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archdeaconry by 1193.[31] Since William of Ely was prebendary by 1192, but not much earlier (see below), he probably died in or about 1191.

Paris witnesses one charter in company with Robert, bishop of London (i.e. before 1150); and two in company with members of the chapter of St Paul's (c. 1180 and 1183).[32] It is therefore possible that he received his prebend c. 1145–50 and reasonably certain that he held it to his death.

Master William of Ely, royal treasurer, was a clerk of his kinsman Bishop Richard fitzNeal (1189–98), became a canon in or shortly before 1192, and held his prebend until his death in 1222.[33]

[31] *Pipe Roll*, 2 *Richard I*, p. 142; *Registrum Hamonis Hethe*, ed. C. Johnson (Canterbury and York Society), p. 46.

[32] *Cart. Monasterii . . . de Colecestria*, ed. S. A. Moore, I, 170 (1145–50); *Cart. of Clerkenwell*, ed. W. O. Hassall, no. 319 (c. 1180); Gibbs, no. 72 (1183).

[33] H. G. Richardson, 'William of Ely, the King's Treasurer', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th series, XV (1932), pp. 45–90, especially pp. 47, 56–8, 60–1; *E.H.R.*, LVII (1942), pp. 131–2 and 132, n. 1.

II. CRUSADERS' CASTLES OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY

By R. C. SMAIL

I

Although the castle is regarded as a distinguishing feature of feudal society in medieval Europe, its functions in that society have been less adequately studied than its architecture.[1] The variety and importance of those functions arose principally from the role of the castle in government. Any ruler needs organized force at his disposal as a final sanction for his authority. It is required both against the external enemy and to preserve internal order; it has both a military and a police function.

Part of the force available to a medieval ruler was embodied in his castles. They were instruments of his policy towards his neighbours and were used as fortresses have been used throughout history: to protect exposed frontier areas and to hold down conquests. But their importance was not confined to the borders. The commander of a castle and its garrison was master of the surrounding district and had means continuously at his disposal to meet any challenge to his authority. Wherever they stood, fortified buildings provided a base from which power could be exercised, and within which it could be protected and preserved. As a consequence castles are found serving not only as nuclei for urban growth or bases of colonization, but most frequently as centres of feudal government, from which administrative and judicial powers were exercised over the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. In a feudal monarchy this could be equally true of the castles both of king and vassals.[2]

The castle was no less important in politics than in administration. The authority of any feudal ruler was founded, to some extent, on effective co-operation with his vassals; therefore baronial castles, no less than his own, were part of the force on which government rested. But when co-operation could not be achieved, the lord needed to be able to control his vassals by virtue of superior resources and, if necessary, of superior force. From this

[1] S. Painter, 'English Castles in the Middle Ages' in *Speculum*, vol. X (1935), 321.

[2] Sir Maurice Powicke, *King Henry III and the Lord Edward*, p. 48; S. Painter, *Studies in the History of the English Feudal Barony*, p. 22. In Germany during the period of the Investiture Contest, many feudal families, unchecked by the monarchy, acquired judicial and other powers originally public. To them, 'the castle was not only a means by which the demesne lands could be more rigorously administered, but also a fixed point in which governmental rights could be concentrated. Attached in this way to a territorial centre, the rights of jurisdiction vested in the prince could be "territorialized", attached to consolidated territorial districts and used as a means of uniform government.' G. Barraclough, *Medieval Germany*, I, 85–6. Also on the castle as such a 'point de cristallisation', see M. Bloch, *La Société Féodale, Les classes et le gouvernement des hommes*, p. 182.

point of view the number and strength of the lord's castles in comparison with those of his vassals, and the rights which he enjoyed over their castles, were matters of the first importance. The right to build fortifications had, in the Carolingian period, been reserved to the king. In the succeeding age of barbarian invasion and fragmentation of public power it had escaped royal control and had been exercised by individuals.[3] But the tradition of such control was never lost, and its gradual resumption by feudal kings and princes was part of the general recovery of their powers in government which can be traced in many parts of Europe from the eleventh century. The dukes of Normandy were from an early date attempting to prohibit any fortification without their licence, and to insist on their right to place a garrison in any baronial castle.[4] Where such control was not yet fully achieved, castles could, as in England, 'raise in a concrete form the whole question of the relations between the... baronage and the king'.[5] The sharp decline in royal authority during the reign of Stephen, or during the minority of Frederick II in Sicily, was marked by the rapid construction of many unlicensed baronial castles; as part of the subsequent recovery of monarchy in both states, the king resumed control of royal castles and ordered the destruction of adulterine.[6]

The history of the county of Anjou provides further illustration. The powers of the counts in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries owed much to their initiative in castle-building.[7] Some of these buildings they gave into the custody of vassals, whose possession became hereditary and whose successors, in varying degrees, gained freedom from the count's control.[8] During the early part of the twelfth century the counts, like their contemporary Louis VI in his demesne state, strove unceasingly and with success to resume control over both vassals and castles.[9]

The political and administrative, no less than the military, importance of the castles made them the constant concern of medieval governments. The appointment of castellans was often a matter of the highest political importance.[10] As the English and Sicilian records show more clearly than those of any other feudal kingdom, the provision of garrisons and programmes of construction and repair were constant charges on the king's resources. In short, the administration of the castles was a distinct and highly important

[3] Mitteis, *Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt*, p. 620. Bloch, loc. cit.

[4] Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, pp. 38, 278. These forms of control are found also in other Norman states. See C. Cahen, *Le Régime Féodale de l'Italie Normande*, pp. 74, 114. Painter, in *Speculum*, x, pp. 330–1.

[5] Sir Frank Stenton, *First Century of English Feudalism*, p. 197.

