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BRUXELLES
FONDATION BYZANTINE ET NÉO-GRECQUE
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The battle of Manzikert decided the fate of Asia Minor and conditioned the subsequent history of the Byzantine Empire. But while this is obvious to the modern historians of Byzantium, to those who were in charge of the empire at the time, the debacle of 1071 and the Turkish occupation of Asia Minor which followed appeared by no means decisive. The Byzantine armies had been beaten before; Persians and Arabs had advanced as far as the Aegean and the Propontis; both were driven back, however, and Byzantine power was re-established in Asia Minor. What was done twice might be done again. The Turks could be checked and Asia Minor recovered once more.

That Michael VII and his advisors hoped to turn back the Turks and re-establish the Byzantine position in Asia Minor is clearly stated by Cedrenus (1). They were aware, indeed, that the task would be difficult, but they believed it could be done with the aid of allies. And to find this aid they applied to the West.

They first turned to Robert Guiscard. In the same year that the Byzantine armies suffered the disaster at Manzikert, Guiscard completed the conquest of the Byzantine possessions in southern Italy by the capture of Bari. The capture of Bari made Guiscard the unquestioned master of southern Italy, but perhaps already before this event the Byzantines had reconciled themselves to the loss of their Italian possessions. It is not known exactly when Romanus Diogenes proposed the marriage of one of his

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(1) Cedrenus, Historiarum Compendium, II (Bonn, 1839), 724.

Byzantium XIX. — 2.
sons to one of Guiscard’s daughters, but the proposal was made, no doubt, in view of the danger which threatened the empire in Asia Minor; in any case, the fact that it was made indicates that the Byzantine emperor was ready to extend to Guiscard some kind of recognition (1). The proposal was rejected by the Norman leader.

Diogenes’ policy was revived by his successor, Michael VII. It is known that Michael definitely abandoned his claims to the former possessions of the empire in southern Italy. He was in no position to reconquer those territories, but this was not the only reason why he abandoned his claims to them; what he wanted was the friendship of the Norman leader, and this for two reasons: To safeguard his empire from any further attacks from Guiscard, and to enlist the Normans in an effort to drive the Seljuks out of Asia Minor. It was for these two reasons that Michael VII revived his predecessor’s proposal for a marital alliance with Guiscard. This we are told by Cedrenus (2) but the two letters by which Michael VII asked the alliance of Guiscard and the chrysobull to Guiscard by which he confirmed the conditions of the alliance which he succeeded in concluding with him have survived. The first letter was most probably written late in 1071 or early in 1072; the second letter was written either in 1072 or 1073; and the chrysobull bears the date, August, 1074 (2).

(1) C. SATIVAS, Bibliotheca Graecæ Medii Aevi, V (Paris, 1876), 387.
(2) CEDRENUS, op. cit., II, 724. ‘Ο δὲ Μιχαήλ ὁ μέτωπον ὑπὲρ παραπομποῦ τῆς διαφοροῦσας ἕκτης χόρας, οὐ μὴν γένοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἣς ἐν τοῖς Τούρκοις τῆς ἀντίθετης ἐξελούσας δύον ἐνίκησεν ἀπεισοδιαί αὐτοῖς καὶ δὲ ἀνιχνίσας καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἀποσπασάμενα αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλέγον κατὰ τὴν Ἱππιανήν ἐξελούσας, ἐδω καὶ κήθη πόλει τῆς Παραλύσεως ηὔτως, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ βουτάταν Ἑλληνικὴν κατεχομένη τὸ Ἰωακείμ τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου.

The subject of the two letters is a proposal for the marriage of the emperor’s brother, Constantine, to one of Guiscard’s daughters in return for Guiscard’s friendship and alliance. Of the two letters; the first is rather general. It puts the emphasis on the common religion of the two rulers; praises the greatness and intelligence of Guiscard, recognizes by implication Guiscard’s conquest of southern Italy, and declares that the two rulers should in the future identify their interests. The second letter is more specific. In return for the marriage of one of his daughters to the emperor’s brother, Guiscard was to become the rampart of the Byzantine frontiers, spare the princes who were vassals of the empire, furnish aid to Byzantium in all things and fight with the Byzantines against all the enemies of the empire (2). Guiscard rejected both proposals (2).

