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IN ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT GERHART V. GRAEVENITZ

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON

RICHARD BRINKMANN UND WALTER HAUG

INHALT 1/1987

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»Literatur ist ein hartes Männergeschäft
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Das muß jede Autorin erfahren,
wenn sie das Wort Ich gebraucht.«

Christa Reining in »alternative«, 1976



Barbara Becker-Cantarino
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Anhand von umfangreichem Quellenmaterial, den Methoden und Fragestellungen der Sozialgeschichte und der Frauenforschung werden in dieser Studie die soziale Rolle der Frau und ihre Lebensbereiche dargestellt: als Ehefrau, als Nonne, die Frau in Erziehung und Unterricht, die literarisch und kulturell tätige Frau. Nur innerhalb dieser Rollen und Lebensbereiche, nicht etwa in Politik oder Wissenschaft, wird weibliche Selbsterfahrung als solche artikuliert. Die zeitliche Eingrenzung dieser Studie von 1500 bis 1800 erwies sich als sinnvoll, weil mit der Reformation die Domestizierung der Frau zur Norm wird, eine Situation, die sich erst im Verlauf des 19. Jahrhunderts allmählich zu verändern beginnt.

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Cathedral Schools and Humanist Learning, 950-1150

By C. STEPHEN JAEGER (Seattle, Washington)

ABSTRACT

Der Humanismus des 12. Jahrhunderts formte sich in den Kathedralschulen des späten 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts. Aus einem an *ethica* und *moralitas* orientierten Kurrikulum ergab sich die Einheit der weltlichen Wissenschaften in Frankreich und Deutschland. Als dieser Humanismus durch die Frühscholastik verdrängt wurde, ging er in den Bereich der weltlichen Höfe über, um dort als höfische Erziehung hervorzutreten.

The curriculum of *litterae et mores* at cathedral schools of the late 10th and 11th centuries is essential in the formation of 12th century humanism. This curriculum, oriented to *ethica* and *moralitas*, accounts for the unity of secular learning in the period. When early Scholasticism displaced humanist learning at the schools, it passed into the realm of the courts and emerged as courtly education.

The humanist strain in twelfth century culture represented by figures like Bernard Silvester, John of Salisbury and Alan of Lille has its roots in the late tenth and eleventh centuries. Charles Homer Haskins knew very well that the more embracing renewal he called the "renaissance of the twelfth century" grew out of developments in the preceding age, and he called the eleventh century "that obscure period of origins which holds the secret of the new movement."¹ The factor that especially favors that obscurity and guards that secret is the apparent poverty of intellectual and artistic achievement in the centers of worldly learning, the cathedral schools. The privilege that modern historians of culture give to such sources is a hindrance to understanding the vitality of the eleventh century. It directs us where there is no path and blocks the way that is open to us.² If we privileged intellectual and artistic achievement in judging fourteenth and fifteenth century Italy, then we could scrap three-quarters of Burckhardt's *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, put aside his idea that the

¹ C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (1927; rpt. 1972), p. 16.

² R. W. Southern made a fundamental point on the use of sources in his article, "The Place of England in the Twelfth Century Renaissance," *History*, 45 (1960), 201-16; rpt. in his *Medieval Humanism and other Essays* (1970), pp. 158-80: that it is necessary to look behind and beyond the most prominent documents to define that place. For Europe in the late tenth and eleventh centuries, it is necessary to look behind and beyond the lack of them.

state and statesmanship can themselves be regarded as works of art, and throw out his entire notion that political conditions, court life, and the development of ideals of the individual preceded the revival of learning, art and literature, and created the necessary presuppositions of that renewal.

If we compare the visible achievements of the century and a half between 950 and 1100 with its intellectual and cultural energy, the discrepancy is evident. Here are some indications that much was stirring in the period:

It produced a number of eminent men praised by contemporaries for their learning and teaching: Brun of Cologne, Gerbert of Aurillac, Fulbert of Chartres, Meinhard of Bamberg, Bernard of Chartres. And yet none of them wrote any works of note, apart from their letters.

The manuscript tradition of Plato's *Timaeus* virtually begins for the Middle Ages in the eleventh century.³ For the period 850–900 one manuscript survives; for 900–950 two; for 950–1000 four. Then suddenly the first half of the eleventh century produces fifteen manuscripts, most of them from Germany; the second half fourteen, also largely from Germany. The preoccupation with Plato's work in that country was so intense that by the end of the century it provoked a polemic from Manegold of Lautenbach.⁴ He attacks opinions and interpretations of German *philosophi*, some of which turn up a few decades later in works of Peter Abelard.⁵ The thrust of the teaching which Manegold opposes is that the *Timaeus* is reconcilable with Christian doctrine. This is of course a favorite idea of the "School of Chartres." It provides the basis of Thierry of Chartres' Hexameron commentary.⁶ And the more general problem of reconciling the ancient philosophers with Christian doctrine is the basic focus of Abelard's *Theologia Christiana*. In other words, some of the central problems that were to occupy the leading schools, or at least the leading representatives of secular philosophy in twelfth century France were intensely debated in eleventh century Germany. And that work which was to play such a major role in the philosophi-

³ R. W. Southern, *Platonism, Scholastic Method, and the School of Chartres*, The Stenton Lecture 1978 (1979), p. 14. For the list of manuscripts see *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*, ed. J. H. Waszink, Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi: Plato Latinus, 4 (1975), pp. CVI–CXXXI. See also Margaret Gibson, "The Study of the 'Timaeus' in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," *Pensamiento*, 25 (1969), 183–94.

⁴ Manegold von Lautenbach, *Liber contra Wolfelmum*, ed. Wilfried Hartmann, MGH, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 8 (1972).

⁵ This is one of the important findings in Wilfried Hartmann's study, "Manegold von Lautenbach und die Anfänge der Frühscholastik," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters*, 26 (1970), 7–149, esp. p. 77ff.

⁶ N. M. Häring, "The Creation and the Creator of the World according to Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras," *AHDLM*, 22 (1955), 137–216. The text of Thierry's tract is also printed in Häring's edition *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Studies and Texts, 20 (1971), 553–75. See the comments of Southern, *Platonism etc.* p. 25ff.

cal commentary and poetry of France, Plato's *Timaeus*, first came to prominence in the eleventh century. We know of a Manegold, a German teaching in Paris around 1080, who was the teacher of William of Champeaux and Anselm of Laon, and is called *modernorum magister magistrorum*. This probably was that same Manegold of Lautenbach, himself a teacher of worldly philosophy and of the Platonic cosmology before he became an adversary.⁷ And apart from the striking testimony of Manegold's polemic against Wolfhelm of Brauweiler, the writings against worldly learning by conservative monks like Peter Damian and Otloh of St. Emmeram show us a very lively academic scene, both in Italy and Germany.⁸ Writings or not, there was plenty of activity.

The secular courts of Germany in the eleventh century also show us a lively scene, one that deserves to be called at least "prerenaissance."⁹

These are preliminary signs of renewal, symptoms of the coming outburst of brilliant cultural achievements in twelfth century France. The larger web of relationships in which the connections become evident has been hard to identify, partly because the rumblings occurred in Germany and the eruption they preceded occurred in France. The traditions of modern historical writing did not favor interpretations deriving the latter from the former. Drawing the lines of development in detail is not the object of this study. It aims at establishing the following points: 1) the humanism of the twelfth century has its roots in that of the eleventh; 2) there is a unity and continuity of secular learning in Germany and France in the period, which is disturbed and gradually supplanted by early scholasticism; 3) the needs of administration at secular and ecclesiastical courts determine a humanistic curriculum, oriented strongly to *ethica*. It has its institutional accommodation at cathedral schools. This symbiosis begins to break up in the second half of the eleventh century in Germany and in the middle decades

⁷ For a thorough discussion and perhaps overly cautious weighing of the evidence for and against this identification, see Hartmann, "Manegold," p. 49ff.

⁸ On Otloh's opposition to worldly learning, see Helga Schauwecker, *Otloh von St. Emmeram: Ein Beitrag zur Bildungs- und Frömmigkeitsgeschichte des 11. Jahrhunderts*, Diss. Würzburg (1962), pp. 165ff. On Peter Damian, J. A. Endres, *Petrus Damiani und die weltliche Wissenschaft*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie im Mittelalter, 8,3 (1910); A. Cantin, *Les sciences séculières et la foi: Les deux voies de la science au jugement de S. Pierre Damien (1007–1072)* (1975). On this opposition in general, Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, Vol. I (1909; rpt. 1957), pp. 215ff.; Pierre Riché, *Écoles et enseignement dans l'occident chrétien de la fin du Ve siècle au milieu du XIe siècle* (1979), pp. 335–344.

⁹ On classical revival in the eleventh century see P. E. Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio: Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Erneuerungsgedankens vom Ende des karolingischen Reiches bis zum Investiturstreit*, 2nd ed. (1957); Reto R. Bezzola, *Les origines et la formation de la littérature courtoise en occident (500–1200)*: Vol. 1: *La tradition impériale de la fin de l'antiquité au XIe siècle* (1944), pp. 239–282; C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Origins of Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals, 939–1210* (1985), pp. 113ff.

of the twelfth in France. At this point humanist learning gradually passes into the realm of the secular courts and emerges as courtly education.

1. Cathedral Schools

The development of cathedral schools is our point of departure.¹⁰ Episcopal schools existed since late antiquity, though they rose and fell in prominence with the coming and going of single masters. They stood in the shadow of monastic schools in Carolingian times, and indeed in the earlier period the nature of education there is hardly distinguishable from monastic education.¹¹ As institutions distinct from monastic schools, they appear not to have found a sustaining goal until the mid-tenth century. At that point they began to flourish. We hear praise of the Magdeburg school in mid-century, of the great crowds of students there, of the intense interest in secular studies aroused by the "second Cicero," Master Ohtricus, a teacher of such distinction and learning that he was later to debate with Gerbert of Aurillac in Ravenna before Otto II and his court.¹² By 952 Würzburg is flourishing under an Italian master, Stefan of Novara, called to the north by Otto the Great and Bishop Poppo of Würzburg.¹³ By 953 the Cologne school comes into prominence under the episcopacy of Otto's brother, Brun of Cologne, a great educator and statesman, called by his biographer a reviver of the seven liberal arts.¹⁴ This school will produce some of the most

¹⁰ Paré, Tremblay and Brunet were quite right in making this the focal point of their study, *La renaissance du XIIe siècle: Les écoles et l'enseignement*, Publications de l'institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa (1933). But their focus was so tightly on France and the seven liberal arts that many of the essential features of education at cathedral schools are not touched.

¹¹ See Josef Fleckenstein, *Die Bildungsreform Karls des Grossen als Verwirklichung der norma rectitudinis* (1953), p. 23; Rosamond McKitterick, *The Frankish Kingdom under the Carolingians, 751–987* (1983), p. 147f.

¹² On Magdeburg and Ohtricus, see *Vita S. Adalberti III*, MGH, SS 4, p. 582 (11.29–37); *Brunonis vita Adalb. V*, MGH, SS 4, p. 597 (1.14ff.); *Annales Magdeburgenses a. 982*, MGH, SS 16, p. 155 (1.40ff.). On Ohtricus and Gerbert, *Richeri Historiae III*, 55–65, MGH, SS rer. germ. in us. schol. (1839), pp. 136–43. For some discussion of the debate see Margaret T. Gibson, "The artes in the eleventh century," in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge*, Actes du quatrième congrès international de philosophie médiévale (1969), 121–126. On the Magdeburg school under Ohtricus, F. A. Specht, *Geschichte des Unterrichtswesens in Deutschland von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Mitte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts* (1885), pp. 350–53.

¹³ See Orlof of St. Emmeram, *Vita Wolfkangi IV–V*, MGH, SS 4, p. 528. On Stefan, L. F. Benedetto, "Stephanus grammaticus da Novara," *Studi Medievali*, 3 (1908–11), 499–508; Josef Fleckenstein, "Königshof und Bischofsschule unter Otto dem Grossen," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 38 (1956), p. 53 f.

¹⁴ See Fleckenstein, "Königshof und Bischofsschule," passim. Otto Zimmermann, *Brun I., Erzbischof von Köln und die in den Schulen seiner Zeit gepflegte Wissenschaft*, Diss. Leipzig, 1871.

illustrious intellectuals, statesmen, educators, and bishops of the next generation. By 954 we hear Hildesheim praised as a center of learning¹⁵; by 956 Trier.¹⁶ In the last quarter of the century, under the guidance of the next generation of scholars – many of them students of Brun – Worms, Liège, Mainz, Speyer, Bamberg and Regensburg¹⁷ come to life; in France Rheims under Gerbert¹⁸, and some decades later Chartres under Gerbert's pupil, Bishop Fulbert (1006–28).¹⁹ These schools are regularly referred to as "a second Athens," the better loved teachers as "noster Plato," "noster Socrates," "alter Cicero."²⁰ In a commemorative

¹⁵ On Hildesheim, see Specht, pp. 343–50. G. von Detten, *Über die Dom- und Klosterschulen des Mittelalters, insbesondere über die Schulen von Hildesheim, Paderborn, Münster und Corvey* (1893). On the importance of Hildesheim for supplying the staff of Otto the Great, H. W. Klewitz, "Königtum, Hofkapelle und Domkapitel im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert," *Archiv für Urkundenforschung*, 16 (1938), p. 108ff. Also Herbert Zielinski, *Der Reichsepiskopat in spätottonischer und salischer Zeit (1002–1125)*, Teil I (1984), pp. 89–91, esp. 135–139.

¹⁶ See Emil Lèsne, *Histoire de la propriété ecclésiastique en France*, Vol. V: *Les écoles de la fin du VIIIe siècle à la fin du XIIe* (1940), p. 368ff.

¹⁷ On Regensburg see Specht, pp. 379–87; Bernard Bischoff, "Literarisches und künstlerisches Leben in St. Emmeram (Regensburg) während des frühen und hohen Mittelalters," in his *Mittelalterliche Studien: Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Schriftkunde und Literaturgeschichte*, Vol. II (1967), 77–115. On Bamberg, Carl Erdmann, "Die Bamberger Domschule im Investiturstreit," *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, 9 (1936), 1–46; Zielinski, *Reichsepiskopat* (above, n. 15), pp. 84–86, 147; Johannes Fried, "Die Bamberger Domschule und die Rezeption von Frühscholastik und Rechtswissenschaft in ihrem Umkreis bis zum Ende der Stauferzeit," in *Schulen und Studium im sozialen Wandel des hohen und späten Mittelalters*, ed. Johannes Fried, Vorträge und Forschungen, 30 (1986), 163–201. On Liège, Charles Renardy, "Les écoles Liégeoises du XIe et XIIe siècle," *Revue Belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 57 (1979), 309–328; Godefroid Kurth, *Notger de Liège et la civilisation au XIe siècle* (1905).

¹⁸ See Lèsne, p. 271ff.; John R. Williams, "The Cathedral School of Rheims in the eleventh century," *Speculum*, 19 (1954), 661–77; idem., "The Cathedral School of Rheims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118–36," *Traditio*, 20 (1964), 93–114. On Gerbert, Oscar G. Darlington, "Gerbert the Teacher," *American Historical Review*, 52 (1946/47), 456–76; Uta Lindgren, *Gerbert von Aurillac und das Quadrivium: Untersuchungen zur Bildung im Zeitalter der Ottonen*, Sudhoffs Archiv, Beiheft, 18 (1976); Hélène Gasc, "Gerbert et la pédagogie des arts libéraux à la fin du dixième siècle," *Journal of Medieval History*, 12 (1986), 111–21.

¹⁹ See Lèsne, p. 152ff. Also the introduction to Frederick Behrends edition, *The Letters and Poems of Fulbert of Chartres*, Oxford Medieval Texts (1976). And Loren C. McKinney, *Bishop Fulbert and Education at the school of Chartres*, Texts and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education, 6 (1957); A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen-âge (du Ve au XVIe siècle)* (1895; rpt. 1965).

²⁰ Regensburg a "second Athens" (Specht, p. 382); Liège in the first half of the eleventh century "a second Athens . . . in literary studies it beggars Plato's academy, in the observance of religion it leaves Leo's Rome far behind" (Gozechinus or Goswin of Mainz, *Gozechini epistola ad Walcherum VI*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, 62 [1985], p. 15; earlier ed. PL 143, 889A). Hamburg-Bremen under Bp. Adalbert (d. 1072) "a second Rome" (Adam of Bremen, *Hamburgische Kirchengeschichte XXIII*, ed. B. Schmeidler, 3d. ed., MGH, SS rer. germ. in us. schol., 2 [1917; rpt. 1977], p. 167. Tournai under Master Udo (1087–92) a "second Athens" (Paré et al., *La*

ative poem from ca. 1012 Bamberg is praised as the "city of letters [or learning], [its citizens] no wit inferior to the Stoics, greater than the Athenians."²¹

In short, some 12 major cathedral schools emerged in the comparatively brief space of 60 years. Clearly some sort of sudden and dramatic growth was taking place in these centers in the second half of the tenth century, and equally clear is that the German schools preceded the French. The reasons for this renewal have been discussed by the historian Josef Fleckenstein in his article, "Königshof und Bischofsschule unter Otto dem Grossen" (above, n. 13). Fleckenstein understands this development as the work of Brun of Cologne in concert with his brother Otto the Great. These two form a purposeful conception of the role of cathedral schools, and this conception raises the fate of the schools above the vagaries of what professor happens to be where. That vagary may still determine the distinction of a particular school and its power to attract students at a given time, but not its educational goal. That remains more or less consistent until the rise of universities at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth centuries. The first flourishing schools are in the episcopal centers favored by the emperor: Magdeburg, Würzburg, Cologne, Hildesheim and Mainz. Clearly imperial patronage was the impetus for their dramatic growth, as Fleckenstein argues.