[6] Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, 5th ed. pp. 487–9. E. Sthamer, *Die Verwaltung der Kastelle im Königreich Sizilien unter Kaiser Friedrich II und Karl I von Anjou*, pp. 5–6: '(Die Kastelle) dienten nicht so sehr zur Landesverteidigung, als vielmehr als Stützpunkte der Macht der Krone nach innen.'

[7] Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, p. 35.

[8] Halphen, *Le comté d'Anjou au XIe siècle*, pp. 152, 158, 166. Mitteis, *Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt*, p. 288.

[9] Chartrou, *L'Anjou de 1109 à 1151*, p. 26. Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, pp. 37–8.

[10] Powicke, *King Henry III and the Lord Edward*, pp. 48–62.

function of the medieval state. In Sicily, where institutional development was more precocious than elsewhere in Europe, that function was embodied in a special department of the central government.[11] The records of that department, and the buildings themselves, have been comprehensively studied by Haseloff and Sthamer,[12] but elsewhere this aspect of government in the Middle Ages has received too little attention.

There has been the same lack of balance in the study of the Crusaders' castles in Latin Syria. They have been the subject of outstanding work by archaeologists and historians of architecture. M. Paul Deschamps's account of the Crac des Chevaliers is the offspring of a perfect marriage between field work and the documentary evidence, and it is fitting that the greatest and most complete of castles should be the subject of the best monograph ever contributed to the study of medieval military architecture.[13] Hardly less impressive was the work of C. N. Johns on the ruins of the Castrum Peregrinorum at 'Atlit. Here again the evidence provided by thorough excavation has been related to that of the documents, and it is unfortunate that the outbreak of war in 1939 and the troubled state of Palestine should have prevented the completion of this work.[14]

The place of the castles in the life and government of that part of feudal society established in medieval Syria has been less fully investigated. The unequal balance as between the study of form and function needs adjustment, and this paper has been written as a contribution to that end. The period selected for study lies between the entry of the first crusaders into Syria in 1097 down to the destruction of effective feudal monarchy in the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1188.

II

Historians who have discussed the purpose of the Crusaders' castles have overwhelmingly emphasized their importance in defending the frontiers of the Latin states, and certain groups of castles have been regarded as planned defensive systems. Such a view was stated in its extreme form by Prutz. From the evidence afforded by a map of the fortified places of Latin Syria, he argued that the Franks established an outer ring of defences on the frontiers and supported this by two inner lines of greater works. Similar ideas found a place in the writings of Rey.[15]

The foremost modern authority in this field is M. Paul Deschamps. His

[11] W. Cohn, *Das Zeitalter der Hohenstaufen in Sizilien*, pp. 176–81.

[12] A. Haseloff, *Die Bauten der Hohenstaufen in Unteritalien*. E. Sthamer, op. cit.

[13] P. Deschamps, *Les Châteaux des croisés en Terre Sainte:* vol. I. *Le Crac des Chevaliers:* vol. II. *La Défense du royaume de Jérusalem.*

[14] C. N. Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrim's Castle, 'Atlit' (1932), in *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine*, III (1933–4) 145–64, and the same author's *Guide to 'Atlit*, Jerusalem, 1947.

[15] Prutz, *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge*, pp. 195–6. Rey, *Étude sur les Monuments de l'architecture militaire des Croisés en Syrie et dans l'île de Chypre*, p. 4.

views are based on an unrivalled knowledge of the Syrian castles, and are more carefully stated than those of Prutz; but they too are primarily concerned with the role of the castle against the external enemy and with its importance on the border. He points out that much of the eastern frontier of the Latin states was protected by the natural barrier presented by the hill and mountain ranges which lie to the east of the Syrian coastal plain. That barrier is, however, broken by passes and wide corridors of open country which offer easy access to an enemy attacking from east to west. The protection of the all-important coastal plain demanded that the deficiencies of nature be made good by the works of man, and the most important works of fortification constructed by the Franks were a response to that need.[16]

This view is supported by evidence of great weight. In some areas of special military importance, like that in the neighbourhood of the Jisr esh Shoghr,[17] and in the wide gap north of the Lebanon which gives communication between Hims and Tripoli, fortified places were unusually numerous,[18] and where the main Lebanon range afforded maximum natural protection they were, on the frontier, few. It is equally true that border castles had a special importance which was recognized by the Syrian Franks themselves. After the major earthquake of 1114, Prince Roger of Antioch, in making good the damage to his castles, gave priority to those 'quae defensioni suae terrae utiliora et hostibus propinquiora novit',[19] and after Saladin had acquired Aleppo in 1183, the Franks took special care of those places which stood 'in confinibus hostium'.[20] The military history of the period shows that the border castles continually served as bases for the Christian field army on campaign and as places of refuge in defeat. Yet the existence of a function special to the frontier strongholds does not justify historians in presenting it, as Deschamps and Prutz have done, as the predominantly important function discharged by the crusaders' castles as a whole. In fact, the weight of emphasis placed on their role in frontier defence needs modification for a number of reasons.

In the first place a castle, or even a group of castles, could defend a frontier in only a very limited sense. In eighteenth-century Europe, when the life of an army in the field often depended on its communications with its magazines, enemy artillery mounted in a fort could engage traffic on the important road, and could literally close it.[21] Conditions in Latin Syria were entirely different. The small field armies lived partly on the country. They were not dependent on supplies brought up by wheeled vehicles from a base, and so were not

[16] Deschamps, *Le Crac*, pp. 16–42.

[17] Dussaud, *Topographie* [*Historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale*], p. 170.

[18] Deschamps, *Le Crac*, pp. 30–1.

[19] Galt[erius Cancellarius, *Bella Antiochena*, ed. Hagenmeyer], p. 65.

[20] W[illermus archiepiscopus] T[yrensis, 'Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum'], in *R*[*ecueil des*] *H*[*istoriens des*] *C*[*roisades*], *Hist*[*oriens*] *Occ*[*identaux*], I, p. 1114.