In 1074 the Byzantine court tried again. This time the emperor proposed, as the basis of the alliance which he sought, the marriage of his own son with one of Guiscard’s daughters. Guiscard accepted this proposal and in August, 1074, Michael VII issued a chrysobull which he addressed to the Norman leader and by which he confirmed the conditions of the alliance the two leaders had reached. The agreement provided for the marriage of the emperor’s son, Constantine, to Guiscard’s daughter who subsequently took the name of Helen; it gave to the young couple the imperial titles; granted to Guiscard the title of nobilissime; allowed him to name one of his sons europates; and put at his disposal eight other titles of varying rank which he was free to grant to anyone among

(1) SATIVAS, Annaire..., 211. Δει οὖν συν εν τῇ ζευγείᾳ τού Χειμάρρου ἥψιστος, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον γαμεῖται καὶ ἀγαθότατος ἐπὶ τὸ πρόγνωμα καὶ τῇ ὀρθολογίᾳ συνεπεμερεῖσθαι ἔχων ἀληθεία, καὶ φημίων εἶναι σαν τῶν ἁμαρτίων δόμων, φιλοσοφεῖν τῇ τῇ μακροπροθέτῃ ἀρχῇ, συμμετέχει τῷ καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ σου τῷ καὶ τῷ μεν αὐτοῦεστὶν ἄρας προφανομένον ἐστιν, τοῖς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἰχνον ανεχέσθαι καὶ μισθόν.
(2) AISN, Ysidoire de Normannie, edited by O. DELACROIX (Rouen, 1892), 297 f. Lo imperatore, per lo consiglio de ceaus de sa cité, a ce qu’il non fust châci de l’onor del empire, requist la fille del due pour mouilier a son fille; et dui foie lo due lo contredist. Cf. Chalandon, op. cit. I, 260.
his followers. Some of these titles carried with them an annual payment. Guiscard, in return, agreed not to violate the territories of the empire, but to defend them against its enemies. The agreement was, as far as the Byzantine empire was concerned, a defensive and offensive alliance (7). The Turks are nowhere mentioned, but we are told by Cedrenus in the passage already cited, that Michael’s motive was the hope that with the help of the Normans he might be able to drive the Turks out of Asia Minor (7).

In their search for aid against the Seljuks, the Byzantine authorities did not restrict themselves to the negotiations with Guiscard. They also tried to win the papacy. But in view of the bad relations which then existed between Guiscard and the papacy, the Byzantines could hardly have hoped to win the friendship of both at the same time. What seems to have happened was that having been rebuffed at first by Guiscard, they turned to the papacy, and when they finally reached an agreement with the Norman leader, they abandoned their negotiations with the pope. The chronology of the negotiations is, in this connexion, of some significance. The Byzantines made their first proposal to Guiscard late in 1071 or early in 1072, and following its rejection they tried again, late in 1072 or early in 1073. It was only after they had been rejected for the second time that they turned to the papacy, for Michael VII must have made his appeal to the pope, Gregory VII, in the spring of 1073, since the reply which he received is dated July 9, 1073 (8). The Byzantine authorities were doubtless made uneasy by Guiscard’s rejection of their second offer, and turned to the pope, who was then at odds with the Norman leader, in the hope that with his aid they might immobilize the Normans and at the same time get the assistance which they needed against the Turks. This point of view is supported to some extent by the letters which Gregory VII addressed to various rulers of Europe in the course of 1074 (9).

The original letters by which Michael VII opened negotiations with the papacy have not survived. What is known about them is derived wholly from the papal reply in which the pope makes the following references: Two monks, Thomas and Nicholas, delivered to the pope letters from the emperor in which he expressed sentiments of warm-hearted benevolence and profound devotion for the Roman Church. To these letters the imperial envoys added an oral message which, they said, came from the emperor and urged the pope to have the greatest confidence in them. The contents of the message dealt with matters of the utmost importance, but no details about them are given by the pope.

The contents of these messages, however, can be determined, at least in general terms, by a careful examination of Gregory’s reply and a number of statements which he made elsewhere. In his reply to the emperor Gregory declared that he had at heart the re-establishment of the ancient concord which had previously existed between the Roman Church and its daughter, the Church of Constantinople. This statement points to the problem of the churches as the important matter with which the imperial messages dealt. This inference is confirmed beyond doubt by the letters which Gregory VII addressed to Henry IV on December 7, 1074, for Gregory here states that the Greeks desired the union of the churches. The letter to Henry IV is important for another reason, for we are here told that Gregory was trying to orga-