The emperor had found a purpose for the episcopal school, one it had not had before. In the Carolingian revival, the schools had taken on the role of educating laymen and clerics to read the Bible and of preparing clergymen for their pastoral and liturgical duties. The goal was correction and reformation of the religious life according to the *norma rectitudinis*.²² The new purpose was to educate statesmen and administrators. The goal was not knowledge for its own sake or knowledge for the glory and worship of God, but rather knowledge to be applied in the practical duties of running the empire. Brun of Cologne as imperial chancellor is known for transforming the royal chapel into a sort of

renaissance p. 23). Fulbert of Chartres, "noster Socrates" (Adelman of Liège to Berengar of Tours, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, "Textes latins du XIe au XIIIe siècle," *Studi Medievali*, 3rd ser., 8 (1967), p. 476; (earlier ed., PL 143, 1289A). Ohtricus of Magdeburg "Cicero unus" (MGH, SS 4, 597, l. 15).

²¹ The poem is by Abbot Gerhard of Seeon. MGH, Poet. Lat., 5, p. 398 (ll. 33ff.): "Non minus ista Sepher Cariath [cf. Joshua 15, 15: *Sepher Cariath* = *civitas litterarum*] cluit arte scienter, / Inferior Stoicis nequaquam, maior Athenis."

²² See Fleckenstein, *Bildungsreform* (above, n. 11), passim. Franz Brunhölzl, "Der Bildungsauftrag der Hofschule," in *Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben*, ed. B. Bischoff, Vol. II: *Geistiges Leben*, p. 32: "Soweit das Bildungsprogramm die Schulen... betrifft, lässt es sich auf die kurze Formel bringen: Ziel des Unterrichts ist die Vermittlung der Fähigkeit, die Bibel zu lesen und zu verstehen; die artes liberales liefern die hierzu erforderlichen Grundfertigkeiten. Das wäre eine rein theologische, ja geistliche Zielsetzung."

academy of philosophy and school for imperial bishops.²³ The instruction that turned gifted young men into trained administrators and loyal supporters of the emperor originated at court, in the chapel. But it was so valuable that it spilled over the borders of that tiny, elite institution, and sought accommodation elsewhere. This gave cathedral schools their new role. The passage of Brun of Cologne from the imperial chapel to the see of Cologne is representative for the shift: he took this particular brand of instruction with him from the court to the cathedral. This, briefly summarized, is Fleckenstein's argument. Others before him noticed that individual schools took on the task of training men for administrative and state service,²⁴ but Fleckenstein's study is so important because he shows this role to be the impetus for the rise of cathedral schools generally in the mid-tenth century, and he shows the logical integration of these schools into the Ottonian "imperial church system." Cathedral school education becomes identical with preparation for service at court, be it secular or episcopal.²⁵ This is an insight of fundamental importance for our understanding of early medieval education and of the beginnings of the twelfth century renaissance.

II. Letters and Manners

The many studies of education in the earlier Middle Ages²⁶ have taught us a great deal about the curriculum. We have a good idea of the books read and the

²³ Cf. the description of his influence at court by his biographer, Ruotger, *Ruotgers Lebensbeschreibung des Erzbischofs Brun von Köln*, V–VIII, ed. Irene Ott, MGH, SS. rer. germ., N. S., 10 (1951), pp. 6–9.

²⁴ Klewitz, "Königtum, Hofkapelle und Domkapitel" (above, n. 16), and Erdmann, "Die Bamberger Domschule" (above, n. 18).

²⁵ Zielinski's recent book (above, n. 15) contains an important statistical and prosopographical study of the close interrelations of cathedral school, royal chapel and episcopate. It represents a strong confirmation of Fleckenstein's thesis: cathedral school education prepared men for service at the imperial court and in the episcopate.

²⁶ In addition to the major works by Specht, Clerval, Lèsne and Paré-Tremblay-Brunet already cited, the following more recent works deserve mention: Philippe Delhay, "L'Organisation scolaire au XIe siècle," *Traditio*, 5 (1947), 211–68; Luitpold Wallach, "Education and Culture in the Tenth Century," *Mediaevalia et Humanistica*, 9 (1955), 18–22; Hans Liebeschütz, "The Debate on Philosophical Learning During the Transition Period (900–1080)," in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. H. Armstrong (1970), pp. 587–610; Margaret Gibson, "The Continuity of Learning circa 850–circa 1050," *Viator*, 6 (1975), 1–13; on Gerbert of Aurillac see the works cited in n. 19 above; Pierre Riché, *Education et culture dans l'occident barbare, VIe–VIIIe siècles*, 3rd ed. (1972); idem., *Les écoles et l'enseignement dans l'Occident chrétien* (above, n. 8); Cora Lutz, *Schoolmasters of the Tenth Century* (1977); Zielinski, *Der Reichsepiskopat* (above, n. 15), pp. 74–164; Rolf Köhn, "Schulbildung und Trivium im lateinischen Hochmittelalter und ihr möglicher praktischer Nutzen," in *Schulen und Studium* (above, n. 17), pp. 203–284. A number of essays relevant to our topic in *La scuola nell' occidente latino dell' alto medioevo*, Settimane di studio del centro Italiano di studi sull' alto

subjects taught. But it is not yet clear in what way the period 950–1100/1150 forms a unity, to what extent education at the cathedral schools in this period is distinguished from what came before, from what followed and from what was going on at the same time in monastic schools. The tendency to see all education against the monastic model and within the scheme of the seven liberal arts is a factor which particularly obscures the role of cathedral schools. But this obscurity is hard to dispel given the nature of the sources. Writings from the monasteries are many, and writings from the cathedrals are few. From the late tenth and early eleventh centuries we have some lists of *auctores*, some library catalogues,²⁷ schemes of studies and discussions of them. We have some descriptions of education in history and biography, some school poetry, and a handful of commentaries and tracts. Deriving our understanding of education at an eleventh century cathedral school from the authors read and the works written there is like writing history of the theater from lists of plays performed and from theoretical treatises by actors. If in a particular period the repertoire does not change much and there are no theoretical treatises (and there never are – actors do not write), then we might conclude that period was not original or productive. And if from the same period which we have just judged unoriginal and unproductive we have many rave reviews from critics, then we might say that given the lack of originality and productivity in the theater, such reviews must be taken as an indication of the low expectations and bad taste of the period. Of course, such an interpretation is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what a theater is and what it does. This, I would suggest, is the predicament of historians of education for the eleventh century. There is a great deal of talk about flourishing schools and great teachers, but there are no works of philosophy, little poetry and few commentaries by masters. Therefore, the schools of Germany – and of course France, where the same holds true – must be judged to “show little vitality from within,” as Haskins thought.²⁸

But there is as strong a distortion in the sources as in the lack of them. To make a start in getting around it, I want to pursue the “scheme” or the framework of studies indicated in the formula *litterae et mores*, “letters” and – if I may translate it in this loose but convenient way – “manners.”²⁹ The phrase is

medioevo, 19, 2 vols. (1972). The good survey by Robert Lerner, “Literacy and Learning,” is easy to overlook because of the textbook nature of the publication it appeared in: *One Thousand Years: Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. Richard De Molen (1974), pp. 165–223.

²⁷ See G. Glauche, “Die Rolle der Schulaufgaben im Unterricht von 800 bis 1100,” in *La scuola*, vol. II (above, note 26), pp. 617–36.

²⁸ Haskins, *Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, p. 16: “As we come into the eleventh century, German culture shows little vitality from within.”

²⁹ Some observations on the formula in *Origins of courtliness*, pp. 213–19.

very common in descriptions of cathedral school education. It occurs in a variety of forms. As schoolmaster at Trier (ca. 957) Wolfgang, later Bishop of Regensburg, taught not only *liberales doctrinae* but also *morales disciplinae*.³⁰ Wazo as schoolmaster at Liège (1008–42) is said to have given instruction in the disciplines *tam morum quam litterarum*.³¹ Bernward of Hildesheim was sent to school *litteris imbuendus, moribus etiam instituendus*.³² The phrase occurs in variants like *sapientia et mores, ingenium et mores*. This is certainly not a topos without much content cribbed from ancient notions on the education of an orator. Examples outside of the standard topical section of a vita on the man’s education show clearly the vitality of the formula. Some students of Würzburg wrote a poem in 1031 in answer to an attack on their school by the scholars of Worms. The poem praises the virtues of their school at length and calls it a flowing spring out of which one drinks the “doctrine of eloquence and of proper conduct of life” (*recte vivendi et dogma loquendi*).³³ That is, their school teaches rhetoric or oratory (proper speaking) and ethics (proper living), clearly a variant of “letters and manners.” In the context of an answer to an attack the phrase had to convey something of substance. Whether or not the school of Würzburg poured forth this two-fold doctrine as abundantly as its students claimed, such a doctrine had to exist; the students of Worms could not have been answered with an empty phrase.

A more telling example is from a letter of the Bamberg schoolmaster Meinhard written around 1060. This letter must be considered a major text in the history of education in the eleventh century. Meinhard answers a request from his bishop, Gunther of Bamberg, for a book on the Christian faith. He begins, “First you entangle me in all the busy cares of a headmaster, and now you are after me . . . for another work, a task not just arduous but downright impossible.” He goes on with this interesting complaint: “If the only task placed in my care were the instruction of young minds in the liberal arts – and many earlier writers argue for this single curriculum – then the rigors of the task and the reputation gained by it would be sufficient pay for me. Now however, those

³⁰ Otloh, *Vita Wolfkangi* VII, MGH, SS 4, 529, l. 3f.: “Juvenes . . . non solum liberalibus exercebat doctrinis, verum etiam moralibus informabat disciplinis.”

³¹ *Gesta ep. Leod.* XL, MGH, SS 7, 210: “In quarum [scolarum] studio tam morum quam litterarum vigilantissime exercuit disciplinam, eos qui pro his moribus essent, licet minus litteratos, longe his anteponens, quibus, ut in plerisque solet, scientia litterarum vanae gloriae peperisset stulticiam.”

³² *Vita Bernwardi* I, MGH, SS 4, 758 (ll. 16–17).

³³ *Die ältere Wormser Briefsammlung*, ed. Walther Bulst, MGH, Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit, 3 (1949), pp. 119–127, here p. 127 (ll. 264–65): “Istinc si discis, statim sensu resipiscis, / Recte vivendi potans et dogma loquendi.”

who are placed at the head of schools are taxed in a dual function for the profit of the church: for they spend the first part of their fortunes in forming *mores* and squander the second part in teaching letters."³⁴ Here "letters and manners" cannot be an empty topos. Schoolmasters do not groan under the burden of meaningless formulae, certainly not when they explain to their bishops why they lack the time to write books. And bishops cannot be persuaded how hard their staff is working by the appeal to non-existent schemes of studies, any more than deans and provosts now can. Meinhard actually taught something called *mores*, and it took a lot of his time, time he would rather have devoted to liberal studies. Particularly interesting is Meinhard's sense of the history of this double instruction within other schemes of studies. It is comparatively recent. Earlier masters got along without it. And while it is, unfortunately, not clear who or what is meant by the *studia veterum*, Meinhard knew Cicero and Quintilian well enough not to include them among the earlier writers who argued for a curriculum in the liberal arts alone. In any case it is the schoolmasters of the present ("Verum *nunc* qui perfecti scholarum habentur"), who are taxed doubly, not just in Bamberg but at schools generally. Telling also is that the instruction in letters and manners is given *pro ecclesiastico usu*, and that must mean in the midst of all this mercantile language, "to profit the church." Why the church? If *mores* meant proper comportment for young men and nothing more, then why not *pro scholario usu*? I will offer some thoughts on this later.

Meinhard gives us a second telling bit of testimony to the reality of this formula. In another letter he commiserates with an unknown recipient on the death of the master of his school: now studies have died, the "light of letters" (*lumen litterarum*) is snuffed out, and "the moral discipline most excellently established and of long standing" is dead and buried. But Meinhard acknowledges with gratitude the arrival of a youth from this bereaved diocese, who has been sent to the Bamberg "workshop" for an education, so that those two marks of the school's former excellence, "letters and manners," may be revived

³⁴ *Briefsammlungen der Zeit Heinrichs IV.*, ed. Carl Erdmann and Norbert Fickermann, MGH, Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit, 5 (1950), pp. 238–39 (*Weitere Briefe Meinhard's*, nr. 39): "Cum me negociosissimi magistratus cura implicueris, urges tamen et instas... ut novam operam, non tam arduam et difficilem quam plane impossibilem suscipiam... Equidem si excubie nostre solis adolescentum ingenii liberali eruditione excolendis assiderent, quod unicum curriculum pleraque veterum studia sibi vindicarunt, laboris mala fame nominisque momenta mihi pensarent. Verum nunc qui perfecti scholarum habentur, gemina pro ecclesiastico usu functione multantur: primas enim partes formandis moribus impendunt, secundas vero litterarum doctrine insumunt." Erdmann takes the letter to be the dedication to Meinhard's work *De fide*. See his *Studien zur Briefliteratur Deutschlands im elften Jahrhundert*, MGH, Schriften, 1 (1938), p. 23.

upon his return.³⁵ Again, an extraordinarily clear example of the real existence of "letters and manners" as a scheme of studies.

The choice of the Bamberg school as a "workshop" to prepare a master of "letters and manners" clearly made good sense. Bamberg gained a reputation for precisely this orientation of studies. We see this in a letter that the canons of Worms wrote ca. 1115 to their colleagues at Bamberg. They urge them to support their bishop elect, Burchard II, a former student of Bamberg ("vestris institutis fundatus a puericia"), "a son of Bamberg" "in litterarum scientia, in rerum agendarum pericia, in honestate morum, in gratia discretionum."³⁶ Whether this is flattery or a deserved reputation, it shows us a desirable curriculum for a school of future bishops: letters and manners, skill in governing or administering, and good judgment, presumably the kind a bishop/administrator, not an intellectual, requires.

In an earlier publication I have tried to show how the educational reforms that took place at Hildesheim in the middle of the eleventh century under Bishop Azelinus (1044–54) are understandable within this same framework of studies. A conservative chronicler complained about Azelinus importing the manners of the court (*curialitas*) into the comparatively rustic diocese, and this complaint has given that bishop the reputation of an epicurean corrupter of his church. But Azelinus also hired the gifted young cleric Benno, later the second bishop of Osnabrück by that name, as *magister scholarum*, luring him from the royal court with promises of great wealth. Benno implanted in the clergy a "zeal for the study of letters" and transformed Hildesheim into a center of learning second to none in the region. Hence we have a picture of the double role of Azelinus and Benno at Hildesheim, the bishop imposing courtly *mores* on the clergy, the schoolmaster instructing them in *litterae* (cf. *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 218f.).

I have given a number of references, not to smother the subject in documentation, but to establish as clearly and definitively as possible the overriding importance of a formula to which I can find no reference in scholarship on medieval education. The phrase "letters and manners" occurs so often not because it was the bearer of an inherited framework of studies, but because it was a formula by which the life of the schools was organized. Whatever is conveyed in the terms *mores*, *recte vivendi dogma*, and others we will encounter – *forma vivendi*,

³⁵ *Weitere Briefe Meinhard's*, nr. 19, ed. Erdmann, p. 213: "Verum inter alia gravia et luctuosa hunc dolorem quasi capitalem deplorastis studium lumenque litterarum penitus apud vos occidisse nec minus disciplinam moralem egregie apud vos antiquitus institutam situ quodam et negligentia nunc dissolutam iam iamque obisse, immo sepultam esse. Quas ob res adolescentem vestrum officine nostre erudiendum informandumque tradidistis, ut duo pignora vestra, mores dico litterasque [sic], per eum vobis... resuscitentur."

³⁶ Udalrici codex, nr. 172, *Bibliotheca rerum germanicarum*, ed. Philipp Jaffé, vol. V. *Monumenta Bambergensia*, p. 305.

disciplina vivendi, studium bene vivendi – students wanted it, and the schools had to provide it.

III. The Old Learning and Cultus Virtutum

I would suggest that the formula “letters and manners,” with all it implies institutionally and pedagogically, indicates to us the essential unifying element in cathedral school education in the period 950–1100/1150. It was this dual instruction that aimed at shaping the statesman/educator, that is, attaining that goal which had given rise to cathedral schools in the mid-tenth century. Letters by themselves could of course be learned in monasteries. It is significant that in some of the best known descriptions of the education of monks from the period, only the term *litterae* occurs, not *mores*. Abbo of Fleury was sent to school *litteris imbuendus*; Otloh of St. Emmeram *pro litteris discendis*.³⁷ The study of *mores* was in part a preparation for secular administrative service, or for a secularized form of ecclesiastical service. Meinhard’s statement that *mores* in the present day are added to *litterae* “pro ecclesiastico usu” makes sense only if we understand that instruction as combining the moral and ethical improvement of the individual with a preparation for service to the church. *Mores* could have been omitted from a monastic education, but it formed an important facet of instruction at the cathedral schools in our period. Letters had to be complemented by an ethical education,³⁸ which could become the main goal of instruction. Fulbert of Chartres wrote a letter to archbishop Ebalus of Rheims in 1023 recommending a student of his who wished to transfer to Rheims for the sake of the same study that had brought him to Chartres, namely, *causa discendae*

³⁷ On Abbo, *PL* 139, 389A; Otloh, *PL* 146, 38B. At Ramsey Abbo is said to have taught *litterarum scientia*, and in a long description of his teaching, no mention is made of *mores*. Cf. *PL* 139, 392B. The informative article by Peter Johanek, “Klosterstudien im 12. Jahrhundert,” in *Schulen und Studium* (above, n. 17), pp. 35–68, shows that the monasteries took a considerable interest in the teachings of the schools. But his idea of a fundamental common purpose linking education at both kinds of institutions (e.g. p. 37) is misleading and ill-conceived. Neither the example of William of Champeaux continuing his teaching at St. Victor nor that of Wibald of Stablo’s letter 167 to Manegold of Paderborn bear out the argument. The former fled from the threat of dialectic back to a teaching aimed at *venustas morum* (cf. Hildebert of Lavardin, Ep. 1, *PL* 171, 141A), that is, non-monastic. The latter gave advice appropriate to a worldly master, and apologized repeatedly for stepping out of his role as monk to do it.