[21] Spenser Wilkinson, *The Defence of Piedmont*, pp. 69–72.

limited to the use of certain roads. Nor could their movement be hindered by the primitive artillery of the age. Routes and areas were held or commanded by medieval garrisons only in the sense that those garrisons dominated them in time of peace and could repress civil disturbances or minor enemy raids. But when warfare was fought on a scale likely to endanger the Latin occupation, no fortress or group of fortresses could restrain the passage of an invading force.[22]

The views of Prutz and Deschamps are to some extent based on maps of the castles and walled towns of Latin Syria. Any such document, however scientifically prepared, needs to be used with caution. Not only will it show as part of the crusaders' states strong places which were in Christian hands for only limited periods,[23] but it is a palimpsest which records the military needs not only of the Franks, but of their predecessors also. The Franks occupied fortresses which had marked the north-west frontier of Islam as it had existed from the seventh until the tenth centuries,[24] and others which stood at the southern limits of the Byzantine duchy of Antioch established by John Zimisces and Nicephorus Phocas.[25]

Nor can it be supposed that the Franks occupied only those places likely to be of use to them against an invader. The process of Latin settlement at the time of the first crusade was not the result of a conquest ordered and organized by a single authority, but was often extended by the boldness and greed of individuals.[26] A castle served not only public ends in providing defence against the Muslim invader, but also the private needs of its possessor in enabling him to dominate and to exploit the inhabitants of the surrounding district. In such circumstances a fortified place was occupied not by a ruler adding units to a planned system of defence, but by an individual acquiring property.

Deschamps is able to show that the Franks heavily defended their frontier where natural protection was weak; but he did not at the same time point out that there were important avenues of access into the kingdom of Jerusalem which were but poorly provided with fortified posts. Throughout the period Damascus was a far more important seat of Muslim political power than were

[22] Historians have stated that the Frankish occupation of certain areas of Syria prevented co-operation between Muslim rulers. It is said, e.g., that the Frankish county of Edessa 'divided' Mesopotamia from Aleppo and Damascus, and that the Transjordan castles kept apart Damascus and Egypt. See Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, II, 554; III, preface, p. xxi. Deschamps, *Le Crac*, p. 20 and in *Revue Historique*, CLXXII (1933), 43. But Muslim armies marched many times through the heart of the County of Edessa, while Shirkuh and Saladin each led a force on five occasions through the Transjordan fief.

[23] See below, p. 138.

[24] Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, p. 26.

[25] E.g. Sahyun, Bourzey, Safita, Bikisra'il, and perhaps Ollaiqa. See Dussaud, *Topographie de la Syrie antique et médiévale*, pp. 119, 151–2. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 172–3. Van Berchem, *Voyage en Syrie*, I, 269.

[26] R[aimundus de] A[guilers], in *R.H.C. Hist. Occ.* III, 275. 'Etenim mos erat in exercitu ut, si signum alicujus Franci in civitate aut castello reperiretur, a nullo postea expugnabatur.'

the towns of the middle Orontes; the defence of the easy routes from that city into the Latin kingdom was therefore a more serious problem than the Hims-Tripoli corridor. A Muslim force marching from Damascus to Banyas was on the main road to Tyre and Sidon, while it could also thrust across Upper Jordan to the plain of Acre. According to Deschamps's ideas, it is to be expected that this sector of the eastern frontier, which by its lack of natural obstacles gave easy access to the principal seaports of the Latin kingdom, would be strongly fortified. The map shows that it was not; and the evidence it provides to the contrary becomes even less impressive when it is remembered that Banyas was in Christian hands only from 1129 to 1132 and from 1140 to 1164, and that the Chastellet at Jacob's Ford was founded in 1178 and destroyed for ever in 1180. The entry into the kingdom by way of the Jordan crossing immediately south of Lake Tiberias at Sinn en-Nabra, used during the major invasions of Mawdud and Tughtagin in 1113, and of Saladin in 1182, 1183 and 1187, was virtually undefended. There appears to have been no fort near the bridge itself; and if the invader, like Saladin, continued his march by way of the valley of Jezreel, he encountered no major fortified place. His route was overlooked by the Hospitaller castle at Kawkab al-Hawa (Belvoir), but on the road itself stood only the weak citadel at Baisan, and, at the head of the valley of Jezreel, the little castle of al-Fule.[27] In considering these facts it is to be emphasized that, except for the years between 1140 and 1154, the ruler of Damascus was throughout the century a potential invader of the Latin states, and a greater danger to them than any ruler or governor of Hims. The roads from Damascus were more often used by invaders than that from Hims to Tripoli. Yet the frontier which they crossed was not so well provided with fortified works.

M. Deschamps is too considerable a scholar to restrict his discussion to but one of the castles' functions; he mentions others, as subsequent references will show. But his main emphasis is unmistakably on their importance as a system of frontier defence and against the external enemy. In this section it has been argued that this interpretation is open to criticism; in the first it was noted that elsewhere in feudal society castles had many parts to play. A study will now be made of the evidence which reveals with certainty the uses to which the crusaders put their fortified places. It shows that the earliest foundations, so far from being planned for defence, were intended for determined and sustained attack.

III

In medieval siege warfare the use of the *Gegenburg* was not uncommon. A besieged garrison did not always conduct its defence from behind stone walls, but by sorties carried the attack into the enemy camp. In such circumstances the besiegers themselves might require a firm base for their operations,

[27] George Adam Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 357.

and therefore constructed a temporary fortification within their own lines. Such buildings could also be used to watch the gates through which the sorties were made, and it was for such a purpose that the Latins built their first castles in Syria.[28] The siege of Antioch began in October 1097, and it was probably in the following month that a council of the leaders decided to establish a castle outside Saint Paul's gate. 'Malregard' was the result, and its garrison were soon able to challenge Turkish sorties.