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(1) P. Βεσσαριάνδος, Χριστιανική της Μιχαήλ VII Δική, in Ιστορία της Δημόσιας Εκκλησίας, VI (1888), 144. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀκροκόσμῳ ἦν καὶ συνεστίγοντας τῆς πράους ἐνεπαράγει τι καὶ εὐχὴν τῷ μαίνον τῶν θριάτευτων μὴ κατατέρχεται, ἀλλ’ καὶ τῶν κατατερχόμενον τούτω κατατέρχεται καὶ σώμα τῆς εὐπρεπείας ἦμοι ἀποφεύγοντες καὶ συμπαθοῦντες, τά μὲν προεκλαβόμενα παρ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ ὀκνηθέν ξένοις τής ἐπισκοπῶν ἐναντίον καὶ τῆς εὐεργείας προσφέρων καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης καὶ βασιλείας ἀρχηγετῆς, τούτως πραγματεύεται τὸ τῶν μὲν ἀπερχομένων ἢ γίγνεται δύναμις ἐξαρτημένη καὶ τῆς σῆς ἀποδοξίας φύλας καὶ αντίληψις, ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ εὐεργείας ἔχοντων ἰσοτάτης καὶ τάς ἰδιότητος εὐεργείας καὶ συναφείτως, καὶ τοστὶς ἡ ἀρματικὴ ὑπό πρέπουσα ἐναντίον καὶ προπηρομένῳ λόγῳ, τοῦτος ὁμοιότατος ἐπι- αγήγορα ἢ γίγνεται ἐυφοράτωσα τοι καὶ βασιλείας σύμφως, ὡποῖος ἐνα ἐν τοῖς ὁλοκλήρους πράγμασιν γένοις. Cf. Daukšas, Regesten, II, 19, N° 1003.

(2) See note 3.
nize a military expedition in response to the appeals of the Greeks (1). This statement, taken together with a number of others which Gregory issued in the course of 1074, calling upon the faithful to come to the aid of the Greek empire, menaced by the Turks, throws further light upon the nature of the imperial messages (2). They must have contained, besides a proposal for the union of the churches, an appeal to the pope for military aid for an offensive against the Turks. The military aid requested for this offensive was no doubt made a prerequisite for the union of the churches.

The union of the churches and papal aid for an offensive against the Turks — these were matters of great importance and Gregory grasped their significance. For this reason Gregory did not content himself with the words of the imperial envoys. He wanted to have them confirmed. He decided, therefore, despite the protest of the imperial envoys that he should have full confidence in them, to send his own representative to Constantinople in order that through him he might learn if the emperor still held to the views his envoys had expressed and if he were ready to put them into practice. He chose for this purpose the patriarch Dominic of Grado (3).

Of the course of the negotiations between the papal envoy and the Byzantine court hardly anything is known. It is known only that the papal envoy was back in Venice by September, 1074 (4).

(1) Ibid., 335-337: Illud etiam me ad hoc opus permaxime instigat, quod Constantinopolitana Ecclesia de sancto Spiritu a nobis dissidens, concordiam apostolicam sedis exspectat.

(2) On February 2, 1074, the pope wrote to William of Burgundy to organize an expedition which, having first subdued Guiscard, would then go to the help of the Greeks against the Turks. Ibid., 325-326. On March 1, 1074 Gregory issued a call to all the faithful urging them to come to the aid of the empire of Constantinople. Ibid., 329-330. On December 7, 1074 he wrote to the Emperor Henry IV that he was organizing an expedition of fifty thousand men in response to the appeals of the Greeks. If possible he would command it himself and would go as far as Jerusalem. Ibid., 335-337. On December 16, 1074, Gregory again issued a general call to the faithful to go to the assistance of the Greeks. Ibid., 390.

(3) Ibid., 300-301.

(4) W. Holtmann, Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapstums

The origin of the First Crusade

He either delayed his report to the pope, or else he brought him some hope, for in December, 1074, Gregory VII again urged the faithful to come to the assistance of the Byzantines (1). Shortly afterwards, however, he must have learned that the Greeks were no longer anxious to bring about the unity of the churches. In a letter to Hugh, Abbot of Cluny, Gregory VII wrote: *Great pain and universal sorrow obsess me. The church of the Orient is moving farther from the Catholic faith, and the devil, having killed it spiritually, causes its members to perish in the flesh by the sword of his henchmen lest at any time divine grace bring them to a better mind* (2). Thus the negotiations begun in 1073 between Byzantium and the papacy ended in failure. The reason for this failure cannot be determined; but it is quite possible that the final success of the negotiations between the Byzantines and Guiscard may have been, at least in part, responsible for it. Here again the chronology is of some importance. The chrysobull to Robert Guiscard by which the emperor confirmed the conditions of the alliance which he had concluded with him bears the date, August 1074. The letter in which Gregory VII expresses his despair concerning the reconciliation of the Greek and Roman Churches is dated January 22, 1075. There is evidently some connexion between these two events. Having successfully concluded the treaty of alliance with Guiscard, the Byzantines must have become reluctant to accept the conditions of the papacy for the union of the churches, and, as a consequence, the negotiations with the papacy were allowed to lie.

Byzantium derived no benefit from its treaty of alliance with Guiscard. Indeed, following the overthrow of Michael VII, this treaty furnished to Guiscard the excuse which he needed und zur Entstehung des ersten Kreuzzuges, in Historische Vierteljahreschrift, XXII (1924-1925), 172.

(1) See note 2, p. 22.

