia]m mirias. Datum ut supra.” Also cited without quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 289.

¹¹⁴ Mahomet Abenadalil received falcons on two occasions, a reflection of his high position, first as captain of the *jenets* and later ambassador from Granada. ACA, R 82:91r (21 December 1290): “Raimundo de Rivo Sicco quod tradat Mahometo Abenadalillo austurchonem suum et dominus Rex satisfac[iat] sibi in precio. Datum XII kalendas Ianuarii.” See R.E. Latham, *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List* (Oxford, 1965), s.v. “Austurcus,” or goshawk, which was a rarity in the Maghrib. Second, while ambassador, Abenadalil received four falcons. ACA, R 90:22v (2 September 1291): “Andree Eymerici, falchoneris et cetera, mandamus vobis, quatenus, de falchonibus nostris novis quos tenetis in Valencie, tradatis Mahometo Abenadalill nuncio illustris regis Granate quatuor falchones quos sibi de gracia duximus concedendos. Datum ut supra.” This second document is cited but not quoted by Catlos, “Mercenary,” 290, n.123. Falcons were regularly given as gifts in diplomatic missions to North Africa (ACA, R 19:48v; ACA, R 65:112r; ACA, R 252:34v; ACA, R 334:63r-63v). For the Islamic context, see *EP*², s.v. “Bayzara.” See also L. Mercier, *La chasse et les sports chez les Arabes* (Paris: 1927), esp. 81-106 and extensive bibliography. In contrast to medieval Europe, falconry was not solely an elite diversion in the Islamic world. See also, Tapia y Salcredo, *Exercicios de la gineta*, 111, who connects falconing and the skill of

the shared chivalric ethos or symbolic vocabulary of the Iberian military aristocracy. They provided neutral spaces through which the *jenets* could enter into and participate in the community of the Crown of Aragon regardless of religion.¹¹⁵ These gifts, Hyde would argue, served to erase the boundaries between the sovereign and his Muslim soldiers.¹¹⁶ They were inclusive.

The vast majority of the remainder items that the Catalan kings presented their *jenets* was valuable clothes and cloth. At first blush, these objects seem innocuous, fancy but rather utilitarian: capes, shoes, and tunics. For example, along with their salaries from the battle at Albarracín, two *jenets*, Muçe and Çahit, received leather-lined capes (*mantella cum pennis*) made from Parisian chiffon (*biffa de Paris*) as well as tunics (*tunicae*) and boots (*caligae*) made from colored cloth (see Figure 3).¹¹⁷ For comparison, it is worth recording that in the same month, a Christian who also served at Albarracín, Guillelmus Mathes, received precisely the same items, suggesting that these gifts were leveling gestures.¹¹⁸

riding *a la jineta*: “De los ejercicios mas generosos de la Gineta es la Cetreria ò Volaterio; para el qual (ademas de tantos preceptos como se necessita) es menester gran diversidad de Pajaros de partes muy remotas.”

¹¹⁵ The term “military aristocracy” is borrowed from Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, 300-322. Burns sees an equivalence between chivalry and *murū’a* as another factor of military accomodation. See *EF*², s.v. “Murū’a” and “Futuwwa.” From an art historical perspective, see, for instance, Jerrilynn Dodds, “The Paintings in the Sala de Justicia of the Alhambra: Iconography and Iconology,” *The Art Bulletin* 61:2 (1979), 186-197.

¹¹⁶ Hyde, *The Gift*, 61: “Logos-trade draws the boundary, eros-trade erases it.”

¹¹⁷ ACA, R 52:83v (26 December 1284): “Raimundo de Rivo Sicco, quod det Muçe et Çahit, jenetis, mantell[is] et totum de Biffa de Pa[r]is et cum pennis et tunicam et caligas de panno coloris, [quatenu]s, solvat dicto Çahit qui sibi restant ad solvendum de quitacione sua usque ad ultimam diem mensis Octobris preteriti anni presentis LXX VII solidos, VI denarios Iaccenses. Item dicto Çahit et Muçe pro quitacione usque ad ultimam diem presentis mensis decembris CLXXXI solidos, VI denarios. Datum in Turole, VII kalendas Ianuarii.” Alcover, *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, s.v. “Pena” and “Bifa.” See also Illustrations.

¹¹⁸ ACA, R 52:81v (13 December 1284). In another clear example, in 1299, Muça Almentauri was given the exact same gifts of cloth as a certain Guillelmus de Stanon (ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 263, fols. 145r-145v).

Dress, however, was a matter of concern in the multi-confessional Crown of Aragon.¹¹⁹ The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) had dictated that Muslim and Jewish minorities should wear clear markers to prevent miscegenation, a mandate that was regularly repeated by the papacy throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹²⁰ Within the Crown of Aragon more particularly, laws specified how Muslims should dress and wear their hair. The Customs of Tortosa (1309) elaborated: “Saracens must wear their hair cut round and wear long beards, unlike the Christians, and their outer garment must be the *aljuba* or *almexia* unless they are going to work.”¹²¹ The *aljuba* and *almexia* refer to the Arabic *jubba* and *maḥshiya*, long robes worn by both sexes over clothing and which, in this context, functioned as convenient markers of difference.¹²² Christians, it

¹¹⁹ Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 300-2; Ferrer i Mallol, *Els sarraïns*, 41ff; Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 330ff. It is worth mentioning that the significance of giving robes would not have been lost on the *jenets* because a parallel tradition of giving robes of honor, *khila'*, existed in Islamic courts. See *EF*², s.v. “Khila’.” Cf. H. Gilles, “Législation et doctrine canoniques sur les Sarrasins,” in *Cahier de Fanjeux. Islam et chrétiens du Midi (XII-XIV s.)*, ed. E. Privat. (Toulouse: Centre d'Etudes Historique de Fanjeux, 1983).

¹²⁰ H. J. Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation and Commentary* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1937), 236-296, namely, canon 68. Cf. Franciso Roca Traver, “Un siglo de vida Mudéjar en la Valenica medieval (1238-1338),” *Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón* V (1952), 115-208, esp. 146 and 160. See also *The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror: Intellect and Force in the Middle Ages*, ed. Robert I. Burns (Princeton, 1985), 3-22; Teresa Maria Vinyoles i Vidal, *La vida quotidiana a Barcelona vers 1400* (Barcelona: 1985), 125. For the case of Castile, see Teofilo F. Ruiz, “Expansion et changement: La conquete de Séville et la société castillane (1248–1350),” *Annales Economies Sociétés et Civilisations* 34 (1979): 548–65, and J. D. González Arce, *Apariencia y Poder: La legislación suntuaria castellana en los siglos XIII y XIV* (Jaén: 1998). For comparison, see also D. O. Hughes, “Sumptuary Legislation and Social Control in the Cities of Renaissance Italy” in *Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West*, ed. J. Bossy (Cambridge, 1983). On the question of miscegenation, see David Nirenberg, “Religious and Sexual Boundaries in the Medieval Crown of Aragon,” in *Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain*, ed. M. Meyerson and E. English (University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 141-60.

¹²¹ The original text dates to the end of the thirteenth century. See *Libre de les Costums Generals Scrites de la Insigne Ciutat de Tortosa* [henceforth *Costums de Tortosa*], ed. José Foguet Marsal (Tortosa: 1912), I:IX:1-5: “Los sarraïns deuen portar los cabells tolts en redon; e deuen portar barba larga. E dels cabells nos deuen tolre a vs ne a costum de crestia. E la sobirana vestedura lur deu esser aljuba o almeixa, si doncs no anauen laurar o obrar”(Costums de Tortosa, I:IX:4). Cf. Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 331-2, who cites two documents from the Chancery Registers that reiterate the requirements regarding hair. Cf. the 1301 Corts de Lleida (*Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y de principado de Cataluña* (Madrid: 1896), I:190) and the 1301 Corts de Zaragoza (*Fueros y observancias de Aragón*, 2 vols. (Zaragoza, 1667), II: fols 10v-11r) as cited in M.T. Ferrer i Mallol, *Els sarraïns de la Corona Catalana Aragonesa en el segle XIV: Segregació i discriminació* (Barcelona: CSIC, 1987), 43, n.11.

¹²² Alcover, *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, s.v. “Aljuba” and “Almeixa.” Reinhart Dozy, *Dictionnaire détaillé de noms de vêtements chez les Arabes* (Librairie du Liban, 1843), s.v. “Jubba” and “Maḥshiya.”

should be added, were forbidden from wearing either item.¹²³ These outer garments, the Customs of Tortosa further stipulated, could not be green, red, or striped, thus underscoring the Mudéjars' ignoble status.¹²⁴ All this is to say, therefore, that these gifts were not just plain gifts.

In the context of sumptuary laws, the Crown's gifts of cloth take on a particular significance. The Catalan kings showered their *jenets* in colored cloth including vermillion *presset*, Parisian chiffon, or, in one case, red chiffon of Saint Dionysius.¹²⁵

See also G. Menéndez-Pidal and Carmen Bernis Madrazo, "Las Cantigas: La vida en el s. XIII según la representación iconográfica. (II) Traje, Aderezo, Afeites," *Cuadernos de la Alambra* 15-17 (1979-81), 89-154.

¹²³ See a letter from Jaume II referring to the matter of Christians wearing the *aljuba* in Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva, *Viage literario a las iglesias de España*, 22 vols. in 11 (Madrid, 1802-1851), XVI:231 as cited in Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 332, n.10.

¹²⁴ *Costums de Tortosa*, I:IX:3: "E no deu esser listada, ne vert, ne vermella." Although this restriction is made specifically for Jews, the *Customs* explain that "aylo meteyx fes de sarraïns," the Saracens must observe the same rules. See Rachel Arié, "Quelques remarques sur le costume des Musulmans d'Espagne au temps de Nasrides," *Arabica* 12:3 (1965), 247. She explains that in Seville, the banned colors included red, green, and white.

¹²⁵ I include here all the references to gifts of colored cloth that I encountered. In addition to the documents cited above, see ACA, R 58:22r (4 May 1285): "Bernardo Scribe quod donet Alaçeno Sarraceno militi nuncio Cahim filio Jahie Abennaquem, unam aliubam et tunicam panni coleris et calligas presseti vermili. Et quod donet Hameto Abenobrut aliubam et tunicam exalonis et calligas panni coloris. Et donetis Mahometo de Villena aliubam et tunicam de bifa plana et calligas narboni [...] Datum Figeriis, IIII nonas Maii." *Presset* (var. *perset*, *preset*, *precet*) was a colored cloth, imported from the Levant. See Alcover, *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, s.v. "Presset." ACA, R 71:50r (8 May 1287): "Item eidem Petro quod solutis et cetera, det Çeyt Abdela, jeneto, sex coudes panni coloris et pro tribus fratribus sociis XVIII coudes de bifa de Sancto Dianisio de colore, quas eis dare debemus cum albarano Iacobi Fivelleri directo Muçe de Portella quod nos recuperavimus. Item uxor sue quatuor coudes de panno coloris quos ei pro vestibus damus prout in albarano Iacobi directo Muçe de Portella quod nos recuperavimus continetur. Et cum eis dederitis et cetera. Datum ut supra." *Coude* (Cat., *colze*) is an archaic form of the Latin cubit. ACA, R 71:50v (9 May 1287): "Petro Pelegrini. ... Item debeantur dicto Çeyt de Picaçen sex cubita de bifa de Paris et tria cubita minus quarta de panno coloris et unam penam et media nigra prout hoc omnia in litera per nos directa Arnaldo de Bastida quam nos recuperavimus continetur. Dicimus vobis et mandamus, quatenus, solutis et cetera, solvatis dictis jenetis quantitates predictas et vestes et facta et cetera. Datum apud Castilionem Campi de Burriana, septimo idus Maii." ACA, R 72:38v-39r (3 May 1288): "Arnaldo de Bastida. ... Item debeamus [Ç]ayt de Pitaçen predicto sex cubitos de bifa de Pariz et tres cubitos minus quarta de panno coloris et unam [p]enam et mediam nigra [fol.39r] cum albarano Iacobi Fivelleri directo Muçe de Portella quod recuperavimus. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, omnes predictas quantitates et vestes solvatis predictis Maymono et Çayt vel cui voluerint loco sui, et facta et cetera. Datum [Va]lencie V nonas Maii." ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 263, fol.145r (1299): "Item donam per manament del Senyor rey an Muça Almentauri, janet, vestir IIII canes e miga de biffa plana de paris a DXX solidos de XX solidos la cana e monta XC solidos item XVIII solidos per I pena e miga negra. Item VII solidos per calses. E axo monta per tot. CXV solidos Barchinone." A *cana* was approximately 160 centimeters. See Alcover, *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*, s.v. "Cana." ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620, fol.69r (16 June 1304): "... Item mostrans dos albarans de vestir dels dits jenets de VI canas de biffa de paris per dues jubes...."

These gifts, in other words, could be read as symbols of the *jenets*' exemption from the discriminatory laws that bound subject minorities, the Mudéjars and Jews.¹²⁶ Such an exemption was precisely what King Alphonse intended in 1290, when he informed his royal officials that although the Jews of Barcelona and Valencia were required to wear long capes (*capas*), Abraham el Jenet did not.¹²⁷ Skeptically and indeed correctly, one could argue that little evidence suggests that sumptuary laws were enforced in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon: evidence of punishments is rare, and the punishments themselves varied widely, from fines to enslavement.¹²⁸ Granting that the laws were unevenly or barely applied, however, does not mitigate the value of exemptions, which were both given and sought.¹²⁹ Indeed, one might say that the privilege passed from the Catalan kings to their *jenets* was protection from the law's essential arbitrariness.

Thus far, these gifts – martial and vestimentary frippery – would seem to be inclusive: they implied a community between these elite Christians and Muslims grounded in chivalric values rather than religion. Red cloth was, in fact, favored by both Naṣrid and

ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620, fol.107r (15 June 1305): "...An Arnau Sabastida de part den Arnau Almerich que dedes a Muça Mufarrax Asxaar tres canas de biffa de paris por una juba...."

¹²⁶ Montaigne saw precisely the connection between dress codes and power. See his "On Sumptuary Laws," *Complete Essays* (Penguin Classics, 2004), I:43: "'Tis strange how suddenly and with how much ease custom in these indifferent things establishes itself and becomes authority."

¹²⁷ The privilege was extended to another Jew of the royal household, Abraham Abenamies, an ambassador who also regularly appears alongside the *jenets*. ACA, R 81:10r (5 January 1290): "... iuratis Valencie. Scire vos credimus quod licet iudei Barchinone et Valencie habeant privilegium ferendi capas quod illi Iudei [...] qui sunt de domo nostra non sunt astricti propter dictum privilegium ad faciendum capam. Quare vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, ... Abrafimus Abenamies qui de domo nostra est et Abrafim el Jenet de dicto domo nostra non compellatis aliquatenus ... aliquam capam racione pri[vile]gii supradicti. Datum ut supra." See also Lourie, "A Jewish Mercenary," 370.

¹²⁸ Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 45 and 331-2.

¹²⁹ Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 301 cites the example of an exemption granted to Muslims during the war with Castile. Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 51 and 332 cites several examples of Mudéjars paying for or receiving exemptions from sumptuary laws.

Catalan knights.¹³⁰ So, was this the basis of the relationship between the Crown and its *jenets*, shared elite values?¹³¹ Taking common tastes as evidence of assimilation or community, however, overlooks the conservative and corrosive potential of the gift-giving above.

During the conquest of Valencia, King Jaume I recorded in his *Llibre dels feyts* two examples of gifts that served this second function. While negotiating the surrender of the castle of Almenara with two Muslim leaders, Jaume promised “red robes for forty of their kinsmen who joined them in the agreement and to each of the two, a palfrey such that they would count among the knights.”¹³² Similarly, the Muslim leader of the Castle of Bayren accepted “three horses, enough strong, red wool to dress fifty men, and one robe for himself of vermillion *presset*, and green ones for his nephews.”¹³³ In these cases, while the gifts conferred a new status upon the Muslim leaders, “such that they would count as knights,” they simultaneously confirmed their submission not their equality. Thus, if these gifts created a connection between the king and his Muslim knights, then they also established a distance and a boundary between them. Rather than inclusive, one might call these gifts coercive and divisive.¹³⁴

Did the Crown see the *jenets*’ acceptance of its gifts as acts of submission parallel to surrender? In this light, one might read the fact that the Crown offered these soldiers

¹³⁰ Catlos, “Mercenary,” 288 n.115. See also, as cited by Catlos, Rachel Arié, *El reino Nasrí de Granada, 1232-1492* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992), 231 and J. García de Cortázar, “Las necesidades ineludibles: alimentación, vestido, viviendo,” *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal* (Madrid, 1994), XVI, 41.

¹³¹ Cf. Burns, *Muslims, Christians, Jews*, 15.

¹³² *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 243: “e quels uestissem de drap de grana XL de lurs parents daquels qui serien ab els en lo feyt, e que donassem a aquels II sengles rocins que anassen en compte de cauals.”

¹³³ *Llibre dels feyts*, chap. 310: “e que nos li desfem III cauals, e uestir a L homens de drap uermeyl destam fort, e el que uestissem de pesset uermeyl, e sos nabots de uert.” See Alcover, *Diccionari-català-valencià-balear*, s.v. “Estam.”

¹³⁴ Cf. Robert I. Burns, “Royal Pardons in the Realms of Aragon: An Instrument of Social Control,” *XV Congreso De Historia De La Corona De Aragón. Actas, 2 Vols. 1:2* (1993), 36-44.

not just colored cloth but also colored *jubbas* as particularly confounding.¹³⁵ On the one hand, the gift of colored garments, as the foregoing stressed, was a mark of privilege above the Mudéjars; on the other hand, the *jubba*, in the Crown's eyes, was a symbol of Muslim submission and separation. What unites both these gifts, however, is the sense of privileged exclusion: the first from the law of the Mudéjars and the second from the law of Christians. In this perpetual state of exception, the *jenets* were not just tied to the sovereign by privilege but arguably indistinguishable from him. And as such, these gifts parallel the symbolic importance of the *guardia morisca*. What bound the *jenets* and the sovereign, in short, was their shared status as outsiders to the law.

What the foregoing has also ignored is simple observation that gift-giving involves two parties: a giver and a receiver, which is to say, the gift and the debt it implies are not just to the giver.¹³⁶ Thus, how might the *jenets* have viewed these objects, as symbols of inclusion or exclusion? The documentation, as mentioned above, hardly promotes this line of inquiry. But stretching the material at hand, focusing on the presence of a preposition, one could point out that when the Crown provided colored cloth to its *jenets*, it occasionally specified that the cloth was “for *jubbas*.”¹³⁷ In other words, the Catalan kings provided cloth but expected the *jenets* themselves to turn it into clothing; this gift – this symbol – was made in the hands of the *jenets*. From this perspective, the *jubba* gains at least two new layers of meaning. First, as sewing very literally restores agency to the *jenets*, one cannot exclude the possibility that through these garments, the *jenets* asserted their particularity and chose to draw a boundary

¹³⁵ For instance, ACA, R 58:22r as cited with edition above.

¹³⁶ Robert Burns and Paul Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror* (Brill, 1999) provides an excellent parallel to the current discussion.

¹³⁷ ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620, fol.69r and ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 620, fol.107r as cited with edition above.

between themselves, as Muslims, and the Crown.¹³⁸ The gift, again, marks rather than erases a boundary. Second and more simply, one could also argue that the *jubba* was what these soldiers preferred and what suited them.¹³⁹ Thus, for all its resonance to the Crown, the *jubba*, the gift that linked these figures, may have held a completely different or, in fact, no meaning to the *jenets*.

§

Machiavelli's mercenary entered into a clear, coherent, and consensual relationship with the prince. His fidelity was grounded in the exchange of commodities – service for pay – and nothing more. As Machiavelli warned, this bond was fragile, essentially faithless. But in that faithlessness, the logic of exchange also held out the promise of an interconfessional idyll, in which men could ally regardless of confession. Nevertheless, Machiavelli's vision cannot explain the mercenary logic that bound the Catalan kings and the *jenets*. Theirs was a relationship grounded precisely in the *jenets'* status as outsiders to the law and the community of the Crown of Aragon. And it was the gift of privileged exception – not the commodity – that linked these two figures, the sovereign and the bandit. One might therefore say that theirs was a political alliance predicated upon ambiguity, incommensurability, coercion, and a willful ignorance of the other. In short, this sovereign bond did not imply a shared sense of community or

¹³⁸ See Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities," 179. He cites a seventeenth-century source which urged Muslims to maintain distinctive dress when in non-Muslim lands, *al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyya* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1986), VI:311.

¹³⁹ Among the goods siezed from a Catalan *jenet* by several Granadan *jenets* during a raid on Almería in 1304 was a green *jubba*, suggesting perhaps that it was an item of some value to them and the Muslim who reported it stolen. ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 15, no.1967 (21 February 1304): "...fagemos vos saber que Hamed Aben Hanem este que vos esta nostra carta ... se nos querello e dise que el viniendo se de vera Almaria seguro que essos genetes que se fueron para vos que se fallaron con el en el camino e quel tomaron en cavallo e un aljuba de verde e diex doblas en albarn e un ... de armellas doro para los brasos e un albornos e otras cosas que vos el dira...."

purpose. How then, one must ask, did the *jenets* imagine their own role in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon?

TABLE 1
Jenet Salaries

Muça	53 sous, 4 deniers (Jaca)	ACA, R 52:57r	29 August 1284
Machomet Abel[.]aye	4210 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:177v	29 March 1285
Ali Arrexadi	46 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:186r	March 1285
Abraham Abenhamenia	190 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:186r	March 1285
Sehit Abdella	1442 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:186r-186v	2 March 1285
Almohad Princes	6430 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:186v	2 March 1285
Sayd and Muçe	458 sous, 6 deniers (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:188r	March 1285
Maymon	165 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:188r	March 1285
Sahid and Mahomet	210 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 65:188r	March 1285
Mahome[t] Aben[abderas]men Ataç	40 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Abdorramen filio Abdolmalich Abenfa[.]ina	50 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Iuceff Aveniacob Avenjacol Abenabdufac	370 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Magderva	40 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Amoç	200 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Mansor Matino Detzayn Abenmiquel	60 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Abrayme Abenhame	120 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Assar	100 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Ayssa Avenfarrat	90 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Machometo Abenfayol	50 sous	ACA, R 67:77r-77v	20 September 1286
Mahomet Abenabderasmen	100 sous	ACA, R 67:79v	20 September 1286
Abrihemil	248 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 67:81r	20 September 1286

Çayt Abdela	248 sous = 8 sous per diem (Perhaps, a scribal error. The albaranum has an interlinear notes that indicates that the payment was for the month of December only.)	ACA, R 71:49v	8 May 1287
Çayt Abdella	120 sous = 4 sous per diem	ACA, R 71:49v	8 May 1287
Açayen	184 sous	ACA, R 71:49v	8 May 1287
Maymon de Picaçen	266 sous = 3 sous per diem (Barcelona)	ACA, R 71:50v	9 May 1287
Maymon de Picaçen	368 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 71:50v	9 May 1287
Mahomet and his three brothers	496 sous = 4 sous per diem (Barcelona)	ACA, R 71:51v	12 May 1287
Mahomet and his three brothers	448 sous = 4 sous per diem (Barcelona)	ACA, R 71:51v	12 May 1287
Zayt and his brother	248 sous = 4 sous per diem (Barcelona)	ACA, R 71:51v	12 May 1287
Mahomet Abelhaye	337 sous = 11 sous per diem (Jaca)	ACA, R 72:32v	10 April 1288
Azayem	184 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 72:32v	10 April 1288
Almohad Princes	5472 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 72:33r	10 April 1288
Altaheh	46 sous, 6 deniers (Jaca)	ACA, R 72:33r	10 April 1288
Mahomet de Picaçen	368 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 72:38v	4 May 1288
Mahomet de Picaçen	266 sous = 3 sous per diem (Barcelona)	ACA, R 72:38v	4 May 1288
Çayt and Muça	186 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, R 72:38v	5 May 1288
Jucef Aben Jacob and Cassim	372 sous = 6 sous per diem (Jaca)	ACA, R 72:53v	17 February 1289
Mahomat Abenadalil and troops	536 duplas miries	ACA, R 82:66v	4 September 1290
Mahomet Abenadalil and troops	800 sous	ACA, R 82:164v	4 September 1290
Jahia Abenallu and his company	50 doblas, 120 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, RP, <i>Maestre Racional</i> , 620:69r	1294
Muça Mufarrax	510 sous = 4 sous per diem (Barcelona)	ACA, RP, <i>Maestre Racional</i> , 620:107r	15 June 1295


Zahen Abenali	546 sous	ACA, RP, <i>Maestre Racional</i> , 620:134r	8 July 1295
Muça Motaui	150 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 8, no. 1152	16 October 1300
Muça Almentauri	120 sous (Barcelona)	ACA, RP, <i>Meastre Racional</i> , 264:98v	1301

Figure 5: *Almogàver* (ca. 1350)¹⁴⁰



¹⁴⁰ *The Vinkhuijzen Collection of Military Costume* (New York Public Library), vol. 702, plate 20.