The device appears to have been successful, for in the following March it was decided to place a similar building on a mound which stood at the western end of the main Orontes bridge, and from which a garrison could command egress from the Bridge gate.[29] A third and final strong point was established outside Saint George's gate on the southern perimeter of Antioch. The necessary buildings already existed in the form of a fort and a monastery, and Tancred manned the new castle with a force of his own followers.[30]

The Frankish settlement was developed by a series of siege operations, some of which extended over a period of years. Bohemond began that series of thrusts against Aleppo which was not to fail finally for another quarter of a century, and to further his attack he was by 1100 intending to fortify existing buildings in the immediate neighbourhood of Aleppo, in order so to maintain a permanent blockade.[31] Ten years later his nephew Tancred began the construction of a stronghold on Tell ibn Ma'shar as a base for attacks on Shaizar.[32]

In 1103 Raymond of St Gilles began his siege of Tripoli. He had but few followers, while the defences of the town were strong and its population numerous; he might also expect attacks from the rulers of still unconquered Muslim territories. Therefore he selected a defensible site within sight of the walls of Tripoli and from the castle he built there disputed control of the surrounding countryside with the city's rulers until, cut off from their sources of supply, they surrendered six years later.[33]

Tyre was a seaport of even greater artificial and natural strength. It could count on assistance both from the Fatimids of Egypt and from the rulers of Damascus, and early attempts against it showed that it would not fall easily into Latin hands. According to William of Tyre, Hugh of St Omer, the second prince of Galilee, organized many attacks against Tyre, but the distance between the city and his base at Tiberias was so great that whenever his men were beaten in an encounter near Tyre they had no refuge against

[28] R.A. p. 247. *Anon[ymi Gesta Francorum*, ed. Bréhier], p. 70. *Ep[istulae et chartae ad historia primi belli sacri spectantes*, ed.] H[agenmeyer], p. 157.

[29] R.A. p. 248. *Anon.* p. 96. *Ep.H.* pp. 158, 166.

[30] R.A. p. 250. *Anon.* p. 98.

[31] K[emal ed-] D[in, 'Chronique d'Alep', in *R.H.C. Hist. Orientaux*, III], 589. Grousset, I, 377.

[32] Derenbourg, *Vie d'Ousamah*, p. 91.

[33] Raymond's castle became the nucleus of the modern town of Tripoli. There is still more than a mile of gardens between Tripoli and its seaport, which was the twelfth-century town besieged by Raymond.

their pursuers. Therefore, sometime before his death in 1107, he established a castle, known to the Franks as Toron, on the hill of Tibnin some thirteen miles east of Tyre.[34] In 1117 Baldwin I ordered the construction of a castle at Iskandaruna on the coast road, nine miles south of Tyre, 'ad coercendum urbem praedictam'.[35] Thus although it is true that ultimately these two Latin foundations 'defended his (Baldwin's) conquests',[36] they originally owed their existence to the Latin offensive against Tyre.

Tyre fell to the Franks in 1124, but Ascalon remained in Muslim hands until 1153. The Egyptian government was careful to preserve its last possession in Syria, and reinforced its garrisons and supplies at regular intervals.[37] After 1123 the Fatimids never again used it as a base for a major attack on Latin Palestine, but the garrison constantly raided towards Jerusalem and Jaffa, and so brought insecurity into the life of the inhabitants of the fertile coastal plain and of the pilgrims on the road to the Holy Places. In order to curb this activity the Franks decided to establish fortified posts in the neighbourhood of Ascalon, and between 1136 and 1149 castles were built in turn at Bait Jibrin (Gibelin), Yibneh (Ibelin), Tell es Safi (Blanche Garde) and Gaza.

Historians have related the function of these places to the need for defining and defending the southern boundary of the Latin kingdom,[38] but William of Tyre has given a more precise statement of the reasons for their foundation. First among them was the need for restraining the raids by the garrison of Ascalon. This was to be achieved not by the mere existence of the new forts, with their garrisons within them ready to meet attack; those garrisons were themselves to take the field, and to attack the men of Ascalon whenever they left the shelter of their city. It can easily be understood how this aggressive defence could become an attack on the surroundings of Ascalon, which was the first step in the process of reducing the city itself.[39] Thus, according to William, the objects of the castle at Gaza were first, to check raids from the city and to watch it from the south, as did the other three new castles from east and north; secondly, to make attacks upon the city and to maintain an unceasing and aggressive warfare.[40] The castles of southern Palestine were not,

[34] W.T. p. 459.

[35] Fulcher[ius Carnotensis, Historia Iherosolymitana, in *R.H.C. Hist. Occ.* III], p. 435.

[36] C.N. Johns, Historical Introduction to map 'Palestine of the Crusades', p. 3.

[37] I[nb al-]A[thir, Kamel-Altevarykh, in *R.H.C. Hist. Or.* I], 490. W.T. pp. 581, 638, 779, 797.

[38] Rey, *Monuments*, p. 4. *Grousset*, II, 154–8.

[39] W.T. p. 638–9 describes the Franks' intentions in fortifying Bait Jibrin: 'Nostri vero videntes praesumptionem eorum non cessare...post multa consilia optimum judicant... municipia in circuitu per gyrum aedificari, unde collecta facilius militia, et de vicino commodius hostium discurrentium refrenari posset impetus, et civitas frequentius impugnari.'

See also the first and last sentences of W.T. lib. xv, cap. xxv, pp. 697–9.

[40] W.T. pp. 777–8: 'Gazam...reformare proponunt (sc. rex et principes), ut sicut a septentrione et ab oriente fundatis in gyrum municipiis eam quasi obsederant, ita eidem ab austro simul non deesset stimulus; et ex ea quoque parte continuis impugnaretur congressionibus, et frequentibus lacesseretur insidiis.'

therefore, established for general purposes of frontier defence. During the period of their construction the political state of Egypt was such that there was no danger of the Fatimids renewing their earlier invasions. The castles were built for a particular purpose: to check sorties from Ascalon and to enable attacks to be made against it. Except that it was wider in space and time, the plan was identical with that adopted at Antioch by the leaders of the first crusade.