(2) Regestrum, MPI, CXLVIII: 400. Circumvalavit enim me dolo immanis, et tristitia universalis, quia orientalis Ecclesia instituta diaboli catholica fide defictit, et per sua membra ipsa antiquus hostis Christianos passim occidit, ut quos caput spiritualiter interficiat, ejus membra carnaliiter pululant, ne quando divina gratis resipiscant.
in order to invade the Balkan possessions of the Byzantine empire. The failure of the negotiations between pope and emperor also proved detrimental to Byzantium. Gregory had been badly disappointed by this failure; he must have also been convinced that the Greeks would not accept the union of the churches under conditions favorable to the papacy. That no doubt was the real reason why he sanctioned the invasion of the Byzantine empire by Guiscard, although he justified his action by his desire to help Michael VII recover his throne. On July 25, 1080, he wrote to the bishops of Apulia and Calabria asking them to lend all possible help to the expedition which Guiscard was about to undertake against Byzantium (1). These negotiations, however, are very important, for in them we see the formulation of a Byzantine policy which was designed to enlist the help of the papacy and western rulers for the purpose of turning back the Turks. This policy was shortly to have world-wide significance.

It was generally admitted, even before the publication by Holtzmann of a series of documents which show that the Byzantine emperor, Alexius I, and the pope, Urban II, virtually reached a temporary agreement concerning the union of the churches (2), that the relations between the two men were cordial (3). It is generally admitted also that Alexius appealed to the pope for help in order to face the Patzinak danger during the terrible winter of 1090-91 (4). But the view, at one time also generally accepted, that the appeals for help which came from the Byzantine emperor, particularly that made at Piacenza, moved Urban II to call the First Crusade, has been contested, first by Riant and then by Chalandon.

Riant took the position that the imperial embassy at Piacenza as well as the correspondence between Urban II and Alexius I had as their aim the union of the churches. He denied that there was an appeal on the part of the emperor for help and as best proof for this he pointed out that the First Crusade was preached and organized not in favor of Byzantium, but for the liberation of the Holy Land. Riant also urged that by 1095, the year of the council of Piacenza, the situation of the Greek empire had so improved that Alexius had no need to make desperate and humble appeals to the West for help (5). Riant thus rejects the statement of a Latin chronicler that at the council of Piacenza, following the appeals made by the ambassadors of Alexius, Urban actually urged those present to come to the defense of the Greek empire. Chalandon, on the basis of Riant’s opinion, expressed essentially the same view. If Alexius appealed to the West for help he made his appeal in connexion with the crisis of 1090-91. There was no reason for him to make any appeal in 1095. Alexius, therefore, had nothing to do with the calling of the First Crusade. Chalandon expressed his views in the study which he devoted to the reign of Alexius I and repeated them in his history of the First Crusade which was published after his death (6). His views have been accepted by outstanding students of the history of the Byzantine empire (7), although historians of the First Crusade such as

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(2) Chalandon, Essai sur le règne d’Alexis 1er Comnène..., 155 ff.; also, Histoire de la première croisade jusqu’à l’élection de Godefroi de Bouillon (Paris, 1925), 17-18.

(3) Only recently Ostrogorsky has written: “Es ist das grosse Verdienst von Chalandon, Alexius I. gezeigt zu haben, dass, entgegen den älteren Ansammlungen, der byzantinische Kaiser das Abendland nicht nur zu einem Kreuzzug nie aufgerufen hat, sondern dass der Kreuzzug für ihn völlig unerwartet und auch höchst ungelegen kam.” Georg Ostrogorsky, Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates (Munich, 1940), p. 225, n. 3.
There exists, however, additional information, included in a Greek source which we shall discuss presently. But by way of anticipation we may state here that, according to this source, Alexius, in order to obtain the aid which he desired, addressed himself not only to the papacy, but to lay rulers of western Europe. We may safely assume that among these lay rulers the Count of Flanders was also included, for Alexius knew him personally. It is more than probable, therefore, that the forgery had its inspiration in a letter that Alexius actually wrote to Robert. That letter must have been written in 1099, for, if we can judge from the forgery, it was the Patzinak danger which prompted Alexius to write to the Count of Flanders. This was five years before the calling of the First Crusade, and it may be objected that the request for help made by Alexius on this occasion could not have had any influence in the calling of the First Crusade. This objection would be valid if this were the only request for help that Alexius had made to the west. That quite the opposite is true is shown not only by other Latin references, but by the Greek source which we are the first to present. It may be said, therefore, that Alexius’ letter to the Count of Flanders could not by itself, especially since it was an appeal for help against the Patzinaks, give rise to the idea of a general offensive against the Turks. But it is proof that Alexius sought help in the West, a policy which he continued to pursue and which contributed not a little to bringing about the First Crusade.