Figure 6: *Juego de Cañas*¹⁴¹



¹⁴¹ Galvão Andrade, *Arte de cavalleria, de gineta, e estardiota bom primor de ferrar, & alueitiara*, 346 (Courtesy of the the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library).

Figure 7: *Juego de Cañas*¹⁴²



¹⁴² Galvão Andrade, *Arte de cavalleria, de gineta, e estardiota bom primor de ferrar, & alueitiara*, 348 (Courtesy of the the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library).

6. AN UNPAID DEBT

In the summer of 1292, several men arrived at the houses of Muça Almentauri and Maymon Avenborayç, *jenets* in the service of the Crown of Aragon.¹ They had come to settle a stunning debt of 900 *sous*, money that the *jenets*' wives had borrowed at usurious interest, and an amount that each *jenet* might expect to earn in half a year.² The angry creditors threatened to seize what they could. A royal document listed some examples in passing: household utensils, wine jugs, oxen, horses, tack, weapons, and plows. The *jenets*, who were members of the king's household, worked to solve this crisis, a fact that accounts for any appearance of this incident among the Crown's records. But the passing list – utensils, wine jugs, oxen, horses, tack, weapons, and plows – paves another path of inquiry, suggests a different story than that of privilege and exception – detailed in the last chapter. Perhaps only a moment of scribal emphasis, this list of mundane and unremarkable items spiders outward to the mess of living: eating, drinking, and laboring. And the questions multiply: From whom did these Muslims buy wine?³ Who tilled their fields?⁴ Who lent their wives money at usurious interest?

¹ Muça Almentauri's name appears numerous times in the Chancery Registers, indicating that he was a prominent *jenet*. He was in the king's service for at least fifteen years; the earliest document to mention him dates from 1290 (ACA, R 82:164v, a compensation for horses lost in battle) and the last that I encountered dates from 1305 (ACA, R 203:13r, a license to export wheat from the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon).

² ACA, R 93:226v (2 August 1292) with full quotation below.

³ That Mudéjars bought and drank wine is documented in the Crown of Aragon archives (ACA, R 205:128r). In 1258, for instance, a certain Petrus Arnaldi received permission to build a *funduq* on the island of Minorca in order to sell wine to both Christians and Muslims on the island, ACA, R 9:61v (3 August 1258): "Possitis vinum vendere Christianis et Sarracenis et facere vinum de vindemia [i.e. the grape harvest] illius terre et emere quandocumque volueritis." Mudéjar communities also managed and tilled their own vineyards (ACA, R 11:182v-183r in Perpiñan or ACA, R 12:40v in Játiva). Lest one think alcohol provided a well-lubricated means of interaction, in 1283, the Catalan king ordered that Jews should stop selling wine to Christians (ACA, R 61:162r).

⁴ Or perhaps, did they till fields for someone? Mudéjars living on the lands of monasteries or military orders worked their fields. For instance, the Muslims working for the monastery of "Bulbune" in Tarazona were exempted from the military duties that they owed the king so that they could till the fields of the

Regardless of the answers, these questions serve to highlight the limits of not only the documentation but also the sovereign bond and the state of exception: the lives of the *jenets* were not neatly confined to the purview of the Chancery or to their relationship with the Crown. Therefore, this chapter endeavors to describe the experiences of the *jenets* beyond the sovereign. How did other encounters and relationships shape the lives of the *jenets* in ways the Catalan kings did not intend? Did these bandits find a place, a sense of belonging on their own? If the gift helped to imagine sovereign power in the last chapter, then in this chapter, the unpaid debt, the other half of the transaction, emerges as the key to understanding the life of the *jenets* in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon.

i. LIFE IS ELSEWHERE

A hundred marks is a long one for a poor lone woman to bear,
and I have borne, and borne, and borne.
(*Henry IV, Part 2*)

The case of Muça Almentauri and Maymon Avenborayç reveals something simple but easily overlooked: the *jenets* did not come into the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon alone but with their families. Scanning the Registers, for instance, one finds a safe-conduct (*guidaticum*) issued to three *jenets*, Muça Abenbeyet, Açe Parrello, and Yoniç in 1290 that describes them as entering Valencia with their “wives and families.”⁵

monastery (ACA, R 62:93v [18 September 1284]). Cf. ACA, R 210:90r. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that *jenets* found themselves in the same situation, that is, living on the land of a monastery or military order.

⁵ ACA, R 81:52r (6 March 1290): “Universis officialibus et cetera. Cum Muça Abenbeyet, Açe Parrello, Yoniç, jeneti habeant mandato nostro venire ad [...]ndo nobis etiam uxoribus ac familiis suis. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, predictis jenetis, uxoribus ac familiis suis veniendo ad nos nullum impedimentum aut contrarium faciatis aut fieri ab aliquo permittatis immo provideatis eisdem [qua]re fuerit de securo transitu et ducatu presentibus ultra XV dies proximos venturos minime valituris. Datum ut supra.” Cited without full quotation in Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 193. The Latin *familia* could also stand for army, but as I will argue, in the case of the *jenets*, whose companies were made up of extended family groups, the distinction may not be very meaningful.

And at the opposite end of their service, in 1286, five *jenets* received permission to return home:

Because Giber, Jahia, Jucef, Hiahiaten and Dapher, *jenets*, brothers, served us, therefore they may return [home] with their families, wives, and sons, in all forty-seven people. We order you [all officials], immediately, to put no impediment or obstacle in [the way of their] return but rather you should provide them safe passage.⁶

These *jenets*, five brothers, had lived in and departed these Christian lands with forty-seven members of their family. What did their families do? How did they survive in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon?

The Crown did, in fact, extend some of the same privileges and protections that *jenets* received to their wives.⁷ Luxurious gifts of the type seen in the previous chapter were rare, perhaps suggesting that these women did not often appear at the king's court. Exceptionally, for instance, the unnamed wife (*uxor sue*) of a certain Çeyt Abdela received a gift of colored cloth alongside her husband.⁸ But by and large, soldiers' families received basic provisions: plain cloth, clothes, and on one occasion, food.⁹

⁶ ACA, R 66:197r (15 October 1286): "Universis et officialibus ad quos et cetera. Cum Giber et Jahia et Jucefus et Hiahiaten et Dapher, fratres janeti, venerint in servicio nostro et inde redeant cum familia et uxoribus et filiis [ei]s et sint inter omnes quadraginta septem persone. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, in redeundo nullam impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis immo provideatis eisdem de securo transitu et du[c]jatu. Datum ut supra."

⁷ See Catlos, "Mercenary," 291-2 for his discussion of families. See also Gazulla, "Zenetes," 193, who edits one document related to the wife of Muça Abenbeyt (ACA, R 81:52).

⁸ ACA, R 71:49v (8 May 1287): "Item eidem Petro quod solutis et cetera, det Çeyt Abdela, jeneto, sex coudes panni coloris et pro tribus fratris sociis, XVIII coudes de bifa de Sancto Dianisio de colore, quas eis dare debemus cum albarano Iacobi Fivelleri directo Muçe de Portella quod nos recuperavimus. Item uxor sue quatuor coudes de panno coloris quos ei pro vestibis damus prout in albarano Iacobi directo Muçe de Portella quod nos recuperavimus continetur. Et cum eis dederitis et cetera. Datum ut supra." Was she perhaps "Garup," who is mentioned in ACA, R 76:19r (full edition below)? Cf. ACA, R 76:39r (22 June 1286), with full edition below, in which a wife of a *jenet* appears in Barcelona. Perhaps she, too, appeared in the court.

⁹ ACA, R 72:33r (10 April 1288): "Eidem altera quod cum dominus Rex mandaverit Petro de Libiano quod daret IIII filiis de Miramamonino et uxoribus trium eorum et Issacho Sanagi de familia eorum, pannum quem sibi constaret Muça de Portella eis debere dare cum albaranis Iacobi Fivellarii. Det eis ipsum pannum quod quem constituerit ipsum Muçam debere dare eisdem. Datum ut supra." ACA, R 72:53v (15 February 1288): "Arnaldo de Bastida quod //solvat Jucef Abenjacob// excomputet seu deducit Jucef Aben Jacob et Cassim, janetos,... quidam alia summa C viginti solidi Barchinone debitorum eisdem pro LXXX

Some families were also provided with houses. Muça Hivanface and his wife, Axone, were given several houses in the *morería* of Valencia, a rather grand gesture that nevertheless parallels the equivocality of the *jubba*.¹⁰ The wives of the Almohad princes, perhaps less generously, received one “suitable” house also in Valencia.¹¹ Other women appear to have traveled alongside their husbands, who received additional compensation for their expenses. Mahomet Abolxahe, the “underprivileged” *jenet* from the previous chapter, was granted 15 *duplas* to cover the cost of bringing his wife, Horo, and family to him.¹² And although no evidence indicates such a thing, it is not unreasonable to imagine that some women accompanied their husbands to the battlefield.¹³ Finally, regardless of whether they settled or followed their husbands, the wives of *jenets* received financial support, regular stipends, from the Crown.¹⁴

solidos Iaccenses pro vestibus uxorum [e]arum cum duobus albaranis Iacobi Fivellerii....” The wife of one Gibri Bomandil received grain when she arrived in Barcelona. ACA, R 67:39r (22 June 1286): “Petro de Sancto Clemente. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, de blado nostro quod Berengarius de Conques ... [pro]videatis uxore Gibri Bomandil ... janetorum de familie sua que sunt in Barchinone in necessarie eorum quoniam nos illud vobis in compotum recipiemus. Datum Barchinone, X kalendas Iulii.”

¹⁰ ACA, R 44:178v (16 April 1280) with edition above. Did they live in these houses? Or, perhaps, were they gifts that they could sell, rent, or give to other soldiers? Cf. Catlos, “Mercenary,” 291 n.129. See the previous chapter for a discussion of the significance of the *jubba*.

¹¹ ACA, R 71:52r (15 May 1297): “Maymon de Plana, baiulo Valencie, quod conducat aliquam domom idoneam in Valencie uxoris filiorum Miramoni in qua est posint esse salve et [se]cure.”

¹² ACA, R 58:9r (30 February 1284): “Bernardo scribe quod donet Mahometo Abulhayr pro expensis uxoris et familie sue quam ad partes istas f[...] venire. Quindecim duplas. Datum ut supra.” See also ACA, R 52:54v (13 August 1284): “Raimundo de Rivo Sicco quod det expensas Axie uxorem Abdulhafet janeti qui est in servicio Regis in veniendo [de] Elx usque ad Valenciam. Datum ut supra.” We know that “Horo” was the wife of Mahomet based on ACA, R 71:37r (with edition below).

¹³ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:371, for instance, reports the presence of Berber women during a battle between Yaghamrāsan and Abū Yūsuf in 666/1267: “While the warriors of the two armies prepared for battle, their wives emerged with their faces uncovered (*sāfirāt al-wujūh*) in order to incite (*fī sabīl al-tahrīd*) [the men]. They celebrated and shouted encouragement.” On the question of women participating militarily as well as a thoughtful discussion of the challenges of source material, see Elena Lourie, “Black Women Warriors in the Muslim Army Besieging Valencia and the Cid’s Victory: A Problem of Interpretation,” *Traditio* 55 (2000): 181-209.

¹⁴ ACA, R 58:29r (6 July 1285): “<Raimundo de Ricco Sicco quod provid[ea]t in expensis uxori Maimoni, janeti, prout iam antequam computasset providebat eidem. Datum in Colle de Panissars, II nonas Iunii.>” ACA, R 58:49r (3 September 1285): “Dominico de la Fugera, baiulo Calatayube, volumus et placet nobis quod expensas idoneas quas dederitis uxoris et filiis filiorum de Maramuni qui in servicio nostro existent, ponatis nobis, a compotu datarum [...] contingerit vos reddere compotum nobis, vel aliqua loco nostri. Mandamus etiam vobis, quatenus, predictis uxoris et filiis filiorum de Maramuni, detis expensas

To conclude from all these privileges and protections, however, that the lives of these women were, in turn, privileged and protected – that they shared in their husbands’ exclusive status – would be to leave the curtain half drawn. The fact that the wives of Muça Almentauri and Maymon Avenborayç accrued significant debts may indicate that their stipends, of which little detail exists, were minimal.¹⁵ The challenge of making ends meet may have been compounded or perhaps caused by the difficulties some women encountered in obtaining disbursements from royal officials.¹⁶ In the case of Muça and Maymon, their wives sought help by turning to money-lenders, who lent them cash at

idoneas per tempore futuro dum ipsas uxores et filios in Calatayube, remanere conting[ant]. Datum Barchinone, III nonas Septembris.” Cited without full quotation in Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 180. ACA, R 65:38r (February 1286): “Raimundo de Rivo Sicco. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, detis uxoris Muçe et Çahit et Maym[u]ni, jane[torum], portiones quas dominus Rex inclite recordationis pater noster eas assignati habendas [c]a[r]ta s[u]a ut in ea videbitis [con]tineri. Datum ut supra.” Cited without full quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 292. ACA, R 76:3r (22 January 1288): “Geraldo de Fonte, baiulo Valencie. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, donetis Muçe et Sahit, jenetis nostris, [...]que eorum centum solidos pro acorrimento \et quitacionis/ eorum [e]t uxoris suarum. E[t] facta eis solutione et cetera. Datum ut supra.” ACA, R 82:69r (5 September 1290): “Fuit scriptum Raimundo Scorne quod quietet uxores Muse et Çayt, jenetorum nostrorum, de eo quod eisdem debentur tam de tempore preterito quam de presenti [die] de[i]nde qualibet die, prout eisdem quitare consuevistis ut in litteris per nos iam super hoc nobis missis plurimus continer. Recuperantes et cetera. Datum ut supra.” Cited without quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 291. ACA, R 72:53v (15 February 1288) with full edition above: “Arnaldo de Bastida quod //solvat Jucef Abenjacob// excomputet seu deducit Jucef Aben Jacob et Cassim, janetos, ... quidam alia summa C viginti solidi Barchinone debitorum eisdem pro LXXX solidos Iaccenses pro vestibis uxoris [e]arum cum duobus albaranis Iacobi Fivellerii...”

¹⁵ Only one document mentions a specific amount, six *deniers*, perhaps per month, dramatically less than the *jenets*’ salaries. See ACA, R 76:19r (23 February 1287): “Geraldo de Fonte. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, solutes et cetera quietis prima die mensis Ianuare proxime preterita et [...]diude donec aliud mandavimus Aixam, uxorem de Muçe, et Garup, uxorem de [S]ait, et Heç[.], uxorem de M[a]ym[on] vid[elicet] sex denarios regaliū pro quolibet ea[r]undem et eisdem uxoris predictorum janetorum [m]ensis dictarum. Sicut [est] dar[e] [...]tum. Datum Barchinone, VII kalendas Marcii.” Cited without quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 292, n.130.

¹⁶ ACA, R 71:37r (12 April 1287): “Maymono de Plana, baiulo nostro Valencie. Cum nos mandavimus per litteram nostram quam recuperavimus Petro de Libiano tunc ba[iu]lo [V]alencie quod quitaret Horo uxore Mahometi Abelhaye, janeti, de eo de quo sibi constaret ipsum non fuisse quitatem per Raimundum de Ri[vo] Sicco et dictus Petrus de Libiano ipsam non quitaverit ut intelleximus de aliquo. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, predictam Horo quietis de eo de quo vobis constiterit ipsam non fuisse quitatam per Raimundum de Rivo Sicco predictum certificando vos prius si aliquid fuit sibi solutum per Petrum de Libiano predicto de dicta quitacione. Et recipiatis albaranum \de eo/ quod sibi tradideritis et presentem litteram recuperetis eb ea. Datum Barchinone, pridie idus Aprilis.” Similarly, see the case of the wives of Muse and Çayt, ACA, R 82:69r (with full edition above).

precipitous interest.¹⁷ Their decision to take usurious loans underscores not only the depth of their crisis but also these women's lack, to use the language of development, of real social protection.¹⁸

So, what became of these women? Two documents, separated by over five hundred folios, reveal that Muça and Maymon used their influence with the Crown to defer their debt and deter their creditors.¹⁹ On July 23, the *jenets* managed to appeal directly to Jaume II in Barcelona. They arranged to have their salaries, two hundred *sous* each, paid directly to their wives in Valencia.²⁰ And just over a week later, on August 3, King Jaume wrote to the local justice to offer the *jenets'* wives protection, arrange a six

¹⁷ For more on the role of women in the sphere of credit, see William Chester Jordan, *Women and Credit in Pre-Industrial and Developing Societies* (Philadelphia, 1993) as well as his "An Aspect of Credit in Picardy in the 1240s," *Revue des études juives* 142 (1983), 141-52 and "Jews on Top: Women and the Availability of Consumption Loans in Northern France in the Mid-Thirteenth Century," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 29 (1978), 39-56. See also Rebecca Lynn Winer, *Women, Wealth and Community in Perpignan, c. 1250-1300: Christians, Jews, and Enslaved Muslims in a Medieval Mediterranean Town* (Ashgate, 2006).

¹⁸ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford, 1999), esp. 189-203, "Women's Agency and Social Change."

¹⁹ The Catalan kings did occasionally intervene to relieve Mudéjar communities of usurious debts, but one cannot read these gestures as unequivocal protection from usury. In 1284, for example, King Pere relieved the Muslims of Zaragoza of usurious debts (ACA, R 46:209r and 215r) only to compel them the following year to pay these both debts and usury (*debetis et usuris*) (ACA, R 56:15r-15v), indicating perhaps that these actions aimed to pressure or ingratiate Jewish lenders, upon whom the Catalan kings relied. Prominent Mudéjars did on occasion receive the same treatment as these *jenets* (for instance, ACA R, 48:150r [12 September 1280]). Boswell agrees that legal interventions were rare: "The King himself intervened in relatively few cases, although all authority over Muslims stemmed ultimately from him. He appears to have concerned himself primarily with cases in which favorites of his were concerned, such as suits involving Faraig de Belvis, or the suit of Çaât Alcafaç against the king's own mercenaries" (*Royal Treasure*, 111). All this, however, does not address the question of why the king would involve himself at all in cases of usury between two minority groups.

²⁰ ACA, R 95:93v (23 July 1292): "Bernardo de Claperiis, baiulo Valencie. Cum Muce Elmentauro et Maymono Abenbiahich et Çayedo de Piçaçen et Mahometo de Patayen, genetis [...] nostre de octingentis solidis regalium ordinaverimus provendi, videlicet unicuique ipsorum ducentos solidos regalium in acurrimetum, [quitacionem], seu portionum suarum. Mandamus et dicimus vobis, quatenus, uxoribus dictorum janetorum solu[tis] dictos octingentos solidos videlicet unicuique ipsorum ducentos solidos Regalium quibus sibi solutis recuperetis presentem literam cum apocha de soluta. Datum ut supra." As the foregoing indicated, two other *jenets*, the brothers Çayed and Mahomet, mentioned several times in the Registers, also had their salaries paid to their wives. As I argue below, *jenets* appear to have entered the Crown in large, agnatic groups. If true in this case, all four of these soldiers' wives may have lived together and shared the debt.

month extension, and adjust their interest to a “more appropriate” four percent.²¹ Their connection to the king, in other words, helped the *jenets* escape the gravity of this crisis, but the same cannot precisely be said of their wives. Despite the king’s intervention, the unnamed wives of Muça and Maymon still had to face their creditors and an unpaid debt. The lives of these women were far from the privileges of the court.

ii. THE BESTIAL FLOOR

Family, however, was not a just matter of what one might call private life for the *jenets* but rather overlapped with the history of their professional and public service.²²

As in the documents above, passing remarks suggest that these mercenary companies were agnatic groups, extended families.²³ Sons served alongside their fathers, and brothers appeared together to collect their salaries. They were *familia* in both senses of the Latin: family and army. All this, however, seemed to be of little concern to the Crown’s bureaucrats, who preserved little detail about the organization or composition of

²¹ ACA, R 93:226v (2 August 1292): “Fideli suo iusticie Valencie vel eius locum tenenti nec non universis aliis officialibus nostris ad quos presentes pervenerint salutem et cetera. Noveritis nos elongasse de gracia speciali Muçam Almentauri et Maymon Avenborayç, genetos nostros, ac debitores et fideiussores pro eis obligatos a solucione debitorum que debent usque ad sumam nongentorum solidorum regalium a proximo ventura festo Baptismo Marie presentis mensis Augusti in antea usque ad sex menses continue subsequentes dum tamen non fuerint ab ipsis debitis alie elongati. Et non habeant bona mobilia de quibus possit satisfacere creditoribus suis per hanc tam graciam non intendimus elongare debita que debentur prodotibus seu sponsaliciis mulierum nec pro vendicione bonorum in mobiliu declarando tam quod inter bona mobilia non computantur arma seu equi vel equitature proprie et consuent boves, arator nec vasa vinaria utensilia domus nec alia et constitutione pacis et treuge seu aliquas constitutionibus nostras. Quare vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, predictam graciam elongamenti observetis et observari faciatis predictis Muçe et Maymon ac debitoribus et fideiussoribus pro eis obligatis. Mandamus etiam vobis non compellatis nec compelli permitatis prefatos Muçam Almentauri et Maymon Avenborayç vel eorum bona ad solvendum usorias suis creditoribus nisi ad rationem IIII denarii pro libra quod prout in tatxacionem quam super dictis usoris fecimus dignocitur contineri. Datum Barchinone, IIII nonas Augustii et cetera.”

²² Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby, *Histoire de la vie privée: De l'europe féodale à la Renaissance* (Points Histoire, 1999). In particular, see Duby’s introduction, where he discusses the changing meaningfulness of the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ during the Middle Ages.

²³ ACA, R 52:77v; ACA, R 71:49v; ACA, R 71:50v; ACA, R 71:51v; ACA, R 72:33r, ACA, R 72:38v-39r (redacted); and ACA, RP, *Maestre Racional*, 774, fol.75r.

jenet companies. Should it have mattered? The *jenets* served, and the Crown paid them all the same.