IV

The crusaders had not only to overcome military opposition. Once the leaders had decided to retain their conquests and their followers had become settlers in the newly won lands, they had the problem of establishing a *modus vivendi* with the native population.

The solution of the problem was in many ways much to the Franks' credit. There is evidence that they did not unduly oppress the Muslim peasantry;[41] they respected native custom; they allowed Syrian Christians to plead in a court over which one of their own community presided as magistrate or in which Syrians were jurors;[42] in their dress, manners and mode of living they adopted many of the habits of the country. In the view of some scholars, the Franks so thoroughly adapted themselves to their new surroundings that conquerors and conquered merged into a harmonious and integrated society. The result was 'une nation franco-syrienne',[43] even 'une civilisation originale', without internal divisions, and which was ultimately destroyed only by irresistible pressure from without, and the failure to establish a sufficiently strong ruling dynasty within.[44]

Whether this interpretation is acceptable, or whether the Franks were tolerant because no other practicable course was open to them, is a matter which cannot be argued here. But it is certain that the deep gulf between the Christian rulers and their Muslim subjects was never finally closed. However peaceful they might appear on the surface, it is natural to suppose that there were within the Latin states many Muslims who did not forget that the Frank was a foreigner and an unbeliever; who maintained connexions in the Muslim states; who looked forward to the day when Syria would be restored to Islam. It is likely that there were many more who lived passively content under the Franks, but who would remember the demands of their faith at the bidding of a successful Muslim invader. If these were the conditions, then no matter how much justice and security marked the rule of the Franks, secret or overt hostility from their Muslim subjects was always a possibility.

[41] Ibn Jubair, in *R.H.C. Hist. Or.* III, 445–56.

[42] Hayek, *Le Droit Franc en Syrie*, pp. 130–5.

[43] Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, I, 287.

[44] Madelin, 'La Syrie Franque', in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 6me série, XXXVIII (1917), 334, 344. See also p. 354: 'Quoi qu'en aient dit certains historiens, je ne crois pas qu'il faille chercher dans le régime même la cause de cette chute. Le royaume a succombé à des événements extérieurs à sa constitution.'

That such indeed was the background of the relations between Frank and Muslim is illustrated by a series of striking facts.

In 1113 the amir Mawdud, leader of the earliest counter-crusades against Latin Syria, defeated the army of Jerusalem at the Bridge of Sinn en-Nabra in Galilee.[45] The defeated Franks took refuge on a hill top, while detachments of the Muslim army roamed unchecked through Samaria and sacked Nablus. Two well-informed contemporaries, both in Syria at that time, recorded that the Muslim peasants of central Palestine entered into friendly relations with the victors.[46] 'Nullus enim pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris inimicus', quoted William of Tyre, when two generations later he elaborated Fulk's account for inclusion in his own history.[47] Future events were to show that he did so with good reason. After the battle of Hattin in 1187, the Franks in the district of Nablus evacuated the area as the Muslim inhabitants rose *en masse* in favour of Saladin.[48]

The employment by the Franks of Muslims in positions of trust is among the evidence quoted to demonstrate the existence of 'une nation franco-syrienne'. But there is also evidence to show that however close relations between the two peoples might become, the Muslims could not forget the call of religion and culture, and that it could draw them towards the Muslims who attacked the Latin States from without. The behaviour of the qadi of Jabala is well known from the account given by Ibn al Athir;[49] that of Sulaiman ibn Daoud has been more recently published by Cahen.[50] This danger was by no means offset by the attitude of the native Christian peoples. The Armenians co-operated best with the Franks, but the records reveal frequent hostility between the two peoples. The Syrian Christians had lived for centuries under Muslim rule, and throughout the period of Latin occupation there were communities of their faith in Muslim as well as in Frankish territory. Both in time and space they were part of both Muslim and Frankish worlds. Between them and their Latin overlords there was the bond of a common

[45] Grousset, I, 268.

[46] Fulcher, p. 427. I[bn al-]Q[alanisi, in *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, ed. and trans. H. A. R. Gibb], p. 139. [47] W.T. p. 486.

[48] el-Imad in *R.H.C. Hist. Or.* IV, 301–2.

[49] I.A. 717. The qadi was a trusted servant of Bohemond of Antioch who had made him, in the words of Grousset (II, 825), 'une sorte de ministre des affaires musulmanes dans la principauté'. Nevertheless, in June 1188 'his zeal for the Faith' took him to Saladin, who had begun an invasion of the country of Tripoli. But when the qadi assured him that Jabala, Ladhaqiya and other towns in the north would surrender to his army, Saladin attacked the principality of Antioch, and the victorious summer campaign of 1188 followed. See also al-Imad quoted in *R.H.C. Hist. Or.* IV, 352.

[50] C. Cahen in *Syria*, XV (1934), 351–360. Sulaiman was probably born in Frankish Jerusalem, and subsequently served the Shi'ite Caliph in Egypt. Later he returned to Palestine to be physician to King Amalric; one of his sons succeeded to this position, and another became riding master to Prince, afterwards King, Baldwin IV. During this service they maintained friendly relations with Ysa, a counsellor of Saladin, and sent a message to Saladin himself. After the Franks lost Jerusalem in 1187, the family remained in Ayubid service.

faith, but they were tied also to the Muslims by history, language and habits.[51] Such a historical background alone justifies the hypothesis that the Syrian Christians would have regarded the prospect of Frankish or Muslim rule with equanimity; it is also supported by available evidence.[52]