The view that Alexius repeatedly requested the help of the West has been based until now on the other two Latin texts, those of Ekkhard and Berold. These texts are, of course, well known, but we submit them once more because they confirm, and are confirmed by, the Greek source to which we have already alluded.

The Emperor of Constantinople Alexius, writes Ekkhard, also sent to pope Urban in connexion with these same barbarian brigands, who had now spread over the greater part of his kingdom, not a few letters in which he deplored his inability to defend the churches of the East. He beseeched the [pope] to call to his aid, if that were possible, the entire West... He promised to provide for those who should go to fight
all that they might need on land and sea (1). Ekkeshard’s
text has no chronological reference and, consequently, we
cannot tell when precisely Alexius addressed his numerous
letters to Urban. For this reason the accuracy of Ekkeshard’s
statement has not been seriously contested. Those who deny
that the appeals of the Greek emperor had anything to do
with inspiring the First Crusade interpret Ekkeshard’s text
as referring to the requests for help which he made in 1090 in
connexion with the Patzinak danger, requests which are
confirmed by certain passages in the Alexiad of Anna Com-
nena. There are two points in Ekkeshard’s text, however, which
are significant: First, Alexius made his appeals for the defense
of the churches of the orient; and second, he urged the pope
to call to his aid the entire occident. These two points, I think,
require that a different interpretation be given to Ekkeshard’s
text. The appeals by the Greek emperor of which it speaks
must be taken to refer not to the appeals which he made in
connexion with the Patzinak danger, but to others made
subsequently and designed to get him the help which he
needed in his struggle with the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor.
Ekkeshard’s text, thus interpreted, constitutes proof, there-
fore, that the appeals of the Greek emperor helped to inspire
the calling of the First Crusade.

The interpretation which we have given to Ekkeshard’s
text is substantiated by our last Latin text, that of Bernold.
Bernold’s text is very precise in its chronology. It refers to
the council of Piacenza, hence to the year 1096, more exactly,
March 17, 1095. Bernold states: ‘There arrived at this
council an embassy from the emperor of Constantinople which
humbly beseeched Our Lord the Pope, and all the faithful
of Christ to procure for him some help against the pagans for
the defense of our holy church which the pagans had already
almost destroyed in his territories. The pagans had rendered
themselves masters of his territories as far as the walls of the
city of Constantinople. Our Lord the Pope, therefore, urged
many to furnish this aid, even engaging them to promise under
oath to go there, with the consent of God, and bring to this
same emperor, to the best of their power, their most faithful
aid against the pagans (2). We may summarize the significant
points of this text as follows: First, at Piacenza Alexius
solicited the help of the West; second, the reason he offered
for his request was the necessity of defending the church;
and third, the pope not only reacted favorably, but actually
engaged some of those present to go to the assistance of the
Greek emperor. These three points, if accurately reported,
make it possible for us to state that at Piacenza we have the
preliminary calling of the First Crusade, a calling which was
made in response to the appeal of the Greek emperor.

Bernold’s account is the only source which definitely states
that at Piacenza ambassadors of the Greek emperor solicited
the aid of the West. For this reason its credibility has been
questioned (3). But it has already been observed that this reason
does not offer sufficient justification for doubting Bernold’s
statement. Bernold was a contemporary; there is some evi-
dence that he was a participant in the council of Piacenza
but even if he were not there, we know definitely that his
bishop, Gebhard of Constance, was. We may safely assume,
therefore, that Bernold obtained his information either direct-
ly or from Gebhard; in either case his source must be almost

(1) H. HAGENMÜTTER, Ekkeshard. Uruguiensis Abbate Hierosolym-
mita (Tubingen, 1877), 81-83. Predictus etiam Alexius imperator
Constantinopolitanus super etsidem barbarum proelium, per maiorem
etiam regni sui partem diffusus, non paucis epistolis Urbano papae di-
rectum, quibus in defensionem orientalium accelesiarum se non sufficerre
deploravit, obtestans, totum, si fieri posset, occidentem, qui tam ex
integro christianam professione censeretur, sibi in adulatorio advocari,
promittens per se cuncta necessaria praebaturis terra marique mi-
nistrari.

(2) Riant, Inventaire..., pp. 101-105, No XXXV; Chalandon,
Essai sur le règne d’Alexis..., 156.
contemporary as he died in 1100. A comparison of his description of the council of Piacenza with the text of the canons which has been preserved in another way shows that he was well informed (1). These are important elements in favor of the accuracy of his account. As to the other argument used to discredit it, namely, that by 1095 the situation of the Greek empire had so improved that Alexius had no need to solicit humbly the help of the West (2), we cite a statement by Fliche which constitutes an effective answer (3). « Without a doubt, as Chalandon observes », Fliche writes, « the situation of the Greek empire in 1095 was not alarming, but could not Alexius I nourish at this date the project of restoring the Byzantine power in Asia by recovering the regions occupied by the Turks?... For the realization of such a dream foreign aid could be, if not indispensable, at least very useful. Was not, as the text of Bernold precisely indicates, the putting forth of the urgent necessity for defending the church, persecuted by the infidels, the surest way of obtaining aid? Nothing then can be opposed to the view that Alexius' legates, in order to succeed in their objectives, may have drawn a dark picture of the suffering endured by the oriental churches ».