At least on one occasion, the king's failure to understand the structure of the companies under his command led to tense negotiations for service. To the historian's benefit, exasperated messengers had to shuttle back and forth between the sovereign and the *jenets*, leaving a paper trail that offers a unique insight. In January 1304, Pere de Montagut, procurator of Murcia, and Ferrer des Cortey, bailiff of Murcia, wrote to Jaume II to acknowledge that they had received two letters of instruction with regards to incorporating the troops of al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū.²⁴ Before turning over castles to the

²⁴ I would like to thank Ramón Pujades i Bataller and Jaume Riera i Sans for their invaluable assistance in editing this document. Any errors are, of course, my own. ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 15, no.1971 (21 January 1304): “Al molt alt e poderos seynor en Jacme per la gracia de deu Rey d’Arago, de Valencia, de Murcia, Comte de Barcelona et de la Santa Ecclesia de Roma seynaler, almirayl, e capitán general. Ab nos en Pere de Montagut procurador vostre del Regne de Murcia e Ferrer des Cortey, batle vostre general del dit Regne, humilment besan vostres mans et vostres peus nos comanam en vostra gracia. Fem nos saber, Seynor, que reebem dues letres vostres en les quals nos envias manar que presessem rahenes d’en Alabes Abarraho, es a saber del dit Alabes, son fill, et [de] Baratdin Ab[arraho] son fill e de Greneladim Abarraho son fill e de Jahia Abenmudahar son fill e reebudes aquelles que yo dit Ferrer que liuras al dit Alabes lo casteyl de N[orgia] et els locs de Cepti e de Lorqui. Estes que.ns certifficassem plerement queles dites rahenes fossen fills dels [davant] dits. On seynor vos fem saber que con lo dit Alabes fo vengut d’una cavalcada que tornarem. Comparec denant nos dijous XVI dies de Jener e donavans rahenes en les quals non avia negun daquels que vos Seynor nos trameses a dir salv un, es a saber lo fill de Jahia Abenmudahar, et nos, Seynor, dixem li que ell nons donava les rahenes que nos nos trameses a dir. E ell respos nos que no cuydava aver covinença ab vós, que ell sol del seu linatge agues adonar totes les rahenes. [Et] que cascun cap donas les sues. Et que ells son IIII alcaniellas es a saber IIII linatges e que valia molt mes que cascun linatge donas lo seu per ço con si ell ab son linatge donas tots les dites rahenes los altres tota ora ques vulgessen sen hieren. Et a la perf[...]. Seynor con [molt] aguem rahonat en est feyt dixerem que ells darien a[quests] rahenes de cascun linatge primerament lo linatge de [Al]abes Abarraho ques apellen de Benihamea que dara lo fill de son oncle per nom Mahomet Abenboyahie [ho lo seus] fills ... epres senyor no ... nengu de la ... Item lo linatge [ques es apellen] de Ben.... qual es cap Aiza Abenayma que dara son neebot fill de son germa per Thaben(?) Anbenihiam Abenayma. Item lo linatge ques apellen de Benabdauet e es cap Jahia Abenmud[...] que dara son fill ... que vós ho manas per vostre letra. Item lo linatge ques apellen de Benihuara et son cap los fills de Taxerfi [que] daran Abrah[im] [A]ben Mahomet lur cosin, germa fill de lur o[n]cle. Et [...] seynor en est feyt no volem res enantar sens liscençia vostra et dixem las quens ho fariem saber et quen fari[em] vostre manament e [tra]metem vós [a dir] aquels rahenes que ells vós an en cor de donar per rahenes. Et creats Seynor per cert que ab que el dit Alabes //ell// e els altres nos vuellen servir quens hic valen mes que no farien atretans [altres tants] cavayls armats que sapiats Seynor que per tota aquesta frontera tremolen et an fort gran pahor d’eyls tots vostres enemics vós Seynor sabets les covinençes que avets ab eyls et sots tan discret Seynor que en aço ordonarets tota ora si a deu plau ço que sera honor et profit vostre et en aço seynor sia vostre mercé que hi manets ço que tendrets per bé et que.ns en fassats trametre en continent vostra resposta per ço Seynor con ja sabets los jenets con son axaquiuses [i.e. make excuses] et cuyden-se que.n faç[a] [hoc] ... et axi es mester seynor que demantinent ajam nostre manament de ço que fer hi denem. Scrita [Murcia] XXI dia de Jener anno domini MCCC

jenets, these royal officials were meant to take hostages (*rahenes*) from among the Muslim soldiers.²⁵ By taking hostages, Jaume clearly intended to insure against the *jenets*' disloyalty, but from the documentation, it remains unclear whether or not this was a customary practice with all the *jenets* as it had been in Mudéjar surrender agreements.²⁶ Regardless, the two administrators certified that the names provided by the king were indeed the sons of Ibn Raḥḥū; however, they also reported that Ibn Raḥḥū refused to comply with the king's demand. The *jenet* captain explained that his company represented four different lineages and that each should be responsible for providing a hostage. Ibn Raḥḥū argued, "It would be much more effective if each provides their own hostage, because if he provided them all, the others would be free to leave whenever they want (*Valia molt mes que cascun linatge donas lo seu per ço con si ell ab son linatge donas tots les dites rahenes los altres tota ora ques vulgessen sen hieren*)." Thus, the royal officials laid out the lineages of each family for the king, mentioning the tribes to

tercio. Et Seynor sia vostra merce que ajam demantinent vostra resposta de ço que.n trendrets per bé que mester hi es segons la manera lur. Nostre Seynor vós den vida longa e victoria sobre vostres enemics." Ibn Raḥḥū's career is discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter.

²⁵ The Umayyads similarly secured the loyalty of their Zanāta troops in North Africa by taking hostages. See Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, I:254.

²⁶ See the final section of this chapter for more on the context that might have led to the taking of hostages. See, for instance, *Llibre dels feyts*, chaps. 308-9, taking the nephews of the *qā'id* of Bayren hostage in return for control of a castle: "E altre dia apres daço parlam ab lalcayt de Bayren, e dixem li que ben podia coneyxer que nostre Senyor uolia que nos haguessem la terra: e pus el ho uolia, que nons hi faes pus laguiar ni traure mal a nos ni a ell: que per talar lo pa nels arbres no era bo, pus a nos romanien los moros e quels hauiem en cor de fer be: e pus romanien per tots temps que per rao del nons destorbas, que a el e a sos parents fariem tant de be que tots temps porien esser honrats e richs. E el dix nos quens ho grahia molt, pero que ell tenia tan bon castell que ben coneixiem nos que aulea faria si tantost lo rendia. E nos dixem: Doncs, pus tantost nol volets rendre pregam uos quens sen fassats segurs, en tal manera que al dia que nos enprendrem ab uos que nons faylats a la couinença. E el dix que qual segurtat ne uolriem? E nos dixem quen uolriem lo major fiyl seu, e hauiem apres lo nom de II nabots seus, e dixemli quens metes aquels II ab son fiyl en ostatge. E el dix que acordarie, e quens respondria altre dia mati: e nos donam li acort. [Chap. 309] E quant uench altre dia mati torna a nos, e feunos aquesta resposta: que nons pesas si noy metia son fiyl ni sos nabots, mas que juraria ab los meylors XX ueyls dels sarrains qui eren en aquell castell que els açons atendria. E nos dixemli quens acordariem sempre de mantinent: e responem li que teniem per bo lo sacrament quens faessen ell ab XX dels ueyls dels meylors que fossen en lo castell, e quens metessen la torra albarrana en fealtat que el nos la rendria lo dit castell, e quens faes fer vna barbacana entorn daquela torre als sarrains. E pregans que uolguessen ques anas acordar al castell, e al uestre que el nos rendria respost."

which they belonged, adding, “Believe, my lord, that from what he says, Ibn Raḥḥū and the others want to serve us and in this [respect], they are worth more than all other armed knights, and know, my lord, that throughout the frontier, your enemies tremble and have great fear of them.” Finally, the officials pleaded with the king for a quick response, explaining, “as you already know they make many excuses,” hinting at a tense relationship, which will be described in detail below.

Montagut’s letter reveals not only more about the process by which the *jenets* were integrated into the Crown’s service but also more about the dynamics of these mercenary companies themselves. Although the distant view of the Chancery Registers makes it rather easy to forget, the *jenets* were not homogeneous units but rather alliances of members of various tribes, a fact that opens up the possibility of competing loyalties between and within companies. However obvious this point seems to only further underscore the significance of the sovereign’s failure to recognize it. Put simply, in this case, Jaume presumed that authority resided solely in the figure of the captain, al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, who in turn had the absolute fidelity of his troops. By contrast Montagut’s negotiations reveal that the structure of these companies served to distribute authority and responsibility horizontally across the group. This is not to suggest, however, that the *jenets* were somehow primitive and tribal while the Catalan kings were modern and hierarchical, a line of thinking that would lead down a troubled and discredited path. Rather, the misunderstanding highlights, again, that the convergence of the *jenets* and the Catalan kings was not a seamless union, a moment of immediate and mutual recognition. How, then, did these sovereigns see the *jenets*?

To be cynical, one could argue that the Catalan kings chose to see in the *jenets* a mirror of their own fantasy of sovereign power, a perfect hierarchy, and nothing else.

This misunderstanding would be consistent with the claim that these troops belonged to a project of political self-fashioning and not cultural accommodation or assimilation. The *jenets* were merely troops and a means to a political end. The real lives of the *jenets*, in other words, did not concern the Catalan kings at all.

One might also argue, however, that such a reading goes too far, leaning toward a bleak and all-consuming vision of sovereign power. Perhaps King Juame simply erred on this occasion. After all, as the last chapter argued, the Catalan kings listened to the demands of the *jenets*, extending privileges and protections. What is more, several particular moments from the Chancery Registers could be read to suggest a deeper bond. For example, when several *jenets* along with their wives and children were captured by Castile in 1292, the Crown moved to secure the return of all of them rather than just the soldiers.²⁷ In another instance, when two *jenets* retired, which is to say, when their martial utility came to an end, the Crown continued to extend their privileges.²⁸ A certain *jenet* named Dauet was given sufficient funds to live out his life in Valencia.²⁹ And at the end of his career and “because of his great service (*propter plurima servicia*),” Muça

²⁷ ACA, R 94:151r (29 December 1292): “... pro re[d]emptione illius janeti et uxoris sue ac filiorum eorum qui in posse dicti Paschasii Dominici capti detinebantur....” Full edition above.

²⁸ The Crown provided safe passage to Abraham Abenhamema and his wife to leave the Crown. ACA, R 66:152v (27 July 1286): “Universis officialibus et cetera, cum Abraham Abenhamema, janetus, cum uxore et familia sua [prepar]ant redire ad terram suam. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, in exeundo de terra nostra recto tramite versus Crivileyn ... [j]ane[te] ... uxore et familie sue nullum impedimentum vel contrarium. Datum Figueris.” Cf. Catlos, “Mercenary,” 291, n.126. Similarly, the Crown offered safeguard to Mahomet Abençabot and his wife, but it is not clear whether he was a *jenet* or an ambassador. ACA, 90:123v (1291): “Universis officialibus et subditis suis et cetera, cum Mahomet Abençabot et uxore sua et quodam alio Sarraceno suo proponit exire de terra nostra et redire apud Granatam per mare vel per terram, mandamus et dicimus vobis, quatenus, eisdem Mahometum, uxor, Sarraceno suo predicto et rebus suis nullum impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis in exeundo de terra nostra, immo provideatis eidem de secure transitu et ducatu.... ne pretextu Sarraceno suo secum ducat alium Sarracenum.”

²⁹ ACA, R 82:3v (7 January 1290): “Raimundo Scorne [quod] ... Daut Alma[...] expensam idoneam de quibus possit ducere vitam suam in civitate Valencie et quod recipiat [a]lbaranum et cetera. Datum in Alcoleya, VI idus Ianuarii.” This *jenet*, although not this document, was also mentioned by Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 194, n.1.

Almentauri received lands in Murcia.³⁰ Were these selfless acts? Or merely efforts to play the good employer, to insure the *jenets*' loyalty? To put the matter in familiar terms, did the sovereign care for his *jenets*? Can one glimpse an intimacy between the Christian kings and their Muslim soldiers based on a shared sense of humanity?

Perhaps, a final example will suffice to lay bare the problem for a historian of appealing to a universal humanity as the basis for understanding the relationship between the Crown and its Muslim mercenaries. In 1289, King Alphonse intervened on behalf of the wife of Abdalla Abençica, a *jenet* in his service. Alphonse explained his actions in a promissory note directed to Arnaldus de Bastida:

Since Ali Amari bought at our command in Jaca the horse of Abdalla Abençica, a certain *jenet* of ours, who died in Jaca, for the price of 55 *duplas* that we ordered him to give, we order you, immediately, to pay Ali [back] for the said *duplas* that he gave to the wife of Abdalla.³¹

After the death of Abdalla and while still on the field of battle, the king acted on behalf of the *jenet*'s widow, ordering that the soldier's horse be sold at a fixed price and his widow immediately compensated. Was this command an act of compassion? Perhaps, in this moment, one can glimpse an intimacy between the Christian kings and their Muslim soldiers beyond religious or political ideology. If not grounded in a chivalric ethos or a

³⁰ The land that was given to Muçe was recently-confiscated land. ACA, R 199:55r (4 March 1301): "Dilecto consiliario suo Bernardo de Sevriano, procuratori Regni Murcie et cetera. Cum nos Muçe Aventura, janeto nostro, propter plurima servicia quod cum nobis exhibita gratiose dare concesserimus unum hereditamentum idoneum et sufficienter de illis que in regno Murcie nostre curie confiscata sunt seu confiscabuntur de quo sustenare valare idonee vitam suam et familie sue. Idcirco vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, de hereditamentis predictis que confiscata sunt sue confiscabuntur in dicto regno Murcie, concedatis et assignetis unum idoneum et suficiens, memorato Muçe Aventura, prout dister[...] vestre visum fuerit expedire. Et cum hereditamentum prefatum dicto Muçe assignaverito //eidere// eidem cartam seu donatione ipsa fieri mandemus et faciamus, inde nos per vestras litteras certis reddere certiores. Datum in Obsidione Montis Falconis, IIII nonas Marcii."

³¹ ACA, R 79:79v (27 January 1289): "Arnaldo de Bastida. Cum Ali Amari emisset de mandato nostro in Iacca equam Abdalla Abenaçica, quendam janeti nostri, qui in Iacca decessit, precio quinquaginta quique duplarum quam equam nos eidem Ali dari mandavimus. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, dictas duplas dicto Ali qui eas traddet uxori dicti Abdalla qui sibi solutis et cetera." Catlos, "Mercenary," 292, which cites this document without quotation, reads it to say that Abdalla "left his horse in Jaca." I read "decessit" as intransitive in this context, "he died."

shared understanding of family, then perhaps, here, one can speak of a genuine community grounded on a small outcrop of human suffering.³² Then again, perhaps, it was nothing of the sort, merely an order to get on with the battle and put the horse back to use. It can only remain an open question.³³

iii. LAWLESSNESS

As previous chapters have argued, the *jenets* were raiders and bandits. The Crown of Aragon let these soldiers loose along its frontiers and turned them against its Christian enemies: the French, the Navarrese, the Castilians, and even its own rebellious noblemen. Raiding, occasionally alongside Christian soldiers, the *jenets* terrorized local populations, driving them into town walls, laying waste to their villages, and ransacking houses for everything they were worth: goods, weapons, animals, and captives. But as the last chapter argued, unlike Christian soldiers, many, if not all *jenets* had the privilege of retaining their spoils without paying a portion to the Catalan kings, a fact that highlighted the unique relationship between the sovereign and the *jenets*.³⁴

³² Suffering as the basis of a truly human community is the argument of Richard Rorty's *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge, 1989).

³³ James Clifford, [Review of *Orientalism*] in *History and Theory*, 19:2 (1980), 211: "It is still an open question, of course, whether an African pastoralist shares the same existential 'bestial floor' with an Irish poet and his readers."

³⁴ In 1287, Alphonse ordered his officials to let *jenets* sell any animals they captured during war. ACA, R 74:5r (14 October 1287): "Fuit mandatum officialibus quod in locis domini Regis permitant janetos vendere libere bestiare quod ceperunt ab inimicis." Two years later, he wrote again to officials on the frontier, informing them that Mahomet el Viello (Muhammad al-Shaykh) was arriving for raids in defense of the territory and had the right to sell all goods retained. Royal officials, he explained, should not harm or impeded these soldiers but rather help and guide them. ACA, R 81:56v (8 January 1289[1290]): "Universis hominibus quorumlibet locorum frontieriarum terre nostre ad quos et cetera. Cum Mahomet el Viello, janetus noster, ac alii va[dunt] ad jenetiam tam Christiani quam Sarraceni socii predicti Mahomet habeant esse de mandato nostro in partibus frontarie pro tuicione [et] deffensione terre nostre ac etiam pro inferendo dampno inimicis nostris. Dicimus ac mandamus vobis, quatenus, quandocumque predictum Mahomat al Viello ac socios suos predictos contingerit venire seu accedere ad loca vestra in partibus frontarie tam cum cavalgatis quam sine cavalgatis ipsos solutis vestris predictis cum cavalcatis seu rebus eorum benigne recipiatis et eis[em] vel rebus suis nullum dampnum vel impedimentum faciatis immo iuветis et dirigatis eosdem in hiis in quibus poteritis bono modo. Datum supra."

Paradoxically, the law permitted the *jenets* to remain lawless, to remain bandits. But just like the unpaid debt with which this chapter began, these spoils – household goods, weapons, animals, and captives – point to the limit of this privilege and exception. Profiting from them meant finding markets, depending upon local Christians and royal officials. How did these men react to the arrival of the uniquely privileged *jenets*? And how did the *jenets*, in turn, deal with them?

An episode from the career of Mahomet Abenadalil provides a dramatic example of what the privilege of raiding meant in practice. Abenadalil, the subject of a detailed study by Brian Catlos, entered the service of King Alphonse in February of 1290, following the mission of the Jewish ambassador Abraham Abenarnies to Granada.³⁵ Although Abenadalil came seeking asylum, the Crown held him in the highest esteem. On August 10, 1290, Alphonse made the *jenet* his vassal and captain of all *jenets* in his service. In addition, Abenadalil received a salary of almost 24 *sous* per diem (six times the rate of other *jenets*) as well as the right to the king's *quinta* from all raids.³⁶ And, indeed, the Catalan king put his vassal to work. Alphonse first sent Abenadalil and his troops to the French and Navarrese borders.³⁷ Perhaps while there, Abenadalil encountered a certain Christian soldier named Puçola – the “Big Flea” – who will join the story again below.³⁸ Abenadalil spent the following months fighting along the Castilian

³⁵ See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this recruitment mission. See also, Brian A. Catlos, “Mahomet Abenadalil: A Muslim Mercenary in the Service of the Kings of Aragon (1290-1291),” *Jews, Christians, and Muslims in and around the Medieval Crown of Aragon: Studies in Honour of Prof. Elena Lourie*, ed. Harvey Hames (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 257-302. (Although cited above, I provide the full reference here for convenience.)

³⁶ The letter of investiture ACA, R 83:71r (10 August 1290) is discussed in detail by Catlos, “Mercenary,” 262-3. For salaries, see Chapter 5, Table 1.

³⁷ ACA, R 81:215r (25 November 1290) with full edition below. This brief, overlooked document from the Registers confirms Catlos' suspicion that Abenadalil was first deployed to the Navarrese front. See Catlos, “Mercenary,” 261.

³⁸ The wonderful translation of Puçola as “Big Flea” is Catlos'. Puçola and his associates received a safeguard and orders to remain on the Navarrese border from Alphonse on 15 November 1289, which is to say

border in various locations.³⁹ Finally, in December 1290, after only ten months in the Catalan king's service, and back in the good graces of the Naşrid sultan, Abenadalil and his troops returned home to Granada.⁴⁰

In Abenadalil's brief career, however, the events surrounding villages in the region of Calatayud (in Aragon along the Castilian border) provide the perfect point of departure. Although Abenadalil and his *jenets* held the privilege of converting the spoils of their raids into profits without royal interference, doing so presented significant challenges.⁴¹ In November of 1290, King Alphonse wrote to Petrus Sancii, the justice of Calatayud. He explained that after a raid into Soria, across the Castilian border, Abenadalil and his soldiers had brought back certain goods, worth 2200 *sous*, that the Christian inhabitants of Calatayud accepted and agreed to pay for on an appointed day.⁴² Apparently, these "goods" also included Castilian captives, for whom the locals had acted

their time of service on this front overlapped with Abenadalil's. ACA, R 80:104v (two documents): "Iustice, iuratis et concilio d'Albayo. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, non impediatis nec ab aliquo impediri permitatis Puçola et socios suos racione alicuius mandati per nobis eis incontrarium facti cavalcata quam nuper adduxerunt de Navarra [nec] alias quas ducturi sunt de locis inimicorum nostrorum, nisi tamen ipsa cavalcata fuerit de hominibus aut locis qui sint sub se[curat]ate [nost]ra et de ipsa securitate a nobis cartam habeant specialem. Man[d]amus etiam vobis quod super cavalcata quam nuper portaverunt de termino de Fustineana nullum impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis prefato Pusola et aliis supradictis nisi ipsa cavalcata vel personis ipsius fuerint aliquorum qui sub predicta securitate nostra sint, et quod de ipsa securitate habeant et nobis carta ut superius continente. Datum ut supra;" and "[Fuit scri]ptum dicta Puçala et aliis scutiferis qui sunt in Francia, Navarre quod placet domino Reg[e] quod [...] et remeneant el Bayo et frontera Navarre in deffensionem locorum terre domini Regis quosque ab [...] aliud receperint primer[...] mandatis. Datum ut supra." These documents were cited without quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 284.

³⁹ Catlos, "Mercenary," 264-73 with maps.

⁴⁰ ACA, R 81:243r (21 January 1291). Catlos, "Mercenary," 269. Gazulla, "Zenetes," 193, n.1.

⁴¹ For the privilege, see ACA, R 74:5r (14 October 1287) and ACA, R 81:56v (8 January 1289[1290]) as cited with editions above.

⁴² ACA, R 81:214v (21 November 1290). Full quotation and translation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 280-281. My edition differs slightly in transcription and annotation: "Iusticie, iudici, et iuratis Calatayube. Quod cum Mahometus Abenadalil cum f[a]milias suas cepi[sse]t [et] traxisset de partibus Castille quan[d]a[m] predictam animalium et aliarum rerum que erant hominem de Soria et aliqui de Calatayube que composuerunt cum dicto Mahometo racione dicte predictae obligaverunt se daturos eidem ce[rt]am pecunie quanti[tatem] certo termino \cum pena/ quam eidem solvere contradicunt, compellant illos et bona eorum et bona eorum ad dandum eidem Mahometo i[p]sam pecunie quantitatem \et penam predictam/ maliciis et diffugiis non admissis. Datum Barchinone, IX kalendas Decembris." Interestingly, mention of the fine was added to the text after an initial draft was written, indicating that it was perhaps an afterthought. The amount of the fine is mentioned in the following document.

as guarantors.⁴³ In any event, the villagers now refused to pay the *jenets*. King Alphonse therefore ordered Petrus to levy a fine of 2000 *sous*, and compel the villagers to pay the *jenets* or confiscate their property. A month later, however, the matter had grown worse. Several men from Calatayud attacked Abenadalil's *jenets*, making off with "horses, shields, and other goods (*roncincos, adargas, et alias res*)."⁴⁴ On December 13, frustrated with Petrus' lack of response, Alphonse addressed a letter to Calatayud's council, indicating that none of the money or the fine against the villagers had been paid and asking them to determine if the local justice, Petrus, was acting maliciously (*maliciose*).⁴⁵ The king simultaneously wrote to the justice of Aragon, Petrus' superior,

⁴³ This detail emerges during correspondence issued almost a month later. ACA, R 81:234v (13 December 1290), trimmed along left margin: "Petro Sancii, iusticie Calatayube vel eius locum tenenti. Intelleximus quod cum Mahometus Abenadalil <cucurri>[t] in Campo de Soria cepit in dicto campo de Soria aliquos captivos et quod redimerunt se quod quandam quantitate <p>[eccunie] et dederunt [al]iquos homines dicti loci de Calatayube pro fideiussoribus dicto Abenadalillo et promitendo eidem dare et ... ad diem certam dictam redemptionem et si forte eam in die prefixa non solvissent quod darent ei [pro] ... duo mille et CC solidos Iaccenses. Unde cum predicto Abenadalillo vel alicui alii loco sui nichil sit satisfactum d[e] quantitibus ut predicatur. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, si est ita, incontinenti procedatis per modum pigneris vel alium mod[um] predictos fideiussores et bona eorum ad solvendum [di]cto Abenadalillo vel cui voluerit dictam quantitatem quam sib[i] ... promiserunt pro redemptione predicta et dictos II mille CC solidos Iaccenses pro pena superius iam expressa et quidquid mis[.]iustere(?) fecerit ratione predicta. Taliter quod ubicum inveniant iusticiam breviter de predictis. Datum Barchinone idus De[cembris]." Cited with partial quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary", 283.

⁴⁴ ACA, R 81:234r (13 December 1290): "Petro Sancii, iusticie Calatayube vel eius locum tenenti. Intelleximus quod cum aliqui jeneti de familia Maho[m]eti Abenadalilli essent in aliquibus aldeis de Calatayube cum magna predicta aliqui homines de dictis aldeis rau[b]eraverunt dictis jenetis sive furto surriperunt quosdam roncinos, adargas, et alias res. Quare vobis man[dam]us, quatenus, visis presentis si est ita, procedatis contra predictos ad restituendum Mahometo Abenadalillo [ve]l cui voluerit omnia supra[dicta] prout de iure et foro fuerint faciendum non expectato a nobis super hoc alio mandamento. Datum Barchinone idus Decembris." Cited with partial quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 281-2 and Gazulla, "Zenetes," 191.

⁴⁵ ACA, R 81:243v-244r (13 December 1290): "Iuratis Calatayube. Intelleximus quod cum Mahometus Abenadalill <cucurrisset in Campo> de Soria, cepit in dicto campo de Soria aliquos captivos et quod redemerunt se quod quadam quantitate peccunie et dederunt aliquos homine de loc[o] de [Calatayube] pro fideiussoribus dicto Abenadalillo, promitendo eisdem dare et solvere ad certam diem dictam redemptionem. Et si forte eam in die prefixa non solvissent quod darent ei et solvere pro pena, duo mille CC solidos Iaccenses, unde cum predicto Abenadalillo vel alicui ... loco sui nichil sit satisfactus de predictis quantitibus ut predicatur et mandaverimus per literas nostras Petro Sancii iustice Calatayube vel eius locum tenenti quod si ita est incontinenti procedat per modum pignoris vel alium modum contra predictos fideiussores et bona eorum ad solvendum dicto Abenadalillo vel cui voluerit dictam quantitatem quam sibi dare promiserunt pro redemptione predicta et dictos duos mille CC solidos pro pena superius iam ex[....] et quicquid missionum iuste fecerit ratione predicta et ... [Abena]dalillus [te]neat sibi quod <dictus iusticie> obligatus est cum predictis fideiussoribus ut asserit in redemptione ... [fol. 244r] ... habeat se ...

and the justice of Valencia, asking them to take an interest in the matter.⁴⁶ Finally, for good measure, the king also issued a circular to the all royal officials in the kingdom of Aragon, reiterating the right of the *jenets* to raid from his lands and sell any captives or goods that they brought back from enemy territory, suggesting that he thought that the attacks were related to this privilege.⁴⁷ Nothing, ultimately, is known of what came of the captives, goods, or debt.