³⁸ There is no doubt that the *mores* studied along with *litterae* is another name for the discipline called in the sources *ethica* and *moralitas*. Cf. Anselm of Laon, *PL* 162, 1590C: “Dicitur et auctor in Proverbiis ethicis, id est tractans de moribus.” The identification of the two is standard in Conrad of Hirsau’s *Accessus ad auctores*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (1970), e.g. p. 21 (Cato): “Ethicae subponitur, quia ad morum utilitatem nititur”; p. 27 (Arator): “Ethicae subponitur, id est morali scientiae, quia tractat de moribus.”

honestatis, to learn virtue or morality.³⁹ The acquisition of knowledge and the study of the seven liberal arts tended towards the higher goal of an ethical education, just as all studies in Carolingian times aimed at religious perfection. The subjects studied and authors read in secular learning may have changed little; but the underlying intent of education changed or broadened considerably. Now a great intermediate object swelled the area separating the arts from theology, and that intermediate object was called *mores*, *ethica*, or *moralitas*.^{39a}

This explains in part the difficulty of assigning a place in earlier medieval education to the discipline called by these names. It is not an independent branch of study, even though in some schemes it may be assigned specifically to grammar or rhetoric.⁴⁰ Certainly, the association of ethics with grammar and rhetoric was a close one, hallowed since antiquity as the essence of an orator’s education, cultivated and practiced in secular education in the Middle Ages.⁴¹

³⁹ Ep. 76, ed. Behrends, p. 136: “[Hubertus]... qui de patria sua causa discendae honestatis egressus...” Behrends misses the intent of the phrase, translating it, “for the sake of acquiring a sound education.”

^{39a} The strongly religious orientation of “letters and manners” in Carolingian education is evident in the following passage from the *Epistola de litteris colendis*, MGH, *Leges* 2, Capit. 1, nr. 29, p. 79: [Along with the “regularis vitae ordo” letters are to be studied]... qualiter, sicut regularis norma honestatem morum, ita quoque docendi et discendi instantia ordinet et ornet seriem verborum, ut, qui Deo placere appetunt recte vivendo, ei etiam placere non negligant recte loquendo.” For a commentary, see Fleckenstein, *Bildungsreform*, p. 52. “Right living” is taken for granted; it is not an object of education. The learned skill is “right speaking.” The end of both is “pleasing God.” This is very far indeed from the *utilitas*, *elegantia* and *sublimitas* that Meinhard got from his studies, or from the *elegantia morum* and *dignitas vitae* that Onulf of Speyer set as the higher goal of rhetorical studies (below, n. 41).

⁴⁰ On the place of ethics in programs of studies, see the works of Philippe Delhay, “La place de l’éthique parmi les classifications scientifiques au XIIe siècle,” *Miscellanea moralia in honorem E. D. A. Janssen* (1948), 19–44; “L’Enseignement de la philosophie morale au XIIe siècle,” *Mediaeval Studies*, 11 (1950), 77–99; “Grammatica et ethica au XIIe siècle,” *RTAM*, 25 (1958), 59–110. It is evident from Delhay’s important works that the various subjects of the trivium could serve ethics. The latter should not be seen as a kind of pendant to the former; it was, or could be, the underlying motive. Some observations on the dependency in Köhn, “Schulbildung und Trivium” (above, n. 26), p. 224, 228.

⁴¹ The short work by Onulf of Speyer *Colores rhetorici* (1071–76), ed. W. Wattenbach, Sitzber. der Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften (1894), pp. 361–86, gives us an especially good example of the subordination of rhetoric to ethics, or rather of the virtual disappearance of the discipline of rhetoric behind the ethical motive. Most of the prologue is lost. The work begins with the sentence fragment, most interesting for our purpose: “... arti rhetoricae: morum elegantiam, compositionem habitus, vitae dignitatem amplectere” (p. 369). A conjecture in harmony with the rest of the work would see this as completing the thought, “The art of rhetoric is not confined to the framing of speeches, but includes the cultivation of elegant manners, composed bearing and dignity of conduct.” The structure of the work is the outbidding of rhetorical definitions (from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*) with moral precepts. E.g. *complexio* is an ornament of speech, but far better and more elegant is “amorem Dei... amorem proximi complectere” (III, 370). He wittily uses the

Gerbert of Aurillac gave a programmatic statement of the connection in saying that he refused to distinguish the art of speaking well from the art of living well.⁴² This is the formula of humanist education for the eleventh and twelfth centuries as well as for Roman antiquity. But neither of those periods necessarily confined ethical education to the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric. Education generally had the purpose not just of conveying knowledge, but of forming the human being, of "attuning" his inner to his outer world, "composing" his manners according to inner virtues acquired through study and practice. Speech and gesture were the activities in which inner man and outer expression met most closely, but all the disciplines and arts could serve that purpose and ideally were pursued *causa discendae honestatis*. John of Salisbury strongly stated this dominant role of ethics. In the prologue to the first book of his *Metalogicon* he makes this trenchant claim: "Any pretext of philosophy that does not bear fruit in the cultivation of virtue [*cultus virtutis*] and the guidance of one's conduct is futile and false."⁴³ Elsewhere he lists and defines all the disciplines of liberal education and sums up: "Of all these branches of learning that which confers the grace of inner and outer beauty [*decoris gratia*] in the highest degree, is Ethics, the most excellent part of philosophy, without which the latter would not even deserve its name."⁴⁴ John here is the spokesman of what I will refer to from now on as "the old learning." It is a humanistic program of education based on the integration of knowledge and wisdom, or, to use the medieval emblem of that union, the marriage of Philology and Mercury. It dominated the cathedral schools in the eleventh century, and toward the end of the century it became locked in conflict with a new kind of learning, based on dialectic,

rhetorical figure under discussion to frame the moral precept. On Onulf see L. Wallach, "Onulf of Speyer: A Humanist of the Eleventh Century," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 6 (1950), 35–56, and Carl Erdmann, "Onulf von Speyer und Amarius," in his *Forschungen zur politischen Ideenwelt des Frühmittelalters*, ed. Fr. Baethgen (1951), pp. 124–34.

⁴² *Die Briefsammlung Gerberts von Reims*, ed. Fritz Weigle, MGH, Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit, 2 (1966), p. 73 (Ep. 44): "Cumque ratio morum dicendique ratio a philosophia non separentur, cum studio bene vivendi semper coniuncti studium bene dicendi..."

⁴³ *Ioannis Saresberiensis episcopi Carnotensis Metalogicon* I, Prol., ed. Clemens Webb (1929), p. 4: "Est enim quilibet professio philosophandi inutilis et falsa, que se ipsam in cultu virtutis et vitae exhibitione non aperit." English in text from *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium*, trans. Daniel McGarry (1962), p. 6.

⁴⁴ Translation taken, with some liberties, from McGarry, p. 67. *Metalogicon* I, 24, ed. Webb, p. 55: "Illa autem que ceteris philosophie partibus preminet, Ethicam dico, sine qua nec philosophi subsistit nomen, collati decoris gratia omnes alias antecedit." Cf. Abelard, *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum*, ed. Rudolf Thomas (1970), pp. 88–90 (ll. 1263–1314) (Ethics, based on the pursuit of the *summum bonum* is the highest discipline, the other liberal arts merely its handmaidens.)

disputation, and the systematizing of philosophical and theological problems: early scholastic philosophy, which from now on I will call "the new learning."⁴⁵

One of the essential tasks of history of education for the tenth and eleventh centuries is to show how the *cultus virtutum* tended to penetrate into each of the seven liberal arts, to appropriate intellectual subjects for the purpose of ethical training. I pointed out Onulf of Speyer's appropriation of rhetoric for the study of *elegantia morum* and *dignitas vitae* (above, n. 41). The subject of cosmology and astronomy as an ethical discipline is a particularly rich and important one. I am preparing a study of it. Here I will just include a few observations.

The connection of ethics and cosmology is ancient and primitive in its origins. The Middle Ages had it most directly from Stoic philosophy, which made nature and the heavens into the pattern for man's moral development.⁴⁶ Cicero regarded the highest goal of moral conduct as "naturam sequi et eius quasi lege vivere" and formulated the pithy phrase, "natura optima vivendi dux."⁴⁷ John of Salisbury is fond of quoting it.⁴⁸ In the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero traced the route by which public life leads distinguished men to philosophy, then to astronomy, thence to the search for the causes and origins of things, and ultimately to the good life. The Ciceronian joining of "natural science," ethics and public service had a vital meaning for the circles of statesmen/administrators in the eleventh century with whom we are concerned.⁴⁹ Boethius, in the *Consolatio philosophiae*, thanked Lady Philosophy for forming his *mores* in accordance with the celestial order and the movement of the planets.⁵⁰ If the

⁴⁵ The discussion of the period is getting a little crowded with "old-new" pairs, but given the transitional nature of the late eleventh-early twelfth century – the turn from subject matters taken over more or less uncritically from antiquity and from comparatively primitive, quasi-magical modes of thought – the terms are useful and accurate. "Old and new learning" are consistent with the framework formulated by Gillian Evans, *Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline* (1980). On the transitional nature of the period see esp. the interesting studies by Charles Radding, *A World Made by Men: Cognition and Society, 400–1200* (1985); "Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach," *American Historical Review*, 83 (1978), 577–97; and "Superstition to Science: Nature, Fortune and the Passing of the Medieval Ordeal," *American Historical Review*, 84 (1979), 945–69.

⁴⁶ See Maximilian Forschner, *Die stoische Ethik: über den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System* (1981).

⁴⁷ Cicero, *De legibus* I, 21, 56; *Laelius* V, 19.

⁴⁸ *Johannes Saresberiensis episcopi Carnotensis polieratice sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum libri VIII*, ed. Clemens Webb (1909), IV, 1 (Vol. I, 235, l. 13); VI, 21 (Vol. II, 60, l. 1). See the study by Tilman Struve, "Vita civilis naturam imitatur: Der Gedanke der Nachahmung der Natur als Grundlage der organologischen Staatskonzeption Johannes von Salisbury," *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 101 (1981), 341–61.

⁴⁹ *Tusculan Disputations* V, 24–25, 68–72. Cf. the adaptation of this passage in the so-called *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe*, ed. Norbert Fickermann, *Briefsammlungen der Zeit Heinrichs IV.* (see above, n. 34), p. 316 (Ep. 9).

⁵⁰ Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy* I, Prose 4, trans. & rev. H. F. Stewart, The Loeb Classical Library, 74 (1968), p. 142.

heavens are seen as a pattern for man's morals, then the study of astronomy is an object of ethics; it offers an approach to forming, or re-forming man's character.

This, I believe, is one of the main impulses for the study of Plato's *Timaeus* in the eleventh century. That stern critic of *Timaeus* studies, Manegold of Lautenbach, indicated this clearly when he conceded the value of Plato's work in "moral judgment aside from questions of faith," and that means the pursuit of the virtues appropriate to the "ecclesiastici rectores et gubernatores divine rei publice."⁵¹ In other words, it is fine for civil and church administrators to study the *Timaeus* within a program of moral education, but let no one confuse it with theological truth. For medieval commentators the subject of Plato's work was "natural justice," the pattern of natural law implanted in the cosmic order at its inception, upon which men can draw to form their own characters: "Hence the subject matter of this book," writes William of Conches in the beginning of his *Timaeus* commentary, "is natural justice or the creation of the world: for he [Plato] treats the latter by way of investigating natural justice."⁵² In his glosses on Boethius William also assigned both the *Timaeus* and *The Consolation of Philosophy* specifically to *ethica*.⁵³ This notion of the *Timaeus* legitimized as a work of ethics certainly helps explain the manuscript tradition of that work. The interest in the *Timaeus* in the eleventh century coincides with the advent of a program of ethical education at cathedral schools.

The more general Stoic connection of ethics with the study of nature also had far-reaching implications for our period. The author of the *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe* sees *honestas* as a cosmic principle without which the entire *mundana fabrica* would collapse.⁵⁴ In Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus* the virtue of *Honestas* teaches the New Man to "love nature" and to embrace whatever nature has created.⁵⁵ Hugh of St. Victor gave the idea terse and sharp expression:

⁵¹ *Liber contra Wolf*. XXII (above, n. 4), pp. 93–94.

⁵² Guillaume de Conches, *Glosae super Platonem: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables III*, ed. E. Jeuneau, *Textes philosophiques du moyen-âge*, 13 (1965), p. 59: "Unde possumus dicere quod materia huius libri est naturalis iusticia vel creatio mundi: de ea enim propter naturalem iusticiam agit." On the origins of the idea of natural justice and its significance in the Middle Ages, see Gérard Verbeke, "Aux origines de la notion de 'loi naturelle'," in *La filosofia della natura nel medioevo: Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale* (1966), pp. 164–73.

⁵³ Cf. Delhay, "L'Enseignement de la philosophie morale," p. 83, n. 13.

⁵⁴ *Reg. rhet. Briefe* nr. 15, p. 334.

⁵⁵ Alain de Lille, *Anticlaudianus: Texte critique avec une introduction et des tables VII*, 208 ff., ed. R. Bossuat, *Textes philosophiques du moyen-âge*, 1 (1955), p. 163: "[honestas monet] . . . Ut vicium fugiat, Naturam diligat . . . amplexens quicquid Natura creavit."

... in the meaning of things lies natural justice, out of which the discipline of our own morals [mores] arises. By contemplating what God has made we realize what we ourselves ought to do. Every nature tells of God; every nature teaches man.⁵⁶

The root impulse for the study of the creation and of nature in the eleventh and twelfth centuries lies in this idea. Any "science" based on this conception of the universe was necessarily a "humane" science, directed towards self-knowledge and moral perfection, towards good governance of the self and the state. The idea of macrocosm – microcosm, and with it the basic form of some of the most prominent works of twelfth century humanism, reveal this conception: William of Conche's *Philosophia mundi*, Bernard Silvester's *Cosmographia*, and Alan's *Anticlaudianus*. In each case the point of departure is the cosmos and cosmic perfection, and following upon this, man and human perfection. This form came from the *Timaeus*, but the idea it proclaimed was no less vivid in the mind of these twelfth century humanists, no less vividly present in their works, than in Plato's. Eleventh and early twelfth century cosmology is in its basic impulse humane and ethical. The progress of science in the twelfth century towards Aristotelian empiricism, towards new Arabic astronomy, towards "natural science" in a sense approaching our understanding of the term, must be seen as a progress away from the pursuit of science in a humane, Stoic-Ciceronian sense.

IV. Teaching Virtue

How was virtue taught? Normally scholars point to the textbooks read in order to illustrate the contents of ethical instruction:⁵⁷ Cicero's *De officiis* and the adaptation of this work by Ambrose; the Distichs of Cato, Seneca, and medieval florilegia like the *Moralium dogma philosophorum* ascribed to William of Conches. But this does not help us distinguish the eleventh century clearly from the ninth or the thirteenth and brings us back to my comparison with theater history through lists of plays. Instruction in *mores* was vital enough to dominate studies for some two hundred years, and lists of textbooks reduce it to a collection of lifeless abstractions. What we miss and what is almost alto-

⁵⁶ Hugonis de Sancto Victore *Didascalicon De Studio Legendi: A Critical Text VI*, 5, ed. C. H. Buttner, *Catholic University of America Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin*, 10 (1939), 123: "in illa [significatione rerum] enim naturalis iustitia est, ex qua disciplina morum nostrorum, id est, positiva iustitia nascitur. contemplando quid fecerit Deus, quid nobis faciendum sit agnoscimus. omnis natura Deum loquitur, omnis natura hominem docet . . ." English in text from *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts*, trans. Jerome Taylor, *Records of Civilization: Sources & Studies*, 64 (1961), p. 145.

⁵⁷ Cf. Delhay, "L'Enseignement de la philosophie morale," p. 83.

gether unrecoverable is the life of the teacher himself.⁵⁸ This is the real textbook and exemplar of *mores*, and this form of instruction was conducted above all simply by *convictus*, a life shared by master and students, the imparting of the teacher's qualities to the student by force of example.⁵⁹ Meinhard of Bamberg wrote a letter to his former teacher in which he recalls nostalgically his student days: "That way of living [*convictus*] into which you received me in so profoundly humane a manner was more free and noble, more effective and practical [*ad utilitatem efficacius*], more scrupulous in the cultivation of elegance [*ad elegantiam accuratius*], more conducive to the highest a man can attain [*ad sublimitatem exquisitius*], than any other whatsoever, even if my thickness of mind deprived me of its richer fruits."⁶⁰ The fruits of *convictus* are *utilitas*, *elegantia*, and *sublimitas*. There is no talk of the challenges of the mind, of analysis, of knowledge gained for its own sake, no talk of learning at all, but rather of the cultivation of a personal quality, called here "elegance,"⁶¹ and of the practical benefits of a way of life shared with the master, and I take the practical side of this education to be indicated directly in *utilitas* and less directly, though still distinctly, in *sublimitas*, which may mean both the perfect life and the highest rank or office a man can attain.