Fliche is an authority and what he says is very significant, but what makes his statement more important is the fact that it finds confirmation in the sources. For we now learn from a Greek text which neither he nor any other scholar seems to have known, exactly what he says, and indeed something more. We have found this text in the thirteenth century chronicle which Sachas had published anonymously under the title of Synopsis Chronike (4), but which is now attributed to Theodore Skutariotes.

The existence of this chronicle was, of course, well known, but apart from certain passages published by Heisenberg in his edition of Acrepolites because they refer to events of the thirteenth century with which the author was contemporary, it has not been generally used. The reason for this is that the sources on which it is based, Malalas, Theophanes, Georgios Continuatus, Constantine Manasses, Skylitzes, Nicetas Choniates, George Acrepolites, are still extant and scholars have naturally preferred to use these rather than the summaries of them which Skutariotes gives. But the summaries are accurate and this fact speaks well for the accuracy of the chronicle as a whole. The point is important because besides these summaries there are in this chronicle scraps of information which we can find in no other source. These scraps of information were doubtless drawn from sources now lost; it is, therefore, impossible to check them, but in view of the accuracy of the chronicle as a whole there is no valid reason why their credibility should be questioned (5). One of these scraps is the text with which we are concerned.

The information given by this text is so important for the problem of the origin of the First Crusade that the fact that no Greek source contemporary with the event makes any mention of it may be cited as an objection to its credibility. This would be an argument from silence, but besides the fact that argumenta a silentio are notoriously fallacious, the silence of the contemporary Greek sources can, we think, be explained.

The two almost contemporary Greek sources for the First Crusade are the chronicle of Zonaras and the Alexiad of Anna Comnena. Neither alludes even in passing to Alexius as having played any rôle in bringing about this great expedition. The silence of Zonaras is not surprising; generally brief, he devotes only a few lines to the First Crusade (6). His chronicle, as a source for the origin of the First Crus-

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1. On the credibility of Bernold see HAGENMeyer, Étude sur la chronique de Zimmern, 66-97; EIDRiCH, op. cit., 301; HOLTZMANN, Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapstums..., 100 ff; Fliche, op. cit., 290-93.
2. Riant, Inventaire..., pp. 101-105, n° XXXV; Chalandon, Études sur le règne d'Alexis..., 196.
3. Fliche, op. cit., 290-93.

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1. On Skutariotes and the credibility of his chronicle, especially for the period of the early Comneni, see G. Monakov, Byzantinische Quellen der Geschichte der Türkenzeit (Budapest, 1942), 329 ff.
2. ZONARAS, Epitome historiae, III (Bonn, 1897), 742-743.
de, is of no significance. The Alexiad of Anna Comnena is, of course, more important, but neither what it says nor fails to say constitutes an infallible argument. There are serious inaccuracies and omissions in Anna’s account of the origin of the First Crusade (1). She attributes the whole movement to the preaching of Peter the Hermit and ignores completely the role of Urban II. She is animated by profound hostility towards the papacy (2) and knows nothing of the cordial relations which existed between her father and pope Urban. Nor is it possible to believe her statement that Alexius first heard of the Crusade when the disorganized masses approached his territories. It suffices to cast a glance at the chronology of the events to expose the incredibility of this statement. Urban II preached the Crusade in November, 1095; at the end of December, 1095, he addressed a bull to the princes and people of Flanders in which he fixed August 15 as the date of the departure of the Crusaders and designated Adhemar of Puy as his representative. Peter the Hermit left for the Orient on March 8, 1096, and it was not until the end of June that he reached Hungary where he stayed until July 2 (3). Now it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that between December, 1095 and July, 1096, especially since Constantinople was fixed as the meeting place of the Crusading armies, Alexius received no official notice from the pope concerning the coming expedition. There is, indeed, evidence to the effect that Alexius was officially informed by Urban as early as January, 1096, of the imminent departure of the Crusaders (4). Alexius

may have been surprised and alarmed when he heard of the arrival of the masses under Peter the Hermit, but that must have been not because he had no previous knowledge of the coming expedition, but because he saw coming to his assistance, instead of experienced soldiers, undisciplined masses whose depredations were causing considerable damage, while their effectiveness against the Turks was highly questionable. And if, when the regular armies began to arrive, he showed some concern and took every precaution in his dealings with them, that was only natural. For he was anxious to avoid any disorder, which would be bound to prove harmful, and at the same time to channel the energies of his new allies in the interest of his empire. Thus in her account of the beginning of the First Crusade, Anna Comnena was either badly informed or else she consciously suppressed essential information. The Alexiad is essentially a panegyric of the first Comnenus and in the light of the troubles which had arisen between the Normans of Antioch and the empire, it is quite possible that Anna suppressed information which showed that her father was responsible for bringing the Latins to the Orient.