What motivated the villagers' actions? It almost goes without saying that canon law banned Muslims from buying or selling Christian captives, which is to say, in trying

super observenda iusticie eisdem iusta dictum mandatum nostrum. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, si forte dictus iusticie maliciose se habuerit evita predicta, compellatis dictum iusticie et fideiussores ... predictos ad so[lvendum] dico Abenadalillo vel cui ipse voluerit redemptionem et penam et missiones predictas ut superius est expressum, taliter quod ubicum inveniant iusticie breviter de predictas. Datum Barchinone idus Decembris." Cited without quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 281.

⁴⁶ He wrote letters to the justices of Aragon and Valencia. ACA, R 81:234v (13 December 1290): "Super predictis fuit scriptum Johanni Çapata, iusticie Aragone, quod faciat procedi per iusticiam Calatayube per m[odum] pignoris vel alium modum contra predictos fideiussores ad solvendum dicto Abenadalillo quantitatem quam sibi dare promiserunt pro redemptione dictorum captivorum et dictos duos mille solidos pro pena predicta et missionum iuste facerit racione predicta. Datum ut supra." ACA, R 81:243v (21 December 1290): "Iustice Valencie vel eius locum tenenti. Intelleximus quod cum Mahometus Abenadallil cucurrisset in campo [de] Soria cepit in dicto campo de Soria aliquos captivos et quod redimerunt se pro quandam quantitatem peccunie et dederant ali[quos] homines de Calatayube pro fideiussoribus dicto Abenadalillo promitendo eidem dare et solvere ad diem cartam dictam re[demptio]nem et si forte eam in die prefixa non solvissent quod darent et solverent pro pena duo mille et CC solidos ia[ccenses]. Unde cum predicto Abenadalillo vel alicui alii loco sui nichil sit satisfactum de predictis quantitibus ut dicitur et mandaverimus per literas nostras Petro Sancier, iusticie Calatayube vel eius locum tenenti quod si est ita incontinenti p[roce]dat per modum pignoris vel alium modum contra predictos fideiussores et bona eorum ad solvendum dicto Abena[da]lilli vel cui voluerit dictam quantitatem quam sibi dare promiserunt pro redemptione predicta et dictos II mille CC s[olidos] laccenses pro pena superius iam expressa et quicquid missionum inde fecerit, racione predicta. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, si f[orte] dictus Abenadalullus faticam iure inveniter in iusticie Calatayube vel eius locum tenentem et vobis inde hostendis publica instrumenta vel alia documenta legitima incontinenti res et bona hominum Calatayube que in civitate Valencie vel a[licubi] poteritis invenire et de eisdem dicto Abenadalillo in redemptione pena et missionibus supradictis prout faciendum fuerit integre satisfacere faciatis. Taliter quod dictus Abenadalillus de predictis vobiscum iusticie breviter assequat[ur]. Datum Barchinone, XII kalendas Ianuarii." Partial transcriptions in Catlos, "Mercenary," 282 and Gazulla, "Zenetes," 192.

⁴⁷ ACA, R 81:237v (13 December 1290): "Universis officialibus civitatum villarum et quorumlibet locorum Aragone. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, aliquibus [ad]alilis vel almugav[eris] equitum vel peditum vel aliis janetis si intravent Castellam seu Navarram nullum impedimentum vel contrarium faciatis vel fieri ab aliquibus permitatis immo providiatis eisdem et familie eorum de securo transitu et ducat[u] ... restituentes et re[s]titui faciemus nichilominus eisdem omnes homines bestiarum et alias res quas habunt de terra dictorum inimicorum nostrorum et que nos vel aliquis nostrum ab eisdem cepistis vel etiam extorsistis. Datum u[t supra]." Alphonse also specified the right of *almogàvers* to sell goods and captives, suggesting, as argued below, that the *jenets* were not the only ones to face hostility from local villagers. Note also that the king refers to the villagers' actions as "extortion," a phrase often repeated in this context below.

to sell their goods to villagers, the *jenets* were crossing a well-established religious boundary.⁴⁸ This transgression, moreover, may have been felt less abstractly and more viscerally by Christian frontiersmen, who were themselves regularly victims – in person and property – of *jenet* raids from Granada. Can one say, then, that religion motivated these assaults? In his reading of the Calatayud episode, Catlos dismisses this motivation as “a convenient rationalization.”⁴⁹ After all, Christian soldiers from Castile also raided these regions, taking their own captives and ransacking homes. What is more, Christians ran into similar problems. At the same time that Abenadalil complained of trouble, a certain Christian *almogàver*, Vincent de Sayona, informed the Crown that a villager from Calatayud, Johannes Petri, still owed him 50 *sous* for a captive.⁵⁰ Frontier interactions, in other words, were too dizzyingly complex for absolutes or bald dichotomies.

For his part, Catlos attributes the attack on Abenadalil’s troops not to the privilege of raiding but to the *jenets*’ own vulnerability. In 1286, for instance, the king ordered Muçe de Portella, the Jewish bailiff of Aragon, to compensate a certain *jenet* named Abduahet for goods that were stolen from him by a Christian.⁵¹ Similarly, in 1290, the king ordered the arrest of one Mosse Maymono, a Jew from Valencia, who managed to

⁴⁸ A. Friedburg, *Corpus iuris canonici* (Liepzig, 1881), 223 [Lateran III (1179)] as cited in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 283, n.93. The Muslim jurist al-‘Utbī (d. 255/869) addressed the opposite problem of Christians buying Muslim slaves. His opinion was cited by Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, *Kitāb al-bayān*, XVI:387-8, specifically addressing Christians who impersonate Muslims in order to buy Muslim slaves. I would like to thank Professor Maribel Fierro for bringing this source to my attention. For more on al-‘Utbī, see Félix and Fierro, “Christianos y conversos,” 415-427.

⁴⁹ Catlos, “Mercenary,” 280.

⁵⁰ ACA, R 81:235v (13 December 1290): “Petro Sancii, iusticie Calatayube, vel eius locum tenenti. Intelleximus quod Vincentius de Sayona pignori ... quendam hominem captivum Johanni Petri de Calatayube pro quinquaginta solidi laccensium, et quod dictus Johannes non vult ... restituere licet dictus Vincentius...” One learns that Vincent was an *adalid* from events described below. Cited without quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 286.

⁵¹ ACA, R 65:125r (29 March 1286): “Muçe de [P]ortella. Mandamus [v]obis, quatenus, detis Abdu[a]het, janeto, ducentos solidi Barchinone quos sibi d<anya et malum> [...] in emenda et restitutione quarumdam rerum quas Corradus Lan[...] ab eo extorsit in Albayde ut asserit et facta sibi soluzione recuperetis ab eo presente litteram et apocham de soluto. Datum Barchinone, IIII kalendas Aprilis.” Cited without quotation in Catlos, “Mercenary,” 286.

steal (*surripuit*) promissory notes from some *jenets*.⁵² In these situations, Catlos reads the *jenets* as disoriented foreigners, who were easy prey for petty criminals. Thus, to Catlos' mind, the events at Calatayud better reflected greed than religion. They were the actions of men accustomed to "the misery and opportunity" of the frontier, to a life of constant conflict. And while the villagers' decision to free the Castilian captives displayed a "sense of confessional cohesion," Catlos suggests that this, too, may have been grounded in self-interest: rational choice rather than religious fervor.⁵³

Catlos is right to complain that focusing on religion flattens actors, dissolving individual agency and historical contingency into the machine-like working of ideology.⁵⁴ Something more than religion, in other words, must have motivated these actions. But Catlos' nearly Hobbesian vision of the frontier – the war of all against all –

⁵² ACA, R 81:63 (7 March 1290): "... quod [ca]pia[t] M[o]sse Maymono, Iudeo Valencie, qui surripuit quibusdam janetis quedam albarana sue quitacionis et ... tam diu quosque reddiderit albarana dictis janetis ut eisdem satisfacerit de ipsis albaranis prout fuerit faciendum." Cited without quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 285.

⁵³ Catlos, "Mercenary," 283, n.92: "This type of exchange, which worked to the benefit both of the Castilian and Aragonese townsmen, is one aspect of the regular commercial ties between municipalities on both sides of the frontier."

⁵⁴ The argument that distant ideologies determined conflict was espoused by Carl Schmitt in his *Begriff des Politischen*. To my mind, Catlos takes a similar view of ideology, as rigid and impersonal, in order to reject its significance. See, for example, his *Victors and the Vanquished*, 83: "One of the proofs of the power of an ideology may be sensed in the degree to which it is applied for its own sake, especially when it seems to run counter to the immediate individual interests of its adherents;" *ibid*, 85: "Correspondingly, the ideological counterparts of *jihād* in contemporary Christian society, the ideals of *Reconquista* and Crusade, played an analogous role: justifying actions in certain situations, while answering a need to express a sense of identity and purpose. As such, they can hardly be interpreted as causes or determinants of events, certainly not on any grand scale and normally not when they came into conflict with the ambitions of those individuals who were their purported champions;" *ibid*, 294: "If Crusade ideology had emerged in the previous two centuries, in the late thirteenth century it had yet to determine Christian relations to Muslims either abroad or at home;" *ibid*, 324: "If one admits that what we characterize as social and administrative 'systems' (at least in the era in question) were *means of describing* social action and attempts to order it, rather than the criteria *by which* social action was determined, it comes as less of a surprise that *mudéjares* could 'exist' socially and administratively on Christian and Muslim planes simultaneously – the apparent paradoxes disappear." And finally, his "Contexto y Conveniencia," 268: "La antipatía asociada a las diferencias sectarias, la confrontación monolítica de Sánchez Albornoz, así como las tendencias hacia la aculturación enfatizadas por Castro no son los determinantes del carácter de la interacción etno-religiosa de la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media, sino más bien sus consecuencias. En las esferas legal, económica y social fueron los convenios negociados dicatados por el mutuo interés – conveniencia – los que determinaron las relaciones entre grupos e individuos a través de las divisiones sectarias etno-religiosas." In sum, ideologies, as ideals, have an explanatory and descriptive but not causal and determinative power.

risks running too far away from one totalizing explanation, only to achieve another.⁵⁵ By focusing on greed and opportunism, the micro-economics of the heart, he also sacrifices agency and contingency in the name of a different, all-consuming principle: individualism.⁵⁶

Indeed, returning to the case of Abenadalil, self-interested opportunism seems to fall short of explaining the villager's actions. While one could argue that as foreigners, the *jenets* were easy marks for rogues and grifters, these soldiers could hardly be called vulnerable in any other sense. The *jenets* were well-armed and more importantly, protected by the Crown. And indeed, by targeting the *jenets*, these Calatayud villagers immediately incurred the wrath of the Catalan king. Initially, they faced extraordinary fines, 2000 *sous*. Eventually, King Alphonse ordered both the villagers' arrest and the seizure of their property throughout *all* the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon.⁵⁷ One can safely say, then, that the frontiersmen were not acting in their own best interest. So, why would they take such individual risks and openly challenge the king?

⁵⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* (1651), chap. 13: "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."

⁵⁶ Cf. Johnson, "On Agency," 114, speaking of efforts to recover slave "humanity," which one could substitute for "individualism" above: "If it is to say anything at all, to say that enslaved people 'preserved their humanity' is to say that they acted in ways that the author recognizes as the ways human beings would act in a given situation. The actions of enslaved people are thus emptied of any specific meaning beyond the bounded terms of the author's own definition of 'humanness'—emptied of personal meaning, political meaning, cultural meaning, and metaphysical meaning and so on."

⁵⁷ The justice of Valencia, for instance, was ordered to sieze any property that these men held in that kingdom. ACA, R 81:243v (with full edition above): "... incontinenti res et bona hominum Calatayube que in civitate Valencie vel a[licubi] poteritis invenire et de eisdem dicto Abenadalillo in redemptione pena et missionibus supradictis prout faciendum fuerit integre satisfacere faciatis...." Catlos, "Mercenary," 282.

Perhaps the Calatayud villagers' actions are best approached from the perspective of their previous encounters with *jenets*. Significantly, the earliest recorded appearance of Muslim mercenaries in the region dates to 1287, that is, during the rebellion of the Aragonese *Uniones* against the Crown. King Alphonse employed the *jenets* to pacify the kingdom, which is to say, the residents of Calatayud would have known the *jenets* not only as foreign raiders but also as agents of sovereign aggression.⁵⁸ This ironic disjunction must have resulted in confusion and tension. On October 14, 1287, for example, the justice of Calatayud – perhaps the same Petrus Sancii above – was reprimanded for seizing and ordered to return several Christian captives that *jenets* had brought back from a raid on the Aragonese village of Cutanda, near Teruel.⁵⁹ Royal administrators, in other words, and not simply villagers found themselves in conflict with the *jenets*. But the officials' caution and suspicion was not unjustified. Just over a week later, *jenets* operating from the villages of Alfamén and Almonacid were accused of violently raiding a Christian village, Aguaro, which was under the protection of the Crown of Aragon.⁶⁰ In this case, as it did with the royal official above, the Crown

⁵⁸ On the *Uniones*, in general, see Luis González Antón, *Las Uniones aragonesas y las Cortes del reino, 1283-1301*, 2 vols. (Madrid: 1975); C. Laliena Corbera, "La adhesión de las ciudades a la Unión: poder real y conflictividad social en Aragón a fines del XIII," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 8 (1989): 319-413; Donald Kagay, "Rebellion on Trial: the Aragonese *Unión* and its uneasy connection to royal law, 1265-1301," *Journal of Legal History* 18 (1997), 30-43 [reprinted in his *War, Government and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon*, Essay VI]; Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon*, 90ff. On the presence of *jenets*, see Gazulla, "Zenetes," 187; Catlos, "Mercenary," 295-6; as well as Chapter 4 above.

⁵⁹ ACA, R 74:5r (14 October 1287): "Iusticie et iuratis Catalayube. Intelle[xim]us quod vos abstulistis janet[i]s nostr[i]s quendam hominem de Cutanda quem ceperunt in presenti guerra. Quare volumus ac vobis mandamus, quatenus, si vobis constiterit quod dictus homo sit de aliquo inimico nostro, ipsum restituatis dictis janetis [incontin]enti, ipsi vero tenentur nobis dare quintam de eo quod habuerint pro redemptione hominis supradicti. Datum in Epila, II idus Octobris." Cited with full quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 285, n.103. At this date, apparently, the *jenets* were still required to give the king a *quinta* of their spoils. See Chapter 5 for the evolution of this privilege.

⁶⁰ Alfamén is approximately thirty miles from Zaragoza toward the Castilian border. ACA, R 74:11r (25 October 1287): "Aljamis Sarracenorum Dalmoneçir et de Alfamen et janetis ibidem existentibus et aliis universis ad quos presentes et cetera. Cum locus de Aguaro sit dilecti nostri Alamandi de Gudal, superiunctarii Tirasone, mandamus et dicimus vobis, quatenus, in predicto loco seu hominibus ibidem existentibus aut aliquibus bonis seu ganatis eorum nullum malum seu dampnum faciatis nec fieri permitatis.

ordered the *jenets* to return any goods or captives that they seized, but otherwise, the soldiers went unpunished. Whether resulting from the complex and ambiguous political situation or the *jenets*' obvious impunity, a climate of accusation and recrimination reigned on the Aragonese frontier. And tensions remained high after the rebellion of the *Uniones*. In October of 1289, several villagers from Alfamén – the same village that hosted the Muslim raiders above – decided to take some *jenets* captive, marking a new boldness and daring. King Alphonse ordered the justice of Calatayud – in all likelihood, now Petrus Sancii – to free the *jenets* and to safeguard the soldiers' journey out of the region.⁶¹ The fact that Alphonse withdrew his *jenets* and insisted on their safeguard suggests that the Crown not only saw the villagers as dangerous and unpredictable but also the entire situation as untenable.

This pattern of conflict reveals two critical things about the encounter between Abenadalil's *jenets* and the Calatayud villagers in 1290. First, these frontiersmen had challenged and attacked the *jenets* before and been rebuked by the king, suggesting that they cannot have been innocent of the consequences of their actions. Second, the justice of Calatayud was not divorced from this tension, not a transparent agent of royal authority. He not only treated the *jenets* with some suspicion but also, given the raids on Aguaro, had reason to do so. In this light, the fact that Petrus Sancii dragged his feet in implementing the Crown's justice in 1290 looks less like bureaucratic inefficiency and

Immo si qua cepistis violenter ab hominibus predictorum loci dum modo non sint inimicorum nostrorum ea eisdem visis presentibus restituis et restitui faciatis. Datum ut supra." The Mudéjars of Almonacid appear to have been working alongside these *jenets*. I return to this document below in the section on *jenet* relations with Mudéjars.

⁶¹ Specifically, he was ordered to provide them safe conduct all the way to Montseny, north of Barcelona in Catalunya. ACA, R 80:66r (11 October 1289): "Scriptum fuit iusticie Calatayube quod absolvat janetos quos homines de Alfama ceperunt et illis traddat seu mutat ad dictum Regem et provideat eis de securo conductu in Monte Sono. V idus Octobris." Cited without quotation in Gazulla, "Zenetes," 187-8.

more like defiance of royal authority.⁶² Put differently, one could argue that the villagers who attacked Abenadalil's *jenets* were not acting blindly but rather with the knowledge that royal officials – if only tacitly – supported their actions.⁶³ Unearthing this kind of local and strategic solidarity in Calatayud therefore demands a more complex approach to the question of motive. Solidarity suggests a sense of legitimacy, which is to say that if these attacks appeared criminal in the eyes of the sovereign, then there is no reason to assume that the men of Calatayud saw them the same way. While these competing ideas of legitimacy render visible the obvious limits of the Crown's law and authority, more significantly for this discussion, they complicate the *jenets*' claim to privileged exception.

While tensions appeared to be particularly high (or particularly well-recorded) in Calatayud, it is worth mentioning that this was not the only region where the presence of *jenets* led to tension and conflict. In March 1290, for instance, royal officials from Játiva took captive several *jenets* serving in Villena, near Alicante. The king angrily (*irato*) rebuked them, his express tone indicating that he saw their actions as malicious and defiant.⁶⁴ More significantly for the discussion at hand, in November 1290, immediately before they arrived in Calatayud, Abenadalil's troops ran into problems on the Navarrese front. The troops of the Aragonese nobleman Lope Ferrench de Luna, who participated

⁶² The echo, here, of James Scott's *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance* (Yale, 1985) also becomes a critique. In this reading, "foot-dragging" is not only resistance to ideology but also the expression of another ideology, a competing form of law and legitimacy.

⁶³ This is precisely what King Alphonse himself suspected in his letter to the council of Calatayud. See ACA, R 81:244r (13 December 1290) with full edition above.

⁶⁴ ACA, R 85:113v (15 March 1290): "Iusticie et Iuratis Xative. Cum iam scripserimus vobis quod miteritis ad nos illos j[e]netos quos captos ten[etis], qui venerant de Billena, et istud no faceritis miraturo de vobis. Quare irato vobis dicimus et mandamus ex parte Domini Regis et nostra, quatenus, visis presentibus, mitatis ad nos jenetos predictos [c]um familia sua et omnibus equitaturis et rebus suis, significantes nobis, causam propter quam [...]istis eosdem. Et istud nullatenus differatis. Datum ut supra."

with the *jenets* in raids, despoiled Abenadalil's soldiers after they returned from battle.⁶⁵

The attack reveals that military cooperation between the *jenets* and Christian soldiers, which was highlighted in the previous chapter, did not necessarily imply acceptance or equivalence. Above all, this history of conflict demonstrates that Christian villagers, local administrators, and soldiers, all took issue with the *jenets*. The incidents in Calatayud in 1290 were neither isolated nor momentary.

So, in this context, one can ask again, why were the *jenets* attacked? Indeed, the foregoing documents suggested many rather than one motivation: opportunism, criticism of royal power, retaliation, violence as an end in and of itself, and, of course, religion. The nature of these conflicts, in other words, could have been private, local, and ideological to varying degrees. One has no reason or means to discount any of these readings. Nevertheless, just as King Alphonse suspected, the *jenets*' raids – or more particularly, their efforts to profit from Christian captives and goods – were both the occasion and catalyst for the pattern of events above. One could argue therefore that the transgression of a religious boundary served to voice and legitimize the diverse motives and aims of the attackers.⁶⁶ By extension, moreover, this seemingly unassailable and

⁶⁵ ACA, R 81:215r (25 November 1290): “Fuit scriptum Luppo French de Luna quod predictam quam quidam jeneti Abenadalili capitis jenetorum extraherunt de Navarr[a] [.].na[.]udemo eis ablata fuit per aliquos de familia dicti nobilis faciat eis restitui. Datum Barchinone VII kalendas Decembris [1290].” The Aragonese family de Luna was extremely prominent and closely related to the royal family through marriage. See Agustín Ubieto Arteta, “Aproximación al estudio del nacimiento de la nobleza aragonesa (siglos XI y XII): aspectos genealógicos” in *Homenaje a Don José María Lacarra de Miguel en su jubilación del profesorado: Estudios medievales* (Zaragoza, 1977): II, 23.

⁶⁶ There is a significant body of scholarship dealing with captivity on the Christian-Islamic frontier that bolsters the argument above. See, for instance, James William Brodman, *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain: The Order of Merced on the Christian-Islamic Frontier* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986) and more recently, with an extensive bibliography, Jarbel Rodríguez, *Captives & Their Saviors in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Catholic University of America Press, 2007). Some of the inspiration for this reading also comes from the notion of “naturalizing discourses,” see *Natural Histories of Discourse*, ed. Silverstein and Urban (University of Chicago, 1996), esp. 1-20.

abstract boundary gained meaning and power through these local and strategic acts.⁶⁷ For the case at hand, this dynamic understanding allows one to speak of religion as shaping violence without reducing actors to empty ciphers and history to a painted backdrop. Put most simply, religion determined the relationship between the *jenets* and Christian frontiersmen in that it set boundaries and limits to their interactions.⁶⁸

iv. KILLED BUT NOT MURDERED

It remains to be asked, however, why the king's *jenets* were vulnerable to such attacks. Were Christian villagers simply unafraid, boldly independent?⁶⁹ The story of Abenadalil and his troops in Calatayud holds a final chapter that suggests a more complex picture that hinges, again, on the problem of the *jenets*' privilege in practice.

This story begins with a murder. A month after the controversial raids into Soria and during the furious exchange of letters between King Alphonse and the various justices of Aragon, two curious attacks were recorded in the Chancery Registers. First, a group of Christian *almogàvers* – Paschasius Valentini, Matheus de Galera, Juanyes Bono,

⁶⁷ Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence*, 6: "Any inherited discourse about minorities acquired force only when people chose to find it meaningful and useful, and was itself reshaped by these choices. Briefly, discourse and agency gain meaning only in relation to each other." Recent studies of contemporary ethnic and religious conflict have developed a similar understanding of the complex way in which local and supralocal factors – greed and grievance – can combine to undergird violence that manifests itself along religious or ethnic lines. See, Paul R. Brass, *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Susan Hardin, *Remaking Ibiaca: Rural Life in Aragon under Franco* (Chapel Hill, 1984); Sudhir Kakar, *The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict* (Chicago, 1996); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, 2006); and Thomas McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Phillipines* (Berkeley, 1998).

⁶⁸ Paraphrasing, here, Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 34. Gramsci's notion of "hegemony" as described in his *Prison Notebooks* [*Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (International Publishers, 1971)] provides another useful way to think about ideology in keeping with the demands of agency and contingency. See also the idea of "rule-governed creativity" in Pierre Bordieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, 1977), 15-17.

⁶⁹ Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (Oxford, 1975) comes to my mind as the greatest sustained criticism of the theoretical habit of overdetermining the divide between rural and urban existence. The warning, I would argue, is relevant here.

Raimundus Petri, Galmus Petri, and others – attacked and killed Puçola, the “Big Flea,” who had earlier raided alongside Abenadalil’s troops into Navarre.⁷⁰ The local justice – Petrus Sancii – convicted Puçola’s murderers and seized their property.⁷¹ Next and a few days later, the same *almogàvers* turned their sights on three of Abenadalil’s *jenets* – Masseto, Assager, and Alabes – violently attacking them and making off with their horses.⁷² What, if anything, connected the two events?