Some testimony from Fulbert's school at Chartres bears out this picture of the master's role. Fulbert was known as a teacher of "both letters and manners,"⁶²

⁵⁸ Also observed by Southern, *Platonism etc.* (above, n. 3.), p. 19: "In the schools it was the spoken world which was important: perhaps one should even say that it was the physical presence of the master..." And Behrends (*Letters of Fulbert*, p. XXVIII) observes sharply, "... it appears that what attracted [students] was Fulbert himself rather than the subjects which were studied."

⁵⁹ See the study by Caroline Bynum, *Docere verbo et exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality*, Harvard Theological Studies, 31 (1979).

⁶⁰ *Hannoversche Briefsammlung*, nr. 65, *Briefsammlungen der Zeit Heinrichs IV.* (above, n. 34), p. 112–13: "Neque enim convictu vestro, quo apud vos humanissime acceptus sum, quicquam potest esse liberalius neque studio illo, tametsi mea ingenii malignitas me uberiorem eius fructum defraudavit, studio inquam illo nihil esse potest vel ad utilitatem efficacius vel ad elegantiam accuratius vel ad sublimitatem exquisitius." Erdmann conjectures that Meinhard's former teacher is Hermann of Rheims (*Studien*, p. 38f.), though the evidence for the identification is very slight.

⁶¹ In general, beauty, elegance, grace – whatever the words in the context of *mores* may convey – were clearly important goals of study and learning. Recall John of Salisbury's words that *ethica*, more than any other discipline, confers *gratia decoris*, the grace of a beauty of both mind and manners (above, n. 44). Onulf of Speyer said that the study of rhetoric cultivates *morum elegantia* (above, n. 41). On "elegant" and "beautiful manners" as an ideal of worldly clergy, see *Origins of Courtliness*, pp. 128–52.

⁶² The biographer of Abbot Angelran of St. Riquier says of his studies with Fulbert, "hic ei monitor, hic tam morum quam litterarum fuit institutor." *Vita Angel.* III, PL 141, 1406A. An interesting bit of testimony to Fulbert's dispensing of "letters and manner" is a letter of his former student and disciple, Hildegard. He writes to Fulbert with two requests: to correct a little work of his (*opusculum*) and to correct his vice of anger. Ep. 95, ed. Behrends, pp. 172–75. Hildegard regarded both his literary and his moral improvement, his letters and his manners, the province of his teacher.

and writings from his students make it clear that his instruction in *mores* was what they particularly valued. Adelman of Liège, later Bishop of Brixen, wrote a poem commemorating his former teacher and fellow students, *De viris illustribus sui temporis*. He praises Fulbert with the verses,

Ah, with what dignity and diligence in questions of *mores*,
With what gravity in subject
matter, what sweetness in words
He explained the mysteries of higher knowledge!⁶³

Here also: no praise of incisive intellect or of penetrating analysis, though presumably the reading of the Bible is the form of study in question. What roused this student's enthusiasm were the teacher's eloquence, gravity and dignity.⁶⁴ The eloquence and noble bearing of the master were what students wanted from Fulbert, undoubtedly at least as much as they wanted illumination of the "mysteries of higher knowledge." Adelman praises Fulbert's student, Hildegard, for having taken over and made his own the master's facial expression, tone of voice, and manners.⁶⁵ Fulbert's personal presence was a text from

⁶³ The critical edition of J. Havet is printed by Clerval in his *Les écoles de Chartres* (above, n. 19), 59–61, here p. 59:

Eheu! quanta dignitate moralis industriae,
Quanta rerum gravitate, verborum dulcedine,
Explicabat altioris archana scientiae!

The lines intriguingly confuse Fulbert's style with the subject matter: Fulbert, and not the text, possesses *gravitas*; Fulbert's words, not those of the text, possess *dulcedo*. It is easy to read these as qualities of his text-interpreting (cf. R. W. Southern, *The making of the Middle Ages* [1953], p. 198). But *moralis industria* is not the level of interpretation called by nearly the same name, *moralitas*, as Southern reads it ("dignity of spiritual interpretation"). It is the striving to attain virtue, a discipline to which a text can lend itself. On Adelman see H. Silvestre, "Notice sur Adelman de Liège, évêque de Brescia (d. 1061)," *Révue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 56 (1961), 855–71.

⁶⁴ Fulbert would seem to have a similar quality in mind when he refuses to send Hildegard, as schoolmaster at Poitiers, any teaching assistant who has not yet attained *gravitas morum* (ep. 92, ed. Behrends, p. 164).

⁶⁵ Adelman in Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres*, p. 60: "Is magistrum referebat vultu, voce, moribus." Gozechin (Goswin) of Mainz praised his student Valcher for his seeming ability to transform himself wholly into his master: "... tu etiam totum magistrum in te videris transfundere" (Ep. ad walterum III, ed. Huygens, p. 12). See also Hugh of St. Victor, *De inst. nov.* VII, PL 176, 932D–933C. Ambrose in his adaptation of Cicero's *De officiis* had urged young men to attach themselves to wise and prudent teachers and imitate them to the benefit of their morals and their careers: "Ostendunt... adolescentes eorum se imitatores esse, quibus adhaerent; et ea convalescit opinio, quod ab his vivendi acceperint similitudinem, cum quibus conversandi hauserint cupiditatem" (XX, 97, PL 16, 137B). The passage is worth quoting in this context not only because of the popularity and importance of Ambrose's work in this period, but also because it is quoted along with admonitions to students to imitate their teachers and to teachers to guide the morals of their students in Manegold of Lautenbach's *Liber ad Gebhardum* IX, MGH, Libelli de lite, I, 327–28. "Teacher imitation" remains an important formula of ethical pedagogy

which the students learned, his personal qualities a substitute for intellectual knowledge. Wibald of Stablo a century later was still speaking entirely within this conceptual framework when he urged a young master, Balderich of Trier,

Let your mere presence be a course of studies for your students . . . Your position requires more than mere teaching. You must exercise strict severity, for you are, as you know, also one who supervises the correction of conduct. This teaching and this exercise is more subtle and in its fruits more important than any other.⁶⁶

The physical presence of an educated man possessed a high pedagogic value; his composure and bearing, his conduct of life, could themselves constitute a form of discourse, intelligible and learnable. Willigis of Mainz is said to have "taught lovers of virtue how to live according to the norms of morality, not with his speech but with his actions, more with the language of his behavior than that of his words."⁶⁷ A comment of Gozechin, or Goswin of Mainz, gives us good reason to think that teaching merely by presence and personal authority was a recognized task at cathedral schools, opposed to the comparative busy work of presenting school learning. He distinguishes between some men who teach *auctoritate*, and others who teach *labore*. The former can stand the rigors of the job, "than which there is none more difficult," longer than the former.⁶⁸

If we can accept that the shaping of character through the person of the teacher, aided by written examples and by any of the seven liberal arts, was one of the central tasks of cathedral schools, the task indicated in the term *mores*, then we have come a long way toward understanding the nature and goal of

into the Renaissance. Cf. Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier* I, 26, trans. Charles Singleton (1959), p. 42: "... whoever would be a good pupil must not only do things well, but must always make every effort to resemble and, if that is possible, to transform himself into his master."

⁶⁶ Ep. 91, in *Bibl. rer. Germ.*, ed. Philipp Jaffé, Vol. I: *Monumenta Corbeiensia* (1864; rpt. 1964), p. 165: "Presentia tua tuis auditoribus disciplina sit... Plus habet locus tuus quam docendi officium; nam et censoriam exhibere debes severitatem, quoniam et corrigendis moribus prefectum te esse noveris. Quae disciplina et exercitatio omnibus est subtilior et in fructu cunctis propensior." Similarly his praise of Bernard of Clairvaux, Ep. 167, p. 286: "Quem si aspicias, doceris; si audias, instrueris; si sequere, perficeris."

⁶⁷ *Libellus de Willigisi consuetudinibus* IV, MGH, SS 15, 2, p. 745 (ll. 31–32): "Amatores virtutis, qualiter honesta moralitate deberent vivere, docuit in re, non ore, lingua magis morum quam lingua verborum." The thrust of this work (composed 1018/1039) is consistently Willigis' person as an ethical curriculum: he was "vitae honestissimae speculum" (p. 743, l. 35); "[from his life]... possunt exempla vivendi honestissima sumere qui student honestissime vivere..." (p. 744, l. 4f.); "... per assiduae lectionis honestaeque moralitatis [note the pair, letters and manners] exemplum honestissimum vitam non cessavit honestare multorum" (p. 744, l. 42f.). Cf. Caroline Bynum, *Docere exemplo et verbo*, p. 41: "... life almost becomes a form (a more effective form) of speech."

⁶⁸ Ep. ad Walch. XXVI, ed. Huygens, p. 30: "Cuius laboris tempus, quia nichil difficilius sub sole geritur vel quod magis operarii sui vires exhaustiat, a sapientibus prefinium est septuaginta, nisi de cetero is qui praest auctoritate presideat, non labore."

education there and the role of *magister scholarum*, a position of incomparably greater stature than its modern counterpart, schoolmaster. It is a striking fact that the position of master is commonly a stepping stone on the way to the bishopric. A career followed by many of the most distinguished imperial bishops since Ottonian times led from student to schoolmaster to court chaplain to bishop, with perhaps stations in between as provost or chancellor.⁶⁹ Master of schools stood in a comparable relation to state service as today the law to government service. And the reason for this is, above all, that the schoolmaster had to embody those qualities he was to transmit to his students, and those qualities were ones that qualified a man for royal service, for administrative and diplomatic duties, for the episcopacy (see below, p. 27ff.). Hence a good schoolmaster was an obvious candidate for the royal chapel and the bishopric. The personal charisma of the great man, the diplomat, the statesman, the follower of the great Roman statesmen:⁷⁰ this was the aura that surrounded the successful teacher at the cathedral schools, and it was the main curriculum of *ethica*.

This notion of a pedagogy of personal charisma explains the exuberant praise of masters from the period. Students were swept away by the personal magnetism of the man suited for the service of the emperor and probably destined for it. And it mattered little what they taught, as long as they spoke well and exuded qualities like *gravitas*, *dignitas*, and *elegantia*. Recall that Abelard, a teacher in a completely different stamp from the masters of the old learning, was astonished that great crowds of students lavished devotion and respect on the venerable Anselm of Laon (whose school offered instruction in *litterae et mores*.⁷¹) Anselm spoke most beautifully, but his thought was obscure and he could not deal with the problems of philosophy he raised: "He had a remarkable command of words, but their meaning was worthless and devoid of all sense. The fire he kindled filled his house with smoke but not with light."⁷² A description of the lecturing style of Berengar of Tours gives us an extraordinary glimpse of this aura of the great man. It was recorded by one of his enemies in the eucharist controversy, Guitmund of Aversa:

⁶⁹ Cf. Lèsne, *Les écoles*, p. 511f.

⁷⁰ One example of many that could be cited: Gerbert claims to be a faithful follower of Cicero "in otio et negotio." Ep. 158, ed. Weigle, p. 187. For other examples of Roman reminiscences in the conduct of this class of men, see *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 117ff.

⁷¹ Helmold, *Chron. Slav.* LXV, MGH, SS 21, 47, 1.8ff.: [Vicelin went to Laon to study with Ralph, Anselm's brother, where] "... ad ea solum enisus est, que sobrio intellectui et moribus instruendis sufficerent."

⁷² Abelard, *Historia calamitatum: Texte critique avec une introduction*, ed. J. Monfrin, Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques (1959), p. 68. English in text from *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise*, trans. B. Radice (1974), p. 62.

Whatever bespoke grandeur and distinction, he affected. This man, almost wholly ignorant, claimed to be a doctor of the arts, and persuaded people of it by virtue of his pompous posing, by elevating himself above others on a platform, by simulating the dignity of a teacher in his manner rather than by the substance of his teachings, by burying his head deep in his cowl, pretending to be in profound meditation, then finally, when the expectations of the listeners had been whetted by his long hesitation, giving forth in an extremely soft and plangent tone, which was effective in deceiving those who did not know better.⁷³

Berengar is a figure very much on the border between the old learning and the new. His career took him between the cathedral schools and the courts of secular lords, his personal charisma won him many enthusiastic students, but his use of reason and analytic thought set him sharply apart from masters like Fulbert of Chartres and Meinhard of Bamberg. He had the style of the masters of the old learning, but he combined it with probing and exacting reason. We can put aside the criticism of this monk and student of Lanfranc that he was ignorant. These reproaches tell us more about the categories of judgment applicable to secular masters in the second half of the eleventh century than about the quality of Berengar's learning. Probably a great many teachers could substitute personal style, intellectually unrigorous moralizing, and grand self-presentation for scholarship, and students were more than willing to accept their education on those terms. Wibald of Stablo complains in the mid-twelfth century that students defend the sayings of their masters not because they are true, but because they love the men who pronounce them, and he sees one school set against another, not in the pursuit of truth through reason, but "in hate or love of individual teachers."⁷⁴ The teacher's main task, or one of them, was the cultivation of the self, of character, virtue, and eloquence in himself and his students; this is the essence of *cultus virtutum*, and knowledge, scholarship, rational analysis were somewhat beside the point, perhaps even dubious products of *curiositas* and the urge to novelties.

One may well think that then as now the cult of personal manners was a substitute for genius and a sign of the mediocrity of the age. Certainly to read what masters of the old learning did write cautions against thinking them alot of mute inglorious Miltons. Adalbold of Utrecht's commentary on Boethius' "O, qui perpetua," (early eleventh century) is wholly unoriginal. Arnulf of Speyer's *Colores rhetorici* is witty and amusing but one has the feeling that its author could have spun it out at great length with the intensity and incisiveness

⁷³ PL 149, 1428B.

⁷⁴ Ep. 167, ed. Jaffé, p. 277: "Discipuli magistrorum sententias tuentur, non quia verae sunt, set quod auctores amant; scola adversus scolam debachatur, odio vel amore magistrorum." Cf. William of Conches' observation that students should love their teachers more than their parents: *Philosophia mundi* IV, 30, ed. G. Maurach (1980), p. 114f. (In the Migne ed., IV, 38, PL 172, 100A–B). And Abelard's, that students should not be duped by love of their teachers into believing that they make sense (below, n. 110).

of table talk, requiring no particular learning or intellectual rigor. Anselm of Besate's *Rhetorimachia* shows much eccentricity and little genius.⁷⁵ Can the explanation of personal greatness possibly cover all the sins of pedantry and self-congratulation this author commits? Henry III took Anselm into the royal chapel, supposedly as a reward for the *Rhetorimachia* (though we have only Anselm's word on it). Let us hope that the emperor did it because his judgment was numbed by the spell of Anselm's personality.

But a fair number of men in Anselm's position and with his ambitions were mute and glorious, whatever the quality of the unwritten works slumbering somewhere in their minds. The problem for us in the twentieth century is to get from the muteness to the glory. Silence means obscurity, and it is a pall over great men and mediocrities alike.

V. The Civil Life as Productivity: *Disciplina Vivendi*

The forum in which learning, intellect and brilliance were to be expressed was the active life, public service, not philosophical tracts. A cleric of Worms wrote a letter to his bishop, Azecho of Worms, around 1030, in which he sets forth an ideal of public administration as the fulfillment of philosophy:

Divine providence, in foreseeing the necessity of installing you as the governor of our republic, has placed you at the apex of pastoral care *in order that you may now translate into acts of public administration those things you have learned in your private studies*. The schoolmistress of all virtues [Philosophy] has taken up her abode in you, so that in all your undertakings you may follow in her footsteps.⁷⁶

The letter was a job application, and the applicant was not only wheedling, but also putting forward his credentials by showing his mastery of Boethius and of the ideal of the learned administrator whose acts reveal the influence of philosophy. Public administration as a form of philosophy: it is a topic that would lead us back to Roman antiquity and into the heart of medieval humanism. Philosophy in the service of the *res publica* is a much cultivated educational and

⁷⁵ Anselm von Besate, *Rhetorimachia*, ed. Karl Manitius, MGH, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 2 (1958).

⁷⁶ *Ältere Wormser Briefsammlung*, nr. 52, p. 89: "Hinc divina providentia, cum te nostre rei publice regende necessarium previdisset, ad pastoralis cure apicem perduxit, ut quod inter secreta otia didiceras, in actum publice administrationis transferres. Magistra itaque Virtutum in te elegit sedem, ut in cunctis actibus tuis illius vestigia sequi videaris." Cf. Boethius, *De cons. phil.* I, 4,7: "Quod a te inter secreta otia didiceram, transferre in actu publicae administrationis optavi." Many texts on the combining of philosophy and public life in the *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe*, e.g. nr. 1, p. 275 (quoting Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, V,2,5): "O vite dux philosophia, o virtutis indagatrix... tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et discipline fuisti." Also nr. 22, p. 348f.

political ideal, one that required the alliance of schools with the apparatus of government.⁷⁷

It is a major theme of the important letter collection, the *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe*. The letters are only slightly fictionalized in the sense that the personae of the writers are loosely maintained. The basic situation is that a clerical administrator corresponds with friends asking them for advice and guidance in the trials and difficulties of public life. The source of advice, consolation, and statesmanly wisdom to which the writers regularly turn in addressing the problems raised is, generally stated, Philosophy, more specifically Cicero's, *Tusculan Disputations*. The latter is a work of major importance for the cathedral schools of the eleventh century. Meinhard of Bamberg had termed it the most important work of philosophy from Roman antiquity.⁷⁸ Its appeal lay in its combining of asceticism and rejection of the world with a stoically courageous affirmation of state service: persist, suffer through all the tribulations of the active life, and make the cult of virtues – identified with Philosophy – into your guide. That is the thrust of the *Tusculan Disputations*, and the author of the letters makes it into his theme. The appeal of this attitude to worldly clergy in the German empire in the second half of the eleventh century should be evident: torn between the parties in the investiture controversy, they could find in Cicero's work a rule of life, a philosophy that lent dignity to administrative service while at the same time casting serious doubt on it, that could idealize imperial statesmen while placing the emperor in the role of Nero, Herod, and Nebuchadnezzar (cf. nr. 9, p. 314), that reconciled *contemptus mundi* with *servitium rei publicae*. In one of the most remarkable of these letters, the author sets the trials of public life parallel with the sufferings of the martyrs and of Christ, and makes the courageous facing of those trials into an act of Christian *fortitudo*. Here is a passage that shows especially clearly the odd mingling of Christian and Roman heroism typical for this writer:

He himself [Christ] once fought for us. And should we now refuse to enter the field of battle for his sake? And would we, seeing his wounds, not suffer tribulations for his sake, having won salvation through the hate he faced? Spartan boys face tortures inflicted on them without crying out. Lacedaemonian youths in competitive fighting suffer blows and kicks and even bites, but would sooner suffer death itself than admit defeat. (nr. 9, p. 319)

I doubt that the sufferings of Christ have ever before or since been set parallel to the training of Spartan and Lacedaemonian boys. But it shows us a central concern of this author: to legitimize and sweeten a cleric's service to the state by appeal to ancient Greek and Roman ideals.