In the situation so far outlined in this section any fortified place was of the highest importance to the Franks, not only on the frontier, but wherever it stood. Throughout feudal society, the castle was a centre of authority. In Latin Syria that authority was needed to control a population which had been subdued by conquest and which, while docile enough in time of peace, could not be wholly relied upon during a period of invasion. A major attack could not be halted at the frontier; many times during the twelfth century Muslim armies penetrated deep into Latin territory. The Franks temporarily lost control of the open countryside, and in such a situation the most fundamental purpose of the castles is apparent. The authority of the Syrian Franks shrank back within the walls of their strongholds; for the time being their dominion could best be represented on the map not as an area bounded by a frontier line, but as a series of points which were their fortified places. On occasions they were so narrowly confined to the shelter of their walls, 'ut extra moenia nemo prorsus auderet comparere'.[53]

All the castles, whether they stood on the frontier or far behind it, had a part to play in resisting invasion; all had a more fundamental and continuous role as the physical basis of Latin overlordship and the centre from which it was exercised. On at least one occasion the needs of administration caused the Franks to build a castle. During the reign of Baldwin II difficulty was found in collecting the revenues due from the Muslim cultivators above Bairut, and the solution adopted was the construction of a castle on 'Mons Glavianus'.[54] Similar problems arose in those districts divided between Franks and Muslims. Such a division appears nearly always to have been made in terms of revenue,[55] and the collection of dues from reluctant Muslim peasants encouraged by the

[51] Jacobus de Vitriaco, 'Historia Orientalis', in *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ed. Bongars, I, 1089. James of Vitry knew Syria and the Syrians. 'Suriani...secreta Christianorum nuntiant Sarracenis, inter quos nutriti sunt, quorum etiam lingua libentius utuntur, quam alia, et quorum mores perversos ex parte magna imitantur.'

[52] At the capture of Edessa in 1144, Zanki showed no mercy to the Franks, but marked clemency to the Syrian Christians. Grousset, II, 866, 882, has drawn attention to the attitude revealed by an Anonymous Syrian account of the fall of Edessa. To the West, Zanki was a bloodstained monster, and his capture of the city provoked the second crusade. The Anonymous Syrian was able to preserve a far more neutral outlook. Elsewhere, like Michael the Syrian, he wrote passages which show how the language, race and culture which they shared with many Syrian Muslims could be stronger than the Christian belief which they shared with the Franks. See 'The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syrian Chronicle,' translated by A. S. Tritton, notes by H. A. R. Gibb, in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1933, pp. 276, 285, 293. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, ed. J. B. Chabot, III, 267, 270.

[53] Fulcher, p. 427. W.T. pp. 486, 784.

[54] Fulcher, p. 473: '...et quia ruricolae Sarraceni tributa locorum reddere antea nolebant, postea vi cohibiti reddibiles exstiterunt.'

[55] Ibn Jubair, p. 446. K.D. p. 651. I.Q. pp. 93, 106, 113.

proximity of the Muslim power with whom the Franks had divided the district was a possible administrative problem. Such a situation is described by William of Tyre in As-Sawad, and there again the Franks had introduced the necessary element of force in the form of a castle and its garrison. The same means were employed at Ouaïra, in the neighbourhood of Petra, when the inhabitants called in the Turks in an attempt to expel their Frankish masters.[56]

The castles strengthened Latin overlordship; they also ensured public order.[57] Some of them served literally as police posts,[58] while the greater degree of security which a newly-founded castle brought to its district could result in the development of the area and increased prosperity for its inhabitants. Such is the account given by William of Tyre of the social and economic results of the building of Blanchegarde at Tell es Safi to which reference has already been made.[59] Settlers moved into the neighbourhood of the new castle and the area became more productive.[60]

The lords of a castle which stood within sight of Blanchegarde actively fostered the colonization of the surrounding district. In 1136 King Fulk, as part of the long-term plan for the reduction of Ascalon, fortified Bait Jibrin. The Knights of the Hospital had already been given the place and certain near-by villages by Hugh of St Abraham,[61] and the new castle was given into the custody of the Order.[62] A charter of 1168 records a grant by its Master, Gilbert d'Assailly, to certain *burgensibus* whose names are given and most, if not all, of whom were Franks.[63] The concessions described in the charter

[56] W.T. p. 1090: '...nam cum praedicta regio hostium magis esset contermina finibus, quam nostris, et ipsi eam facilius pro suo possent tractare arbitrio, et ejus habitatoribus confidentius imperare, hujus tamen praesidii beneficio multis annis obtentum fuerat, et obtinebatur nihilominus in praesenti, quod nostris et illis ex aequo dividebatur potestas, et tributorum et vectigalium par fiebat distributio.' [57] W.T. p. 712.

[58] Castrum Arnaldi was built on the road from the coast to Jerusalem 'ad tutelam transeuntium peregrinorum'. W.T. p. 617.

[59] Information from William's great History has been frequently cited because, judged by any standard, it is evidence of first-class value. The author was a native of Palestine who spent nearly the whole of his life in the kingdom of Jerusalem (c. 1130–1184/5). From 1167, when he became archdeacon of Tyre and was commissioned by King Amalric to write a history of his reign, he remained for the rest of his life in close touch with the royal house and with the problems of government. Amalric made William tutor to his heir who in 1174 became King Baldwin IV; in the same year William became chancellor of the kingdom, and in the next archbishop of Tyre. He subsequently discharged political and diplomatic missions of the highest importance. He wrote of great events from personal experience. See Prutz, 'Studien über Wilhelm von Tyrus', in *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, VIII (1882), 93–132. Krey, 'William of Tyre: the Making of a Medieval Historian', in *Speculum*, XVI (1941), 149–66.

[60] W.T. p. 698: 'Porro qui circumcirca possidebant regionem, praedicto confisi munimine, et vicinitate castrorum, suburbana loca aedificaverunt quam plurima, habentes in eis familias multas et agrorum cultores; de quorum inhabitatione facta est regio tota securior, et alimentorum multa locis finitimis accessit copia.'