If not for a letter, another complaint from King Alphonse to Petrus Sancii, the connection between Abenadalil and Puçola would only have been a matter of speculation. Alphonse explained that at the time of his death, Puçola owed a debt to Abenadalil. Puçola and his troops, it appears, had agreed to pay Abenadalil in return for the privilege of raiding alongside the *jenets*.⁷³ Were these spoils the motivation for the murder? Or was Puçola attacked because of his association with the *jenets*? Interestingly, on the eve

⁷⁰ ACA, R 81:224r (7 December 1290, left margin trimmed): “[Petro] Ferrandi recepimus litteras vestras et intelleximus ea que in eisdem nobis dici misistis super facti mortis Puçole de qua fuerunt inculpati [Pa]schasius Valentini, Matheus de Galera, Juanyes Bono, et //quicum// alii adalilli nostri cum sociis et familiis eorumdem ad que vobis [re]spondemus quod volumus et placit nobis quod predicti adalilli nostri cum sociis et tota familia sua remaneant et sint in servicio vestro ... esse cons[ue]verunt ipsis cum assecurantibus idonee in posse nostro, quod si forte ratione dicte mortis proponeretur querimonia contra eos [quod] faciant inde iust[itia] complementum. Nos enim mandamus per litteras nostras universis officialibus nostris quod incontinenti cum ipsi firmaverint ... restituant ... eis omnia ea que eisdem ceperent vel emperaverent ratione mortis predictæ. Datum Barchinone, VII idus Decembris.... [...] scriptum universis officialibus quod cum constiterit eis predictos firmasse in posse dicto Petri Ferrandi desemperantis et desemperari faciant omni que eisdem occupaverunt, ac prestant eisdem super inferendo dampno inimicis domini Regis consilium, iuvamen. Datum ut supra.” See below for the names of the other *adalids*.

⁷¹ This fact is inferred from the following document, to which I return below. ACA, R 81:237v (13 December 1290): “Petro Sancii, iusticie Calatayube. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, visis presentibus tradatis et tradi faciatis Paschasio Valentinum et Vincenio de Sayona et aliis sociis eorum [omnia] albarana cartas bestias et alias res quas emperastis sive tenetis emperatis ab eisdem ratione mortis Puçole [...] qua fuer[un]t ut dicitur inculpati. Datum Barchinone, idus Decembris.”

⁷² ACA, R 81:234v (17 December 1290): “Paschasio Valentini, Juanyes Bono, Raimundo Petri, Galmo Petri et aliis sociis eorum. Intelleximus quod vos abi[...] per violentiam Masseto, Assager et Alabes, jenets nostris quandum roncinum et quandam equam quare vobis mandamus, q[ua]utenus, [si est] ita incontinenti restituitis dictis jenets equitaturis predictas al[...] mandamus per presentes Petro Sancii [de] Calatayube quod vos ad predicta compellant prout fuerint faciendum. Datum Barchinone, XVI kalendas Ianuarii [1290].”

⁷³ Al-‘Utbī addressed the question of sharing spoils with Christian bandits. See Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, *Kitāb al-bayān*, IV:186-7 and 208-9; Cf. IX:293-4 and 375-7 as well as X:21-2 as cited in Fierro, “Christianos y conversos,” 420-1.

of the attack on the *jenets*, Alphonse ordered Petrus Sancii to use Puçola's goods to pay the debt "so that [Abenadalil] should not have to complain of defective justice."⁷⁴ The goods seized by Petrus Sancii from the *almogàvers*, in other words, may have made their way into the hands of the *jenets*, providing a possible connection between the two episodes. The curious thing, in this case, however, was not the attack – which fits the pattern above – but rather the response of the Crown. While it appears that Alphonse supported the *jenets* against the *almogàvers*, he, in fact, played both sides. After the initial attack on Puçola, Alphonse wrote to the Petrus Sancii, insisting that the Christian *almogàvers* – however guilty – should have their goods returned and more interestingly, be sent back into service on the Valencian front, which is to say, to face Granadan Muslim *jenets*, their traditional enemies.⁷⁵ One could argue that Alphonse's decision to exculpate the *almogàvers* precipitated the second act, not only in giving them a sense of immunity but also legitimacy in attacking the *jenets*. And, proving that the gesture was not exceptional, Alphonse responded to the second attack even more equivocally than the first. Caught between his *jenets* and *almogàvers*, he ordered Petrus Sancii to return the *jenets*' horses but not to arrest the *almogàvers*.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ ACA, R 81:234r (13 December 1290, my emphasis) with partial quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 284: "Iusticie Calatayube et Daroce vel eorum locum tenentibus. Intelleximus quod Puçola quod debebat Mahometo [A]benadalil quendam quantitatem peccunie ratione quarum dicti rerum quas ipse Puçol[a] recepit de cavalcata [...]erate Castille que erant inter dictum Abendallil et dictum Puçolam. Quare vobis mandamus, quatenus, si [est] ita de bonis dicti Puçole satisfaciatis et satisfieri faciatis dicto Mahometo Abenadalil vel cui [v]oluerit in dicta quantitate peccunie quam ei debebat dictus Puçola ratione predicta, taliter quod dictus [A]benadalillus de vobis pro defectum iusticie non habeat materiam conquerendi. Datum ut supra." Catlos argues that Puçola was intending to bilk Abenadalil, but nothing in the document suggests this. He may have simply been killed before he had a chance to repay Abenadalil.

⁷⁵ ACA, R 81:237v (13 December 1290) with full edition above. A more detailed letter was issued to Petrus Ferrandi, the Procurator of Valencia, who oversaw the operations of the *almogàvers* during the so-called *Guerra Jenetorum*, which is discussed below. See ACA, R 81:224r (7 December 1290) with full edition above.

⁷⁶ ACA, R 81:234v (17 December 1290) with full edition above: "... quare vobis mandamus, q[ua]tenus, [si est] ita incontinenti restituitis dictis jenetis equitaturis predictas al[...] mandamus per presentes Petro Sancii [de] Calatayube quod vos ad predicta compellant prout fuerint faciendum."

Perhaps, then, to call Puçola's death a murder begs the question, obscuring more than it reveals about the incidents above. The Catalan king let his *almogàvers* attack Abenadalil's associate with impunity, which, to put it differently, is to say that Puçola was killed but not murdered.⁷⁷ The law was indifferent on that point. Similarly, these Christian raiders received a slap on the wrist for attacking the *jenets*, making Alphonse's complaint against Petrus Sancii for "defective justice" seem absurd.⁷⁸ Did Alphonse, one must then ask, similarly abandon justice in the case of the Calatayud villagers once Abenadalil's troops had moved on? Better yet, did these frontiersmen know that the king's threats were only that and nothing more? For what it is worth, the sovereign's logic was obvious: his sole aim was to keep his soldiers in battle. He managed the peace in order to maintain the war. The privilege of lawlessness, then, was double-edged. If the Crown permitted its Muslim *jenets* to stand outside and above its law, then the law also withdrew from them as it willed. By short circuiting justice and disavowing the *jenets*, the sovereign only exposed them to more violence and reinscribed their status as outsiders.

This discussion of the interaction of *jenets* with Christian frontiersmen began by pointing to the limits of privileged exception. Circumstance and practice brought the *jenets* into contact with royal officials, soldiers, and villagers, opening up the possibility of new connections, understandings, and collaborations. But, as the foregoing has argued, these broader interactions only seemed to deepen the *jenets'* exclusion from these

⁷⁷ The documents literally speak of the "death of Puçola (*mortis Puçole*)," but this usage is consistent with numerous documents that refer to crime (ACA, R 10:62v; 10:66r-bis; 15:12r; 16:196r; 20:297v; 42:191r; 62:2r; 85:144v; 85:196r; 98:232v; 99:157v; 200:214r; 215:231v). Cf. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 73: "What, then, is the life of the *homo sacer*, if it is situated at the intersection of a capacity to be killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law?"

⁷⁸ It is also worth noting that the neither the Mudéjars nor the *jenets* could be subject to capital punishment, which is to say, the law could not kill them. See Catlos, *Victors and the Vanquished*, 177 citing Massip, *Costums de Tortosa*, sec.1.1.14 (1279).

communities, to reinforce the very religious boundaries that the *jenets* appeared to break by entering the service of the Crown of Aragon. More significantly, one notes that whereas the sovereign marked the *jenets*' simultaneous inclusion and exclusion through complex legal and symbolic gestures, these frontiersmen used the granite weight of violence to pronounce their unambiguous rejection of the *jenets*.

v. BELONGING

In November 1290, in the midst of the Abenadalil's struggles in Calatayud, King Alphonse wrote the following letter to the Mudéjar *çalmedine* (*ṣāḥib al-madīna*) of nearby Zaragoza:

We know that a certain Saracen named Mahumet Sugeray, soldier of our esteemed nobleman, Abenadalil, captain of the *jenets*, very much loves (*diligit multum*) a certain Saracen woman of Zaragoza, named Fatima, daughter of Abdullasis, whom he wants to lead into marriage. Therefore, we tell and order you immediately to do and arrange to be carried out that this Saracen man should have that Saracen woman in marriage.⁷⁹

Set against the violent and exclusionary acts above, this document looks hopeful and offers a way to imagine how the *jenets* remained and lived in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. If marriage suggests a willingness to ally, then perhaps one can argue that interactions between the Crown of Aragon's Mudéjars and the *jenets* fostered a sense of community.⁸⁰ The present and final discussion therefore considers this relationship and the shape of this community. Was religious affiliation a sufficient condition for

⁷⁹ ACA, R 81:215v (20 November 1290): "[Ç]almedine Cesarauguste. Intelleximus quod quidam Sarracenus nomine Mahumet Sugeray, mil[item] dilecti nostri Abendalli[1], capitis jenetorum, diligit mult[u]m quamdam Sarracenam Cesarauguste nomine Fatimam, filiam Abdullasis, quam vult ducere in uxorem. Quare mandamus vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, faciatis et procuretis cum effectu quod d[ictus] Sarracenus dictam Sarracenam habeat in uxorem. Datum ut supra." See Catlos, "Mercenary," 293, n.135 with a transcription that differs slightly and Lourie, "Jewish Mercenary," 371.

⁸⁰ For a different but fascinating context, on the question of marriage and assimilation, see William Dalrymple, *White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India* (Penguin, 2004).

inclusion? How did the unique relationship that each of these groups had with the Crown shape and affect their bond? And finally, how did the Crown react to their association?

On closer inspection, this document – recording the marriage of a *jenet* to a Mudéjar woman – opens itself to many possible readings. One could read it as congratulatory – a pure formality – which would suggest that the king was merely adding honor to the occasion. Following this thread, one could argue that the letter speaks of the Crown’s approval of interaction between the *jenets* and the Mudéjars. Sensitive to the dialogic quality of texts, one could read this document as a response. Did the Mudéjar *çalmedine* seek approval for the marriage, knowing that the king took a keen interest in the affairs of his Muslim subjects with foreigners? In this scenario, the Mudéjars were taking tentative steps in their relationship with the *jenets*. Perhaps again, one could take a less subtle view of the sovereign and see this document as a monologue, as the order (*mandatus*) that it claims to be and nothing more. This perspective might suggest that the king was pressing his will on the Mudéjars, staving off any stated or potential objections to the marriage. Did Abdullasis or the local Muslim leader disapprove? This is all to say, given the fact of the relationship of the *jenets* to the Mudéjars, one still must ask whether theirs was a happy or unhappy marriage.

Elsewhere, it was argued that the Mudéjars played a critical role in recruiting the *jenets* – participating not only in negotiations but facilitating the *jenets*’ journey into the lands of the Crown.⁸¹ And without question, these groups remained connected after the *jenets* entered the service of the Catalan kings. There is evidence that *jenets* sought to live alongside the Mudéjars. For example, although operating in the Christian-dominated kingdom of Aragon, the *jenets* raiding from Alfamén and Almonacid in 1287 were in fact

⁸¹ See Chapters 3 and 5.

residing with local Mudéjars, not Christians.⁸² In addition to their taking up temporary residence, there is also evidence that *jenets* and their families made more permanent residence among Mudéjar communities. Muçe Hivanface, a *jenet*, and his wife Axone, owned several houses in the *morería* of Valencia.⁸³ When he retired from the king's service, a certain *jenet* named Dauet settled in the city of Valencia.⁸⁴ And after more than a decade of service, Muça Almentauri, the indebted *jenet* with whom the chapter began, settled in Murcia.⁸⁵ Rather obviously, a great deal recommended these places. Among the Mudéjars, the *jenets* would have found speakers of Arabic, Islamic institutions, and people who adhered to the same or familiar customs, rituals, and practices.⁸⁶ One imagines that all this, religion broadly defined, promoted a sense of belonging for the *jenets* and the potential for the uncomplicated marriage of these communities.

Islamic belief and practice, however, were not uniform. Indeed, it is worth recalling that the opinions of jurists varied widely on the status and requirements of Muslims living in non-Muslim territories. One could argue, however, that a relatively consistent position had been taken by the Mālikī jurists who dominated Spain and North

⁸² ACA, R 74:11r (25 October 1287) with full edition above: “Aljamis Sarracenorum Dalmoneçir et de Alfamen et janetis ibidem existentibus et aliis universes ad quos presentes et cetera...”

⁸³ They moved into houses previously owned by another Muslim. ACA, R 44:178v (16 May 1280): “Noverit universis quod nos Petrus dei gracia Rex Aragonem, tradimus et concedimus vobis Muça Hivanface jeneto in domo nostra et Axone uxore sue quasdam domos in moraria Valencie que fuerant Xerqui Alhadit.”

⁸⁴ ACA, R 82:3v (7 January 1290): “Raimundo Scorne [quod] ... Daut Alma[...] expensam idoneam de quibus possit ducere vitam suam in civitate Valencie et quod recipiat [a]lbaranum et cetera. Datum in Alcoleya, VI idus Ianuarii.” Cited in Gazulla, “Zenetes,” 194.

⁸⁵ ACA, R 199:55r (4 March 1301): “Dilecto consiliario suo Bernardo de Sevriano, procuratori Regni Murcie et cetera. Cum nos Muçe Aventura, janeto nostro, propter plurima servicia quod cum nobis exhibita gratiose dare concesserimus unum hereditamentum idoneum et suficienter de illis que in regno Murcie nostre curie confiscata sunt seu confiscabuntur de quo sustenare valare idonee vitam suam et familie sue. Idcirco vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, de hereditamentis predictis que confiscata sunt sue confiscabuntur in dicto regno Murcie, concedatis et assignetis unum idoneum et suficiens, memerato Muçe Aventura, prout ... vestre visum fuerit expedire. Et cum hereditamentum prefatum dicto Muçe assignaverito //eidere// eidem cartam seu donatione ipsa fieri mandemus et faciamus, inde nos per vestras litteras certis reddere certiores. Datum in Obsidione Montis Falconis, IIII nonas Marcii.”

⁸⁶ On the issue of bilingualism and Arabic, see Chapter 2.

Africa.⁸⁷ At the risk of repetition, this view was epitomized by the well-known ‘Statute of the Mudéjars,’ issued by the hard-line jurist Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī (d. 914/1508) shortly after the fall of Granada.⁸⁸ Writing from North Africa, al-Wansharīsī considered emigration (*hijra*) from conquered territories obligatory (*farīḍa*) upon all Muslims physically and economically capable. The Mudéjars, to his mind, had failed in their religious duty by resigning themselves to Christian rule. He rejected, moreover, any and all opinions of jurists living in non-Muslim territories.⁸⁹

Is it possible, then, that the *jenets*, relative newcomers from North Africa, shared the Mālikī jurists’ contempt for the Mudéjars and their leaders? From this perspective, one might read as significant the fact that the *jenet* Dauet, who retired to Valencia above, chose to reside in the city – that is, the Christian city – rather than in the nearby *morería*. The privilege of living outside the *morería* was unusual, shared only by the occasional, visiting Muslim dignitary.⁹⁰ By living near but nevertheless apart from his co-

⁸⁷ The Muslims of Spain showed themselves both willing and capable of seeking opinions from jurists in other schools. See Chapter 2.

⁸⁸ *Mi’yār*, II:121-4, 130-3, and 140-1. See Chapter 4 above for a fuller discussion and bibliography.

⁸⁹ *Mi’yār*, II:133.

⁹⁰ Whereas travelers and traders had to reside in the *funduq* in the *morería*, the king occasionally granted the privilege of staying inside the city to foreign dignitaries, who may have taken offense at an association with the Mudéjars. For instance, in 1277, two Muslim visitors from Tangia (Ar. *Tanja*, modern Tangiers) arrived at Valencia in order to arrange for the exchange of captives. They traveled with their wives and family and were housed within the walls of Valencia city. They were also given the privilege of trading goods directly from their residence rather than in the market. See ACA, R 40:4r (3 August 1277): “Petrus dei gracia et cetera fidelibus suis vicariis, baiulis, curiis, iusticiis, alcaydiis, corsariis et marinariis et universis aliis officialibus et subditis nostris ad quos presentes litere pervenerint, salutem et gratiam. Sciatis quos placet nobis quod Ali Abeocon et Machomet Abeocon filii Ab[....] Sarraceni de Tangia cum Iacobo Farfāl de Valencie sicut Motholassi et possint Sarracenos captivos extrahere et redimere de terra nostra et ducere ad terram Sarracenorum salve et secure. Et extrahere et redimere etiam Christianos de terris Sarracenorum et ad ducere ad terras Christianorum salve et secure, secundum quod dominus Rex pater noster felicis recordationis [...] eis concessit cum carta sua ita que ea continetur. Et quod dictus Ma[cho]metus cum uxore sua et familia sua possit stare infra muros civitatis Valencie cum omnibus rebus suis et mercimoniis, et dictas merces possit exheronare quocienscumque ad eum veniant in propria domo ipso solvere ius consuetum et debitum nobis et officialibus nostris pro nobis. Qu[are] mandamus vobis, quatenus, eisdem rebus aut mercibus eorum vel captivos quos secum ducerint nullum malum faciatis vel fieri permitatis. Immo eisdem p[re]s[en]tis in eundo, stando, et redeundo securum transitum et ducatum. Datum Valencie, III nonas Augusti, anno domini MCCLXX septimo.”

religionists, was Dauet asserting his superiority? In a similar vein, in December 1286, Çehit, a *jenet*, was accused of attacking a Muslim *alaminus* and his son.⁹¹ Although the cause of the conflict is unknown, the incident required the intervention of the royal bailiff, who stepped in to absolve the *jenet* of any charges, circumventing Mudéjar leaders and perforating the illusion of autonomy.⁹² This kind of privilege, however, was not occasional but rather continual and manifest: the *jenets* were exempted from the sumptuary laws that bound all but a few of the most privileged Mudéjars; they could ride horses, carry swords, and wear sumptuous garments without fear of the law.⁹³ The Crown, in other words, was an unavoidable presence in the relationship of the Mudéjars and the foreign *jenets*, a third party to their marriage. And these privileges could only have driven a wedge between these Muslims.

Two seemingly contradictory examples from the Chancery Registers will suffice to lay bare the problem of defining this community. Despite Jaume's conquest of Mallorca in 1229, the smaller (as the name indicates), neighboring island of Minorca remained under Muslim control until 1287.⁹⁴ After its conquest in that year by King

⁹¹ ACA, R 70:31 (18 December 1286): "Baiulo Valencie vel eius locum tenenti quod absolvat Çehit, genetum, quod captum tenet ratione vulnerum per ipsum illatorum Alamino Sarracenorum Valencie et filio eiusdem, ex quibus vulneribus nullus est ut dicitur, mortuus nec sunt talia vulnera quod aliis eorum ut asseritur, mortem inde assequatur. Quoniam dominus Rex, si ita est, absolvit dictum genetum a captione predicta, et quod [re]sti[t]uat ei ensem quem in dicta ritxa sibi abstulit, ut dicitur. Datum in Portupino, XV kalendas Ianuarii." Cited without quotation in Catlos, "Mercenary," 292-293.

⁹² His sword, which was also seized by the local Muslim official, was also ordered returned, underscoring the *jenets*' exception from the laws that banned Mudéjars from carrying weapons.

⁹³ See the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of sumptuary laws in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. See also the case of the Belvis, a prominent Mudéjar family, who were explicitly exempted from these laws. ACA, R 981:22r (12 February 1355) and R 904:232r (13 November 1360) as cited in Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 45.

⁹⁴ *Libre dels feyts*, chap. 47ff for the conquest of Mallorca; *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, ed. Antonia Ubieto Arteta (Valencia, 1961), chap. 37 for the conquest of Minorca. See also, David Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994); Joan Ramis i Ramis, *Les Illes Balears en temps cristians fins als àrabs* (Institut Menorquí d'Estudis, 1988); Elena Lourie, "Free Moslems in the Balearics under Christian Rule in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum* 45:4 (1970): 624-49; and the standard text, C. Parpal y Marqués, *La conquista de Menorca en 1287 por Alfonso III de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1901).

Alphonse, those Muslims who could not buy their freedom made their way into the slave markets of Barcelona and Mallorca. And it is precisely in this unexpected and uninviting context – at the Muslim slave market – that several *jenets* appear, performing the rather curious act of buying slaves.⁹⁵ The fact that these soldiers exclusively chose “black Saracens” from among the captives from Mallorca suggests that religious affiliation mattered less than other prejudices or calculations.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, a poorly preserved Chancery document at the mangled edge of a folio paints a very different portrait of the *jenets*’ relationship with Muslim captives of war. In 1285, six Muslim prisoners – five men and a woman – fled from their Catalan owners in Barcelona. Local officials were immediately informed of the escape but also warned, “Take sufficient care of Albohaya, Cassim, and Sahat, *jenets*, who by action or insinuation are said to have caused said Saracens to have fled.”⁹⁷ Whereas before, the *jenets* seemed to be profiting from the

⁹⁵ ACA, R 70:60r, R 70:61v, R 72:24v, and R 72:53v. See also Catlos, “Mercenary,” 294 which cites an additional document, ACA, R 70:49v. All these texts, often several to a folio, are simple but intriguing. ACA 70:61v (5 February 1286) reads: “A proof of purchase was made for al-‘Abbās, *jenet*, for one black Saracen called Bilāl / Fuit factum albaranum Alabeç, geneto, de uno Sarraceno negro vocato Bilel.”

⁹⁶ The Registers contain numerous records of slave sales from the auctions at Mallorca and Barcelona that discriminate carefully between white (*albus*), brown (*laurus*), and black (*niger*) men and women. For an introduction to the debate surrounding the question of race in the Middle Ages, see the special issue “Race and Ethnicity,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31:1 (2001). For a discussion of black African slaves in fifteenth-century Valencia, see the work of Debra G. Blumenthal, “Implements of Labor, Instruments of Honor: Muslim, Eastern and Black African Slaves in Fifteenth-Century Valencia (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2000); “Defending their Masters’ Honour: Slaves as Violent Offenders in Fifteenth-Century Valencia,” in ‘A Great Effusion of Blood?’: *Interpreting Medieval Violence*, ed. Meyerson et al. (Toronto, 2004), 34-56; and her “‘La Casa dels Negres’: black African solidarity in late medieval Valencia” in *Black Africans in Renaissance Europe*, ed. T. F. Earle and K.J.P. Lowe (Cambridge, 2005), 225-46. See also David Nirenberg, “‘Race’ and ‘Racism’ in Late Medieval Spain,” in *Rereading the Black Legend: The Discourses of Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires*, eds. W. Mignolo, M. Quilligan, and M. Greer (University of Chicago Press, 2007) as well as Núria Silleras-Fernández, “*Nigra Sum Sed Formosa*: Black Slaves and Exotica in the Court of a Fourteenth-Century Aragonese Queen,” *Medieval Encounters* 13 (2007), 546-65.

⁹⁷ ACA, R 57:189r (29 August 1285, my emphasis): “Universis [offici]alibus quod ubicumque et apud quemcumque reperiantur V Sarraceni et I Sarracena quorum unus est Raimundi [de] Gerunda [et] alius Nicholai de Samares et alius Bernardi de Calle et alius Guillelmi Fratri et alius Bernardi Reig et ipsa Sarracena est A[b]rahim Amiel, civium Barchinone, capiant et occupent et pos[.] a quolibet detentare et captos cust[o]diare et conservent donec predicti cives dictos Sarracenos probaverint esse suos et tunc tradant eos procuratori dictorum civium cum de eorum dominio fuerit facta fides. *Preterea recipiant idoneam cautionem ab Albohaya et Cassim et Sahat, genetis, quorum o[per]a et insinuatione dicti*

capture of Minorca without care for religious affiliation, here, they seem to have taken a personal risk to help these six Muslims. The opposing events make only one thing clear: while religion may have connected the *jenets* to the Mudéjars, it did not determine their relationship alone.

vi. CONSPIRACY

In the prison break above, one also detects a whisper of fear in the king's letter. Regardless of the *jenets*' involvement, the Crown saw sufficient reason to suspect them: in potential coincidence, it chose to see conspiracy. This attitude was not isolated. The Crown of Aragon saw all the Muslims living in its kingdoms as potential insurgents or worse, a fifth column for an invasion from Granada, a lesson it learned from the revolt of al-Azraq.⁹⁸ All the same, throughout the period of sovereign crisis, the Catalan kings continued to recruit *jenets* and allow their interactions with the Mudéjars. Yet despite this, another al-Azraq did not present himself, which raises the question: Why did the Mudéjars and the *jenets*, who had surrendered Valencia to the Crown in recent memory, never unite to seize the kingdom back?