⁷⁷ On the combining of the intellectual and civil life in England see Southern, "England's Place" (above, n. 2), p. 174ff. Also Beryl Smalley, *The Becket Controversy and the Schools* (1973).

⁷⁸ *Briefe Meinhards*, nr. 1, ed. Erdmann, p. 193: "Unde hortor, ut Tusculanis tuis plurimus insideas, quibus Latina philosophia Cicerone parente nichil illustrius edidit."

But our point of departure was the combining of philosophy and the active life. The *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe* find in the *Tusculan Disputations* a Roman model for this combination, one which must have had a deep resonance in the schools and courts of eleventh century Europe, at least among its statesman/intellectual class. Cicero observed in that work that philosophy was a fairly new discipline in the Rome of his time, and he recognized the superiority of the Greeks in the *writing* of it. But by way of explaining this to the advantage of his countrymen, he says that the early Romans did not write works of philosophy because they were so taken up with the great tasks of running the state, and they preferred to practice "that most bountiful of disciplines, the discipline of living well" (*bene vivendi disciplina*). They pursued this more in their lives than in their writings: "Vita magis quam litteris persecuti sunt."⁷⁹ It is difficult to do justice in English to the phrase *disciplina vivendi*, and one takes recourse to spelling out its implications. It makes the conduct of public life into a form of philosophical discourse, a program of studies, a textbook. Wibald of Stablo was speaking within this trope when he urged Balderich of Trier to turn his mere presence into a discipline (above, n. 66). And the example of the Roman statesman who turns public life into a philosophical discipline gave allure to this substitute form of productivity: life itself could become a work of philosophy, a composition analogous to an oration or to a musical composition. This work of art, the composing of *mores*, was a major contribution of the eleventh century to "philosophy"⁸⁰ and to culture. It is the best answer to the question how that age could have been mute and glorious at the same time.

⁷⁹ *Tusc. Disp.* IV, 3, 5–6. Cf. *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe*, nr. 1, p. 275; nr. 11, p. 329; nr. 12, p. 331f.; nr. 13, p. 333; nr. 16, p. 336; nr. 22, p. 348.

⁸⁰ Histories of philosophy almost without exception pass over the tenth and early eleventh centuries in silence, moving generally from Scotus Eriugena to Berengar of Tours. They would find their subject if they focused on the double orientation of philosophy in the period: not only intellectual but also ethical and civil. Isidor defined philosophy as "rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta" (*Etymologiae* II, 24, 1, ed. W. M. Lindsay [1911]). Alcuin echoes this, *De dialectica*, I, PL 101, 952A: "Philosophia est naturarum inquisitio, rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio... Est quoque philosophia honestas vitae, studium bene vivendi, meditatio mortis, contemptus saeculi..." In the Worms letter collection Philosophy is the "magistra virtutum" (p. 89). She is depicted throughout the *Regensburger rhetorischen Briefe* as the "virtutis indagatrix" and "magistra morum." Cf. esp. nr. 1, p. 274ff. Eraclius of Liège (d. 971) was equal to the greatest philosophers, his biographer (mid-twelfth century) tells us, in part for his mastery of human and divine knowledge, but especially because his splendid manners "guilted his physical beauty" ("... presertim cum venustatem corporis mores etiam inaurarant splendidi" – MGH, SS 20, 562, l. 9f.). Hildebert of Lavardin consoled William of Champeaux that only on his retirement to St. Victor had he become a true philosopher, since "acquired knowledge" had only been a hindrance to cultivating *venustus morum*, presumably the true goal, at least the higher goal, of philosophy (PL 171, 141A). Wibald of Stablo encouraged an archdeacon of Liège to bring peace to his diocese, excusing himself from the negotiations because "Neque enim mores nostros ita

VI. *The Statesman and other New Men*

By its very nature, then, the end product of *cultus virtutum* is lost to recovery: it is the living administrator functioning at court, expressing philosophy through acts of governing. But we can recover some literary representations of this ideal type in portraits of bishops, in descriptions of an idealized education and of particular virtues within that education. The courtier and bishop embodied the ideals of a program of education in *mores* and *ethica*. *Cultus virtutum* was a preparation for those offices, and any study of qualifications for court service and the bishopric that concentrates on the conventional school subjects, letters and the liberal arts, is bound to end in uncertainty on the role of education in an ecclesiastical career. The school subjects provided the educational basis for a man's advancement only in conjunction with the study of virtue. Richard of St. Victor wrote a letter to Robert of Hereford congratulating him on his promotion from schoolmaster to bishop: "... all your students were filled with joyful hope [at the news of your promotion], and the entire school was heartened and roused to the love of letters and the cultivation of virtue [*cultus virtutum*] through the example of your efforts and your success."⁸¹ Robert's promotion to the bishopric holds out hope to his and other students that the study of letters and *mores*, *cultus virtutum*, is rewarded by high office, and they redouble their efforts at those school subjects in the hope of repeating his success.

The content of that program of studies registers in the idealized portraits of men pursuing that education and those ambitions. Such portraits represent a humanistic view of man, an ideal of human dignity and greatness indebted – for its articulation – first and foremost to Roman antiquity, Cicero's *De oratore*, *Tusculan Disputations*, and *De officiis*, Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory*. The formation of the courtier and bishop in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was the task of the old learning. But I stress that this type, the ideal educated bishop, the courtier bishop, was not in its origins a product of shaping ideas, but rather of political and social circumstances which favored the rediscovery and revival of those ideas. An office in the Ottonian imperial church system required a statesman/orator/administrator to fill it, and from that office and its require-

instituit et formavit illa vestra doctrix et domina, rerum divinarum et humanarum magistra et educatrix, philosophia..." (Ep. 331, ed. Jaffé, p. 462). Philosophy for Wibald, as for many of his contemporaries, is a force that forms men's character and guides them in the difficulties of public life.

⁸¹ Ep. 1, PL 196, 1225A: "Magnam de promotione vestra concepit Ecclesia nostra laetitiam, et spe non modica hilarati sunt auditores vestri, tum universi scholares animati ad amorem litterarum, et cultum virtutum, vestri laboris et successus exemplo." On the connection between studies and promotion to the bishopric, see Zielinski, *Reichsepischo-pat*, p. 110ff.

ments,⁸² an educational program, the cultivation of virtues in the old learning, took its major impetus in our period.

This program, as a survival from antiquity, had never completely died out in the earlier Middle Ages. The texts that transmitted it were a firm part of medieval education.⁸³ But it rose and fell in prominence, served a variety of educational goals, and maintained through all vicissitudes a fairly low profile until the end of the tenth century. Here suddenly it made itself felt distinctly – no longer just in tracts on education, like Alcuin's, but in the biographies of men who had received a statesman's education, imperial bishops.

I have talked elsewhere about this figure and the personal qualities requisite to his office, and I will not repeat here more than is necessary to lay the foundation for reading a few portraits. In the courtier bishop the German empire under the Ottos created a figure of great political and cultural significance. Important institutional changes took place through him and around him, the most immediate of which was the transformation of the court chapel and the cathedral schools into training grounds for future imperial bishops. This change laid the institutional groundwork for the career to which I referred earlier: from student to teacher to courtier to bishop.

The position had certain personal requirements, and one of them was charisma. There are many tales of the awe-inspiring presence of the great man from the episcopal milieu. William of Malmesbury tells of a bishop, the object of a murder attempt, who turns and faces his assailants, and the splendor of his presence is so dazzling to them that they drop their knives and flee. The story places us in the atmosphere of the saint's life, of the miraculous, but this bishop performs a humanist miracle; he is saved by his personal qualities, by the magical spell cast by his presence, not by divine intervention.⁸⁴ A bishop had to be tall, handsome and impressive in appearance: "statura procerus, vultu venerandus" are common terms of praise; *splendor* or *nitor personae* sums them up. Bishop Gunther of Bamberg (mid-eleventh century, Meinhard's bishop) was said to be so beautiful that on his crusade in Jerusalem crowds of locals

⁸² See my article, "The Courtier Bishop in Vitae from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century," *Speculum*, 58 (1983), 291–325.

⁸³ Alcuin speaks the language of the old learning clearly. His *Dialogus de rhetorica et virtutibus* (the connection of rhetoric and virtue already is indicative) is written for the person "qui... civiles cupiat cognoscere mores" (PL 101, 919), and it ends with the master urging the pupil (Charlemagne), "Disce, precor, juvenis, motus, moresque venustos" (950). On the civil/ethical cast of ancient and early Christian education generally, see Joseph McCarthy, "Clement of Alexandria and the Foundation of Christian Educational Theory," *History of Education Society Bulletin*, 7 (1971), 11–18; idem., *Humanistic Emphases in the Educational Thought of Vincent of Beauvais*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 10 (1976), p. 58ff.

⁸⁴ *De gestis pontificum Anglorum* 1, 6, ed. N. E. Hamilton, Rolls Series, 52 (1870), p. 14.

gathered in front of a church he was in and prevented him from leaving, so eager were they to get a look at his fabled beauty.⁸⁵

An important ideal of this figure is borne by the phrase, "the greater we are," or "the higher we are set above other men, the more we should bear ourselves as their inferiors." It is an ideal of aristocratic deference, not Christian self-denial. The phrase is borrowed from Cicero and quoted frequently.⁸⁶ Other qualities often praised are gentleness (*mansuetudo*), affability and popularity, if I may put it that way – being all things to all men, making oneself loved of all men. Particularly important is a quality called "beauty of manners" and borne by a number of terms: *elegantia morum*, *venustas morum*, *gratia morum*, *pulchritudo morum*. We find out and out reference to this virtue as a qualification for royal service and the bishopric. Meinwerk of Paderborn is said to have been judged suited for service at the court of Otto III because of the elegance of his manners.⁸⁷ And Gerald of Wales complained that his Welsh nationality prevented him from receiving a bishopric from Henry II even though he had served the king loyally and had shown the requisite learning and "grace of manners," here evidently regarded as a prerequisite for advancement from the royal court.⁸⁸ This quality forms a bridge between the teachings of the schools and the entrance into the service of the king or bishop. "Beauty of manners" is an object of the study of *mores*, and at the same time a means of entry into the court and episcopacy.

The final quality I will mention here is one of overriding importance, though I know no name for it from the sources other than *decor*: a man must show the composition and harmony of his inner world by the grace, charm, poise, courtesy and urbanity of his outward bearing, by his gait, his table manners, his speech, the motions of his body and limbs. Outward elegance of bearing is taken as a manifestation of *compositio morum*.⁸⁹ It might be appropriate to

⁸⁵ Cf. "The Courtier Bishop," p. 298ff.

⁸⁶ *De officiis* I, 26: "... quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius." See *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 35f.

⁸⁷ *Das Leben des Bischofs Meinwerk von Paderborn* V. F. Tenckhoff, MGH, SS rer. germ. in us. schol., 59 (1921), p. 7: "Meinwercus autem, regia stirpe genitus, regio obsequio morum elegantia idoneus adiudicatur evocatusque ad palatium regius capellanus efficitur."

⁸⁸ Gerald of Wales, *De principis instructione liber*, Praef. prima, ed. G. F. Warner, Rolls Series, 21, 8 (1891), p. LVIII: "Si quid enim gratiae morum gravitas, si quid litterae, si quid industria conferre potuit, totum id suspectum, totum infestum, totum exosum Gualliae nomen ademit." We recognize in this triad of frustrated qualities the pair "letters and manners."

⁸⁹ A history of this virtue from Cicero (who insists that outer *decorum* can never be present without inner *honestas*, nor *honestas* without *decorum*) to Shakespeare (whose Ophelia asks Hamlet, "Could beauty, my lord, have better commerce than with honesty?") would be a rewarding task. Here are a few references for our period. Ambrose echoes Cicero in maintaining that physical beauty is a decoration to inner virtue (*De officiis min.*, PL 16, 48B). Poeta Saxo (888), *Annales* V, MGH, Poet. Lat. 4, 1, p. 60, li

mention the resonance between this educational ideal and the Hellenic *kalos kai agathos*, as long as we insist that we are not dealing with a topos-like survival from an earlier culture where the ideal once was alive. It was alive in the eleventh century, and perhaps the best proof of its vitality is in a series of portraits to which we now turn.

Meinhard of Bamberg writes to a friend and former student, a cleric of high nobility, who is moving to Cologne, no doubt to take up a position at the episcopal court, and who will be exposed to the dangers and temptations of that city.⁹⁰ Meinhard warns him of a war to be waged there over his soul. Two courts will fight to gain his services, to make him a member of their retinue. The one is the noble court of virtues, the other the ignoble court of vices. The court of virtues summons him as its special favorite and places the entire business of the court in his hands because of the perfection of his manners (*specimen morum*) and the sharpness of his mind (again, letters and manners, or intellect and

211–220: "Interius radix operum latet exteriorum, / Mens moresque viri facta palam generant: / Qui solet esse domi constans prudensque decenter, / Perficit is crebro facta decora foris; / Intra se vitii dominans rationeque pollens / Exteriora sibi nulla nocere sinit: / At cui mens torpet, mores neque corrigit in se, / Illum iure manet dedecus exterius." Bern of Reichenau, *Vita S. Udalrici*, PL 142, 1186B: "in corporis motu, gestu, incessu, foris ostendere [incipiebat], qualis habitus formaretur intus in mente." Decretum of Leo IX on the synod of Mainz (1049), PL 143, 623D: [Confirming Hugo as archbishop of Besançon, who deserves the splendid trappings of office] "... ut qui pollet meritorum laudabili dignitate, tam in virtutum scientia quam in morum honestate, polleat etiam ornamentorum pulchritudine in omni archiepiscopalis culminis plenitudine, semper meminerit in exteriore decore interiorem decorem procurare..." Here I find noteworthy, besides the idea of the bishop's robes and insignia as the outer signs of merit, the phrase *virtutum scientia*, the "science of virtues." Science must be taken to mean "skilled application [of virtues] learned through study." *Vita Adalardi* XXXIX (1055), PL 147, 1059: [though he wore vile clothes] "... non egebat aliqua corporis compositione, nihil enim sibi deerat pulchritudinis humanae, nihil etiam interioris animae." Conrad of Hirsau, *Dialogus de mundi contemptu vel amore*, ed. R. Bultot, *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia*, 19 (1966), pp. 62–63: [in a discussion of the proper relation between *habitus* and *animus*] "... nihil vero prodesse cultum exteriorem virtutum gressus mentientem... lunge utrumque, et habitum et animum, et summa voti perfectionis calculo constabit." Hugh of St. Victor, PL 176, 935B–D "... disciplina ... est membrorum omnium motus ordinatus et dispositio decens in omni habitu et actione... Disciplina est... frenum lasciviae, elationis jugum, vinculum iracundiae, quae domat intemperantiam, levitatem ligat et omnes inordinatos motus mentis atque illicitos appetitus suffocat. Sicut enim de inconstantia mentis nascitur inordinata motio corporis, ita quoque dum corpus per disciplinam stringitur, animus ad constantiam solidatur... Integritas vero virtutis est, quando per internam mentis custodiam ordinate reguntur membra corporis... Liganda ergo sunt foris per disciplinam membra corporis, ut intrinsecus solidetur status mentis." Thomasin von Zirclaere, *Der Wälsche Gast*, ed. Heinrich Rückert, *Deutsche Nationalliteratur*, 30 (1852), ll. 912ff.: "Der lip wandelt sich nach dem muot. / des libes gebaerde uns dicke bescheit, / hât ein man lieb ode leit." Some sketchy comments on the subject in *Origins of Courtliness*, pp. 147–49.