The silence of Zonaras and Anna Comnena, therefore, constitutes no argument against the credibility of Skutariotes. Skutariotes must have had before him sources of information which were either unknown to, or ignored by, Anna Comnena and Zonaras. His credibility, when considered in the light of what is already known concerning the relations between Alexius I and Urban II and the information transmitted by Eickhard and Bernold, becomes evident.

Now here is what Skutariotes says about Alexius I: «Having considered, therefore, that it was impossible for him alone to undertake the battle on which everything depended, he recognized that he would have to call in the Italians as allies, and effect this with considerable cunning, adroitness

(1) Anna Comnena, Alexiad, II (Bonn, 1878), 26 ff.
(2) To Anna Comnena pope Gregory VII was an execrable barbarian. Alexiad, I, 83 ff.
(3) On the chronology of these events see Hagenmeyer, Chronologie de la premiére croisade (1094-1100). (Paris, 1902), p. 9, n° 9; p. 11, n° 13; p. 12, n° 15; p. 15, n° 22; p. 20, n° 47.
(4) Riant, Inventaire..., p. 112, n° 48. The document which gives this information is not absolutely dated, and for this reason Riant included it in his Inventaire with reservations, but he adds: «Je dois dire cependant qu’il est peu probable que les croisés n’aient pas eu la précaution de prévenir de leurs dessins Alexius, dont ils allaient traverser les états, et qu’en lui-même l’envoi par eux d’une missive destinée à avertir l’empereur, n’a rien que de très naturel ». He adds further that at the beginning of the sixteenth century Benedetto degli Accolti and Guillaume Aubert of Pothiers, seigneur de Massogna, published each a history of the first crusade in which they speak of an embassy sent by Urban II to Alexius I in order to inform the latter of the deliberation of the Council of Clermont.

Byzantium XIX. — 3.
and deeply hid planning. For finding a pretext in the fact that this nation considered unbearable the domination of Jerusalem and the life-giving Sepulchre of Our Saviour Jesus Christ by the Persians and seeing therein a heaven-sent opportunity, he managed, by dispatching ambassadors to the bishop of Old Rome and to those whom they would call kings and rulers of those parts, and by the use of appropriate arguments, to prevail over not a few of them to leave their country and succeeded in directing them in every way to the task. That is the reason why many of them, numbering thousands and tens of thousands, having crossed the Ionian sea, reached Constantinople with all speed. And, having exchanged assurances and oaths with them, he advanced towards the East. With the aid of God and their alliance and by his own efforts he speedily expelled the Persians from Roman territories, liberated the cities and restored his sway in the East to its former glory. Such was this emperor; great in the conception of plans and the doing of deeds (1).

Thus the reports of the Latin Chronicles, that Alexius repeatedly asked the West for help, are now confirmed from a Greek source. Its credibility, in view of what we are told by

(1) SATHAS, Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi, VII (Paris, 1894), p. 184-185. Συγκεκριμένος ον γὰρ τὰς ἡγεμόνες τῆς ἡπειρώτων ἀνωτέρωθεν μάχης, εὐφημίσατο καὶ τοῖς ἱεραρχοῖς ὁ εὐφημεῖς οἱ ἐγκυροὶ προσλάβοτο, καὶ τάξιν μετά τίτων καρποφορίας καὶ βαθύτατον αὐθαρίσματος καὶ εὐπρεπείας. Εἰδὼς γὰρ πόρφυρας ὡς τότε τὸ ἱδρύμα τοῦ ἁγίου ταῦτα ἄρτεν ἔμενε τῆς Ἱερουσαλήμ τοῦ Ἰωάννου ἐπικράτειον καὶ τοῦ συνοπτοῦ τάφου τοῦ αὐτός ἔμενεν Ἑράκλειον, τοῦτο ἀξίων ἔρωμα εὔρημα, καὶ ἀποπολεμάτων προσέβοιν πολείς τὰ τῶν προερχόμενον Ἐμερικῆς ἢ ἐρχόμενα προστάτας καὶ σήμα τούτο κατὰ τόπων ὡς ἐν εὐεργετέστατοι καὶ προσερχόμενοι, οἵ τε λόγους γεγονότων, ὡς ἑρωτεύσατο τέκτων τῆς σοφίας ἐποιεῖτο, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτάτο τῶν ἐκπραγμάτων. Εἰδὼς γὰρ πολλοὶ τάφους ἐν συμμετοχῇ καὶ παραδοσῖς καὶ ἀρρητοῖς παραφράσεως, τῇ Κωνσταντινούπολι, σὺ διὰ χρόνον προσέβοιν ἐπιφανείας τῶν ἱεροθεία ἐποίησεν καὶ καθός καὶ πίστες ἐνδοκρισίον ἐνθρώπευσεν, καὶ κύριος καὶ κυκλικός καὶ κυκλικοῦ, πρὸς εὐφημίας καὶ ὡς ἑρωτεύτων τοῦτο καὶ συμμετοχῆς τοῦτο, καὶ εἰς εἰναίδες προσερχόμενοι τῶν Ἱερουσαλήμ ἐκπραγμάτων τοῦ Πέρρου καὶ τῶν πάλιν ἐκπραγμάτων, καὶ τότε τῶν ἐλευθερίων πάλιν ὡς τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιμεληθήναι.