At the end of 1286, while his *jenets* were dispatched to Aragon to fight the *Uniones*, King Alphonse began to mobilize a mass of forces to send to the Valencian frontier. Among others, he called upon Templars, Hospitallers, Knights of Alcañiz, and *almogàvers* in order to prepare for a rumored attack of Granadan *jenets*.⁹⁹ By the

Sarraceni dicuntur aff[u]gisse de restituendis dictis Sarracenis ubi probatum f[uit] contra eos vel de [...] modum eis iusticie complementum. Datum Barchinone, IIII kalendas Septembris."

⁹⁸ See Chapter 2 for more detail on this figure.

⁹⁹ ACA, R 70:25v (5 and 9 December 1286): "Petro Ferrandi, procuratori Regni Valencie, vel eius locum tenenti. [Cum] intelleximus quod aliqui jeneti et pedites Sarraceni parant se et intendunt intrare hostiler Regnum nostrum Valencie et ibidem nobis gentibus nostris dampnum inferre, dicimus et mandamus vobis, quatenus, vocens //vel// ex parte nostre Magistrum Templi, Magistrum Hospitalis, et Comendatorem de

following April, the calls became more urgent as Granadan attacks began, threatening to overrun Valencia.¹⁰⁰ Bishoprics were called upon to lend horses, and royal revenue from the kingdom was redirected to pay the salaries of troops on the frontier.¹⁰¹ The battle, which the Crown came to call the *Guerra Jenetorum*, the War of the *Jenets*, lasted only a few months.¹⁰²

Given the fact that two decades earlier the *jenets* had been so integral to al-Azraq's uprising against the Crown of Aragon, one might have expected the Valencian

Alcanicio quibus super hoc scribimus et nobiles ac milites in Regno Valencie hereditates habentes ut ad deffensionem Regni Valencie et bonorum suorum, veniant et stent cum equis armis et aliis apparatibus suis ut si forte aliqui hostes nostri intrarent Regnum Valencie possint eis viriliter resistere ac eis dampnum inferre. Datum Maiorice, nonas Decembris.

“Universis nobilibus ac militibus in Regno Valencie hereditates habentibus. Cum intelleximus aliquos Sarraceno[s] se parasse ad expugnandum Regnum nostrum Valencie dilectum nostrum requirimus ac vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus visis presentibus, paretis vos cum equis et armis et aliis apparatibus vestris et stetis ad deffensionem Regni Valencie supra dicti et bonorum ac hereditatum vestrarum, ut si forte aliqui hostes nostri intrarent [R]egnum Valencie predictum, possitis eis viriler resistere ac eis dampnum inferre. Datum ut supra.

“Commendatori de Alcanicio. Cum intelleximus quod jeneti et alii Sarraceni extranei tam equites quam pedites parant et intendunt intrare regnum nostrum Valencie et malum inferre ibidem, requirimus vos ac vobis firmiter dicimus et madamus, quatenus, incontinenti omni dilatione remota entis cum militibus et familia ad predictum regnum Valencie et ibi sitis pro resistencia predictis Sarracenis viriler facienda in defensionem regni predicta et eorum que ibi habetis. Datum Maiorice, V idus Decembris.

“Simile fratri Bernardo de Miravals.

“Simile magistro Hospitale.

“Simile magistro Temple.”

Particular noblemen were also written directly (ACA, R 70:92v [11 April 1287]). *Almogàvers* are mentioned in a letter to Petrus Ferrandi, procurator of Valencia (ACA, 71:49v [5 May 1287]). For general information on the military orders in the Crown of Aragon, see Joseph O'Callaghan, *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates* (Variorum, 1975); *The Military Orders*, ed. Malcolm Barber (Aldershot, 1994); and Alan Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the early Fourteenth Centuries* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

¹⁰⁰ Letters were issued again to the military orders, ACA, R 70:93r (7 April 1287) and 70:106r (22 April 1287).

¹⁰¹ On the bishoprics, ACA, R 70:92v (11 April 1287) and 70:101r-101v (29 April 1287). On revenues, ACA, R 71:34r (7 April 1287) and ACA, R 71:36r (12 April 1287).

¹⁰² ACA, R 71:34r (7 April 1287), a series of documents related to financing the war, are the first to refer to it as the *Guerra Jenetorum*. The war appears to have already ended when in October, Alphonse sent the following order, ACA, 71:88r (25 October 1287): “Iacobo Delmars, collectori reddituum Vallis de Merinyen. Volumus ac vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, soluto eo quod nobilis Petrus Ferrandi, procurator Regni Valencie, vel Petrus Peregrini de domo nostra, assignaverunt aliquibus super redditibus supradictis racione guerra Janetorum, respondeatis sive responderi faciatis de eisdem redditibus creditoribus nobilis dompni Ferrandi quon[i]am avunculi nostri vel procuratoribus eorum iuxta assignacionem per nos inde ipsis factam cum carta nostra in ea continetur. Et hoc aliquatenus non mitetis. Datum in Alagone, VIII kalendas Novembris.” I would argue that the war only lasted the summer months.

Mudéjars to embrace the *Guerra Jenetorum* as a new opportunity for rebellion. In this case, however, the threat seemed more contained, and the Mudéjar response, uncertain. In April of 1287, for example, the Mudéjars of Alhavir received permission to withdraw from service in the king's army, citing their fear of both "the Moors entering Valencia" and the *almogàvers*.¹⁰³ On the one hand, the Crown may have thought better of testing the Mudéjars' allegiance. On the other hand, caught between warring armies, the Mudéjars may have recognized that they were in a vulnerable position and earnestly sought to stay out of the battle. Indeed, even the rumor of a *jenet* attack was fuel enough for local Christians to attack the Valencian Muslim communities, which is to say that the constant threat of *jenet* raids may have ironically promoted Mudéjar quietism and passivism.¹⁰⁴ Some Muslims, to be sure, did choose to throw in their lot with the *jenets* and in the wake of the war's failure, they retreated into Granada alongside these soldiers.¹⁰⁵ But others chose loyalty to the Crown: in his accounts for the war, for example, King Alphonse recorded a payment to a "Saracen spy."¹⁰⁶ Thus, during the last two decades of the thirteenth century, the threat of another Mudéjar rebellion with the

¹⁰³ ACA, R 70:106r (23 April 1287): "Alamino et aliame Sarracenorum de Alhavir, avem entes que per pahor dels moros qui entraren el Regne de Valencia et dels almugavers nosen sots pугats el pug de laucho. En con nos siam venguts en Valencia, deym nos eus manam que tornets tan tost en vestres cases et vestres habetats et pensets de laurar axi con avets acostumat cor nos sem nenguts per ço ques tingam sans et segurs. Datum Valencia, IX kalendas Maii." Cf. Abou El Fadl, "Muslim Minorities," 179. Some Muslim jurists considered it preferable for Muslim subject populations to remain neutral during confrontations with Muslims. See also Chapter 4.

¹⁰⁴ In the following case, "young men" inspired the violence against the Muslim *aljamás*. ACA, R 161:107r-107v (21 August 1316, my emphasis) with full quotation in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 265: "... In nostri presencia constitutus nuncius aliame Sarracenorum Elchii exposuit humiliter coram nobis quod aliquociens tam de die quam de nocte, cum *insurgit rumor aliquis in dicho loco quod geneti seu Sarraceni de partibus Granate intrant hostiliter terram nostram*, aliqui homines iuvenes loci ipsius, temeritate ducti, concitando populum contra Sarracenos loci predicti vociferunt et dicunt 'al rival, al rival'" Cf. a similar incident ACA, R 1377:67v-68r (5 July 1340) in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 288-90.

¹⁰⁵ A document records the repopulation of the raval of Játiva because some Muslims "recently returned with the *jenets*," ACA R 75:7r (3 May 1287): "... qui nuper recesserunt cum genetis." Given the general scarcity of documentation for the period, it is a matter of speculation as to how extensive such "defections" were.

¹⁰⁶ ACA, R 78:57r (22 April 1287): "Item debetis vos dictus nobile recuperare ... centum XXX solidos [quo]s dedistis in uno Sarraceno qui erat espia in guerra Janetorum."

support of *jenets* remained no more than a rumor. In November 1294, for instance, several Granadan *jenets* were arrested carrying letters from the Naṣrid ruler urging the Mudéjars to revolt.¹⁰⁷ Nothing, however, came of the proposal; Granada soon entered into another alliance with the Crown.¹⁰⁸ Thus, a combination of canny Crown policy, political circumstance, and conservative local dynamics stood in the way of uniting the *jenets* and Mudéjars.

The fact that the Crown of Aragon maintained a defensive front against some *jenets* during the *Guerra Jenetorum* while employing other *jenets* to suppress a rebellion in its own kingdoms is even more revealing. Not only did the Catalan sovereign demonstrate military creativity – a mercenary logic – but also a surprising confidence that the *jenets* in its employ would not trade allegiances. As in the case of Abenadalil, some *jenets* entered the service of the Crown precisely because they found themselves on the Naṣrid or Marīnid political margins – bandits – and perhaps the Crown did not consider these asylum seekers a risk. Moreover, in keeping the *jenets* on the Castilian and French fronts, the Crown was not only displaying pragmatism but also respecting the terms of its agreements with the Muslim rulers of Granada and North Africa that brought *jenets* into its service. Both parties agreed to place reciprocal limits on the use of troops that they

¹⁰⁷ ACA, R 100:202r (14 November 1294, my emphasis): “Petro de Libiano, baiulo generali regni Valencie, salutem et cetera. Noveritis ad nostram audienciam pervenisse quod quedam comitava Sarracenorum almugaverorum nuper venientium de partibus //Castelle// Regis Granate adgredebatur intrare in regnum nostrum Valencie pro dampno inferendo et quod Ferrandus Garcesii de Roda cum quandam comitivam quam secum ducebat obviavit eisdem et deviat eosdem et etiam quosdam ex ipsos captos retinuit et fuerunt invente penes eorum eos, *quedam carte seu litere quas dictus Rex Granate mittebat aliāmis Regni Valencie quod se insurgerent contra nos et terram nostram* et quod occuparent et subriperent Ruipos et fortitudines quas occupare possent quoniam ipse Rex Granate erat missum ad ipsos familiam equitum in deffensione et iuvamen eorumdem. Quare vobis dicimus et mandamus, quatenus, visis presentibus ad frontariam accedatis et recognoscatis loca et castra et fortitu[di]nes ipsius frontarie et si qua defugerit vel necessariam fuerit ad stabilimenta dictorum castrarum faciatis providere et custodiri diligenter, taliter quod propter malam custodiam seu curam non possit ipsis castris sinistram aliquam evenire. Datum Barchinone, XVIII kalendas Decembrii, anno domini MCCXCIII.”

¹⁰⁸ ACA, R 252:121r (18 November 1295) with full edition above in Chapter 3.

exchanged: Muslims could only fight Christians, and Christians, Muslims.¹⁰⁹ This curious economy of violence in a period of Crusade and *jihād* held legitimacy – at least, in the eyes of those involved – precisely through this respect of religious boundaries and limits. This is not to say, however, that the Crown respected the *jenets* as Muslims. Precisely because and as long as France and Castile continued to threaten the Crown of Aragon, this circumscribed use of the *jenets* suited the Catalan kings, and they felt no need to test it.¹¹⁰

This period of sovereign crisis – a nearly perpetual state of exception – did, however, come to an eventual end.¹¹¹ In 1295 at Agnani, King Jaume II put the issue of Sicily to rest and settled the Crown's differences with France. Tensions with Castile, however, continued to mount. Almost immediately after settling Sicily, Jaume invaded Murcia, the coastal region south of Valencia, under the pretense of support for Alfonso de la Cerda, a claimant to the Castilian throne. Over the next decade, the Crown of Aragon remained under a constant threat of invasion from Castile, and throughout this period, it continued to recruit *jenets* from Granada and North Africa. This period of status quo, however, would end dramatically in 1302. And out of a moment of confusion, suddenly and surprisingly, there came the end of the crisis. In August of 1304, the Crown of Aragon signed a peace with Castile at Agreda. For the first time in over two decades, not only did the state of emergency come to a close, but also confessional and political lines in the Iberian peninsula coincided. A new crusade against Granada was in the offing, and

¹⁰⁹ See Chapter 4 above for a detailed discussion of diplomatic charters.

¹¹⁰ North African sultans employed their Christian mercenaries to gather taxes, suppress rebellion, and hold nomadic tribes at bay. See Hopkins, *Medieval Muslim Government in Barbary*, 53-5; 75-8.

¹¹¹ A more detailed discussion of the following can be found at the end of Chapter 4.

the Naṣrids did not fail to recognize the threat.¹¹² Would the *jenets* continue to remain loyal to the Crown under these new conditions?

vii. THE WORST MAN IN THE WORLD

The context in which and the process by which the Crown of Aragon recruited foreign Muslim soldiers was the concern of an earlier chapter, a chapter that also described in detail the events that prompted the arrival of the captivating figure of al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū.¹¹³ Briefly, following his rise to power in 1302, the Naṣrid sultan Muḥammad III faced an uprising of the *Ghuzāh*, the very North African soldiers that the Catalans called *jenets*. In particular, the captain of the *Ghuzāh*, Ḥammū b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Raḥḥū revolted, seizing the fortress of Bedmar near Jaén (Ar. Jayyān), and declared himself independent of the new sultan. Seeking support against these rebels, Muḥammad entered into a sudden alliance with Castile to the displeasure of both the *Ghuzāh* and the Catalan king.¹¹⁴ And it was at this moment, at the end of 1303, with Granada and Castile aligned, with Christian Castilian troops entering into Granada to attack the *Ghuzāh*, that al-‘Abbās b. Raḥḥū, the uncle of Ḥammū, entered the service of the Crown of Aragon.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Preparation for the crusade against Almería began in 1308. See, *EF*², s.v. ‘al-Mariyya’ as well as J.A. Tapia Garrido, *Almería musulmana (711-1147 y 1147-1482)* = vols. ii and iii of *Historia General de Almería y su provincia*, (Almería, 1976-8); ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Sālim, *Ta’rīkh madīnat al-Mariyya al-islāmiyya* (Beirut, 1969); Andrés Giménez-Soler, *El sitio de Almería en 1309* (Barcelona: 1904); Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 103-116; Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 173-80; and Arié, *L’Espagne musulmane*, 89-93.

¹¹³ See Chapter 4. Ibn Raḥḥū’s career is outlined in Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 352-72; Mariano Gaspar Remiro, “Relaciones de la Corona de Aragón con los estados musulmanes de Occidente. El negocio de Ceuta entre Jaime II de Aragón y Aburribia Soleiman, sultán de Fez contra Mohamed III de Granada” in *Revista del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada*, XIII (1923), 125-292, esp. 218-38; and Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 79-90. Several relevant documents were also edited by Àngels Masia i de Ros, *Jaume II: Aragó, Granada, i Marroc: Aportació Documental* (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas: Barcelona, 1989), 211-30.

¹¹⁴ Jaume began making preparations for war. In May, he wrote to Ferrer des Cortey, bailiff of Murcia, with a list of soldiers who owed him service on the frontier. ACA, R 231:54r (18 May 1303).

¹¹⁵ Ibn Khaldūn, VII:777 presents a genealogy. Raḥḥū was the eldest son of ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq. He had many sons, with numerous descendents of their own, among them: Mūsā, ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq, al-‘Abbās, ‘Umar,

Precisely because he arrived at such a pivotal moment – less than a year before the peace at Agreda – and left in his wake a trail of documentation in both Latin and Arabic, Ibn Raḥḥū provides the ideal case study, the perfect test of the limits and loyalties of the *jenets*.

On 22 December 1303, Ibn Raḥḥū signed a contract for service and presented it to King Jaume II.¹¹⁶ For his part, Ibn Raḥḥū swore allegiance to the king on behalf of not only his soldiers but all the *jenets* and captains (*cabos*) of the *jenets* in Valencia and Murcia, suggesting that he, like Abenadalil before him, had received command of most,

Muḥammad, ‘Alī, and Yūsuf, all sons of Ṣawṭ al-Nisā’ and all of whom entered al-Andalus together. Cf. Gaspar Remiro, “El negocio de Ceuta,” 218.

¹¹⁶ ACA, R 235:1r-1v *segunda numeración* (22 December 1303): “Sepan todos quantos esta carta veran como nos Alabez Abenrraho, e sus parientes, e los cabos, e toda la cavalleria, qui metran lures nompnes en esta carta, por toda la cavalleria de los Genetes qui son presentes en Valencia, e aquellos qui son agora en Murcia, prometemos, atorgamos, e juramos a vos Sennor muye alto e poderoso don Jayme, por la gracia de dios Rey de Aragon, que vos serviremos con fe, e con verdat, assi como sierven buenos vassalos lur Sennor, e lur Rey. Encara vos prometemos, e atorgamos, e juramos que guardaremos vos, e todos vuestras cosas, e vuestro cuerpo e vuestros lugares, e vuestra tierra, e vuestros gentes de qualquiere condicion sean. Encara vos prometemos, atorgamos, e juramos, que nos faremos guerra por vos cuenta Rey de Granada, e cuenta Rey de Castiella, et cuenta todos aquellos qui avian guerra con vos, vos con ellos, de qualque condicion sean si quiere Christianos si quiere Moros. Encara vos prometemos, et atorgamos, e juramos, que nos no faremos treuga ni paç, ni amor, ni seguridat, con ninguno, menos de vuestro mandamiento, e vuestra licencia. Encara vos prometemos, e atorgamos, e juramos, que vos daremos rahenes nuestros fillos por el castiello de Negra, e Lorchi, e Cepti los quales vos a nos atorgastes por estatge nuestro, e que nos los tengamos p[or] vos avebos de nuestros estages assi como vassallos tiene castiellos por lur Sennor. Encara vos prom[e]temos, atorgamos, e juramos que cada hora que vos nos demandaredes el dicho castiello de Negra, et los otros lugares sobreditos que nos luego vos rendiemos el dito castiello e los ditos lu[g]ares. Et vos Sennor otrossi quando cobrades los aures siades tenido de tornar a nos nuestras rahenes. Encara nos prometemos, atorgamos, e juramos que quando nos partiremos de vos, no iremos a tierra de vuestros enemigos, sines de vuestro mandamiento, e vuestro comiado. E si por aventura vos Sennor no erades en la terra e alguno de los cavalleros se querian ir, que lo pueda fazer con albaran del procurador del Regno de Valencia or de Murcia. Encara vos prometemos, atorgamos, e juramos que nos tangamos e tener fagamos con [fol. 1v] todos aquellos con l[os] [quales] avedes paç or treug[a] [agora] o aures daqui adelant las ditas paç o treugas a qual[es] quiere luga[re]s o personas las [avedes] dadas \o daredes/ a los faredes dar. Et porque esta carta sea confirmada, e mantenida, metemos en ella nuestros nompnes. Et juramos e[n] presencia de vos Sennor Rey sobredito por el alcoran que todos las cosas, e posturas sobreditas sean tenidas e complidas por nos en buena fe sin mal enganyo. Nomina illorum que subscripserunt sunt hec: Alabeç Abenrraho, Iyca Abenrraho, Bedrebdin Ebemuca Abenrraho, Hiemeledin Ebemuca Abenrraho, Hali Ebemuca Abenrraho, Jaffia Abemutarref, Iyça Avennelima, Auderemel Mafumet Abemutarref, Auderemel Ebbenumar, Cale Abemafumet Abdenalcahue, Jahacob Abenyucef, Hali Abenixa, scrivi//ero//\per ell/ e presencia dell Huahin Zamar Benhabez, escrivieron en presencia dell. Culaymen Benbuchar, escrivieron en presencia dell. Abdelle, escrivieron en presencia dell. Jucef Hali, Mahomet Benmaton, escrivieron en presencia dell. Muça Abemane, escrivieron en presencia del. Jahacob Abemuça, escrivieron en presencia dell. Auderramel Benexiffe, Gazalit Abenibram, escrivieron en presencia dell. Hamo e Beniuyucef e Beneyer Abdella, e Benhomar Ayet, e Muça Abenharraquet.” Cited with quotation in Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 357-8.

if not all the *jenets* in the service of the Crown of Aragon.¹¹⁷ Ibn Raḥḥū agreed to place his sons as hostages (*rahenes*) in the king's charge in return for three Murcian castles – Negra, Lorquí, and Ceutí – which he would hold as a vassal of the king.¹¹⁸ He also agreed to seek permission from the king or his royal procurator before leaving the Crown's service. Finally and most significantly, Ibn Raḥḥū promised to support the Catalan king against all his enemies whether Christian or Muslim (*si quiere Christianos si quiere Moros*) and more particularly, against the kings of Granada and Castile, against whom the *Ghuzāh* were fighting. But in this final regard – his willingness to attack other Muslims – Ibn Raḥḥū's service was unique in the long thirteenth century. Among all the *jenets*, one could say that he was the first truly mercenary mercenary, a man who placed no limits on his service.¹¹⁹ Ibn Raḥḥū and his colleagues sealed this commitment by swearing on the Qur'ān (*alcoran*).¹²⁰

At the same moment Ibn Raḥḥū presented Jaume with this agreement, the Catalan king signed and returned his own, which offers a unique opportunity to see this alliance from the other perspective.¹²¹ Jaume promised to inform all his officials of Ibn Raḥḥū's

¹¹⁷ Cf. Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 84 calls the corresponding figure in al-Andalus, “the captain of the western army (*ra'īs jund al-gharbī*).” He also speaks of the *shaykh* of the *Ghuzāh* (*Lamḥa*, 115).

¹¹⁸ For details about the hostages, see Section 2 above. Ibn Raḥḥū also received income from these castles but had some trouble in making dependent villages pay their due (ACA, R 235:70r *segunda numeración* [16 May 1304]). See also Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 356.

¹¹⁹ I have excluded the similar case of the Almohad 'Abd al-Wāhid, discussed in Chapter 4, because his was an alliance with the Catalan king rather than service for him.

¹²⁰ ACA, R 235:1v with full edition in the note above: “And we swear in the presence of you, Lord King, by the Qur'ān that everything above will be held and completed by us in good faith and without trickery / Et juramos e[n] presencia de vos Sennor Rey sobredito por el alcoran que todos las cosas, e posturas sobreditas sean tenidas e complidas por nos en buena fe sin mal enganyo.”

¹²¹ ACA, R 235:1v-2r *segunda numeración* (22 December 1303): “Sepan todos quantos esta carta veran como nos Don Jayme por la gracia de Dios Rey de Aragon atorgamos a vos Alabeç Abenrraho, e a vuestros parientes, e a los cabos, e a los cavalleros qui son presentes agora en Valencia, e a aquellos qui son en Murcia que vos guardemos, e vos aseguremos mientras seredes en nuestro servicio en nuestra terra. Encara vos atorgamos que vos daremos nuestra carta a todos oficiales e subditos nuestros que vos aguarden e defienden, e que vos den compra, e venda en todos nuestros lugares, e de nuestra tierra. Encara vos atorgamos que a vos dito Alabeç liuraremos el castiello de Negra, e Lorchi, e Cepti que los tengades por nos a vuestro estage, e de los sobredito[s] asi como vassallo tiene castiellos por su sennor. Encara vos

new service as well as to establish the *jenet* as his vassal in the aforementioned castles. The *jenets* were guaranteed freedom of movement, except travel into enemy territory. They were allowed to keep the king's *quinta* from all spoils as well as what was owed to the Crown by any Christian soldiers – like Puçola – who raided in their company.¹²² The king promised them the freedom to leave his service whenever they wished, an understanding slightly inconsistent with Ibn Raḥḥū's. Nevertheless, to this point, Jaume's terms seemed to be the same that he had offered other *jenets*.