⁹⁰ *Weitere Briefe Meinhards*, nr. 1, *Briefsammlungen*, ed. Erdmann, p. 192f. According to Erdmann, the receiver, called only G., is a future archbishop of Cologne on his way to be groomed for the office. See *Studien zur Briefliteratur*, p. 282.

manners as the prerequisite to court service). The other court calls to him with the allure of its "slippery, silky bodies," and tries to make him into a citizen of the second Babylon, Cologne. The allegory is a sort of psychomachia, as E. R. Curtius suggested (privately to Erdmann. See *Studien*, p. 282). But it is fabricated from the real situation of the competition between courts for a gifted courtier.⁹¹ Meinhard now urges him to arm himself for this battle with the same virtues his father had possessed, whom he describes as

a man instructed in every kind of virtue, a man who enjoyed to an astonishing degree all the charm and grace of humanity, qualities visible far and wide not only in his dazzling blaze of manners [*flagrantia morum*] but also in the bright good humor which shone most graciously from his eyes.⁹²

Presumably humanity, charm and grace, dazzling manners and gracious good humor are results of that instruction in the virtues which his father had received ("omni genere virtutis instructus"). The virtues are neo-classical, Ciceronian, and especially striking is Meinhard's use of *humanitas* in a context which shows that he understood the Ciceronian sense of the word very well.⁹³ It is a quality accompanied by charm and grace and one that is visible not only in his conduct and bearing, but in the joviality and charm of his facial expression. His inward qualities, a virtuous and humane disposition, shine forth outwardly like a blazing fire. We must remind ourselves that we are at a German cathedral of the eleventh century, not an Italian court of the sixteenth. It is also worth noting for our purpose that these virtues are placed exactly in the context of public life: they are what the cleric and future bishop requires to assert himself and survive in the conflicts of court life, and it is just at this point in his letter that Meinhard recommends to the young man Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, "than which Latin philosophy has produced nothing more illustrious." This teacher of *mores* knew perfectly well that that philosophy was vital to a man entering court service.

The description is not isolated. From the eleventh century on we find great men said to embody virtues like these: beauty of soul, composition of manners,

⁹¹ On the competition for "sought after men" (*virī expetibiles*) *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 52.

⁹² *Weitere Briefe Meinhard's*, nr. 1, p. 193: "Est enim vir ille omni genere virtutis instructus, omni lepore humanitatis mirifice conditus, que in eo non solum flagrantia morum latissime redolet, sed ex ipsa oculorum hilaritate gratiosissime renidet. Atque sic in te animi ornamenta redundant, ut illa ocularis gratia relucet."

⁹³ Other occurrences of *humanitas*: *Briefe Meinhard's*, nr. 74, p. 122; nr. 75, p. 123; nr. 80, p. 130; *Weitere Briefe Meinhard's*, nr. 14, p. 206; nr. 21, p. 216; nr. 24, p. 222. Erdmann has a few comments on Meinhard's classicism, *Studien*, p. 61, pp. 104–5. On *humanitas* in the Middle Ages, see Rolf Sprandel, *Ivo von Chartres und seine Stellung in der Kirchengeschichte* (1962), pp. 9–31. And especially Peter von Moos, *Hildebert von Lavardin 1056–1133: Humanitas an der Schwelle des höfischen Zeitalters*, *Pariser historische Studien*, 3 (1965).

inner qualities that express themselves outwardly in the good humored appearance, the graceful gait and elegant bearing of the courtier/statesman. Otto of Bamberg (d. 1139) is praised by one of his biographers for manifesting his elegant breeding and his inner harmony in each and every act of the outer man, in his table manners, his speech, gestures and dress.⁹⁴ By the twelfth century the ideal appears to have permeated the milieu of the worldly clergy in Germany, France and England. One of the most impressive statements of it comes from Bernard of Clairvaux, certainly not the typical spokesman for external elegance, but here one of the most eloquent. He explains the line from Psalm 92, "The lord desireth your beauty," which he takes to mean beauty of soul (*decor animae*):

What then is beauty of the soul? Is it perhaps that quality we call ethical goodness [*honestum*]? ... But to understand this quality we must observe a man's outward bearing... The beauty of actions is visible testimony to the state of the conscience... But when the luminosity of this beauty fills the inner depths of the heart, it overflows and surges outward. Then the body, the very image of the mind, catches up this light glowing and bursting forth like the rays of the sun. All its senses and all its members are suffused with it, until its glow is seen in every act, in speech, in appearance, in the way of walking and laughing... When the motions, the gestures and the habits of the body and the senses show forth their gravity, purity, modesty... then beauty of the soul becomes outwardly visible.⁹⁵

Bernard's description has much in common with Meinhard's. Both are using a basically Ciceronian ethical vocabulary; both employ the image of the powerful light breaking forth from within to express the relation of inner virtue to outward grace. We see the sign of the monastic writer in Bernard's indication that "beautiful" bearing manifests, not the quality Meinhard had called *lepor humanitatis*, but rather a pure conscience. But we are still in a conceptual environment where behavior – speech, gesture, dress, gait – is estheticised and regarded as a visible manifestation of inward beauty and harmony.⁹⁶

Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudian* is a poetic *summa* of the old learning. At the

⁹⁴ See *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 128ff.

⁹⁵ *Super Cant.* Sermo 85. 10–11, *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, vol. II, ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, H. M. Rochais (1958), p. 314: "In quo ergo animae decor? An forte in eo quod honestum dicitur?... De honesto autem exterior interrogetur conversatio... Siquidem claritas eius testimonium conscientiae... Cum autem decoris huius claritas abundantius intima cordis repleverit, prodeat foras necesse est... Porro effulgentem et veluti quibusdam suis radiis erumpentem mentis simulacrum corpus excipit, et diffundit per membra et sensus, quatenus omnis inde reliceat actio, sermo, aspectus, incessus, risus... Horum et aliorum profecto artuum sensuumque motus, gestus et usus, cum appareverit serius, purus, modestus... pulchritudo animae palam erit..."

⁹⁶ Consistently *gestus*, *habitus*, *gressus* or *incessus*, *motus corporis*, *locutio* or *sermo*, *cibus* and *potus* are seen as the measurement of inner virtue. These and their relation to virtue are the subject of the last chapters of Hugh of St. Victor's *De institutione novitiorum*.

same time it is the highpoint of twelfth century humanism and in many ways exemplifies the renaissance spirit of the period. Much of the work, but particularly Alan's portrait of the New Man, must be read against the background of *cultus virtutum*. Late in the poem the New Man is equipped by a parade of allegorical virtues for his battle with the vices.⁹⁷ First comes Bounteousness (*copia*), then Favor and Fame, then Youth and Laughter. Chastity makes him rival the patriarch Joseph. Modesty follows. She "composes" the whole man according to the law of *moderamen*, the golden mean ("Totum composit hominem"). She moderates his action, measures his speech and his silence, weighs his gestures, judges his bearing and restrains his senses. She sets the tilt of his head in a middle position, not too far up towards the heavens to show scorn of the world of men, nor too far down to sink into the material. Constancy comes next; she arranges his gestures and his gait, his hairdo and the style of his dress. Next comes Reason, who gives him good sense for making judgments in practical affairs, prevents him from taking any course of action hastily, teaches him to prepare all undertakings carefully, to make few promises and give many gifts wisely. *Honestas* then gives him love of his fellow men while still preserving the integrity of his inner life.

A series of recent studies has shown that the court and the civil duties of the court administrator are the context in which this description is to be located.⁹⁸ Michael Wilks calls the *Anticlaudian* "a species of court poetry," and locates it, approximately, in the genre of education of princes. This seems to me accurate for one important aspect of the work, though I doubt that Alan intended a specific reference to Philip Augustus and a prediction of his victory over the Plantagenets, as Wilks and Linda Marshall argue.⁹⁹ The virtues of Alan's New Man are a summing up of the moral instruction of the old learning. As a preparation for court life, it applied to courtiers no less than to kings. It is a preparation through civil virtues for battle against civil vices. The gifts of Reason associate the passage especially clearly with *ethica* and *practica* and its products, the perfect statesman or courtier. Reason's gifts have to do with governing and administering, not with analysis, thought, argumentation. *Ratio* here is a virtue of the active life; it is that principle by which, according to the traditions of the cathedral schools, both the cosmos ("O, qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas...") and the composed human being were governed. It is also the virtue by which the man of well composed *mores* governed the state. The

⁹⁷ *Anticlaudianus*, VII, ll.77ff., ed. Bossuat, p. 159.

⁹⁸ Linda Marshall, "The Identity of the 'New Man' in the 'Anticlaudianus' of Alan of Lille," *Viator*, 10 (1979), 77-94; Michael Wilks, "Alan of Lille and the New Man," *Studies in Church History*, 14 (1977), 137-57. Also of interest for our topic is P. G. Walsh, "Alan of Lille as a Renaissance Figure," *Studies in Church History*, 14 (1977), 117-35.

⁹⁹ John W. Baldwin is also sceptical about this connection: *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (1986), p. 571.

concept experienced a fundamental transformation from the civil to the intellectual realm at the hands of the early scholastics.¹⁰⁰ *Ratio*, in the passage just discussed, comes into effect in administrative, not intellectual, activity. None of the virtues of this parade are abstract inner qualities, cloistered or scholastic virtues. All of their gifts aim at external perfection. What *constancia* gives is not loyalty, not faith to oaths and vows, not steadfastness, but an elegant gait, measured gestures, correct clothes and hairdo. The virtues do not bestow the inner qualities they govern: rather they *are themselves* those inner qualities, and what they bestow are the external signs of their presence. The logic at work is that of virtues made visible, beauty or harmony of soul shining forth from every action, down to dress, personal grooming and table manners.

My purpose here and throughout this section in juxtaposing texts from the eleventh and twelfth centuries, from Germany and France, was of course to suggest lines of development, perhaps even lines of dependency. The virtues of Bernard's *decor animae* and of Alan's New Man are anticipated in the values embodied by German courtier bishops. The perfect, elegant, humane gentleman/courtier, who receives his armor from civil virtues, does battle with civil vices, and shows outwardly the beauty within, occurs in Meinhard's letter from the mid-eleventh century. What these common features suggest is that the fates of the old learning and twelfth century humanism were linked, that the one was the bearer and transmitter of the other, and the institutional basis of this humanism was the cathedral school in its relation to court service. The common features of these portraits also teach us to regard the humanism of the eleventh and twelfth centuries as a more or less homogeneous phenomenon. Meinhard and Alanus produced such similar portraits of idealized future statesmen because they taught programs of *ethica* that were not essentially different in either content or purpose.

VII. Old Learning Vs. New

Gradually in the second half of the eleventh century and precipitously in the first half of the twelfth, the masters of the old learning became threatened by a new kind of teacher offering a new kind of studies: the disputatious philosopher-scholar-teacher in the stamp of Peter Abelard. Both Italy and the north apparently bred this type, because in reports from the monastic as well as the cathedral communities we see the schools teeming with cavillers whose breasts swell with pride in their knowledge, and who even contradict and show up their own teachers. We start this section by pursuing some early examples of teacher

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, I, 272-336.

insulting. In observing clashes between masters and bright, irreverent students we locate a fundamental characteristic of the old learning and a fundamental weakness.

The saintly Wolfgang of Regensburg, as a student at Würzburg in the mid-tenth century, had commented so astutely on Martianus Capella that his erudition became an affront to his teacher, Stefan of Novara, that Italian master called to the north by Otto the Great.¹⁰¹ Stung to anger and threatened by the loss of his students, Stefan undertook to stifle Wolfgang's further progress. But the inner flame of divine erudition only burned the more brightly for the attempt to snuff it out, "as a fire flares when fanned by blasts of wind." Still, the future saint might have saved himself a lot of trouble by not giving offense at all, especially to this sensitive foreigner. Clearly some etiquette was violated here when Wolfgang complied with the request of his fellow students for a commentary on Martianus superior to that of their master. The incident brings us close to the circumstances in which the young Abelard outdid Anselm of Laon in explaining Biblical texts.

Abelard's intellectual arrogance is foreshadowed also in the insult dealt to the clergy of Limoges by a Lombard grammarian, Benedict of Chiusa, who visited Limoges in 1028 and disputed the claim that the local patron, St. Martial, was an apostle. Our source, Ademar of Chabannes, tells the story by way of holding this pompous windbag up to ridicule. He quotes a long speech which he attributes to Benedict. In it the latter boasts of his knowledge of grammar, claims that all of Aquitaine and most of France are ignorant of this art, that after nine years of study his own wisdom is so perfect no one under the sun can match him.¹⁰² The monks of St. Denis a century later would undoubtedly have liked to place such discrediting speeches in the mouth of Peter Abelard, whom, out of the arrogance of his learning, they took to be diminishing the authority of their patron.¹⁰³ It may be that Benedict and Abelard were entirely right in disputing the beliefs of the local monks. The validity of the claims against those beliefs, the historical truths at stake, did not matter; reasoning and proof, when pitted against venerable authority, textual or personal, were pernicious instruments of pride that invited discrediting and were seen as deserving it.

But gradually in the course of the later eleventh century, knowledge, reasoning, success in disputation and in proof, become ends in themselves. Grave and

¹⁰¹ Orloh of St. Emmeram, *Vita Wolfkangi* IV-V, MGH, SS 4, p. 528. In view of the fact that Stefan's countryman Gunzo had his grammar corrected by the monks of St. Gall, one wonders whether Italian masters were fair game in the North. They certainly were sensitive to contradiction.

¹⁰² *Epistola de S. Martiali*, PL 141, 107ff. See H. E. J. Cowdrey, "Anselm of Besate and some North-Italian Masters of the Eleventh Century," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 23 (1972), p. 119.

¹⁰³ Cf. *Historia calamitatum*, p. 90, ll. 963ff.

dignified orations are no longer the object of intellectual effort, but definitions and systematizing, frameworks of argumentation, and harmonizing of inconsistencies.

The contest between old and new learning is as much a part of twelfth century intellectual life as is the clash between the new learning and monastic orthodoxy, though the latter has commanded much more interest from historians. In many ways the old learning and monasticism were allies in opposition to the new. They had, it is true, a traditional antagonistic relationship in the eleventh century (polemics of monks against worldly professors), but at the same time an easy reciprocal relationship (many professors converted). The rise of the new learning brought their common interests and characteristics into clear focus. Representatives of both ganged up on Berengar of Tours and Peter Abelard. The intellectual world of the monasteries had much in common with that of the schools. Philosophical Realism was fundamental to both. The eucharist controversy showed this in the late eleventh century; the dispute on universals in the early twelfth. Also common to both was authority as the basis of argumentation and of instruction. The basic intellectual reorientation of the period has long been regarded, quite rightly, I believe, as the clash between reason and authority. But some understanding of the old learning helps us to see the nature of authority in a clearer light. It does not only reside in texts and traditions. It is also a human quality, one of considerable importance both as an instrument and a goal of pedagogy.

A letter of Adelman of Liège to Berengar of Tours allows us to see this form of authority at work in the eucharist controversy. The letter is a trenchant rejection of Berengar's position on the divine presence in the sacrament, but it is written in a tone of loving correction from one former student of Fulbert to another. The body of the letter is a dossier of arguments against reasoning, novelties, and heresy. Of interest to us is its introduction. Adelman evokes at length the figure of Fulbert of Chartres, their former master, and in doing so he recreates vividly and emotionally the atmosphere of the old learning:

I have called you my fellow suckling and foster brother in memory of that sweetest and most pleasant of times we spent together, you a mere youth, I somewhat older, at the Academy of Chartres under our venerable Socrates. We have more cause to glory in the common life of studies [*convictus*] shared with him than had Plato, who gave thanks to nature for bringing him forth as a man rather than as an animal in the days when Socrates was teaching.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ R. B. C. Huygens ed., "Textes latins du XIe au XIIIe siècle," *Studi Medievali*, 3rd ser., 8 (1967), 476-89, here p. 476, ll. 3-8: "Conlactaneum te meum vocavi propter dulcissimum illud contubernium, quod tecum adolescentulo, ipse ego maiusculus, in academia Carnotensi sub nostro illo venerabili Socrate iocundissime duxi, cuius de convictu gloriari nobis dignius licet quam gloriabatur Plato, gratias agens naturae eo, quod in diebus Socratis sui hominem se et non pecudem peperisset."

Berengar and Adelman have experienced ("expertus sumus") the more saintly life and sound doctrine of Fulbert, and now can hope to benefit from his prayers in heaven, since the regard and Christlike charity in which he held them, as in a maternal womb, still live on; indeed his death has only intensified them. Fulbert watches them from heaven and calls to them with his vows and silent prayers to follow him,

entreating us through all those intimate evening colloquies he used to hold with us in the little garden next to the chapel in the city . . . and beseeching us, by the tears which broke forth and interrupted his lecture whenever the force of divine ardor overflowed within him, to hasten thither with all diligence, treading in a straight path the royal road, adhering with utmost observance to the footsteps of the holy fathers, lest we should be detoured, turning aside into some new and false path and succumbing to the snares of scandal . . .¹⁰⁵

In other words, Adelman conjures him by the person of their former teacher; if Berengar holds the memory of Fulbert dear, he will not deviate from the path of the fathers. These are arguments from authority: the personal authority of the great man. He tries to dissuade Berengar from "false," at least deviant opinions, by the force and authority of Fulbert's personality, by pulling him back into the orbit of the master's charisma. The nostalgia of the scene he paints – Fulbert weeping during evening colloquies, overcome by the force of divinity breaking forth in his lecture – derives straight from the rhetoric and ideals of the old learning. We see how true the statement by Wibald of Stablo rings, that students defend what their teachers say because they love the men, not the truth in their pronouncements. "I conjure you by the tears of our teacher . . ." This is the poetry and the mood music of the old learning, unthinkable in a scholastic disputation,¹⁰⁶ powerful in an atmosphere where love of teacher substitutes for thought, where the teacher's person constitutes a kind of orthodoxy. For Adelman there was more truth in Fulbert's tears than in Berengar's logic.