[61] *Reg[esta regni Hierosolymitani*, ed. Röhricht], no. 164. *Cart[ulaire générale de l'Ordre des] Hosp[italiers de St Jean de Jérusalem*, ed Delaville le Roulx], no. 116. Prutz, *Die geistlichen Ritterorden*, p. 50.

[62] W.T. p. 639. [63] *Reg.* no. 457. *Cart. Hosp.* no. 399.

were not new, for it is stated that they were made 'juxta tenorem concessionis ...predecessoris mei Raimundi', and Raymond had died nearly ten years earlier.[64]

The burgesses were each given land 'ad mansiones faciendas et laborandam terram', in respect of which each paid an annual rent (*terragium*) and tithe. The grant was made in perpetual inheritance and it could be sold or pledged (except to knights or to religious) provided that it was first offered to the Hospital at a fraction less than the proposed price, and provided that a payment was made to the Order in respect of each sale. The purpose of terms so much more attractive than the customary peasant tenures is clearly stated in the record: 'ut terra melius populetur'. The Order was colonizing an area controlled and protected by its castle at Bait Jibrin.

Thus castles helped to carry Latin rule and settlement into the broad coastal plain of southern Palestine. They enabled the Franks to establish themselves as well on the fertile plateau beyond the Jordan. The great strongholds of Kerak in the Desert and Shobak (Mons regalis), together with their smaller satellites, made possible the command and the exploitation of the Beduin of the area, and of the caravans and the pilgrims who passed along the Darb al Hajj from Damascus to Egypt or to the Holy Cities of Arabia.[65]

Many of these purposes for which castles were used are summed up in William of Tyre's account of King Amalric's intentions in fortifying Darum. He wrote: 'Condiderat autem rex ea intentione praedictum municipium, ut et fines suos dilataret, et suburbanorum adjacentium, quae nostri casalia dicunt, et annuos redditus, et de transeuntibus statutas consuetudines plenius et facilius sibi posset habere.'[66] Darum is mentioned by modern historians as one of the defences of the kingdom's southern border. William says nothing of defending a frontier. The castle extended the limits of the kingdom by bringing a new area under control. As an administrative centre it enabled the king to organize more easily and efficiently the collection of dues both from the villagers, and from the Beduin and caravans moving through the district.

V

Throughout feudal society the possession of castles affected and was affected by the relationship between lord and vassals. Latin Syria was no exception, although during the twelfth century conflicts between the two appear to have been rare. This may seem surprising in view of the standard accounts of the subject which describe an 'ideal' or 'colonial' feudalism, in which the authority

[64] The date of his death lies in the period 1158–60. Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte*, p. 60.

[65] All this is best discussed by Deschamps, *La Défense*, pp. 35–79. For the inducements to control Transjordan, see especially pp. 35, 49. For contemporary evidence of the profits to be extracted from the fief, see the terms on which Baldwin III granted it to Philip de Milly in 1161, in *Reg. no.* 366. [66] W.T. p. 975.

of the suzerain, and especially of the king of Jerusalem, is said to have been narrowly limited by the rights of his vassals and by the rigorous application of a feudal law to which he himself was subject. Such conclusions are based on accounts given by thirteenth-century jurists of the laws of the Latin Kingdom. In these Law Books accurate information on the early kingdom is mingled with versions of the laws and customs of Latin Syria during the twelfth century as remembered in the thirteenth and with the ideas and practices of the later Latin states in Syria and Cyprus. Since these works have never been properly edited, it is difficult to reconstruct from them any clear picture of the institutions of Latin Syria between the conquest and the loss of Jerusalem. Modern scholars have admirably described the kingdom of the thirteenth century; it is by no means certain that they have so well portrayed that of the twelfth.

The first five kings of Jerusalem were great men whose achievement has been underrated by posterity.[67] With small material resources they conquered, colonized, repelled counter-attack and organized stable government. They seem to have ruled in co-operation with their baronage. They were spared Louis VI's problems of constantly imposing control over unruly vassals, and during their reigns Jerusalem never suffered the lack of central control and the disorder known in Germany during the early years of the twelfth century or in England under Stephen. Internal order in Syria was partly a consequence of a constant threat of invasion; but equally effective was the succession of able kings who appear to have maintained a balanced relationship with their vassals while yielding none of their right to rule. The twelfth century was an age of successful feudal monarchies among which, until 1174, that of Jerusalem had its place.[68]

There were occasional conflicts, some of which involved civil war and fighting for the possession of castles;[69] and there was one occasion when the disposal of the castles of the kingdom as a whole was a matter of the highest political importance. In 1185 Baldwin IV died and was succeeded by an infant of a few months old. The regent was Raymond, count of Tripoli, who was supported by most of the baronage; but during the past ten years the problems of settling the regency and the succession had bitterly divided

[67] Among the greatest merits of Grousset's *Histoire des Croisades* is his revaluation of the personal qualities and of the solid achievements of these rulers.

[68] It failed to survive because it was not rooted sufficiently deeply in institutions. As elsewhere in feudal society, too much depended on the personal ability of the monarch. After 1174 the accession to the throne of minors and women raised grave problems of regency and succession. These bred faction, and the weakening of authority coincided with the rise of Saladin's power and the development of his designs against the Latin kingdom. The result was Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem.