Thus the reports of the Latin Chronicles, that Alexius repeatedly asked the West for help, are now confirmed from a Greek source. Its credibility, in view of what we are told by


(2) We know, for instance, that Alexius had an interview with Robert I of Flanders when the latter passed through Constantinople on his way to the West from Jerusalem where he had gone as a pilgrim. See Verlinden, op. cit., 158.

(3) We know this from a document which Bzobrazov published in the Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction (Russian) CCLIV (1887), 77. It is there stated that the patriarch Ephimius was sent by Alexius to negotiate with Bohemond who was then invading the empire. Breiter remarks concerning this event: « En 1093 Euthymius, patriarche de Jerusalem, qui se trouvait alors dans l'empire byzantin fut chargé par Alexis Comnène d'aller négocier la paix à Thessalonique avec Bohemond. Le choix de ce messager est significatif, et l'on peut penser que parmi les arguments destinés à entraîner le consentement des Normands, celui de la situation de Jérusalem et de la défense commune de la chrétienté devait peser d'un certain poids. » L'Eglise et l'Orient au moyen âge : Les Croisades, 53.

(4) The Alexiad, II, 32.
the most powerful argument — the need of liberating the Holy Land — in order to gain the support which he needed to carry out his offensive against the Turks. He must be regarded, therefore, along with Urban II, as the instigator of the First Crusade. The two men had different motives. Alexius' motive is known; that of Urban II is more difficult to determine. But the union of the churches, no doubt, figured among his objectives (1). This would have greatly increased his prestige at a time when the investiture struggle had by no means been decided. If the two men fell short of fully realizing their objectives, that was because, as in all political movements, great and small, it was difficult to predict or guide the development of events (2).

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(1) On this point see the interesting article by A. C. Kyri, Urbanus' Crusade, Success or Failure, in American Historical Review, LIII (1948), 235-30; P. Charanis, in American Historical Review, LIII, 941-944.

(2) My presence in Europe and, as a consequence, my participation in the Seventh International Congress of Byzantine Studies, where this paper was read, was made possible by the financial assistance granted me by the American Philosophical Society, the American Council of Learned Societies and by the Rutgers University Research Fund to enable me to continue there my researches in the history of the Byzantine empire.

EXCONSUL

OBSERVATIONS SUR L'HISTOIRE DU CONSULAT

À L'ÉPOQUE BYZANTINE

Les fastes où sont inscrits, obscurs ou illustres, les noms de ceux qui, depuis les débuts de la République romaine, reçurent les honneurs consulaires, s'interrompent en Occident avec celui de Fl. Decius Paulinus Junior, consul en 534, et, en Orient, avec celui de Fl. Anicius Faustus Atilianus Basilius Junior, consul en 541 (1). On en a généralement conclu, et des érudits aussi avertis que J. B. Bury ou E. Stein eux-mêmes, que Justinien avait en fait aboli le consulat (2).

A vrai dire, cette conclusion appelle d'assez sérieuses réserves et, en droit comme en fait, la plus vénérable des institutions romaines ne devait pas prendre fin parce que l'empereur s'était abstenu de désigner, pour l'année 542 et de même pour les années suivantes, les consuls éponymes. Bien qu'une Novelle de 537 s'efforçait de persuader que l'on comptait désormais les années d'après l'indiction ou la date d'avènement de l'empereur régnant, on n'en continuait pas moins, par attachement à une habitude séculaire, à les désigner post consuli trium Basili et, en 545, Justin II crut devoir revêtir à nouveau le consulat (3). Mais, s'il renouait avec la tradition,

(1) W. Liebenam, Fasti consulares imperii romanii, pp. 55 et 56.
(3) On se reportera principalement à l'excellent mémoire de E. Stein, Post-Consulat et Abrosergios, dans Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientale, t. II, 1934 (Mélanges J. Bidez), pp. 868-912. Sur le rétablissement du consulat par Justin II, K. Gnom,