This gives us the common strand in the examples cited earlier of authority defied: the old learning responds to conflict and intellectual challenge by asserting and defending the authority of the masters. An ideal of demonstrable truth

¹⁰⁵ P. 476–77, ll. 14–21: "... invitatur ad se votis et tacitis precibus, obtestans per secreta illa et vespertina colloquia, quae nobiscum in hortulo iuxta capellam de Civitate illa . . . sepius habebat, et obsecrans per lacrimas, quas, interdum in medio sermone prorumpens, exundante sancti ardoris impetu emanabat, ut illuc omni studio properemus, viam regiam directim gradientes, sanctorum patrum vestigiis observantissime inherentes, ut nullum prorsus [in] diverticulum, nullam in novam et fallacem semitam desiliamus, ne forte in laqueos et scandala incidamus . . ."

¹⁰⁶ Werner of Basel's debate poem from the mid eleventh century, "Synodus," *AHDMA*, 8 (1933), 397ff., is a disputation carried on in this climate. The Old Testament embodied debates with the New; Sophia is judge. The atmosphere is marked by harmonious intellectual exchange, loving cooperation towards a common goal. Sophia's judgment: "... vos non certastis, amici, sed bene cantastis . . . / Nec clamavistis."

approachable through arguments represented a powerful threat to men whose instruction was based on eloquence and personality. And this points up the fundamentally irrational nature of an education based on the formation of character. It relies on the personal moral authority of the teacher, and reasoning – certainly critical, independent thought – can become an offense against him, can diminish his authority. The old learning made the masters into an image of God, and the student's goal was to fashion himself in that image.¹⁰⁷ Disputation and reasoning are fundamentally at odds with this goal. Awe and reverence are appropriate to it.

The cult of personality in the old learning was the form of irrationality that Peter Abelard was up against long before he faced that of the Cistercians. In his early conflicts with masters of the old learning, as in so many incidents, Abelard's life is exemplary for the tendencies of the time. An entire system of education was caught in a conflict between a traditional kind of teaching that tended toward the acquisition of human qualities and a new kind that tended toward rational inquiry. This conflict forced the separation of letters and learning from manners.¹⁰⁸ The clash between Abelard and Anselm of Laon is a good illustration. It is as if whatever forces of history shaped the general conflict had designed Abelard and Anselm to embody it: they brewed the intellect and character of Anselm with an overbalance in favor of *mores* and eloquence (the products of the old learning). Then, like chemists performing an experiment, exactly reversed the proportions in brewing Abelard. Anselm and the type he represented may have lacked penetration and analytical sharpness, but they

¹⁰⁷ Hugh of St. Victor uses this conceit in urging students of the *schola virtutum* and *recte vivendi scientia* to imitate the examples of good men. *De inst. nov.* VI, PL 176, 932D: "In ipsis [good men] siquidem similitudinis Dei forma expressa est, et idcirco cum eis per imitationem imprimimur, ad ejusdem similitudinis imaginem nos quoque figuramur."

¹⁰⁸ The letter of Goswin of Mainz (Gozechinus) to his former student Walcherus (above, n. 20) is an important document on the conflict of old and new learning in Germany. He contrasts the school of Liège where he once taught ("ad omne quod civile sit et moribus conducit informat et instruit" VI, p. 14) with the schools of the present day (ca. 1065) which suffer from rejecting *mores* and *disciplina* (XXVII, p. 31). Young students, who ought to be taught beneath the rod, flee instruction on the "gravity of moral discipline" and are blown about like light chaff in the wind of every doctrine: they follow vain and pestiferous novelties and questions (XXVII, p. 31). Certain pseudo-masters wander about giving new readings of texts, seducing students to flee discipline and seek the levity of novelties (XXVIII, p. 32). Since the whole church is being poisoned by this lust for novelty and the abandoning of discipline, few can be found who will work for the true institutes of a good life (XXXII, p. 34). Many fine teachers, men of outstanding repute and high authority – Hermann of Rheims, Drogo of Paris, Huzmann of Speyer, Meinhard of Bamberg – have abandoned teaching for theology (XXXIII, p. 35). The golden age of the schools, when the gravity of discipline ruled and all studies were for the utility of the republic and of *honestas*, when the beauty of virtues and the liberal arts flourished, is now past (XXXIV, p. 36f.). The passage is full of sentiments we encounter a few decades later in France. It is not only an old, disillusioned teacher's empty *laudatio temporis acti*.

were masters of the discipline of living well. Abelard may have known a great deal and possessed a keenly analytical mind, but he was a failure at the discipline of life.¹⁰⁹

Abelard's opposition to authority was two-fold: he called it into question in its written form in his *Sic et non*, and he challenged it in its living personification by opposing, contradicting and outdoing his own masters. Besides the clashes with Anselm and William of Champeaux, we have his written testimony to this opposition in his poem to his son, Astralabe. He prefaces the work with cautionings against some of the underlying principles of the old learning: "Care not who speaks, but what the value of his words are. Things well said give an author his reputation. Neither put your faith in the words of a master out of love for him, nor let a learned man hold you in his influence by his love alone." The pointedness of these precepts is quite evident against the background presented above, but Abelard accommodated the modern reader in locating the sentiments within the actual flux of trends in the schools, because he immediately restated them in the formulations he had used against Anselm of Laon in the *Historia calamitatum*: "We are nourished not by the leaves of trees, but by their fruits. The meaning is to be preferred to the mere words. The rhetoric of ornate words may capture minds effectively, but true learning prefers plain speech. A wealth of words conceals a poverty of understanding."¹¹⁰

"Plain speech and ideas which bear up to criticism": the formula, combined with a willingness to contradict, to assert the truth of one's own opinion over the teacher's, was fateful for the masters of the old learning. The combination of reason and impudence answered their riddle, dissolved the magic spell of their authority. They were as vulnerable as their aura of venerability: tarnish it

¹⁰⁹ Abelard came to the ethics of the old learning by betraying them. He is arguing against himself in his poem to his son Astralabe when he says, "No man becomes wise by mere sharpness of mind; character and a good life make a man wise. Wisdom professes itself in actions, not in words, and the gift [of such actions] is conferred only on good men" (*Petri Abaelardi carmen ad Astralabium filium*, B. Hauréau ed., *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque nationale*, 34 (1895), p. 158: "Ingenii sapiens fit nullus acumine magni, / Hunc potius mores et bona vita creant. / Factis, non verbis, sapientia se proficitur; / Solis concessa est gratia tanta bonis"). Also p. 180: "Pluris sit morum tibi quam doctrina librorum . . ." He was keenly aware of the ancient distinction between the wise man, who lived well, and the philosopher, who knew a great deal (cf. Heloise's purported advice to him, *Hist. cal.*, pp. 78–9), and distinguished between the philosopher, who sees the hidden causes of things, and the practical man, who foresees the results of his acts (*Ad Astral.*, p. 159).

¹¹⁰ *Ad Astral.*, p. 157: "Non a quo, sed quid dicatur, sit tibi curae; / Auctori nomen dant bene dicta suo. / Ne tibi dilecti iures in verba magistri, / Nec te detineat doctor amore suo. / Fructu, non foliis pomorum quisque cibatur, / Et sensus verbis antefereendus erit. / Ornatis animos captat persuasio verbis, / Doctrinae magis est debita planities. / Copia verborum est ubi non est copia sensus." It is a constant theme in Abelard's works: "Do not regard the person of the teacher but the weight of his ideas; do not respect the ornament of his words, but their sense."

and they fell; contradict them convincingly and they faced early retirement. They had only faith, charisma and tradition to fall back on, not a systematically worked out philosophical position. Stefan of Novara sensed that a systematic commentary on Martianus Capella, one that satisfied the intellectual curiosity of his students, was a serious threat to his authority as a teacher. William of Champeaux shows such fears to be well-founded: his teaching career was seriously deflected¹¹¹ because he lost to Abelard in their exchanges on the nature of universals. The very foundation of the old learning, personal authority, was at the same time its Achilles heel.

Anselm and William were not the only masters in the old tradition to suffer rough treatment. John of Salisbury tells of his own teachers, William of Conches and Richard the Bishop, who were forced to give up teaching "when popular opinion veered away from the truth" and they were "overwhelmed by the rush of the ignorant mob."¹¹²

John's *Metalogicon* is the most important monument to the conflict of old and new learning. The general intention of that work is to defend humanist learning against purely scholastic and to urge an integration of the two. John sees studies and all civilized life threatened by the tendency of contemporary scholars and teachers to cultivate specialized subjects, to privilege dialectic, to separate learning from ethics and thus end the fruitful relationship between philosophy and state or church administration. In a passage that is a touchstone for these concerns, he complains about the tendency to see dialectic as separable from other disciplines and from the active life. To exercise dialectic without broad learning and a practical context for it is senseless and harmful, like a pigmy trying to wield the sword of Hercules. Learning must find its fulfillment in domestic life or at court or in the church, not remain merely a "school" discipline. And he sounds a theme central to the old learning when he asks, "What moral philosopher does not fairly bubble over with laws of ethics so long as these remain merely verbal? But it is a far different matter to exemplify

¹¹¹ He retired from Notre Dame to found the new community of St. Victor and its famous school. But though he remained active as a teacher, he had burned his fingers on dialectic and was denied participating in the more vital life of the Paris schools. For a good summary of the founding and history of the school of St. Victor see Stephen C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and their Critics, 1100–1215* (1985), pp. 27–44.

¹¹² *Metalogicon* I, 24, ed. Webb, p. 57f. Trans. McGarry, p. 71. On this passage and the "retirement" of William and Richard, see R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning*, 2nd ed. (1920), pp. 310–14. John says that William of Conches took over the teaching method of Bernard of Chartres. This statement and John's mention of a shift in popular opinion make William's position fairly clear: a master of the old learning has his position undermined by a new fashion.

these in his own life."¹¹³ John's description of the teaching of Bernard of Chartres (*Metalogicon* I, 24) is a classic portrayal of the old learning. Bernard, like his predecessor, Fulbert, fit the old model in the teaching of eloquence and ethics together, in his use of the classics, in his holding of evening colloquies, in the adulation accorded him by his students, and in not producing a single written work.¹¹⁴

John of Salisbury's attempt to reconcile the old and the new had no hope of succeeding. It was a conservative, humanistic, rear-guard action. The days of friendly and emotional colloquies and symposia in cloister gardens between a magisterial teacher and a handful of socially and intellectually elite disciples was past.

VIII. The Schools and the Courts

In the course of the twelfth century the old learning dwindled, collapsed, was forced out of the schools. John of Salisbury was shocked that twenty years after he had studied in Paris the learning there was merely "scholastic," seemed to consist of abstract school exercises. Cathedrals and the new schools of Paris may have remained training grounds for administrators,¹¹⁵ but they were no longer schools of virtue. The *cultus virtutum* still had life in it, as we see in a work like the *Anticlaudianus*. But now it had to seek accommodation elsewhere, and it found it in the institution that had originally accounted for its rise in the tenth century, the prince's court. Courts secular and ecclesiastical had after all been the hidden context of the old learning for the centuries of its prominence. Cathedral schools had handled the overflow from the court chapel and had aimed at preparing men precisely for service in the chapel and what came to be called the chancellery.

The fading of the old learning at cathedral schools coincides with the rise of an education which we must now call "courtly," and no longer merely "for the court."¹¹⁶ There is an old controversy on the question, whether actual schools

¹¹³ *Metalogicon* II, 9, ed. Webb, p. 77: "Quis ethicis morum regulis, dum in lingua versantur, non habundat? Sed plane longe difficilior est ut exprimentur in vita." Trans. McGarry, p. 94.

¹¹⁴ A possible exception, his *Timaean* commentary. See Paul Edward Dutton, "The Uncovering of the *Glosae super Platonem* of Bernard of Chartres," *Medieval Studies*, 46 (1984), 192–221. But the comparative anonymity and the difficulty of the ascription tends to confirm the rule.

¹¹⁵ See John W. Baldwin, "Masters at Paris from 1179 to 1215: A Social Perspective," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. R. L. Benson and G. Constable (1982), pp. 138–164.

¹¹⁶ The contemporary terms are *aulica* or *curialis nutritura*. See *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 215f.

existed at worldly courts.¹¹⁷ The question to my mind is a misleading one, because as soon as we determine that in the post-Carolingian period schools at court no longer existed *as institutions*, we are also tempted to conclude that teachers and instruction had little role at court. The Carolingians needed court schools. They had not discovered, as their successors did, that cathedral schools could function as a more secular alternative to the monasteries. But we would shoot over the mark if we turned this around and said, the Ottonian and Salian kings did not require palace schools, because the cathedral schools had taken over their function. More accurate would be: from Carolingian times on there is no useful distinction to be made between the court school and the life of the court itself. Hincmar formulated for Louis the German the ideal of the court as a school of letters and manners:

The king's court is indeed called a school, that is a course of studies, not because it consists solely of schoolmen, men bred on learning and well trained in the conventional way, but rather a school in its own right, which we can take to mean a place of discipline, that is correction, since it corrects men's behavior, their bearing, their speech and actions, and in general holds them to the norms of a good life.¹¹⁸

Hincmar considered the court a school of *mores*, to which might have been added formal instruction in letters. This does not change in Ottonian times. The statements of Ruotger that Brun of Cologne as chancellor at Otto the Great's court rescued the seven liberal arts from their decline, attracted philosophers and intellectual "refugees," held philosophical disputations, improved the Latin of the court members, and served personally as an exemplar of wisdom, piety, and justice (*Vita Brun.* V, ed. Ott, p. 6f.) cannot be emptied of their content merely because no traces of an institutionalized court school can be found. Ruotger's words make perfect sense when we understand the nature and goal of the old learning and distance ourselves from a conception of education limited to notions of classroom and textbook, learned lecturing and writing. Ruotger speaks unmistakably the language of the old learning: letters are combined with manners, the person of the teacher is a large part of the curriculum, philosophy, learning, and public life are inseparable. The masters of the old learning were courtiers in their capacity as teacher, and teachers in their capacity as courtier.

¹¹⁷ See Lèsne, *Les écoles*, p. 39ff.; Fleckenstein, "Königshof und Bischofsschule" (above, n. 13), p. 40f.; idem, *Die Bildungsreform Karls des Grossen* (above, n. 11), p. 24ff.; Brunhölzl, "Der Bildungsauftrag der Hofschule" (above, n. 22), p. 28f.; Rosamond McKitterick, "The Palace School of Charles the Bald," in *Charles the Bald: Court and Kingdom*, ed. M. Gibson and J. Nelson, BAR International Series, 101 (1981), 385–400.

¹¹⁸ *Epist. syn. Karisiac.* XII, MGH, Leges 2, Capit. 2, p. 436, ll. 2–6: "Et ideo domus regis scola dicitur, id est disciplina; quia non tantum scolastici, id est disciplinati et bene correcti, sunt, sicut alii, sed potius, ipsa scola, quae interpretatur disciplina, id est correctio, dicitur quae alios habitu, incessu, verbo et actu atque totius bonitatis continentia corrigit." For other references to the Carolingian "court school" see Lèsne, p. 39ff.

What need for institutionalized schools at court; the court itself was a school, where the pedagogy of personal charisma was at work more immediately and effectively than at more formally constituted schools. Every educated man at court was, ideally, philosophy embodied and translating itself into acts of public administration. What changed around 950 and in the following years is that this sort of education became more strongly oriented to classical models of the statesman and orator and was transferred out of the courts and into the cathedral schools, where hitherto secular and sacred letters had formed the curriculum. After ca. 1150 letters joined to manners returned to the courts and left the schools to "scholastic" endeavors.

The career of William of Conches is exemplary for this development. He began teaching either in Paris or Chartres or both around 1120 or 1125.¹¹⁹ His student John of Salisbury tells us that he taught in the manner of Bernard of Chartres and that he had to withdraw from the schools because his students left him for other disciplines and for teachers who promised greater success with shorter studies.¹²⁰ It is a fate like the one that Stefan of Novara feared and William of Champeaux suffered. William of Conches left the schools and consoled himself with a position as tutor to the young Plantagenet prince and future king Henry II of England. He had written his work *Philosophia mundi* under the influence of the *Timaeus* for use in the schools; he now rewrote it in dialogue form for the education of the prince and gave it the title *Dragmaticon*. It was probably William who composed the work *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, which has stood in the center of the discussion of a "ritterliches Tugendsystem." The intended audience of this work is uncertain. It is dedicated to a "vir optimus atque liberalis Henricus," who may be Henry II.¹²¹ The work is located, like William himself and like the old learning itself, between schools

¹¹⁹ On William of Conche's career, see Jauneau, *Glosae super Platonem* (above, n. 52), p. 9ff.; Max Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, vol. III, *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, 9, 2, 3 (1931; rpt. 1973), p. 215ff. Bradford Wilson in his edition, *Guillaume de Conches, Glosae in Iuvenalem*, *Textes philosophiques du moyen âge*, 18 (1980), p. 75ff.

¹²⁰ "... impetu multitudinis imperite victi, cesserunt." *Metalogicon* I, 24, ed. Webb, p. 58. Throughout his *Philosophia mundi* William's defensive posture is apparent; he was threatened with the loss of his students. Cf. his attack on teachers who fawn on students and on students who pass judgment of their masters (*Phil. mundi* IV, Prol., ed. Maurach, p. 88). Also his statement that he cares not for the multitude, but only for the probity and love of truth of the few (II, Prol., p. 41). John's notice about William's and Richard's "retirement" makes a comment by William appear especially poignant: he says that the true teacher teaches out of love of learning, not an urge for popularity, "nec, si deficiat multitudo socioiorum, deficiet [alt. desinet]..." (IV, 30, p. 114). Undoubtedly trends at the schools, new professors offering dialectic and short periods of study, cost William his students, not the attack of William of St. Thierry, as Wilson (above, n. 119, p. 76) suggests.