[69] In 1152 Baldwin III wished to bring his minority to an end and to begin personal rule. He was resisted by his mother, who hitherto had exercised power alone, advised by the Constable. In the brief civil war which followed, the Queen Mother was besieged in the citadel of Jerusalem, and the Constable in his castle of Mirabel at Majdal Yaba. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, II, 315–20.

the magnates, so that Raymond had powerful enemies among members of the royal family and their friends. If the semblance of unity was to be preserved in the face of Saladin, a solution acceptable to both factions was needed for two questions of particular delicacy: the custody of the royal infant and of the royal castles. The count wished to remove any cause which his opponents might have of suspecting his intentions; the castles were therefore delivered into the keeping of the Military Orders.[70]

Since the Hospital had been given Bait Jibrin in 1137, the Orders had been acquiring castles with all appurtenances, generally not merely in custody, but in perpetual frankalmoign. These concessions made to the knights were transfers not only of property but of power. Feudal government in Latin Syria during the twelfth century was progressively weakened, not because lords and vassals failed to achieve a satisfactory relationship, but because lands, castles, powers and rights over men had continually to be conceded to Orders which were not wholly part of the feudal structure. In the special conditions of Syria the landholding feudal knighthood lacked the resources to discharge its duties to society in war and government, and the well endowed Orders had increasingly to take its place.

The growing ineffectiveness of the military tenants was due in the first place to their lack of numbers. Throughout the century a succession of appeals for reinforcement was sent to Europe,[71] and knightly recruits prepared to settle in Syria were made welcome. The feudal tenants were further weakened by poverty, for they were the victims of both man and of nature. All sources of our knowledge of the period record the recurrence of earthquakes, drought, plagues of locusts and small-scale feudal warfare between Frankish seigneurs and Muslim amirs. The consequences were the failure of crops, the laying waste of cultivated land, the interruption of commercial intercourse. Peasants and other tenants could not pay their dues to their feudal lords, whose revenues, on which depended the organization of effective government and military action, could be seriously diminished. It is significant that the jurists considered the circumstances in which the poverty of lord or vassal temporarily destroyed the normal feudal relationship. The fact that such conditions were discussed in the oldest of the law books, the Livre au Roi, written soon after the loss of Jerusalem, suggests that they were a reality during the twelfth century. Some reasons for such poverty are also mentioned: 'aucune mauvaise année, pestilence, Sarasins.'[72] There was another: the payment of ransoms.[73]

[70] *Chronique d'Ernoul*, ed. Mas Latrie, p. 116. Baldwin, *Raymond III of Tripolis*, pp. 58, 70.

[71] See Letters in *Reg.* nos. 261, 383, 394, 396, 404, 497.

[72] Le Livre au Roi, in *R.H.C.* Lois, *Les Assises de Jérusalem*, I, 625. See Grandeclaude, *Étude critique sur les Livres des Assises de Jérusalem*, pp. 46–50, where this work is assigned to the years 1197–1205.

[73] In 1158, Hugh III of Ibelin, 'captivitatis redemptione compulsus', sold two casales to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; *Reg.* nos. 332, 333. At the same time Ralph, one of his

That such conditions chiefly account for the opportunities given to the Orders of acquiring castles is apparent from the charters. Land near Muslim-held territory entailed the heaviest military responsibility and was the most uncertain as a source of profit. When in 1186 the castle of Marqab, one of the largest and most powerful in all Syria, was sold to the Hospital, its lord sold it 'prae nimiis expensis et nimia infidelium vicinitate'.[74] In 1142 the count of Tripoli had ceded to the same Order the castle which was to become known as the Crac des Chevaliers, together with all his rights in an area to the north and east, including Rafaniya and Ba'rin.[75] These two places had been taken by Zanki five years earlier, and the other castles and lands named in the grant had thereby become an area exposed to frequent enemy attack. This is the first of many grants of extensive border areas to be made in Northern Syria to both Orders during the rest of the century.[76] Feudal poverty is further reflected in the grant to the Hospital of two castles, 'Arqa and Jebel Akkar, destroyed by an earthquake, and in the sale of castles by William of Maraclea and a vassal of the Prince of Galilee.[77]

The Orders were thus acquiring both property and governmental powers. This would not have affected the feudal basis of rule in Latin Syria, if those powers had been exercised under the king or other feudal magnates, and if full services had been rendered. But these conditions were never satisfied. The Orders took all homage and services due from the lands conceded to them, but themselves held in frankalmoign. They rendered military aid not as tenants owing service to a feudal overlord, but as powerful international Orders which became progressively more free of feudal control in Syria. This progress towards freedom is reflected in the terms on which they acquired the castles. They used occasions of grant or sale to negotiate special privileges. They won the right to negotiate their own truces with the Muslim, independently of the feudal prince, and to be exempt from the normal custom of dividing spoils of war.[78] Although these charters are in the form of a grant from the feudal prince to the Orders, they read like treaties between equal and independent powers.[79] The castles were intimately connected with this changed balance of forces in government, and with the decline of the feudal organization on which the Latin states had originally been founded.

The crusaders' castles protected the Latin settlement against external attack,

knights, 'de captivitate Turcorum rediens', also sold some property, 'ut pretium redemptionis solvere possit'. *Reg.* no. 335. In 1161 John Gothman sold five casales for 1400 besants to the canons of the Holy Sepulchre, 'urgente necessitate videlicet redemptione de paganorum captivitate'; *Reg.* no. 369.

[74] *Reg.* nos. 647, 649. *Cart. Hosp.* no. 783

[75] *Reg.* no. 212. *Cart. Hosp.* no. 144.

[76] On this series of grants, see Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 511–17. Richard, *Le comté de Tripoli*, p. 63.

[77] *Reg.* nos. 378, 448. *Cart. Hosp.* nos. 317, 398.

[78] For examples see *Reg.* nos. 212, 428, 452, 649. *Cart. Hosp.* nos. 144, 391, 402, 783.

[79] See especially *Reg.* nos. 428, 452. *Cart. Hosp.* nos. 391, 402.

and in that defence the frontier castles had a special part to play; but that is neither the whole nor even the most important part of the matter. The castles were also the instruments of conquest and colonization, and continuously embodied part of the force on which Latin dominion rested. The castle was not only a fortress. It is hoped that 'something has been done here to correct that exaggerated vision, and...to build up a more reasonable conception of what the castle stood for in the political and social life of its time'.[80]

[80] W. Mackay Mackenzie, *The Medieval Castle in Scotland*, p. 213.