Three final stipulations, however, throw their relationship into sharper relief, exposing a deep-seated and mutual distrust. First, Jaume insisted that Ibn Raḥḥū neither allow other *jenets* to enter his kingdoms nor hire new soldiers without the consent of the Crown. In short, he charged these *jenets* with policing the frontier and preventing raids from Granada. However paradoxical it may seem, Jaume's use of these raiders as border guardians is the perfect expression and fulfillment of their intertwined history: the journey of the *jenets* into the service of the Crown of Aragon only confirmed and

atorgamos, e queremos que quales quiere de vuestros cavalleros se querran ir que lo puedan fazer exceptado que no vayan a tierra de nuestros enemigos, ni fagan danyo a nos, ni a nuestra tierra. Encara vos atorgamos //que cada hora que vos querades // por gracia, en ayuda de vuestras messiones, toda la quinta o setmo de las cavalgadas que faredes en tierras de nuestros enemigos assi de las vuestras cavalgades como de los Christianos, qui con vos entraran. Encara vos atorgamos que cada hora que vos querades ir, ni partir por mar o por tierra, que seades salvos e seguros de toda nuestra gent en cuerpos e en averes. Encara [fol. 2r] mandamus e queremos que otros cavallero[s] gen[etes] [sine]s nuestra voluntat no [v]engan en nuestra tierra salvo [e]stos que agora son con vos en nuestra tier[ra]. E si algunos [hi] vin[dran] [s]in nuestra voluntat vos [n]o los aculgades en vuestra company[a] menos de nuestra voluntat. Encara que [t]engades e observedes la paz, e las treugas que nos avemos dadas, o daremos daqui adelant a qualsquiere lugares o personas de quales condiciones que sean. Encara que vos Alabeç rendades a nos o a qui nos mandaremos el dito castiello de Negra, e los otros logares sobreditos toda hora que nos los queremos cobrar de vos asi como vassallo es tenido de render casitello a su sennor. E nos seamos tenidos de render a vos vuestras rahenes. Encara vos atorgamos que qualsquiere castiellos o lugares [t]omaredes del Rey de Granada que sean vuestros. Encara queremos e mandamos que en las cavalgadas \que faredes/ en tierras de nuestros enemigos Christianos no prengades, ni matedes, muller ninguna porque no es costumpne nuestra. E en testimonio destas cosas mandamos poner en est escripto nuestro siello pendent feytas estas posturas en Valencia dia lunes XXII dias andadas del mes de Deziembre en el anyo de mille CCC e tres.” Another full quotation in Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 353-4, curiously cites Zurita, *Anales*, V:61 rather than the Registers. Both the foregoing transcriptions are my own; they differ from Giménez-Soler's on minor points of transcription and add editorial annotations for the reader's benefit.

¹²² The king actually specifies “a fifth or sixth.”

achieved their exclusion from its community. These boundary-crossers had very literally become boundary-makers. Second, Jaume consented that the *jenets* could retain any land or castles that they seized from the king of Granada, a fact that casts a new light on Ibn Raḥḥū's willingness to attack other Muslims. Any raids into Muslim territory would ultimately benefit the *jenets* – the *Ghuzāh* – and not the Crown. Thus, the strategic alliance against Granada did have its qualifications. Finally and most curiously, the Crown requested that on raids against Christians, the *jenets* neither capture nor kill women because “it is not our custom (*no es costumpne nuestra*).”¹²³ The specter of *jenets*' taking Christians captive – more particularly, Christian women – brought to the surface an acute need for boundaries – even for the Catalan king.¹²⁴ In Jaume's language, the *jenets* possess a dangerous alterity that was not simply religious but something bordering on monstrosity.¹²⁵ Thus, far from ignoring religious and political limits, this alliance seemed deeply concerned with them. These negotiations underscore the very complexity and instability of the bond that tied the *jenets* to the Crown of Aragon.

Although in theory, the strategic aims of the *jenets* and the Crown coincided well, in practice, problems quickly mounted. In March of 1304, three months into their alliance, Jaume wrote to Ibn Raḥḥū.¹²⁶ He praised the *jenet* for his service but explained that on a recent raid into the region of Cuenca, in Castile, Ibn Raḥḥū's soldiers had seized goods and captives from villages under the protection of Don Juan Manuel, who was an

¹²³ ACA, R 235:1v-2r *segunda numeración* (22 December 1303) with full edition above: “Encara queremos e mandamos que en las cavalgadas \que faredes/ en tierras de nuestros enemigos Christianos no prengades, ni matedes, muller ninguna porque no es costumpne nuestra....”

¹²⁴ Cf. David Nirenberg, “Religious and Sexual Boundaries,” 141-60.

¹²⁵ A familiar trope: see John Block Friedman, *The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). See also Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, *Of Giants: Sex, Monsters, and the Middle Ages* (University of Minnesota, 1999), xiii: “The giant appears at that moment when the boundaries of the body are being culturally demarcated.”

¹²⁶ ACA, R 235:41r-41v (27 March 1304). A full quotation of this document, although mislabeled, appears in Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 360-1.

ally of the Crown.¹²⁷ Given that alliance, Jaume ordered Ibn Raḥḥū to return the goods and captives. Jaume also informed the *jenet* captain that the Crown had signed a temporary truce with Castile, a truce which would ultimately pave the path to Agreda.¹²⁸ For his part, Ibn Raḥḥū wrote back not only to contest the charges against him but also to complain of mistreatment.¹²⁹ He claimed that as his *jenets* returned from Castile, the local governor of Jarafuel, in Valencia, sent robbers in the middle of the night, who made off with their sheep and cows. At Játiva, moreover, where the *jenets* hoped to sell their remaining spoils, the residents sealed the town gates and armed themselves against the Muslim soldiers. Thus, as before, Christian administrators and frontiersmen continued to treat the *jenets* as enemies and outsiders. Curiously, however, Ibn Raḥḥū said nothing in his letter about the shifting political situation.

Private dispatches to the king, however, reveal that Ibn Raḥḥū's silence masked a great deal. Bertran de Canelles, the procurator of Valencia, wrote to inform the king that despite making several requests, he had failed to convince Ibn Raḥḥū to return the goods belonging to Don Manuel.¹³⁰ To the procurator's mind, however, the *jenet* captain's

¹²⁷ Ibid: "Avenos entendido que vos sacastes de la tierra del muy noble Don Johan Manuel ganado e hombres."

¹²⁸ The initial truce lasted until May. A month later, Jaume wrote again to explain that the truce had been extended until August, the month that the peace at Agreda was signed. ACA, R 235:53r (21 April 1304).

¹²⁹ ACA, R 233:18r (25 March 1304) as cited with full quotation in Giménez-Soler, "Caballeros," 363-5.

¹³⁰ ACA, CR, *Judíos y Musulmanes*, no. 521 (13 March 1304): "Al molt honrat et amat en Bernat de Libia de nos en Bertran de Caneles, saluts et bona amor. Fetz vos saber que nos avem trames a la justicia et als juratz de Valent en Domingo Catena sobrel fet daquests genets e creet que Alabeç es molt mal hom, et cada dia es de pigor enteniment e especialment depuys que a[c] la carta dels Seynor Rey de la treva. E reba ses aço matex tot [...] qui devant li pas, e a preses deli terra den Johan Manuel ço es d[al]arcu M ovels e IIII fadrins. E avem lo request moltes vegades quels nos reta e per res nols avem poguts cobrar ans nos en [fiu] fort mal re[s]post. E a li venguts III genets del Rey de Granada oer missatges dels quels el e tota sa companya se son fort alegrats. E nos sabem que tos los Sarrah[ins] de Regno de Valent son venguts a ell e venen cada dia e fan gra[n] noves dell, e son fort alegres, e non volvendre lo bestiar tan car lo te. Per quens es semblant que con mes sie aturara que mes de mal hic pogues tractar. On nos prec que vos daço parlasset ab los prohombres de Valent e que ordonasset els templers que venguessen açi al pus tost que poguessets, que magor mercat aurien açi de tota res que no aqui. E ell no go[sa]ria fer ço que per aventura a encor de fer, que opinio es de tots quants son que ell al exir que sen menara tot ço que puxa, e daquest regne e de la terra Johan Manuel, a qui menaça fort. E els estans açi nou gosaria ferm que exceptats tro a L

refusal did not reflect greed but rather defiance. Ibn Raḥḥū had not sold the goods and seemed to have no intention to do so. Bertran reported that Ibn Raḥḥū's attitude had grown increasingly bad, particularly after receiving news of the king's truce.¹³¹ More startlingly, Bertran reported that three *jenets*, bearing letters from the king of Granada, had visited with Ibn Raḥḥū, which was a cause for great celebration (*fort alegrats*) among his soldiers. Thus, Bertran requested that Templar knights be sent to the kingdom for its protection. Seeing the *jenets*' lack of loyalty to the Crown, Bertran warned the king that Ibn Raḥḥū and his men were "the worst and the most evil men in the world (*la pigor gent e la pus avol del mon*)."

In a separate letter, Bernat de Libia, the bailiff of Valencia, also reported that the situation in the kingdom had grown worse and potentially dire.¹³² Every day, he wrote, Ibn Raḥḥū met with Valencian Muslims, who were pleased to see him. He had also heard rumors that after meeting the *jenet* captain, some of these Mudéjars sold their possessions

homens a cavall totz los altres son la pigor gent e la pus avol del mon e la pus arreada. E prec vos que daço siats curos. Scripte en Xativa, XV kalendas Aprilis." Also cited with full quotation in Gaspar Remiro, "El negocio de Ceuta," 233-4, upon which I relied for the transcription because of the deterioration of the original. Cf. ACA, CR, *Judíos y Musulmanes*, no. 522 (s.a.). See also, Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 80.

¹³¹ ACA, CR, *Judíos y Musulmanes*, no. 521 with full edition above: "Cada dia es de pigor enteniment e especialment depuys que a[c] la carta dels Seynor Rey de la treva."

¹³² ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 91, no. 11093 (24 March [1304]): "Al molt alt [e] molt poderos Seynor en Jacme per la gracia de deu Rey d'Arago e de Valent, e de Murcia, com[te] de Barchinona e de la Santa Esglea de [Roma] gamfanoner e almirall e ca[pitan] general. Bernat de Libia, humil servidor e sotsmes vostre besan vostres mans e vostres peus se comana en [la vostr]a gracia. Seynor, lestim[ent] del Regne no es en bona condic[i]o quant als Sarayns per ço con [depus] Nalabez vench ab la cavalcada a ... he la treva en continent fo cridada, Nalabez no espeega de vendre sa cavalcada. E tots los moros de la terra son se vist ab el e an molt parlat ab ell e parten se del venen lurs heretats e ço que vendre poden, e aperellensen danar poch a poch. Los morad[i]ns ço es aquells qui perhiquen sajusten molt mes que no solen. Per cert, Senyor, que enteniment es m[eu] e de les altres qui conexem los moros que els no estegren axi \sino/ de pus que salsaren latra vegada. Jo, Seynor, fuhi en Xativa e parle molt Abnalabez. Quant en ço que yo podia entendre en ell, molt se f[a] volenteros de servir vos, mas empero tots los jenets de mes li dixeran yo estan en Xativa, que ells no farien mal al Rey de Granada. Les castells, Seynor, quem menas regonerex del Regne ... en cascun malorament e especialment en lo castell de Oenaguilla e de Bayren axi con dob[re] e de guarda si per aventura los alcays dels castells no volen crexer en les guardes segons que jo los he manat de part vostra, que manats que si faça. En los fets, Seynor, la vostra dis[c]recio sab mils que [sia] a fer que yo nels altres nous purien trametre a dir. E vos Seynor manats hi ço que vos tingats per be. E seria mester que tost vengues lo manament. Escrita en Valent, diluns XX IX dies anats del mes de Març." This document was misfiled amongst the records of 1319. Cf. Gaspar Remiro, "El negocio de Ceuta," 237 who cites with full quotation a similar document. See also Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 80-1.

and made preparations to leave the kingdom. Had the *jenet* captain convinced them that it was their religious duty to emigrate? Bernat also warned that since Ibn Raḥḥū's arrival, Muslim preachers (*moradins*) in Valencia had become more outspoken. "For certain," he added, "to my understanding and that of others who know the Moors, they would not behave like this unless they were going to rise up like the other time [i.e. the revolt of al-Azraq]."¹³³ Bernat explained finally that he had spoken with Ibn Raḥḥū extensively and that the *jenet* captain swore that he was loyal but that many of his soldiers said that they now refused to attack Granada.

Thus, not only had the changing political climate affected Ibn Raḥḥū and his troops but also the presence of the *jenets* had had a profound influence on the Mudéjar population. Nevertheless, Jaume's response to the claims that the *jenets* were a threat was equivocal. On the one hand, he ordered the arrest of the Muslim preacher Alhaig (*al-Ḥājj*) for incitement.¹³⁴ And he commanded the Templars to enter Játiva for its protection.¹³⁵ On the other hand, he ignored Ibn Raḥḥū's conspiratorial behavior and passed over complaints that the *jenets* would not support the Crown against Granada. During an uncertain period, Jaume hoped to maintain the status quo.

The situation, however, could not hold. After several raids from Granada and pressure from the Templars, Jaume was forced to authorize reprisals.¹³⁶ It was in this context that in May of 1304, the Templar knight Berenguer de Cardona issued a report, now lying among the royal letters, on a five-day raiding mission that the Templars

¹³³ Ibid: "Per cert, Senyor, que enteniment es m[eu] e de les altres qui conexem los moros que els no estegren axi \sino/ de pus que salsaren latra vegada."

¹³⁴ ACA, R 235:28v-29r *segunda numeración* as cited in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 82 and 230-1, doc. 10.

¹³⁵ ACA, R 235:42v-43r *segunda numeración* as cited in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 82.

¹³⁶ A month earlier, in April, Jaume II wrote the Templars to desist from attacks on Granada. Apparently, his position quickly changed. ACA, R 235:57r *segunda numeración* (22 April 1304).

conducted into Granada. Berenguer's account not only offers a detailed look into raiding on the Christian-Islamic frontier but also self-consciously addresses the issue of the *jenets'* loyalty.¹³⁷ On Thursday, May 15, the knights left Lorca, on the Granadan border of the kingdom of Murcia, in the company of Ibn Raḥḥū as well as his cavalry, totaling in

¹³⁷ ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 137, *Templarios*, no. 101 (20 May 1304): “Al molt honrat e molt sani e discret en Bertran de Canelles, frare Berenguer de Cardona, de les cases de la cavaleria del Temple en Aragon e en Catalunya, humil mestre e visitador general en Espanya, salut e bona amor per tots temps, e aperallada voluntat a tota honor vostra. Fem vos saber que divendres XV dies anatz del mes de Maig, nos ab alcuna companya de Cavall de Regno de Murcia e ab Nalabez e an mille D peons los quals homens a caval erem entre totz CCC homens a caval, e partim de Lorca lot dit divendres e anam lo jorn e la nit, e quant fo tercia nos fam en I loch del Rey de Granada lo qual ha nom Sugena e aqui talam tota lorta e fem hi gran dan. E apres anauem nosen deues bera e quant haguem passat I coll Nabez qui tenia davanter e corria lalgar trames nos missatge que [la] cavaleria de Bera los quals eren CCCL homens a caval venien deues nos e axi quens apercebessem e quens aparella sem. En aço [...] aperlegam tuyt, e Nalabez aria algareyan an ells e ells [...]aren lo tro sus prop de Bera, e puix vanse mestlan ab Nalabez e matarenh tantost nos haguem misatge den Alabez que pensan se de caytar nos e de acorreli. En aço nos e tota la companya pensam de brocar e de correbe una legua e mes. En aço los debera tantost quens veeren giraren les costs e nos donam en ells e fem los recollir en Bera e matamlos XIII homens a cavall e XXX homens de peu, e fem brocada e nostre ganfano entre dins la raval de Bera, e frares nostres e companya entrarem, e forem tro ales portes de Bera. E si tinguessim los cavals armatz, hagerem barreyada tota la Raval de Bera. En aço avallam nosen a les cres e cremam tot lo blat que havien cullit. En apres talam gran res de lorta debera puix anam nosen a I altre loch prop debera que ha nom les Coves, a aqui talam tota lorta, e atendam nos aqui la nit. En apres lendema ço fo ditmenge dia de Sinquagesima partim de les Coves e anam nos lo Rivamunt de Porxena, talan e creman masses e molins e[...].derrocan. En pres anam nosen a I Castell lo qual ha nom Huercal e aqui nos ... companya puyam tro sus almur, e aqui apeam totz los frares e laltra companya nostra de caval e pensam de Cobatre lo Castell regeament e f... haviem mes foch a les portes del Castell e aportatz los homens del Castell a aço [que] no podien als fer sino que gitaven pedres orbes. En aço que nos combatiem lo dit Castell en Pere de Montagut procur[ador] del Regne de Murcia e Nalabez qui sesperaven davayll en Jacme Pla. Trameterem nos missatges quens deguessem jaquir de combatre e quens navallassem a ells, per ço car veyen venir gran companya domens a caval del Rey de Granada. E axi per aquesta rao jaquim nos de combatre lo Castell e avallam no sen, e guarnim nostres cavalles e replegan los peons e les aczembles en Jacme Toçalet e aqui vengeem nos los genetz de Granada esperonant denant. En Alabez ab CC homens a caval ixquells algareyam e torneat se ab ells e aqui donaren se los uns abs los altres de grans colps. E axi nos fem manament a alguns homens a cavals nostres los quals tenien cavals alforratz e alguns ballesters nostres que feesen una esdemesa deves los genetz e aqui brocarem et ferem los dan. En aço nos ab los cavals armatz pensam de brocar en vos la cavaleria de Granada e havuem feytes III mans e erem mille C homens a cavall ço era saber entre de Bera edeix e aqui ab la merce de nostre senyor metem los en arrancada e pensaren de fugie e axi ençalcam los et matam los C homens a cavall e los altres recolliren se en aquell Castell que nos haviem combatut. E axi sildit Castell nols fos tan prop hagerem pres molt major dan la merce de nostre Senyor nos ni les altres companyes qui ab nos eren noy prenguerem dan, exceptat que nos hi perdem I hom de peu, quel donarem an una treyta e Nalabez quey perde de IIII fins a VI homens a caval. E axi tornam nosen benit ajaure a Nogalt prop de Lorca III legues e len doma ço fa dilluns apres sinquagesma, entram nos en Lorca. E car nos som cextz que a vos plauria tota hara nostra honor e nostre cueximent(?) e los profit e la honor del Temple per aquesta raho vos scivim aquestes novelles, altres arditz a la sao dara nous podem fer saher mas si nulles coses a vos plahien que nos fer paguessem per vos. Fetz nos a saber fiançosament, car nos sum aperellat a tota honor vestra. [Verso] Data en Lorca, dimercres XX dies anatz de Maig.” Although the above is my own transcription, I later discovered a full quotation in Finke, *Acta Aragonensia*, III, 122-125. Cf. a letter addressed to Jaume II, edited but without proper citation in Giménez-Soler, “Caballeros,” 366-9. Gaspar Remiro, “El negocio de Ceuta,” 260 seems to conflate the two documents.

all 1500 foot soldiers and 300 horsemen. They traveled night and day until they arrived at Zurgena (*Sugena*), near Almería. Here, they “pillaged all the fields and did great damage (*e aqui talam tota lorta e fem hi gran dan*).” After Zurgena, the army turned towards Vera, also along the coast of Almería. Near the hill of “Nabez” they received a messenger, who informed them that 350 horsemen from the cavalry of Vera were approaching. Ibn Raḥḥū’s knights charged (*algareyan*) these troops, engaging them close to Vera, killing 13 horsemen and 30 foot soldiers and sending the rest into retreat within the city walls. The Templars and *jenets* consequently laid waste to the surrounding area, seizing all the horses and burning all the harvested wheat (*cremam tot lo blat que havien cullit*), and finally, forced their way through the city gates. They turned next to Les Coves, where again they laid waste to its fields and spent the night. On the following day, Sunday, they moved on to Rivamunt de Porxena, burning mills and fields again. Their raid, however, took a turn for the worse as the soldiers laid siege to the castle of Huercal. Having surrounded the castle and set fire beneath its gates such that the men of Huercal could do nothing to defend themselves save throw stones (*Haviem mes foch a les portes del Castell e aportatz los homens del Castell a aço [que] no podien als fer sino que gitaven pedres orbes*), the soldiers received a notice that the cavalry of the King of Granada was approaching. Deciding to abandon their siege, they gathered their horsemen, pack mules, and soldiers and turned to face the Granadan *jenets* (*los genetz*). Two hundred of Ibn Raḥḥū’s men immediately charged (*algareyan*) and exchanged heavy blows with the Granadan cavalry (*e aqui donaren se los uns abs los altres de grans colps*). For their part, the Templars dispatched several armed horsemen and ordered their crossbowmen to discharge a volley of bolts. “Through the mercy of Our Lord,” Berenguer added, they killed a hundred of the Granadan soldiers and pressed the rest into

retreat within the castle of Huerca. The Templars suffered the loss of one foot soldier, and Ibn Raḥḥū, of four to six men. The soldiers returned to Lorca the following day, Monday, and on Wednesday, Berenguer de Cardona addressed this report to Bertran de Canelles, the very same man who called Ibn Raḥḥū the worst man in the world, on account of the honor and profit gained by the Temple through this mission (*e los profit e la honor del Temple per aquesta raho vos scrivim aquestes novelles*).

Berenguer's report is striking not only for its substance but also its import. In the former respect, it provides unparalleled detail. Here, one witnesses the quintessential border raid, whose primary aim was plunder and chaos rather than conquest: the soldiers ransack and burn mills, fields, and towns; they operate in a small, light company with several scouts but nevertheless can engage in the siege of a castle. The military importance of the *jenets*, moreover, is manifest. Ibn Raḥḥū's men serve as a frontline, and consequently, suffer the only significant losses. By contrast, the heavily-armed Knights of the Temple lagged behind with only a few horsemen capable of keeping pace with the *jenets*. Perhaps more striking than this wealth of detail is the document's import. First, the Templars, whom one readily associates with crusading ideology, are riding alongside Muslim soldiers into Muslim territory, a fact that deepens the extent of Christian-Muslim military collaboration in this period. Second, among the hundreds of documents involving *jenets*, this is the only record of Catalan *jenets* fighting Granadan *jenets*.¹³⁸ Despite the fact that Ibn Raḥḥū's *jenets* had refused to attack Granada when speaking with Bernat de Libia, it now appears that they underwent some change of heart.

¹³⁸ This is not to say, of course, that it did not happen. ACA, CR, Jaime II, caixa 16, no. 2026 (27 January 1304), for instance, records a complaint from Granada about Catalan *jenets* raiding their territory. This does not mean, however, that on this occasion the Catalan *jenets* directly engaged their Granadan counterparts.

How, one must ask, did these soldiers understand their joint actions? In sharp contrast to the royal administrators above, Berenguer de Cardona, who penned this report, appeared confident of Ibn Raḥḥū's loyalty to the Crown against Granada: "My Lord [Jaume II], know that al-'Abbās acted well and faithfully in this raid, and we saw and know that he desires to serve loyally.... It should be certain to you, Lord, that he is essential to you in this kingdom [Murcia]." ¹³⁹ The Templars, it should be added, strongly advocated a full invasion of Granada. ¹⁴⁰ And to the degree that Ibn Raḥḥū's presence furthered that end, in Berenguer's eyes, the mission could convey "profit and honor." While perhaps only rhetorical in intent, Berenguer unflinchingly invoked "the mercy of Our Lord" in the victory over the Granadan cavalry. Did Ibn Raḥḥū and his troops share this attitude? Did they see their actions as a justified part of their rebellion against Granada? ¹⁴¹

Regardless of their intentions, the direct consequences of the May raid must have troubled the *jenets*. Almost immediately and in direct response, Granada launched a devastating sea attack, causing panic throughout Valencia. ¹⁴² As before, the threat of invasion had an immediate and negative effect on the Mudéjar population. In June, Jaume wrote to Bernat de Libia, the royal bailiff of Valencia – who earlier had feared a Mudéjar uprising. On this occasion, the king ordered his bailiff to protect the Muslim

¹³⁹ ACA, R 235:78v (20 May 1304): "A la vostra senyoria senyor fem asaber quen Alabez ses molt be e lealment menat en aquesta entrada e veem e conexem queus ha cor e voluntat de servir lealment Car sert sia a vos senyor que ell vos es obs en aquest regne." As edited without citation in Giménez-Soler, "Caballeros," 368. I was unable to locate the original in the location given.

¹⁴⁰ The Templars argued this position (Finke, *Acta Aragonensia*, I:146 as cited in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 82).

¹⁴¹ The juristic discourse surrounding the moral and legal obligations of those in rebellion against political authority, *aḥkām al-bughāh*, was extensive and fairly normative. See, for instance, the position of al-Wansharīsī, as given in Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence*, 236, citing *Mi'yār*, V:34-5. See also *EF*², s.v. "Mārid." Nevertheless, the same al-Wansharīsī considered any rebellion that seeks the support of non-Muslims as illegitimate. *Mi'yār*, II:129-130 as cited in Abou El Fadl, "Muslim Minorities," 169.

¹⁴² Gaspar Remiro, "El negocio de Ceuta," 278-9; Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 83.

population from local attacks and to assure the Mudéjars that they would not be punished for their conspiracies with Ibn Raḥḥū, which is to say, Jaume hoped not only to prevent a general revolt but also to drive a wedge between the Mudéjars and the *jenets*.¹⁴³

Meanwhile, Catalan reinforcements continued to arrive at the Valencian frontier in preparation to meet another massive Granadan assault.¹⁴⁴ Ibn Raḥḥū's interconfessional raid, in other words, became an excuse for violence between Muslims and Christians on every level.