¹²¹ The editor of the *Moralium dogma*, John Holmberg, takes this to be Henry II (*Das Moraliun dogma philosophorum des Guillaume de Conches: Lateinisch, Altfranzösisch, Mittelniederfränkisch* [1929], p. 6f.) Manitius disagrees (*Gesch. lat. Lit.*, vol. III, p. 219).

and secular courts. But the example of William is especially significant, because his activity for worldly courts followed upon his "retirement" from teaching at schools. The new developments in the schools of France and the drift towards dialectic forced this humanist schoolmaster to transfer his pedagogy, oriented to the Platonic view of man and the world and to ancient Roman ethics, to a secular court, one which by no coincidence was to be closely associated with the rise of courtly literature.

Brun of Cologne was exemplary for the shift of court education from the chapel to the cathedral schools in the tenth century, William of Conches for its return to the courts in the twelfth.¹²²

Two examples of the old learning in the setting of the court will show us some of the ties between *cultus virtutum* and courtly education.

Thomas Becket took up a position at the court of Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury after returning from his studies in Paris. Here he worked together with many men distinguished for their learning, William Fitzstephen tells us, and while Thomas was not their equal in letters, he surpassed them all in, as Fitzstephen puts it, the far superior endeavor of *mores*. He applied himself to *moralitas* and *prudentia*, and distinguished himself in this study: "litteris adhuc inferior, moribus conspectior et acceptior..."¹²³ Fitzstephen describes his character and appearance as follows:

He was of a placid and beautiful countenance, noble in stature, his nose long and straight, his body vigorous and adept; he was skilled in eloquence, subtle in mind, great in soul, and because he tread the path of virtue in a higher sense, he showed himself amiable to all men... generous and witty [or sophisticated or courtly: *facetus*]... (ch. 7, p. 17)

Upon his promotion to chancellor of England, he maintained a household that rivalled that of the king for pomp and magnificence. He loved and excelled in courtly games, especially chess, also the hunt with dogs and falcons. He gave splendid banquets where richly clothed guests ate from gold plates and drank from gold goblets. In the next chapter the biographer tells us that Becket, rich, popular, famous, and burdened with the business of state, takes over the duties of court tutor. The king places his own son and heir, Henry, in his hands, and many princes of the land entrust their sons to his care. He prepares them for knightng.¹²⁴

¹²² Another instructive example is William of Champeaux. Forced from Paris, he founded the school at St. Victor, where a later master, Hugh, was to write important educational tracts presenting the ethical views of old learning. But this path was a dead end. The future of a classically oriented ethics was at the courts, not in the church.

¹²³ *Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. J. C. Robertson, Rolls Series, 67, 3 (1877), p. 16 (William Fitzstephen, *Vita S. Thomae* V).

¹²⁴ XII, p. 22: "Cancellario et regni Angliae et regnorum vicinorum magnates liberos suos servituros mittebant, quos ipse honesta nutritura et doctrina instituit, et cingulo donatos militiae ad patres... remittebat... Rex ipse, dominus suus, filium suum... ei nutriendum commendavit..."

This biography shows us a man who becomes a master of *mores* and *moralitas* in the schools of London, Paris and Canterbury then turning into an educator in *mores* at court. The moral instruction of the schools transfers comfortably to the courts; the *moralitas* of the educated cleric prepares its possessor as an educator of princes or knights. Here we see also the successful courtier/administrator as educator. Even in the highest state office next to the king, burdened with work, Becket becomes tutor to the children of nobles. Of course we must not imagine him holding classes in grammar, dialectic and the classics.¹²⁵ Letters were not his strong point; *mores* were. His "students" served him ("servituros mittebant"), watched him in action, probably received an occasional tip in comportment, possibly learned Latin names for strategies of political/social behavior, which they learned to regard as the functioning of "virtue." The busy chancellor had little time to instruct *verbo* but instruction *exemplo*, through the *lingua morum*, was what counted. Becket presided over this "court school" by his authority, leaving the *labor* to others. In his role at court he was the perfect embodiment of what the old learning aimed at.

Nothing in the text states outright that the *moralitas* Becket pursued as a young clerk at Canterbury had anything in common with the education he gave to aspiring knights as chancellor of the king and court tutor, that *moralitas* and *curialitas* had approximately the same content by this time.¹²⁶ But our second example makes the connection clear.

Gottfried von Strassburg's romance *Tristan and Isold* is the highpoint of literary humanism in medieval Germany. The author includes a scene that is a mirror of courtly education. After Tristan, disguised as a minstrel at the Irish court, is nursed back to health from a poisoned wound, he takes over the task of educating princess Isold from her previous tutor, a learned courtly cleric. This scene deserves a prominent place in the history of medieval education. The princess, already instructed in foreign languages, music and composition, learns various kinds of disciplines from him, but she devotes most of her attention to the one called *moraliteit*:

under aller dirre lere
gab er ir eine unmuëzekeit,
die heizen wir moraliteit.
diu kunst diu leret schoene site.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ It is not out of the question that such instruction took place at the court, however. William Fitzstephen tells us that Becket as chancellor had fifty-two clerics in his service, most of whom were attached to his household staff. *Vita Thomae* XVIII, p. 29.

¹²⁶ However Matthew Paris (mid-thirteenth century) tells that the king sent his son to Becket "to be instructed in manners and courtly ways." *Historia Anglorum* (*Historia minor*), ed. F. Madden, Rolls Series, 44, 1 (1866), p. 316: "rex filium suum... beato Thomae cancellario commisit alendum, et moribus et curialitatibus informandum."

¹²⁷ Gottfried von Strassburg, *Tristan und Isold*, ed. F. Ranke, 11th ed. (1967), ll. 8002–5.

All women, he continues, should occupy themselves with this "sweet discipline" from youth on. It teaches them to please God and the world, and without it they will attain neither wealth nor honor. The results of this instruction for Isold:

hie von so wart si wol gesite,
schone unde reine gemuot,
ir gebaerde süeze unde guot. (8024–26)

In the six months of her instruction she improved her "learning and comportment" (*lere unde gebare*) to such an extent that the fame of her talents spread throughout the land. When guests come to court she entertains them with her arts: she sings, writes and reads. Then follows a dazzling description of the "double" beauty of her singing: she not only performs a masterpiece, she herself is one; the audible beauty of her song is matched by her "unheard" song, the visible beauty of her person. The passage is one of the most sublime statements of the human presence as a work of art from the Middle Ages and beyond. There follows a final summary of the results of this education: Tristan's instruction gave her "sweetness of mind" (*suoze gemuot*), lent charm to her manner and her bearing. She mastered all kinds of courtly games and pastimes, could compose letters¹²⁸ and songs (cf. 8132ff.).

It is immediately evident against the background of our previous discussion that Gottfried speaks the language of the *cultus virtutum*. Many of his terms and his turns of thought translate easily into that vocabulary: *moraliteit* is the art that teaches *schoene site*; "moralitas est ars quae morum elegantiam docet."¹²⁹ *Lere unde gebare*, which Gottfried also varies as *rede unde gebare*, comes close to *litterae et mores*. Isold learns many arts, but the one to which she devotes most attention is *moraliteit*. Like John of Salisbury Gottfried sets *moralitas* as the highest goal of learning. The princess receives from this discipline beauty of mind or temperament (*schone gemuot*, *süeze gemuot*; cf. *decor animae*, *compositio morum* or *mentis*), and both references to this "well-tempered" quality are followed by the statement that her manners and her comportment, her gestures and bearing were pleasing and charming. The implica-

¹²⁸ In the three translations I consulted (Hatto, von Ertzdorff, Krohn) Gottfried's phrase *brieve und schanzune* (8139) is rendered as some variation of "words and songs," though neither Gottfried's usage nor any other Middle High German citation in the standard lexica justifies translating *brieve* with "song text." Gottfried's meaning is clear when we read this scene as a "mirror of courtly education": she composed letters and songs. Translating *brieve* as lyrics was the translators' means of preserving the sanctity of her artistry which would appear diminished to modern sensibilities by combining her role of siren with that of secretary. But that is what Gottfried intended: to juxtapose administrative tasks and courtly pastimes, *otium* and *negotium*.

¹²⁹ See my article, "Beauty of Manners and Discipline (*schöne site*, *zuht*): An Imperial Tradition of Courtliness in the German Romance," in *Barocker Lust-Spiegel: Festschrift für Blake Lee Spahr* (1984), 27–46.

tion is that her pleasant gestures are a result of her spiritual beauty; elegant bearing expresses inner harmony.¹³⁰

But what we observed first as an ethical ideal taught to aspiring worldly clerics at cathedral schools recurs here as an education in courtliness aimed at princesses and other noble ladies. Far from representing a contradiction, however, this simply shows us in a clear light what had been a feature of the old learning since its emergence in the eleventh century: that it is a preparation for court life and court service, both worldly and ecclesiastical. Here that education has shed all its religious trappings and shows the educational goal – refinement of mind and manners – as a means to wealth, honor, and reputation at court, as a prerequisite to administrative skills (reading and writing letters) and court entertainments (games, music, composing). The only remaining trace of a religious orientation of *moralitas* is the observation that it is pleasing to God and the world. But in Gottfried's romance the emphasis is decidedly on "world".

In the second half of the twelfth century a single master at the schools could still produce a grand *summa* of the old learning, the *Anticlaudianus*. But from the mid-century on the cult of virtues registers largely in works from the courtly milieu: tracts on the education of princes, nobles and noble children like Gerald of Wales' *De principis instructione* and Thomasin von Zirclaere's *Der welsche Gast*. Vincent of Beauvais' *De eruditione filiorum nobilium* is a particularly rich summation of this learning and the virtues it sought to cultivate. Vincent still preserves the basic formula of that education: "... litterarum erudicioni morum eciam instructio copulanda es..."¹³¹ and his ethical vocabulary and concepts, though richer, still draw from the old learning and the authorities who formulated it.¹³²

The renaissance of the fifteenth century experiences the rebirth of an education based on the ethical formation of man according to classical models. In reading the humanist tracts on education that W. H. Woodward has edited and translated, we encounter vocabulary and concepts familiar to us from the humanism of the eleventh and twelfth centuries: *moralitas* and *ethica* are the most important disciplines; they are "learned" by imitation of classical models

¹³⁰ Gottfried shows his familiarity with the notion of *decor* in a number of passages. Cf. *Origins of Courtliness*, p. 148f.

¹³¹ Vincent of Beauvais, *De eruditione filiorum nobilium* XXIII, ed. A. Steiner, Mediaeval Academy of America Publication, 32 (1938), p. 78. Also LXIII, p. 176: "... congruum est, ut litteris imbuantur et moribus instruuntur..."

¹³² Cf. his discussion of the "two-fold discipline" of *moralis compositio*. It has an inner and an outer aspect, the inner consisting in the cultivation of virtue, the outer "in decenti compositione membrorum," involving "membrorum omnium motus ordinatus et dispositio decens in omni habitu et actione." His best source is Hugh of St. Victor, whose *De institutione novitiorum* he quotes at great length. *De eruditione* XXXI, p. 117ff. On Vincent as an informant on courtly ideals, see Rosemary Combridge, "Ladies, Queens and Decorum," *Reading Medieval Studies*, 1 (1975), 71–83.

and of the teacher; Philosophy is identified with the pursuit of virtue, and "school" subjects are subordinated to that pursuit.¹³³ Humanist education gradually moved from the courts back to the universities. In Tudor England the abolition of Catholicism rendered the dominant curriculum of canon law unimportant at the English universities and created a great space in which humanist courtier administrators could restructure university education on humanist principles.¹³⁴ When Sir Humphrey Gilbert designed an academy for courtier/statesmen for the Elizabethan government, he provided for a Reader of Moral Philosophy (he is to receive 100 pounds yearly salary; the reader in natural philosophy receives only 40), who "... shall teach civill policy and warres. By directing the Lectures to thendes afforesaid, men shall be taught more witt and policy than Schole learninges can deliver... the greatest Schole clarks are not always the wisest men."¹³⁵ And the formula "letters and manners" once again looms large. Castiglione writes in the *Libro del Cortegiano*: "good masters teach children not only letters, but also good and seemly manners in eating, drinking, speaking and walking, with appropriate gestures."¹³⁶

Conclusion

There is much to be said on the growth and spread of humanist learning. Here I have only been able to characterize it. I hope to have indicated where in the previous centuries the roots of twelfth century humanism lie. The immediate social and intellectual context of the works we traditionally associate with that direction in twelfth century culture – Bernard Silvester's *Cosmographia* and *Aeneid* commentary, John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* and *Policraticus*, Alan's *Anticlaudian* – is the *cultus virtutum* of the cathedral schools and its application in administrative service. The old learning flowed into and extensively informed these writings, and an acquaintance with its content and goals teaches us to regard those works as the last flowering of a movement, based on the alliance of

¹³³ W. H. Woodward, *Vittorino de Feltre and Other Humanist Educators*, Classics in Education, 18 (1897; rpt. 1963), p. 221: "It is a marked characteristic of Humanism to limit Philosophy, as a serious study, to Ethics, to the entire exclusion of Metaphysic." See also his *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance 1400–1600* (1924).

¹³⁴ See Joan Simon, *Education and Society in Tudor England* (1966), and J. H. Hexter, "The Education of the Aristocracy in the Renaissance," in his *Reappraisals in History* (1962), pp. 45–70. On Humanist influence and the role of ethics in the founding of University of Vienna, see Jan-Dirk Müller, *Gedechtnus: Literatur und Hofgesellschaft um Maximilian I.*, Forschungen zur Geschichte der älteren deutschen Literatur, 2 (1982), p. 43ff.

¹³⁵ Sir Humphrey Gilbert, *Queene Elizabeths Achademy*, ed. F. J. Furnivall, EETS, Extra Ser., 8 (1849), p. 3.

¹³⁶ Cf. Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier* IV, 12, trans. Charles Singleton, (1959), p. 297.

school and court, learning and government, that preceded them by some two hundred years. The most impressive *written* testimony to humanism surfaced well after the establishment of humanist learning in the courts and cathedrals, the administrative centers of Europe. But the same is true of humanism in ancient Rome and in fifteenth century Italy: its ideals were formulated in the active civil life first, then in written testimony.

The continuity of secular learning in the period 950–1150 is not to be sought in texts and artifacts, but in personalities and the cultivation of personal qualities. Our notions of humanism and humanistic education remain one-sided and lifeless as long as we insist on separating the learning of the period from the lives of its educated statesmen. That is a difficult fact for the historian of literature and culture to deal with. We interpret texts and comment on artifacts, and when we look at the eleventh and twelfth centuries we can still read the works of Abelard and John of Salisbury, and we can still see the sculpture and architecture of the early Gothic. But the ideal of the statesman and the education that formed him are no longer visible. The ideal was as perishable as the men who embodied it, and it died with them, like a dance or a stage performance. And now we can only catch glimpses of its shaping ideals of humanity, deference and elegant comportment in the writings of the schools and courts, and we can find them, sublimated, in the figure of the chivalric knight of courtly romance.

Gottfried von Strassburg and the School-Tradition

By ROBERT GLENDINNING (Winnipeg)

ABSTRACT

Für Gottfrieds *Tristan* wird eine bisher unbeachtete, von rhetorischer Schulpraxis bedingte Stilebene und Sinnggebung nachgewiesen. Die Feststellung einer unmittelbaren Verbindung des *Tristan* zur erotisch-antithetischen rhetorischen Lehre des Matthäus von Vendôme und zu dessen Schüler-Gedicht "Pyramus und Thisbe" führt zur Freilegung eines "niederen Zugangs" zum Epos.

In both style and sense Gottfried's *Tristan* is shown to be more closely related to the school-rhetoric of his time than previously recognized. The demonstration of a direct link between *Tristan* and both the antithetical-erotic rhetorical treatise and the school-poem "Pyramus and Thisbe" of Matthew of Vendôme opens a "low road" to our understanding of the epic.

A review of modern *Tristan*-scholarship leads us to the conclusion that although we have made considerable progress in understanding particular aspects and dimensions of the poem since Friedrich Ranke's epoch-making publications in 1925,¹ we are still as distant as ever from a consensus as to even the broad outlines of a total interpretation of the work. This has not been due to its richness and complexity alone, but to the fact, as Schwietering realized in 1940,² that paradox and contradiction are at the heart of the work itself. The older scholarly attempts to understand the poem as a whole tend to fall into opposing camps, depending on their more negative or more positive assessment of *Tristanminne*. The outer extreme of the former is represented by Gottfried Weber,³ for whom *Tristanminne* is spiritual ruin. The extreme in the other direction is the interpretation of Bodo Mergell,⁴ for whom *Tristanminne* is a way to salvation.

¹ Friedrich Ranke, *Tristan und Isolde* (1925); *Die Allegorie der Minnegrotte in Gottfrieds Tristan*, Schr. d. Königsberger Gel. Ges. 2, geisteswiss. Kl. 2 (1925; rpt. in Friedrich Ranke, *Kleinere Schriften* [1971], pp. 13–30, and in *Gottfried von Straßburg*, ed. Alois Wolf [1973], pp. 1–24).

² Julius Schwietering, *Der Tristan Gottfrieds von Straßburg und die Bernhardinische Mystik*, Abh. d. Preuß. Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl. 5 (1943; rpt. in Julius Schwietering, *Mystik und höfische Dichtung im Hochmittelalter*, 2nd ed. [1962], pp. 1–35, and in Julius Schwietering, *Philologische Schriften* [1969], pp. 338–61).

³ Gottfried Weber, *Gottfrieds von Straßburg "Tristan" und die Krise des hochmittelalterlichen Weltbildes um 1200*, 2 vols. (1953).

⁴ Bodo Mergell, *Tristan und Isolde: Ursprung und Entwicklung der Tristansage des Mittelalters* (1949).