In July, the procurator of Murcia, Pere de Montegut, who gathered Ibn Raḥḥū's hostages earlier, wrote to Jaume II.¹⁴⁵ He informed the king that the Marīnid ruler, Abū

¹⁴³ ACA, R 235:80v-81r *segunda numeración* (1 June 1304): "E aquestes letres los trametem per ço com aviem entes que per raho daquels parlamens que avien hauts ab Alabez avien dupte que hom nols agreujas..." Cited with quotation in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 231-2, doc. 11.

¹⁴⁴ I have glossed over some of the complexity of this moment. Muḥammad III agreed in July to join the truce between Castile and the Crown of Aragon. Nevertheless, his agreement only provided a brief reprise before attacks began again. For more detail, see Gaspar Remiro, "El negocio de Ceuta," 281-2; Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 83-85.

¹⁴⁵ ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 16, no. 2043-2044 (12 July 1304): "Al muyt alto et poderoso senyor don Jayme por la gracia de dios Rey D'Aragon, de Valencia, de Murcia, et compte de Barchinona et de la Santa Romana Iglesia senyaler et almirante et capitanno general. Yo Pere de M[on]tagudo, humil procurador vestro en el dicho Regno de Murcia, beso los vestros piesdes et las vestras manas et me encomiendo en la vestra gracia, como a senyor de qui atiengo mucho bien et mucha merçe. Sepa senyor la vestra Real mayestat que recebi las vestras letras et aquella letra que enviavades al Rey de Granada sobre el confirmamiento de la tregua entro a santa mar de agosto et senyor entendi quanto me enviavades a dezir et a mandar [...] las dichas vestras letras. E yo senyor vistas aquellas envie[...] la dicha vestra carta al Rey de Granada, et quand que aya repuesta della, faç vos lo ho luego a saber. E ahun senyor vos fago saber, que el Rey Abenjacob que envie sus mandaderos et sus cartas al noble d'en Alaabbez Abenrraho et a los otros cavalleros qui eran aqui con ell, en que les enviaria a mandar ques fuessen luego por a ell et por a su serviçio et otrasi el dicho Rey Abenjacob envio a mi una carta en la qual me requeria que yo deviesse reçeibir los castiellos que Alabbez tenia vestros et quel deviesse tornar sus rahenes por que ell enviaria por Alabbez et por estos cavalleros, que los avia mester al su serviçio et que se fuessen a recoger a aljaçira que el les enviaria alli sus vaxiellos por que nos non de huviessemos afan. E senyor Alaabbez vista la carta de Abenjacob et sus mandaderas, vino a mi, et dixo me como Abenjacob que enviaria por ell et por sus sobrinos et por su compaña, et demando me de conseio a mi et a otros cavalleros que eramos en semble, que le consellasemos como faria, et nos consellamos le que se fuesse por a vos et a es pedir se de vos asin como la postura era, et dixo ell que lo faria asin que ell se lo avia a coraçon. Otro dia torno a nos, et dixo nos que ell por ren del mundo no poria ir a vos, que los sobrinos et sus fijos et la otra cavalleria se le querian hir se carrera et que por ren del mundo no lo atendrian. E axi dixo me que se es pedria de mi en lugar de [vos] senyor et que me rendria los castiellos et yo quel dase su[s] rahenas. E yo senyor huvi mi acuerdo con cavalleros et con el bayle et con otros homnes buenos de Murcia, et dieron me de conseio que yo deviesse reçeibir del dicho don Alaabbez su espedimiento, et cobrar los castiellos, et dar le sus rahenas, por que ell non poria aturar asin como asin, que non se fuesse su carrera. E senyor yo viendo que si sende auria a f[aç] lo que Alaabbez quisiesse por tal que el noy pudiesse atayeger, por que ell era tan poderoso de

Ya'qūb (685-706/1286-1307) had sent messengers to Ibn Raḥḥū, ordering him and his soldiers to return to Fez (*Fās*) immediately, a fact that recalls that despite their being bandits from North Africa, the *jenets* maintained a connection to it.¹⁴⁶ The Marīnid sultan asked Montegut to retake possession of Ibn Raḥḥū's castles in Murcia and return his hostages, while Ibn Raḥḥū would take his soldiers to the port of Algeciras (Ar. *al-Jazīra*, Rom. *Aljaçira*) where ships would wait. Upon receiving these instructions, Ibn Raḥḥū immediately came with his troops "*en semble*" to seek Montegut's advice. Montegut counseled the soldiers to go to the king before taking a decision, advice consistent with the *jenets*' contract. Ibn Raḥḥū replied that "he would do it, despite knowing what was in his [own] heart (*nos consellamos le que se fuesse por a vos et a es pedir se de vos asin como la postura era, et dixo ell que lo faria asin que ell se lo avia a coraçon*)."

Montegut continued, however, "The next day he returned and said to us that nothing in the world would make him go to you, that his nephews and sons and other soldiers wanted to leave and nothing would make them wait (*Otro dia torno a nos, et dixo nos que ell por ren del mundo no poria ir a vos, que los sobrinos et sus fijos et la otra cavalleria se le querian hir se carrera et que por ren del mundo no lo atendrian*)."

It appeared, in other words, that Ibn Raḥḥū's soldiers now questioned the legitimacy of their service to the Crown of Aragon. Thus, Montegut consented to discharge Ibn Raḥḥū

cavalleria. Reçebi los castiellos et die le sus rahenas et espidio se de mi en vestro lugar senyor, et comienda se en la vestra gracia et que todos tiempos sera al vestro serviçio et al nostro mandamiento, et es se ydo su carrera con toda su cavalleria. E senyor va muyt pagado de vos et de quantos somos en el Regno de Murcia. Senyor todo ell estamiento del Regno esta muyt bien gracia a dios. Senyor la tregua que avedes con el Rey de Granada salrra ayna, et si vos mas tregua adelante avedes a aver con ell, antes que esta passe senyor façet me lo a saber, por que seyamos apercibidos en el Regno, que ellos todavia se adelantan algunas neçes affaçer d'anyo, ante que la tregua salga. E comiendo me en la vestra gracia. Scripte en Murcia, dia Domingo, XII dias de Julio, anno domini millesimo CCC quarto." Cf. ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 17, no. 2266-2266v and Giménez-Soler, 366-8, who presents a similar document.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 8, no. 2265 (24 March 1304) and ACA, *Cartas Árabes*, no. 58 (15 Sha'bān 703/24 March 1304).

on the king's behalf, take possession of his lands, and return his hostages. And just seven months after entering the king's service, Ibn Raḥḥū departed for North Africa.

A month later, the Crown of Aragon and Castile signed the peace at Agreda, by which they agreed to divide Murcia between them. And what followed leaves little doubt as to the motivation behind Ibn Raḥḥū's sudden departure. In September of 1304, Granadan *jenets* under the command of none other than Ibn Raḥḥū attacked Murcia and Valencia.¹⁴⁷ On this occasion, the arrival of the *jenets* had precisely the result that Bernat de Libia had feared the most: the Mudéjars, who perhaps already knew of Ibn Raḥḥū's plans, rose up in large numbers to join him.¹⁴⁸ But despite this auspicious start, the invasion fumbled and failed.¹⁴⁹ In some regions, entire Mudéjar villages were forced to retreat alongside the *jenets*, abandoning their possessions.¹⁵⁰ All the same, through an act of transgression, the worst man in the world, a seemingly faithless mercenary, had become the new al-Azraq, a champion of Islam.

¹⁴⁷ ACA, R 307:107r (1 September 1304) as cited with full quotation in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 85 and 232-3, doc. 12.

¹⁴⁸ Mudéjar participation was noted in attacks in Cocentaina and Alcoi. See ACA, R 235:142r *segunda numeración* (27 September 1304) as cited with full quotation in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 234-5, doc. 14. Following the rebellion, some Mudéjars, young and old, women and men, who fought alongside the *jenets* were imprisoned. See, ACA, CR Jaume II, caixa 19, no. 2423 (27 February 1304): "... poderos Senyor en Jacme per la gracia de deu Rey d'Aragó et cetera. Jo Gombau d'Entença, <procurador> ... de Valencia me coman Senyor en la vestra gracia besan vostres peus et vostres mans, com de Senyor de ... Senyor la vostra magestat que huy que es ditmenge III kalendas Marcii per a manament per vos ... et de prendre d'aquells moros los quals sen eren anats ab los jenets et eren tornats ... sens vol[....] vostra [et] en los dit dia presne CCCCL persones enre pochets et grans et masculs et fembres et axi s[...] ... es mon enteniment que enserch et prenga tots aquells que daqui avant atrobar pore que daquela raho sien. E en ... mateix pris alcuna partida de bestiar que es fort pocha. E axi Senyor ens en volgut certificar de les dites ... quants als altres moros qui no sen eren anats de la vostra terra, tenense per assegurats et esta la terra en bon <estar [...] la merça de deu. E axi senyor es enteniment meu que axi mateix faça daquells Sarrahins qui son de Sexona en la ... enteniment meu quey faça ney enant en res entro que naia manament vostre siu voletz que axiu faça ... Xativa, VI kalendas Marcii, anno domini MCCCXV."

¹⁴⁹ Sea support failed to arrive in time, see ACA, CR, Jaume II, caixa 18, no. 2282 (10 September 1304) as cited with full quotation in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 86 and 233-4, doc. 13.

¹⁵⁰ Almost the entire village of Gandia was abandoned ACA, R 307:120r as cited in Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 88 alongside numerous other documents. Some of these Mudéjars later chose to return to Valencia and faced prosecution by the Crown (ACA, R 203:94r-v [29 December 1305]).

7. CONCLUSION

This study attempted to follow the journey of the *jenets* into and ultimately out of the service of the Crown of Aragon. It began by mapping the arrival of these North African cavalry soldiers in al-Andalus as bandit and exiles who had come for the purpose of holy war, *jihād*. The Crown of Aragon's efforts to recruit these soldiers – to convert enemies into agents – revealed a conservative dynamic. The Catalan kings used motley bands of Muslims, Christians, and Jews as well as informal and formal channels to reach the *jenets* throughout the Western Mediterranean. Nevertheless, these multiconfessional alliances did not signal the collapse of political and religious boundaries – the emergence of a free market of arms and men – but rather reflected and reinforced those boundaries. The paradox of the *jenets* was therefore that their inclusion in the service of the Crown of Aragon was predicated on their exclusion from its community and law. Their act of boundary-crossing was simultaneously an act of boundary-making. And in this paradoxical status, this mercenary logic, the dissertation argued that one could see the operation of the sovereign exception, the ability to suspend the law in order to constitute it. The sovereign exception, however, was only one part of the story of the *jenets*. In their interactions with the Crown's Christian and Muslim communities, the transgressions of the *jenets* met with competing ideas of law and legitimacy, each with the potential for new acts of exclusion and inclusion, resistance and collaboration.

Although this study highlighted the variety of overlapping private, political, economic, and religious motivations that shaped the *jenets*' many encounters throughout the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, in each of these encounters, the *jenets* were marked or chose to mark themselves as outsiders and more particularly, as Muslims.

Even their relationship with the Crown's Mudéjars, which held out the promise of belonging, was grounded in their shared desire for exclusion from the law and community of the Crown. Thus, if this study offers a slightly more optimistic vision than Agamben's of the construction of political authority, it remains a bleak view of a multiconfessional society based on the logic of exception. During the state of emergency that defined the long thirteenth century, the inclusion of the Muslim *jenets* within the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon was always predicated on their ultimate exclusion.

EPILOGUE

The story of the *jenets* was not over. In 1314, the deposed sultan of Granada, Abū'l-Juyūsh Naṣr (708-713/1309-1314), fled to Gaudix (*Wādī Āsh*) with a contingent of loyal *Ghuzāh*.¹ As Arabic chronicles report, from exile Naṣr sought the support the Castilians, who agreed to send troops.² The Iberian peninsula was still a world of complex and dizzying alliances. And indeed, the state of exception was still the rule. Nevertheless, despite some small successes, the Castilians could not maintain their support and abandoned Naṣr's cause. Although Arabic sources pass over the fact, a series of letters present in the Chancery Registers of the Crown of Aragon show that Naṣr also sought the assistance of the Catalan king. In fact, on the sultan's behalf, one of the captains of the *Ghuzāh*, al-'Abbās b. Raḥḥū, wrote directly to Jaume II, his onetime ally, offering to unite his forces with the Crown's once again. For his part, Jaume welcomed the new alliance and promoted the adventure as a new crusade for the sake of the Papacy.³ Thus, the curious history of the *jenets* continued.

¹ Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Lamḥa*, 80. For a discussion of the events below, see Giménez-Soler, "La Corona de Aragón y Granada," *Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona*, 27 (1907): 51-61; Harvey, *Islamic Spain*, 180-1; Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane*, 93-4; Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 109-12.

² Ibn Khaldūn, VII:768-9. See also *La gran crónica de Alfonso XI*, ed. Diego Catalán (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1977), 297, which confirms this fact.

³ ACA, R 243:264v (5 April 1317): "Don Jayme et cetera. Al amado Alabeç Abenrraho, salut e amor. Fazemos vos saber que recibimos vuestra carta que nos enviastes con Mahomad fiço de Façan e entendimos asi lo que se contenia en la dicha vuestra carta como lo que nos dixo de vuestra part el dicho Mahomat. A la qual vos respondemos que ciertos eramos nos e ciertos somos de la buena voluntat que vos havedes al nuestro servicio. E por esto havemos nos voluntat buena a vos de fazer vos toda honrra e toda bien como a aquell que los merescedes. E creet al dicho Mahomat [del] que vos dira de nuestra part sobre aquello que nos enviastes dezir. Dada en Ba[r]celona V dias andados del mes de Abril en el anyo de nuestro senyor de M CC XVII." My transcription differs on minor points from the one offered in Masia i de Ros, *Jaume II*, 230. Cf. ACA, R 243:248r (8 March 1317) and ACA, R 243:249v-250r (11 and 14 March 1317). See also Ferrer i Mallol, *La frontera*, 112.

APPENDIX A

The Almohad Princes in the Crown of Aragon (1285-1288)

ACA, R 58, fol. 49r (3 September 1285)

Dominico de la Fugera, baiulo Calatayube, volumus et placet nobis quod expensas idoneas quas dederitis uxoribus et filiis filiorum de Maramuni qui in servicio nostro existent, ponatis nobis, a computo datarum cum contingerit vos reddere computum nobis, vel aliqua loco nostri. Mandamus etiam vobis, quatenus, predictis uxoribus et filiis filiorum de Maramuni, detis expensas idoneas per tempore futuro dum ipsas uxores et filios in Calatayube, remanere conting[ant]. Datum Barchinone, III nonas Septembris [1285].

ACA, R 65, fol. 186v (2 March 1286)

Arnaldo de Bastida. Cum filiis Miramamunini debeantur pro quitacionibus eorum sex mille quadringenti triginta quinque solidos [Ba]rch[inonenses] de tribus albaranis Bartholomei [de Villa] Francha quos nos recuperavimus quorum unum est trium milium sexentorum nonaginta solidos et aliud est mille octingentorum nonaginta [s]olidorum et aliud \est/ [quad]ringentorum quinquaginta quinque solidos. Mand[amus] et dicimus [vobis], quatenus, satisfaciatis eisdem in dicta peccunie quantitate per termi[nos] comprehensos et cetera. Datum Barchinone VI [n]onas Marcii, anno domini M[CC]LXXX quinto.

ACA, R 70, fol. 168r (13 August 1287)

Fuit facta litera guidaticum alcayt Abrafim et Abrafimo Muça, Atiça Patrello, Atiça et Muça, et Caçim, Çayt, Abenbey Mahomet et Alaçemi, Hamu, [H]uniç, A[l]ii Acrrayedi, Jacob, Maçet Mahomat Almotihal et Çahat Algorçili, jenetis [...] Barchinone et debebant se re[co]lligere cum aliquibus filiis Miramamonini. Datum ut supra.

ACA, R 71, fol. 51v (12 May 1287)

Petro Peregrini. Cum nos mandaverimus per literam nostram quam recuperavimus Arnaldo de Bastida quod solveret Abdelhuahit, janeto, filio Miramoni, quadrigentos quinquaginta solidos Barchinonenses qui sibi restabant ad solvendi de sexcentis solidos quos sibi debeamus pro precio unius mule et dictus Arnaldus ... ei solverit quantitatem predicta, ut dicitur. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, solvatis ipsi janeto, quantitate ipsa, solutis assignacio et cetera et facta et cetera. Datum ut supra.

Petro Peregrini. Cum Mahometo, filio Miramoni, pro se et tribus fratribus suis debeantur quod quitacione menses Ianuarii cum albarano Iacobi Fivellerii quadrigenti nonaginta sex solidos Barchinonenses. Item cum alio albarano quadrigenti quadraginta [o]cto solidos dicte monete pro quitacione et dictorum trium fratrum mensis Februarii. Item cum alio albarano quod [...] et dictis fratribus quadrigenti nonaginta sex solidos Barchinonenses pro quitacione mensis Decembris. Item debean[tur] eisdem pro se et dictis fratribus pro quitacione mensis Marcii, quadrigenti nonaginta sex solidos dicte

monete cum alio albarano dicti Iacobi Fi[v]elleri quod simile cum aliis tribus predictis recuperavimus. Mandamus vobis, quatenus, solveritis dicto [M]ahometo quantitates predictas solvas assignacio[nis] et cetera et facta et cetera. Datum Morelle quarto idus Maii .

ACA, R 71, fol. 52r (12 May 1287)

... solverit filiis Miramon[i] [...] illorum ... eisdem [...]are mandavimus [...] quibus [...] per ... Muçe de Portella ... sunt quinque et satisfacto de predictis vesitibus [...] recuperavit [...] liter et pre[...] ... Iacobi Fivellerii cum apocham. Datum ut supra.

Maymon de Plana, baiulo Valencie, quod conducat aliquam domom idoneam in Valencie uxoris, filiorum Miramoni in qua est posint esse salve et [se]cure. Datum ut supra.

ACA, R 72, fol. 33r (10 April 1288)

Eidem altera simile quod <solvat> filiis Miramamonini <quitiis> eis remanet ad solvendum D mille CCCCLXXII solidos Barchinonenses qui <sibi> debebantur pro quitacione in tribus [albara]nis [Iacobi] [F]iv[e]llarii de quibus fuerunt eis <s>oluti <CCCC solidos> pro ci[....]<mentum> per Muçam. Datum Barchinone <IIII> idus Aprilis.

Eidem altera quod cum dominus Rex mandaverit Petro de Libiano quod daret IIII filiis de Miramamonino et uxoris trium eorum et Issacho Sanagi de familia eorum, pannum quem sibi constaret Muça de Portella eis debere dare cum albaranis Iacobi Fivellarii. Det eis ipsum pannum quod quem constituerit ipsum Muçam debere dare eisdem. Datum ut supra.

ACA, R 72, fol. 35r (10 April 1288)

Arnaldo de Bastida. Sciatis quod nos mandavimus per literam nostram Petro de Libiano quod solveret Abdelhuahit, jeneto, filio Miramamonini, sexcentos solidos Regalium quos sibi debebamus pro precio unius mule. De quibus solvit ei fidelis scriptor noster Raimundus Esco[rne] centum quinquaginta solidos et postea scripsimus dicto Petro de Libiano quod residuos quadringentos quinquaginta solidos solveret jeneto predicto que duo albarana missa predicto Petro Libiano super soluzione dictorum denariorum nos recuperavimus. Quare mandamus vobis, quatenus, predictos quadringentos quinquaginta solidos solvatis jeneto predicto vel cui voluerit loco sui. Et facta sibi solutione et cetera. Datum Barchinone, IIII idus Aprilis. Fuit recuperata et facta.

APPENDIX B

Instructions from Alphonse III to his ambassadors Pere de Deo and Abraham Abengalel on their mission to the Marīnid Sultan Abū Y‘aqūb Yūsuf (1286-1307):

ACA, R 64, fols. 191r-191v (March 1286)

Aquestes son les parraules quells missatges deven dir a Abenjacob en Pere de Deu et Nabrafim Galell.

Primerament con lo Senyor Rey don Alfonso a entes per lo Senyor Rey en Pere pare seu la Gran amor et la bona voluntat que el avia a el et al Rey en Jacme avi d’aquest Rey don Alfonso.

Encara entes per los Senyor Rey son pare la valença que el li porferi en la guerra dels Franceses de son cors ab son poder o de companya sua de cavalers.

Item que entes per Abraham Abengelel et per los missatge Sarray que li porferia valença del de II mile janets ab sa messio.

Les quales coses lo Senyor Rey don Alfonso li graex molt con el vula esser son amic et sia tengut damor totz aquels qui eren amics de son pare et especialment a el per ço cor nomenadament nat matiament de son pare.

E sobre aço digen ço quel Senyor Rey en Pere ne dix al Senyor Rey don Alfonso largament segons que lur semblara.

En lo Senyor Rey volun seguir la volentat et lo bon consul de son pare, vol aver amor ab el et requer et prega que Abenjacob fassa comte dell, et de ses gens per mar et per terra atressi que el pusen fer aquest comte metex d’Abenjacob et del seu.

Si Abenjacob diu que aço li plau.

Aquestes son les coses que deuen tractar ab el.

Primerament que aia pau et amor entre els a V anys. Enaxi que les gens de cascu pusquen anar ab lurs coses salus et segurs per la senyoria del altre.

Item que Abenjacob li vayla contra tots los Christians del mon. El Senyor Rel a el contra tots los Sarrayns del mon.

E con vendra al especificar de la valença que demanen valença de D cavalers janets a aquest estiu a messio et a despesa d’Abenjacob. E sil Senyor Rey navia mes obs que el los li trameta, el Senyor Rey fees lurs obs a aquels mes que mester auria.

Item quel Senyor Rey li enviara en sa valença V galees armades ab sa messio. E si mester na mes de X tro en XV galees que les li prestara, et que les pusen fer armar ab

la sua mesio de les gens del Senyor Rey. E si altre navili a mester dela terra del Sen[y]or Rey, quel puse[n] aver et armar a messio d'Abenjacob.

[fol.191v]

E aquestes valençes promet[en] de fer Abenjacob al Senyor Rey, el Senyor Rey a Abenjacob dins III meses que laun ne sera demanat del altre.

Item que Abenjacob ni nuyl hom dels seus no fassen neguna ajuda contral Senyor Rey et nuyl hom Sarray ni altre. Nel Senyor Rey nels seus contra Abenjacob a nuyl hom Christia ne altre.

Item que nuyl hom d'Abenjacob no gos portar mercaderia en terra de Christians enemics del Senyor Rey, ne les gens del Senyor Rey en terra de Sarrayns enemics d'Abenjacob.

Item que nuyl hom no pusca trer vianda ni armes de la terra d'Abenjacob tro que assegur que no portara aqueles en terra de Christians enemics del Senyor Rey, ni dela terra Senyor Rey tro que assegur que no portara aqueles en terra de Sarrayns enemics d'Abenjacob.

Item que totes les gens del Senyor Rey ab tots lurs avers sien ajudades per les gens d'Abenjacob et mantengudes en tots locs on los troben. Levats aquels qui treutassen res de les paus. E les gens d'Abenjacob ajudades per les gens del Senyor Rey en aquesta metexa forma.

Del fet del Rey de Granada digen que per ço cor n'Abrafim Abengelel et lo missatge Sarray dixer[.] al Senyor Rey per la creença quels comana Abenjacob que con lo Rey de Granada, sia Abenjacob, et que el ne pot fer guerra et pau, quel pregaven de part d'Abenjacob, que el volges quel Rey de Granada fos en aquesta pau, lo Senyor Rey atorgals o per amor Abenjacob. E atressi del Senyor de Cepta.

Encara si lur parle del fet del Rey de Castela que digen que li plau que Abenjacob se pusen entrametre d'aquest fet et de tots altres seus qui son ben sim, axicon aquel en qui a maior esperança que en nuyl //hom// amic que el [a]ia et qui mils o sabra et pora fer. E sobre aço los missatges posen lo Senyor Rey en rao. El rey de Castela en culpa de ço que saben que lies culpable.

Del fet de Margam, quen raonem ço que els entenen pus Margam es reemut.

Item que enamic del Senyor Rey, Crestia no sia sofert en la terra d'Abenjacob, ne enamic Sarray d'Abenjacob en terra del Senyor Rey.

Item que per rao dela valença quel Rey d'Arago faria o fer faria per lo Rey de Sicilia a Abenjacob en la conquesta de Tuniç, no peresquen enans sien salus a els los tributx, els altres dretx que <au o aver deven> en Tuniz per qualque manera.

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